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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Founded in 1922 by Socialist who already exerted 
considerable influence in the Chilean trade union movement, 
the Chilean Communist Party was a communist party in name 
only during its early years. It was not until the later 
1920s that it began to acquire the organisational forms 
and practices characteristic of all members of the Third 
Communist International and not until the early 1930s that 
it was led by men who gave unquestioning allegiance to 
Moscow. Reduced to a shadow of its former self by prolonged 
persecution in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the party's 
fortunes did not begin to revive until after 1935, when the 
Third International adopted policies which encouraged it to 
become a regular participant in Chilean coalition politics. 
Between 1935 and 1947, the party's fortunes fluctuated some- 
what in accordance with changing national and international 
circumstances but coalition politics enabled it to play im- 
portant roles in the election of three successive Presidents 
of the Republic, to extend its appeal to wider sectors of 
society, to expand its electoral and trade union support and, 
indirectly, to lay the basis for an increasingly effective 
and professional party machine. In 1946, the party became 
the first Latin American Communist Party to hold designated 
portfolios in cabinet but its experience of high government 
office was cut short by Cold War pressures - pressures which 
eventually forced the party into a period of clandestinity 
which lasted from 1947 until 1958. 
This, then, is the broad chronological sweep of this 
study. Within its context, particular attention is paid to 
the party's relations with the International Communist Move- 
ment, to its links with organised labour, to its organisational 
development, to its electoral support and to its changing 
relations with other Chilean parties. 
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PREFACE 
Perhaps, in recent years, the Chilean Communist 
Party has become best known for the role it played in the 
election and government of the ill-fated President Salvador 
Allende (1970-1973). Yet, in fact, the Chilean Communist 
Party had been a force of some significance in Chilean 
politics for many years and, until the Cuban Revolution, 
could lay claim to being the most successful Communist 
Party in Latin America. No other Latin American Communist 
Party achieved such close links with organised labour, no 
other party had similar electoral appeal and no other 
party had the degree of acceptance and respectability which 
the Chilean party enjoyed. Despite this, the Chilean Com- 
munist Party has not been the subject of much systematic 
study by either foreign or Chilean scholars and this work is 
an attempt to remedy that neglect for the years 1922-1947. 
During those years, the PCCh developed its more striking 
characteristics both as an organisation and as an actor 
in the Chilean political process and it was during those 
years that it moved from the margins into the mainstream of 
Chilean political life. 
This study is based primarily on the newspaper and 
pamphlet literature of the time, not only of the party it- 
self but of all groups which had some part in the develop- 
ment of events. Use has also been made of archival material 
. iv . 
from the Foreign Office in London and from the Direcci&n 
General del Trabajo in Santiago. The Chilean Communist 
Party was in the process of collecting material for the 
Museo Recabarren when this author was in Santiago but that 
collection only yielded a few items which were not avail- 
able in public and private libraries elsewhere. 
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.1. 
Chapter 1 The Origins and Foundation of 
the Chilean Communist Party 
.2. 
The roots of the Partido Comunista de Chile(PCCh) 
and of the modern Chilean working class movement lie in the 
economic, social and political changes which that country 
experienced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 
Like its neighbours, Chile had emerged from its 
struggle for independence from Spain impoverished and 
plagued by civil war. After 1830, however, Chile enjoyed 
a prolonged period of relatively peaceful and orderly 
development -a striking contrast to the bloody turbulence 
which continued to afflict most other Latin American 
Republics. Chile owed much of its good fortune in this 
matter to those geographic, economic and social peculiarities 
which gave the country a greater degree of cohesion than was 
usual on the continent. Thus, despite Chile's rugged and 
difficult terrain, the vast majority of its inhabitants 
lived in one distinctive area - the 700 mile long Central 
Valley which lies between the Andes Mountains and the coastal 
ranges. This concentration of population, together with the 
country's narrowness (never more than one hundred miles 
wide) and its lengthy coastline meant that central govern- 
ment, based in the capital city of Santiago, had good land 
and sea communications with other population centres which 
made the task of governing a relatively easy matter. (l) 
(1) See Harold Blakemore and Clifford T. Smith, Latin 
Americas Geographical Perspectives (London, 1971 
pp 75-5 5, for a more detailed geographical appreci- 
ation of Chile. 
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Similarly, the vast majority of Chileans were engaged upon 
one economic activity, agriculture, and experienced one 
form of social organisation, the fundo or great estate. 
The dominance of agriculture based on the fundo provided 
cohesion in two directions. Firstly, the (undo owner or 
hacendado had a paternalistic and almost feudal attitude 
towards his work force and their close relationship tended 
to forge strong bonds of loyalty between classes. Secondly, 
the hacendados, who constituted Chile's ruling elite, tended 
to share the economic preoccupations and the social attitudes 
of their rivals for political power. (2) Finally, Chile 
was relatively homogeneous in racial terms. Negroes had 
never been imported in large numbers and the Indians, by the 
early nineteenth century, had been submerged by miecegena- 
tion, driven out of the Central Valley or exterminated. (3) 
Thus, two racial groups dominated, the mestizo and the white 
and since the latter constituted a numerous minority, not 
all of whom were wealthy, the sharp coincidence between 
social type and economic class which so embittered political 
conflict elsewhere in Latin America did not prevail to the 
same extent in Chile. 
These factors, however, did not make Chile entirely 
immune from the sort of conflicts which all Latin American 
countries experienced in the decades after independence. 
Chile had its caudillos, it experienced the pulls of a 
(2) G. 1. MaBride's Chiles Land and Society (New York, 
1936) provides the classic study of the importance 
of the latifundia to Chile's development. 
(3) Francisco Encina and Leopoldo Castedo Resumen de la 
Historia de Chile (3 vols., Santiago, 1961) i. p3 1. 
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regionalism reluctant to accept rule from Santiago and 
suffered from civil wars as Federalist and Centralist, 
Liberal and Conservative battled for power. (4) Nonethe- 
less, its underlying cohesion meant that the gulfs which 
separated rival groups in Chile were rather less deep and 
less bitter than in most Latin American countries. 
The period of sustained and more or less peaceful 
development which Chile experienced after 1830 was not 
altogether the product of fortuitous and impersonal circum- 
stance. Chile owed much to human ingenuity and, in particular, 
to the skill and foresight of the wen who framed the 1833 
Constitution and created the system which channeled Chile's 
political development for almost a century. In 1830, at the 
Battle of Lircay, the more conservative and centralist forces 
in Chilean politics, the peluconos, defeated their more 
liberal and democratic opponents, the pipiolos, and brought 
to an end a seven year period of intermittent civil war 
known as La Anarguia. One faction of the pelucones, led by 
Diego Portales, managed to impose its criterion on the 1833 
Constitution. Portales and his friends perceived that 
lasting peace and statllity could only be restored to Chile 
by re-establishing harmony between the three principal pillars 
of Chilean society - the landed aristocracy, the Church and 
the Army - and by recreating the firm, authoritarian 
government which Chile had experienced as a colony. (4) 
(4) See Simon Collier Ideas and Politics of Chilean 
Independence 1808-1833 Cambridge, 1967) for a 
detailed account of struggles during the Indepen- 
dence period. 
(5) Julio Heise GonzalezI Historia Constitucional do 
Chile (Santiago, 1950) pp 7-50. 
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They restored the privileges and properties which previous 
'democratic' regimes had confiscated from the landed aristo- 
crats and the Church and curbed the Army through reorganisa- 
tion and the creation of a civilian militia. In the 1833 
Constitution, they instituted a quasi-monarchical form of 
government suitably adapted to the then current republican 
and constitutional norms. Thus, while the principle of the 
separation of powers was recognised, almost total power was 
invested in the office of the President of the Republic 
while a primarily consultative role was envisaged for the 
bi-cameral legislature. By severely limiting the franchise 
and by instituting indirect elections for the Presidency, 
Portales and his friends ensured that control remained 
firmly in the hands of the landed aristocracy. However, 
despite the deliberate attempt to limit popular participation 
in the political process, the 1833 Constitution was not un- 
enlightened. Education, for example, was made the responsi- 
bility of the state and, more important still, steps were 
taken to ensure that the Presidency did not degenerate from 
an institutional to a personal dictatorship. Presidents were 
not permitted to serve more than two consecutive terms and 
Congress, which the Presidents could not dissolve, was given 
limited powers over finance and the Armed Forces. In sum, 
the 1833 Constitution had the merits of recognising and bes- 
towing legitimacy upon existing power relationships in 
Chilean society and of providing an acceptable framework 
within which rival groups could compete for political power 
in a relatively peaceful manner. 
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Under the aegis of the 1833 Constitution, Chile 
experienced the peace and stability necessary for sustained 
economic growth. In the middle decades of the nineteenth 
century, mining and agricultural resources were developod; 
banking and commerce began to flourish. With economic 
growth came social change; new elites emerged whose wealth 
was not based primarily on land but on banking and commerce; 
new middle sectors - professional men, functionaries and 
businessmen - appeared in response to the demands of an 
increasingly complex economy and, at the lower end of the 
social scale, a new urban artisan class began to form. 
However, mid-century economic and social change was not on 
a sufficiently large scale to generate new forces willing 
and able to challenge the traditional ruling class for 
power. Indeed, the landed aristocracy showed considerable 
flexibility in absorbing the new mining and commercial 
elites and political divisions, far from being re-drawn on 
the basis of class or socio-economic policy, continued to 
revolve around constitutional and religious issues. 
Two issues in particular dominated nineteenth 
century politics in Chile - presidential authoritarianism 
and the powers and privileges of the Church. These issues, 
together with the intense personal rivalries between those 
who wished to become President of the Republic, lay behind 
the emergence of a series of loosely-knit political parties 
in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1840s, some pelucones, 
thwarted in their efforts to secure the presidency for one 
of their number, joined with the remnants of the pip solos 
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to form the Partido Liboral(PL) which pressed for curbs on 
presidential powers and greater public 
liberties. Later, 
an administration hostile to the Church caused 
the pelucones 
to split again, producing two parties; the Parte o 
Conservador(PC), which defended the Church's position, and 
the Partido Nacional(PN), which took the government's side. 
Finally, in the 18603ß the left wing of the PLC more mili- 
tant in its anti-clericalism and its defence of public 
liberties than the main body of Liberals, broke away to 
form the Partido Radical(PR). (6) 
If mid-century economic and social change played a 
minor role in the emergence of these parties, over the years 
they did become associated with particular sectors of the 
ruling class. The PL, for example, drew its support from 
the less devout hacendados and the newer elites; the PC 
became the voice of the traditionalist Catholic landowners 
while the PH represented secular-minded landowners, state 
functionaries and progressive businessmen. The PR was, 
perhaps, the clearest manifestation of mid-century economic 
and social change since it drew its leadership and inspira- 
tion from the new mining elites. 
The issue of presidential authoritarianism was not 
only a catalyst in the formation of political parties but 
a significant factor in Chile's constitutional development. 
(6) Standard works on the development of Chilean poli- 
tical parties include Alberto Edwards and Eduardo 
Frei, Historia de los partidos olfticos chilenos 
(Santiago, 1949); lien Leon Echaiz, Evoluci n de log 
artidos politicos chilenos (Santiago, 2nd ed., 1971)- 
See also Germ fin Urz a Valenzuela, Los partidos 
politicos chilenos (Santia-o, 1968r 
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Conflict between the executive and legislative arms of 
government, each intent on expanding or defending its pre- 
rogatives, characterised Chile's constitutional history in 
the nineteenth century - much in the same way, according to 
one famous Chilean writer, that King and Parliament wrestled 
for power in seventeenth century England. () Indeed, the 
balance of power between President and Congress is often 
used to distinguish periods in Chile's development. Thus, 
the Autocratic Republic, generally dated from 1833 to 1861, 
saw presidential power little troubled by congressional inter- 
ference while during the Liberal Republic which followed, 
constitutional reforms were passed which converted Congress 
into a strong and independent body. So strong that, by the 
1880s, Congress could make governing an arduous task for any 
president who incurred its hostility. In the late 1880s, 
President Balmaceda found himself in precisely that position 
although, ironically enough, as a congressman he had been 
in the forefront of the battle to curb presidential power. 
In the face of congressional obstructionism, Balmaceda tried 
to rule without Congress altogether, an action which pre- 
cipitated the 1891 Revolution - and his own downfall. (8) 
The 1891 Revobtion is usually taken to mark the 
beginning of the final stage of Chile's development under 
(7) See Alberto Edwards La Fronda Aristocrätica 
(Santiago, 1936). 
(8) For contrasting views on the contentious subject 
of the origins of the 1891 Revolution, see Harold 
Blakemore British Nitrates and Chilean Politics 
1886-1896 (London, 197 and Iiernan Ram rez 
Necochea Balmaceda y la Contrarevoluc16n de 1891 
(Santiago, 3rd edn., 1972). 
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the 1833 Constitution - the so-called Parliamentary Republic. 
As its name might suggest, the Parliamentary Republic saw 
the ascendency of the legislature over the executive arm of 
government. Emboldened by its victory in the 1891 Revolution, 
Congress began to use the powers it had won under the Liberal 
Republic with an increasing frequency and, according to some 
critics, with a decreasing sense of responsibility. Minis- 
terial instability, caused by the use of the congressional 
faculty to censure and remove ministers from office, and the 
interference of Congress in the most minute details of pub- 
lic administration, in a manner inimical to efficiency and 
dispatch, became striking features of the Parliamentary Re- 
public. Increasingly, Presidents found themselves in need of 
a working majority in Congress to perform the most routine 
tasks of government. Presidents still possessed the means 
to influence Congress - through control over state patronage 
and the ability to influence election results - but the 
loose structure of the political parties and their suscepti- 
bility to fierce internal conflicts and fragmentation made 
the task of constructing a stable congressional majority one 
which often eluded the most astute of presidents. Inevit- 
ably, the Parliamentary Republic came to be associated with 
weak, uncertain and corrupt governments incapable of meeting 
the challenge of economic and social change. (9) While 
this reputation may well have been undeserved, it led 
(9ý See Ricardo Donoso Alessandri, agitador demoledor 
(2 vols. : -Mexico City, 1952) i, pp178-191 for a use- 
ful survey of contemporary critical opinion of the 
Parliamentary Republic. 
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broad sectors of Chileans to believe that something had 
to be done to purge and reform the political system in the 
early twentieth century. (10) 
The major cause of the rapid social and economic 
change which Chile experienced in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century can be found in Chile's victory in 
the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). By defeating Peru and 
Bolivia, Chile acquired the rich nitrate deposits of 
Tarapacä and Antofagasta. Nitrates swiftly became Chile's 
most important export industry and the key factor in a 
general economic expansion which brought profound social 
changes. The nitrate industry stimulated the development 
of ancillary industries and services to satisfy its own 
needs and contributed to an expansion of the internal market 
by paying wages to large numbers of workers. The industry 
had an even greater impact on the economy through the role 
it came to play in government finances. Taxes levied on the 
exports of nitrates rapidly became the most important single 
source of revenue for the statu and between 1880 and 1920, 
governments obtained an average of 43% of their total annual 
income from this sourcee(11) Moreover, since the industry 
rapidly fell under the control of foreign investors, the 
bulk of Chile's share of its most important export industry 
(10) See Julio Heise CTonzälez Hi5toria de Chiles El 
Periodo Parliamentario, 1861-1925 (Santiago, 1974) 
Part 5, for an interesting defence of the record of 
the Parliamentary Republic. 
(11) Hernän Ramirez Necochea op cit, p14. 
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was received in the form of these taxes. Thus, the integra- 
tion of the nitrate industry into the economy initiated a 
complex process. Government spending and not private invest- 
ment became the principal motor of economic growth and the 
government's capacity to spend was directly tied to the 
prosperity of the nitrate industry which, in its turn, was 
subject to the vagaries of world demand. In sum, the whole 
economy became hostage to the fortunes of this single indus- 
try. (12) The social consequence of the economic growth 
promoted directly, or indirectly, by the nitrate industry 
was great. Middle sectors of Chilean society - professional 
men, commercial and government functionaries, businessmen, 
small industrialists and manufacturers - expanded to meet 
the demands of the economy. Perhaps more striking still, 
the processes of internal migration were stimulated and an 
urban proletariat was created. Farm workers, deprived of 
their traditional occupation by a decline in agriculture and 
attracted by the prospect of higher wages and better opportu- 
nities* flocked to the major cities and the new productive zones 
in the north and the south of the country. By 1907,43% of all 
Chileans lived in towns as compared with 27% in 1875. (13) 
During almost the same period, the population of the nitrate 
provinces more than trebled and the coalmining and manu- 
facturing zone around Concepcidn in the south experienced 
(12) See Anibal Pinto, ed. Chile, Hoy (Santiago, 1970) 
pp9-16, for a brief but clear discussion of the 
impact of the nitrate industry on the economy. (13) Julio Cesar Jobet Enaa o Critico del desarrollo eco- 
n6mico social do Chile Santiago, 1955) ppl32-133. 
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a similar increase. (14) By 1910, some 50,000 workers 
were employed in the nitrate fields, 10,000 in the coal 
mines, 17,000 on the railways and 71,000 in manufacturing 
industries. (15) 
With the concentration of large numbers of workers 
in working and living conditions which were often harsh and 
very different from those to which the worker had been ac- 
customed in the countryside, a strong sense of class iden- 
tity and consciousness began to develop. For the first time 
the worker was exposed to the regimentation of industrial 
life and dependent on wages for his daily survival; any 
illusion which the migrant may have brought from the fundo 
concerning a community of interest between employer and em- 
ployee was swiftly eroded. Indeed, as an increasing number 
of workers were becoming dependent on wages, Chile itself 
was affected by a slow but persistent inflation. The value 
of the peso fell by two-thirds between 1880 and 1910 while, 
according to another source, the real cost of consumer 
articles increased fourfold between 1891 and 1908. (16) 
It was, perhaps, this inflationary pressure as much as the 
different working and living conditions which the migrant 
worker experienced which helped to develop class conscious- 
ness - and which led to the creation of organisations 
specifically designed to defend the interests of the working 
(14) Enrique Reyes El Desarrollo do In Con dencia 
Proletaria (Santiago, 1973)t ppa -3 " (15) Jorge flarrfa Seren Los inovimientos sociales de 
principios del sip lo XX Inerooria, Univereidad de 
Chile, 1953) pp10_13. 
(16) Ibid. p18: Julio Cesar Jobet opcit p. 134. 
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classes. 
Perhaps nowhere is the process of the formation of 
working class consciousness better seen than in the nitrate 
provinces of Antofagasta and Tarapacä. There, large numbers 
of workers, often recruited by unscrupulous means, were 
herded together in poorly constructed camps in the hostile 
isolation of the Atacama desert. Lacking in the most rudi- 
mentary amenities, the camps were the private kingdoms of 
the nitrate companies. The compp6ny store provided the worker 
with the necessities of life at its own prices and convenience 
while the company police controlled access to and departure 
from the camp and maintained order and discipline - sometimes 
in a brutal and arbitrary fashion. The truck system, poor 
water, the absence of civil rights, the lack of schools and 
impartial justice, the open toleration of prostitution, 
gambling and illegal distilling of liquor, the lack of proper 
medical attention - these were the perennial complaints of 
the nitrate workers. (17) Moreover, living cheek by jowl 
with the nitrate workers was a scattering of administrative 
personnel whose lifestyles, pastimes and often language 
were very different. Small wonder that the nitrate workers 
developed a particularly strong sense of class identity and 
solidarity which was regularly transmitted to other parts 
of Chile when, by necessity or choice, they returned to the 
central and southern provinces. 
(17) See Enrique Reyes, op ccit, pp129-211 for copies of 
the nitrate workers' complaints and the responses 
of government and the employers. 
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The nitrate fields were by no means the only places 
where conditions helped to foster a strong sense of class 
identity. Conditions in the southern coalfields mirrored 
those found in the nitrate provinces while the experiences 
of the migrant worker in the towns tended towards the forma- 
tion of similar attitudes, if in a less intensive form. 
While the development of a clear sense of class 
consciousness had profound significance for the development 
of the working class movement in Chile, the first form of 
worker organisation which that country experienced belonged 
to an earlier stage of 1s development. £id-century economic 
and social change and the creation of an urban artisan class 
produced the first mutualist society in 1853. The rnutualist 
society, which remained the most usual form of worker organisa- 
tion until well into the twentieth century, provided social 
security and educational benefits for its members. Generally, 
it was organised on a trade basis, was not political in a 
partisan sense and was not concerned with fighting employers 
for better pay and conditions. Under the impact of late 
nineteenth century change the mutualist movement grew con- 
siderably and in 1902 created a national organisation, the 
Congreso Social Obrero, which claimed 20,000 members in that 
year. (18) Associated with the mutualist societies were 
the philharmonic and instruction societies which were 
particularly concerned with music and education. 
(18) Jorge Barria Serön pp cit, p67. 
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century, sharpen- 
ing class conflict and the penetration of anarchist ideas 
produced a new form of worker organisation - the resistance 
society - specifically designed to fight for better pay and 
conditions for its members by direct and militant action. 
First founded by railway shop workers in Santiago in 1898, 
the resistance society spread to other groups of workers 
elsewhere in the country - including miners in Lota, port- 
workers in the northern provinces and bakers and seamen in 
Valparafso. (19) Shortly after the first resistance society 
was founded, another form of worker organisation appeared - 
the mancomunal. The mancomunal, which first appeared in 
Iquique in 1900, combined the essential features of both the 
mutualist and the resistance society and was the true pre- 
cursor of the modern Chilean trade union. Associated with 
socialist rather than anarchist influence, mancomunales 
were created in Tocopilla, Taltal, Copiap6, Lota, Coronel 
and Lebu in the years following 1900. However, while the 
resistance society and the mancomunal were influential amongst 
certain sectors of workers, they do not appear to have had 
a long life. A government survey of all forms of worker 
organisation in 1910 reported that of a total of 433 organi- 
sations claiming 59,136 members, only 7 were resistance 
societies while the mancomunal seems to have disappeared 
(19) For general accounts of the working class organisa- 
tions in Chile in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries see Julio Cesar Jobet Aecabarrent 
Los on ones del movimiento obrero del socialismo 
chileno (Santiago, 1955); Alejandro Chelen Rojas 
Trayectoria del Socialismo (Buenos Aires, 1967) and Marcelo Segall Desarrollo del Capitalismo on Chile (Santiago, 1953). 
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altogether. (20) The vast majority of worker organisations 
then, were mutualist, philharmonic and instruction societies. 
One of the major reasons for the relatively short 
life of the resistance society and the mancomunal was their 
involvement in strike actions. The increasing frequency of 
strikes in the first decade of the twentieth century was 
not viewed by the authorities with equanimity and they 
resorted to judicial process and physical repression in an 
effort to crush the more militant type of worker organisa- 
tion and the strikes with which they were ässociated. 
Although most strikes were settled peacefully and quickly 
by direct negotiation between employer and employee without 
government intervention, others dragged on for long periods 
and some ended in bloodshed. Police and Army killed tens 
and sometimes hundreds of workers in strikes in Valparaiso 
(1903), Santiago (1905) and Antofagasta (1906). (21) While 
the strikers themselves sometimes occasioned riots and civil 
disturbances which, to some extent, excused the vigorous 
responses of the authorities no such justification can be 
found for the treatment meted out to strikers in Iquique in 
1907 where government repression reached its climax for that 
decade. There, Army machine-gunn©rs opened fire on a dense 
but peaceful crowd of striking nitrate workers and their 
families gathered in and around the Escuela Santa Maria; 
(20) Jorge Barrfa Ser6n op. cit. p67- 
(21) See Julio Casar Jobet"s Äecabarren ppl14_ll7, for 
a brief account of these strikes. 
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some 2,000 people died, (22) The repression of the Iquique 
strike dealt a physical and moral blow to the Chilean working 
class movement; recovery took several years. 
The established political parties were not unaffected 
by the social developments produced by late nineteenth 
century economic change. In 1901, the PC formally incorpora- 
ted the social christian principles laid down in the papal 
encyclical Rerum Novarum into its ideology; the PL and the 
Partido Liberal Democrätico(PLD), formed by balmacedistas 
after the 1891 Revolution, eventually accepted the idea that 
the state should intervene in the settlement of labour dis- 
putes while, in 1906, the PR proposed that the state should 
play an even larger role in the regulation of class relation- 
ships. (23) While these parties showed varying degrees of 
paternalistic concern for the condition of the new working 
classes, none of them tried to capture their political sup- 
port by adopting programmes specifically designed to meet 
their needs. In political terms the working classes were 
seen as a problem to be solved rather than a force to be 
harnessed. 
The first political party to make a concerted 
attempt to represent and appeal to the working classes as 
such was the Partido DemScrata(PD), founded by a group of 
dissident Radicals in 1887. Aiming at nothing less than the 
political, social and economic emancipation of the people 
(22) First official reports of the massacre claim only 140 dead and wounded (La Patria, Iquique, 24.12.1907) 
but the figure of 29000 dead is not generally dis- 
puted now. 
(23) See Peter G. Snow, Radicalismo Chileno, (Buenas 
Aires, 1972) pp57-59. 
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the PD adopted electoral means to fight for the implementa- 
tion of a rather incoherent reform programme which, even if 
enacted in its entirety, would have fallen short of the 
stated objective. (24) Several different factions soon 
emerged within the PD which, almost from the first, was 
affected by serious internal divisions caused by political 
and personal differences. Perhaps the issue which caused 
most conflict in the early years of the PD was the question 
of whether to participate in the coalition politics of the 
day and, if so, which of the two great coalitions should be 
supported - the Alianza Liberal, based on the PL, or the 
Coalicidn, based on the PC. (25) These questions, and the 
approach of presidential elections, oponed a breach in the PD 
in 1901 between the reglamentarios, who argued against parti- 
cipation in either coalition, and the doctrinarios, who urged 
support for the Alianza Liberal. (26) Even at this stage, 
the conflict between reglamentarios and doctrinarios was 
complicated by the existence of a third socialist or social 
democratic current. The socialist Democrats, who had begun 
to appear in the 1890s, differed from the other currents in 
the greater emphasis they placed on the need to create 
workers' organisations and to direct the PD's activities 
(24) Julio Cesar Jobet, Recabarren, pp126-128. (25) Both the CoaliciSn and the Alianza Liberal were cre- 
ated in 191 when the support of a majority in Cong- 
ress became essential for presidents. Although the 
CoaliciSn survived until 1919, when it was replaced 
by the UniSn Nacional, and the Alianza Liberal until 
1925, their component parties tended to change sides 
when they wished. Presidents, for their part, felt 
no binding obligation to rule with the coalition which 
had elected them. Lia Cortes and Jordi Fuentes Dic- 
cionario Politico do Chile (Santiago, 1967) pp31-33" (26) f; ctor do Petris Giesen, llistoria del Partido Democra- 
tico (2vemnoria, Universidad de Chile, 1942) ppl -33" 
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more strongly towards the 'moral and economic betterment 
of the working class'. (27) Howevor, although most of the 
socialist Democrats supported the doctrinarios in 1901, 
they did not begin to act as a faction within the PD until 
1905. In 1906, the socialists managed to capture control 
of the PD for a brief period but the reglamentarios and 
doctrinarios combined to break their hold. In 1906, the 
socialists took a further step towards becoming a more 
cohesive group by forming the Escuela Socialista in Santiago. 
The Escuela Socialista came to have some 200 members and 
provided the Partido Obrero Socialista(P0S), the immediate 
precursor of the PCCh, with many of its leaders. (28) 
Not all socialists belonged to the POS nor was 
socialism the only ideology to lay claim to the allegiance 
of the working classos. (29) An ideology which attracted 
lasting support and which probably had greater influence 
amongst the Chilean working classes during the first two 
decades of this century was anarchism. Like socialism, 
anarchism began to bear fruits at the turn of the century - 
anarchists, for example, were the prime movers in the forma- 
tion of the resistance societies and were prominat in a 
(27) Enrique Reyes, op. cit. p42. 
(28) Andros Escobar y Carvallo in Hevista Occidente, 
no. 122(JMn. /Feb. 1960) pp6-1 , gives an interest- ing account of the early struggles of the socialists 
inside the PD. Other articles by the same author 
in I(evista Occidente, nos. 119,120 and 121 are 
also useful in the study of the early working class 
organisations in Chile. 
(29) See Julio C6sar Johet's Hiecabarren, pp93-101 for a 
brief account of other socialist parties which 
emerged at the turn of the century. 
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number of important strike movements, including the ill- 
fated Iquique strike of 1907. Although the groups and 
organisations generated by anarchism were usually short- 
lived, its ideological impact stretched far beyond those 
who formally embraced its ideals. In particular, anarchism 
helped to form and articulate two major and complementary 
working class attitudes which survived for some years. 
These were, firstly, a complete rejection of the bourgeois 
political process and, hence, a rejection of electoral 
politics; and, secondly, a belief in independent, direct 
action by workers' ortranisations. Both;. attitudes were to 
present the POS and the PCCh with formidable obstacles in 
the years to come. 
The POS grew out of this background of burgeoning 
labour organisations and out of the spread of socialist 
ideas. But before proceeding to examine the POS and its 
development, mention must be made of the man who came to 
dominate working class politics in the second decade of this 
century and who is considered, to this day, to be the most 
prominent figure produced by the Chilean working class move- 
ment. Luis Emilio Recabarren was born into a modest family 
in Valparaiso in 1876. At the are of fourteen he loft 
school to learn the trades of printing and typesetting. In 
1891, he first showed his mettle by joining the Balmacedista 
Army with the express purpose of subverting it from within - 
only his youth saved him from the firing squad. Later, he 
joined the Constitutionalist Army, served in the Norte Chico 
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and rose to non-commissioned rank. (30) In 1894 he joined 
the PD because fit said it sought the betterment of the 
working class and was a working class party'. (31) In the 
PD, he swiftly identified himself with the socialist current 
and in 1897 and 1905, together with like-minded colleagues, 
pledged himself to bring the PD round to socialism. The 
real turning point in his career came in 1903 when, already 
prominent in Democrat circles in Valparaiso and Santiago, he 
was chosen to organise the second national conference of the 
Congreso Social Obrero. There, he came to the attention of 
Gregorio Trincado, the founder of the mancomunal in Toco- 
pills, who invited him to go north to found and operate a 
newspaper for the mancomunal. Recabarren accepted Trincado's 
invitation, went to Tocopilla and founded El Trabajo, the 
first of a long line of workers' newspapers which he was to 
create. Recabarren'e work in Tocopilla gave him the oppor- 
tunity to stand as candidate for deputy for Antofagasta in 
1906 - an election which he won. Congress, however, refused 
to seat; him because of his reputation as a labour agitator and 
in that same year he was sentenced for his supposed involve- 
ment in the 1906 strike in Antofagasta -a strike which had 
ended in bloodshed. By now a figure of national prominence, 
(30) For details of Recabarren's early life see Julio 
Cäsar Jobet's Recabarren, pp7-8 and Obras selectas 
de Luis Emilio Hecabarren (Santiago, 1917) ppl3-15. 
See also Fernando Alegria Recabarren (Santiago, 
1938) which, although a fictionalised biography, is 
generally held to adhere strictly to the known facts. 
Official PCCh publications generally neglect to 
mention Recabarren"s active opposition to Balmaoeda, 
who after his death rapidly became a hero to the 
Left. 
(31) El Des ertar de los Trabs adores, Iquique, 12.9.1912. 
(Cited hereafter as DTIQ. 
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Recabarren fled the country to avoid arrest. He went first 
to Argentina, where he became involved in the Argentine 
Socialist Party, and then went to Europe. In Europe, where 
according to some accounts he met Lenin, he affiliated the PD 
to the Sebond International - although he had no authority 
to do so-(32) Returning to Chile in 1908, he served his 
gaol sentence and became active in PD politics once more. 
In 1911, after quarrelling over an electoral matter 
with other members of the socialist faction of the PD in 
Santiago, Recabarren withdrew to Tarapacä where he proceeded 
to found another newspaper (in Iquique) and to reorganise 
the PD in that province in preparation for the 1larch 1912 
congressional elections. (33) While it is not altogether 
clear whether Recabarren had definitely decided to form a 
new political party at that point, the configuration of 
circumstances in the PDT both nationally and locally, made 
the emergence of a new party entirely possible, if not 
inevitable. With the approach of the congressional elections, 
the old feud between reglamentarios and doctrinarios flared 
up while socialist Democrats and their more conservative 
rivals vied for the PD's nomination as candidates in the 
forthcoming elections. In Iquique, Recabarren managed to 
secure the nomination for a deputy's seat even though a 
Democrat, Pedro Araya, was already sitting for that 
(32) The Soviet historian Vassili Yermolaev claims that 
Recabarrön met Lenin twice in Brussels in 1908; 
article by Jorge Soza Egaiia in Al Siglo, Santiago, 
2.1.1972. Andros Escobar y Carvallo claimed that 
Aecabarren affiliated the PD to the Second Inter- 
national in Revista Occidente no. 122. 
(33) Ibid. for details of Recabarren's dispute with the 
Santiago socialists. 
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constituency. Despite Araya's protests to the PD's national 
leadership in Santiago, the PD refused to annul Recabarren's 
nomination - with the result that both stood in the 1912 
election. (34) In the event, both were soundly defeated 
but Recaharren polled 599 votes to Araya's 61 (out of a 
total of some 13,000 votes cast). (35) 
Although Recabarren and the PD in Tiraoacä had 
fully, if gruc. ngly, endorsed a pact which the PD had made 
with the Coaliciön to exchange votes in the 1912 election,, 
the failure of the pact to produce the promised results in 
Tarapaca and elsewhere in Chile and the news that the PD 
leadership intended to take its coalition politics a stage 
further by supporting a government majority in Congress, 
finally persuaded Recabarren and others to break from the 
PD. (36) Recabarren justified the creation of the POS in 
June 1912 on the grounds that, in recent years, the policies 
of the PD's leaders had not served the interests of the 
working classes. In particular, he claimed that the policy 
of electoral pacting had worked to the advantage of the 
exploiting classes and that the national leadership was 
bourgeois, had no knowledge of the doctrinal and material 
needs of the people and showed no concern to carry out 
propaganda activities or create a definite party press. (37) 
In sum, Hecabarren accused the national leadership of 
handing the workers over to bourgeois exploitation -a 
(34) DTI(, 22.2.1912. 
(35) E1 rarapaca Iquique 70-1912- 
(36) El Grito Popular Iquique 6.9.1911; ELI 11.5.1912. 
(37) D1'Iq 21.5.1912. iecabarren expanded on these 
reasons in DL6.6.1912. 
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sentiment which was evidently shared by many socialists 
inside the PD since the appearance of the P05 in Tarapaca 
coincided with the emergence of similar break-away groups 
in Santiago and Punta Arenas. 
The P03 had a life-span of nine and a half yoars 
before it changed its name to the PCCh in 1922. During much 
of that time, it was irrelevant to the main stream of Chilean 
politics and it usually existed in small, semi-autonomous 
groups which suffered from a high turnover in membership 
and bitter internal disputes. Despite this, the P03 came 
to wield considerable influence in the trade union movement 
and it developed a series of characteristics which were 
carried over into the PCCh. 
Although the POS was founded independently in 
Tarapacä, Santiago and Puntas Arenas in mid-1912, it was not 
until 1915 that these groups celebrated their first National 
Congress and created a national organisation. Both before 
and after 1913, the most important centre of socialist 
activity was Tarapacä, with its close links with the nitrate 
industry, its relative numerical strength and the dominant 
personality and energy of its leader, Recaharren. 
At the time of the P0S's foundation, Tarapaca was 
one of the newest provinces of the Republic, part of the 
spoils of the War of the Pacific. The province Consisted 
of some 58,000 square kilometres of the Atacama Desert, the 
arid monotony of which was interrupted only by the nitrate 
camps and the occasional oasis. In 1907 Tarapacä had only 
three towns of any importance and all of them were on the 
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coast. Iquique, the capital, had a population of 
40,000; 
Arica and Pisagua had populations of some 4,000 each. Of a 
total population of 110,000,42,291 were directly involved 
in the nitrate induetry. (38) Almost all the population 
were migrants from the more southerly provinces of Chile 
or from Bolivia and Peru. Indeed, in 1914, out of a total 
workforce of 50,000, almost half came from these two neigh- 
bouring countries. (39) 
In 1912, Tarapacä was very much a frontier society, 
lacking the sub-structure of social, cultural and educational 
organisations associated with more mature population centres. 
The brothel and the tavern rather than the church and the 
school were the dominant social organisations. Indeed, 
neither the Church nor the Conservative Party had been for- 
nially organised in the province. Politically it was the 
domain of the Radical and Liberal Democratic parties but these 
only became active at election times. This absence of social 
amenities and cultural and education facilities had marked 
effects on the POS's activities. The POS adopted propaganda 
forms designed, to some extent at least, to fill the vacuum. 
It formed drama groups which toured the nitrate 12amj2a 
performing plays, often written by the workers themselves, 
which held a clear socialist or moral message. The concert 
party or velada was a propaganda form particularly favoured 
by the P05. sometimes hundreds of workers would attend 
(38) Enrique Heyes, op. cito p34. 
(39) nri 6.8.1914. 
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veladas to hear musical performances, recitations, declama- 
tions and speeches on topics which ranged from the work of 
socialism to the evils of drink, from the economic misery 
of the people to the true ends of the Boy Scout h, ovement. (40) 
Public meetings and debates, used throughout the Republic 
to popularise the socialist message, assumed an unusual 
prominence in Tarapacä. Indeed, in the coastal towns, where 
there were fewer restrictions on freedom of meeting, such 
debates became something of an institution. In Iquique, for 
example, thousands of workers gathered in the main square 
at week-ends to hear anarchists and socialists defend their 
viewpoints and, on one occasion, a debate between Catholics 
and socialists on the existence of God drew an audience of 
159000. (41) 
The main implement of socialist propaganda in 
Tarapacä and elsewhere, however, was the party newspaper. In 
1916, the POS had seven newspapers in Iquique, Antofagasta, 
Taltal, Santiago, Concepciön, Valparafso and Puntas Arenas. (42) 
Although most were short-lived ventures, El Despertar do los 
Trabajadores of Iquique and El Socialista (after 1922 El 
Comunista)of Antofagasta survived until 1927 and El 3ocialista 
of Valparafso was published between 1915 and 1918. The news- 
papers of Iquique and Antofagasta were published several times 
a week, and sometimes daily, while El Socialista of Valparafso 
was a weekly publication. Although the circulation of these 
(40) Ibid. 21.7.1914. 
(41) Ibid. 4.12.1914. 
(42) Ibid. 27.4.1916. For a detailed study of the workers' 
press between 1900 and 1930, see Osvaldo Arias 
Escobedo La Prensa Obrera en Chile, (Santiago, 1970). 
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newspapers were sometimes in the region of 3,000-14,000 for 
each issue, suggesting a large readership, they suffered 
from continual financial difficulties. (J3) The POS news- 
papers constantly undertook the propagation of socialist 
ideals through explanatory articles, through poetry and song 
and through the publication of serious literature in a 
serialised form. The newspaper presses were used also for 
the publication of a wide variety of pamphlet literature. 
The importance-of the POS newspapers lay not only 
in their propa: *anda activities but also in the fact that 
they constituted the backbone of the party's organisation. 
They provided the premises for the meetings of local POS 
groups and served as a training ground for party activists. 
The few paid jobs on the newspaper were given to men who 
were, to all intents and pu rposesq full-time party function- 
aries exclusively dedicated to the work of propaganda and 
organisation. Furthermore, their training as newspapermen 
permitted the movement of these early party functionaries 
from one part of the country to another as the needs of the 
party dictated. Indeed, the list of first and second genera- 
tion leaders of the PCCh who received their training in this 
manner, often from Recabarren himself, is impressive. (44) 
(43) DTJ , for exa'uple, the P05's lonr*est runninr* and 
most successful newspaper, reported an average 
monthly debt of 500 pesos in 1914 and debts total- 
ling 4,300 pesos in 1917; 21.5.1914; 17.5.1917. 
(44) Salvador Barra Wollt Elias Lafertte, Salvador 
Ocampo, Galvarino Gil, ý, aclovio Galdames, Nufino 
Hosas, Atamön äepülveda Leal, Luis A. 119Prnhdez - 
all prominent in the PCCh in the early years of its 
life, were trained in this way. 
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The nature of the socialism which the P03 attempted 
to spread was charactorised by vapunness, romanticism and an 
absence of profound analysis. Yet the essential elements 
were clear enough; society was divided into two classes, 
the owners of the iieans of production and the workers who 
possessed only their mental and physical resources - the 
former living in decadent luxury at the expense of the lat- 
ter. The Socialists proposed the creation of a more just and 
egalitarian society in which 'production is a common factor 
as is also the fruits of production' and where all would be 
'masters of the fruits of their labour, free, equal, honoured 
and intelligent'. (45) The P0S's goal, then, was revolution- 
ary reorganisation of society along utopian socialist lines. 
If the P0S's long tern goals were revolutionary, the 
means it chose to effect them were those which had already 
been tried and tested by the socialist wing of the PD. 
Socialists were to participate in elections for public of- 
fice and were exhorted to form trade unions and cooperatives. 
The POS's adoption of political means to achieve its ends 
earned it the implacable hostility of the anarchists who 
regarded participation in tho bourgeois political process, 
however noble the objective, as rank reformism and class 
treachery. And indeed, without accepting the anarchists' 
equation of all political activity with reformism, the P05 
clearly was a reformist party both in action and ideology. 
aecabarren, for example, identified socialism as'the increase 
of individuals who perfect themselves, who modify their had 
(45) Julio Coosar Jobet, ßecabarren, pp33-38. 
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habits and who invite others to perfect thernselves! (46) 
Similarly, the POS welcomed the few attempts which the 
authorities made to ameliorate the lot of the workers and 
it positively encouraged the state to take an active part 
in regulating relations between labour and capital. (47) 
Conversely, the P03 rejected direct violent action as pro- 
posed by some anarchist groups - arguing that the gains 
made by such means would be temporary at best. (48) 
But despite its reformism, the POS was a revolution- 
ary force in at least two senses. In the first place, it 
was revolutionary in the emphasis it placed on the need 
to organise trade unions and cooperatives, which were seen 
not only as necessary to defend the workers' immediate 
interests but also as the key organisations in the defeat 
of the capitalist system and as the nuclear units upon which 
the new society would be built - beliefs which brought the 
POS very close to its anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist 
rivals. (49) Secondly, socialism as purveyed by the P03 
was also intended to bring about revolutionary changes in 
personal behaviour and habits. Impressed by the visible 
evidence of the working classes' physical and moral decadence, 
particularly in Tarapacä where drunkenness and venereal 
disease were rife, the P05 developed a strong atmak of 
puritanism. Drinking, whoring, ? amblinc and smokinc were 
the objects of varying degrees of conde, mation in the 
(46) DTIg, 2.7.1914. 
(47) See, for example, ibid. 16.5.1912; 13.8.1914; 21.8.14. 
(48) Ibid., 2.7.1914. 
(49) Recabarron was still thinking along these lines in 
1921. See, for example, his draft constitution for 
a Federal Socialist Republic of Chile, reproduced in 
Julio ; (eise Gonzälez 'riistoria de Chile, pn463-475" 
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socialist press and members of the POS were expected to 
turn their backs on the popular vices which prevented them 
from being good husbands, fathers, brothers and sons. The 
idea that it was not possible to be a good socialist without 
being a good family man of moderate habits was carried over 
into the PCCh. 
Other striking features of the P05's ideology were 
its anti-clericalism, its anti-militarism and its interna- 
tionalism. While all these features were common to most socia- 
list movements in the early twentieth century, conditions and 
events in Tarapacä and elsewhere in Chile made them particu- 
larly relevant. Thus, the P08's anti-clericalism was fuelled 
by the decision of the Catholic Church to establish a bishop- 
tic in Iquique in 1912. In response, the POS launched an 
anti-clerical weekly paper, El Bonete, nominally edited by 
Elias Lafertte, which carried out a vitriolic campaign against 
the Church and priesthood until it ran into trouble with the 
local courts. (50) In 1915, other socialist newspapers re- 
turned to the attack when some priests attempted to act upon 
their social Christian principles and form trade unions. (51) 
By the end of the decade, however, this particular feature 
of the P0S"s ideology was becoming less pronounced. 
The POS had no particular need to draw on the tra- 
ditions of European or any other brand of socialism to he 
(50) El 13onete, Iquique, had a circulation of some 2,000 
copies. See the issue for 15.2.1913. Elfas Lafertte 
claimed that he was only the editor for legal pur- 
poses; the real editor was Aguirre 3rotön; Elfas 
Lafertte Vida de un Comunista (Santiago, 1957) P98- (51) if I 24.12.1915. 
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anti-militarist since, in the turentieth century at any rate, 
the Chilean Army had killed far more labour 'agitators' 
than it had foreign enemies. ßut the POS's anti-militarism 
tended to be rather muted for two reasons. Firstly, the 
Chilean Armed Forces had the power to accuse and, through 
their own courts, to judge those who offended aiainst their 
dignity or who attempted to subvert discipline. Secondly, 
the POS's attitude towards the Armed Forces was essentially 
ambivalent. While the POS clearly saw the Armed Forces as 
the instrum, ent of class oppression, it also identified then 
as the possible source of radical and even revolutionary 
change in Chile - thus, long before the Conspiracy of 1919 
and the military golpes of 1924 and 1925, the POS had de- 
fended t)e Army's right to think for itself. (52) 
The P0S's deep sense of internationalism was one 
of its most pronounced and enduring features. Rejecting 
narrow 'bourgeois' concepts of patriotism - they greeted 
patriotic celebrations with silence or a caustic comment 
on the inevitable drunken disorders which marked them - the 
POS studied the development of the world working class 
movements with a passionate interest and concern. Indeed, 
shortly after its foundation the PUS applied to join the 
Second International and, while full membership does not 
(52) See, for example, a serios of articles on the 
: masonry and the Army in which its right to press 
for certain reforms is defended. DTI 1.5.8.1916; 
16.8.1916; 17.8.1916. See Frederick 1. Nunn, 
Chilean Politics 1920-1931: The Honorable mission of 
the Armed Forces (Albuquerque, 1970) ppll-12, n0117-87 
for details of the Conspiracy and the of es. 
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apnear to have been pranteds it remained in contact with 
the Second International for several years. (53) However, 
the POS did not confine its internationalism to passive 
theorizing. A few Chilean socialistst most notably 
Recabarrenq became active in the Argentine Socialist Party- 
Recabarren helped to form the group which later became the 
Communist Party of Argentina. (54) Converselyq some 
foreigners became prominent in the POS althoughq as a groupq 
they do not appear to have had a great impact on the over-all 
membership despite their presence in larpe numbers on the 
nitrate pampa. Nevertbelessq an Arfrentineq Nariano Rivast 
and an Italian, Loj:, rqia Frattiq became prominent In the POS 
while some Bolivian workersq who learned the lessons of 
political and trade union organisation on the nitrate pampaq 
became a nrominent force in the socialist movements of their 
own country. (55) The POS's internationalism is also well- 
illustrated by the fact that Argentine socialists were usually 
invited to National Party Congresses -a practice which was 
carried over into the PCCh. The POS also demat rated its 
internationalism by celebrating May Day with public meetings 
(53) Recabarren sent a report to the becond Intornational 
giving details of POS activities in 19121 lYfIC4 
13.2.1913. In 19179 the POS transmitted its fears to 
the Second International that the Spanish 60cialist 
Party was urging Spain to enter the First iorld War. 
It did this through the Argentine Socialist Party 
because that party was a mpmher of the jecond Inter- 
national and the POS 'was not yet able to be so$. 
wiq 5.6.1917- 
(54) Comisi6n Nacional de EducaciOn (PCCh) Luis Wilio 
Recabarren, foQador del movimiento rovolucLonario 
chileno (iantiagop 1972) p5 and pll. 
(55) Guillermo Lora Nistoria del Movimiento Obrero Bolivi- 
ano 1923-1933, (La Paz)(1970) PP135-135. 
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and, occasionally, with the withdrawal of labour. At times 
the PO demonstrated against specific events abroad - asp 
for example, in 1916 when 2,000 workers in Iquique gathered 
to protest against Carranza's treatment of strikers in 
Mexico City. (56) 
These then, were the POS's most prominent ideologi- 
cal features but wbat of its organisational structure? 
Although the POS had no national organisation until 1915 and 
although the internal organisation of the local parties tend- 
ed to differg the basic unit in Tarapaca was generally the 
section which met periodically to discuss ideology and the 
problems of the day and which elected a five-man administra- 
tiVe committee to conduct the section's affairs. In Santiagog 
howeverg some attempt was made to place party work on a more 
urofessional footing by appointing permanent commissions to 
deal with such aspects of party activity as trade union af- 
fairsq financeg press and propaganda. (57) Whatever the 
local variationsg the internal processes of the party were 
characterised by openness and denjocracy, All posts within 
the party organisation were filled by election and the POS's 
candidates for public office were selected by the same method - 
as were the editors and administrators of the party newspapers. 
But this is not to say that Recabarren could not impose his 
wishes in spite of the democratic process*(58) 
The size and social complexion of the POS are 
(56) DT- N 3.10.1916. 
(57) äl 6ocialista, jarntiat; o, 15.5-1913- 
(59) See below, P40 for a description of one incident 
in which he did this. 
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matters for conjecture since no accurate statistics were 
compiled of either. Howeverg it seems likely that the 
POS in Tarapaca had a membership of between 300 and 400 in 
1915 and by 1917 had grown to some 800 members. (59) if 
this last figure is correctq a not unreasonable hational 
projection for the POS In 1917 would be around 19500 members. 
In social termst the POS was predominantly working class 
butq if the-man who occupied sectional office are any 
indicationg the bulk of the POS9e support came from the 
skilled rather than the unskilled workers. In the early 
yearal there were a scatteringr of professional meng doctors 
and lawyerav who usually made their appeakance as POS can. 
didates in public elections* Earlier mention has been made 
of the large number of foreign workers on the nitrate pampa 
but they do not appear to have joined the pos in any great 
number. In 19179 admittedly in an article defending the 
POS from the charge that it was an alien element in Chilean 
societyq It was claimed that only eight foreigners were 
members of the partyo(60) The wealthy were not excluded 
from membership but POS puritanism did lead it to ban brothel 
and tavern keepers and although masons and members of 
Catholic brotherhoods could become members# they were war- 
ned not to proselytise inside the POS* The party made a 
special appeal to women and in 19139 a Centro Famenino was 
founded in Iquique under the leadership of Recabarrenta 
compafiera Teresa Flores. Although the Centro eventually 
(59) DTiß 21-11-1917- 
(60) Ibid. 
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laid claim to some 40 members, it soon disappeared In a 
welter of nersonal antagonisms. 01) Neverthelessq a 
few women did make their mark as effective orators and 
propagandists for the Socialist cause in Tarapaca. 
(62) 
The POS's evolution as an electoral force was con- 
siderably hampered by Its refusal to follow the example Of 
the PD and make pacts with other parties for the purposes of 
trading votes. Thusp although the po, elected its first 
municipal councillors In 1913, it was not until 19219 after 
it had become more flexible on the question of electoral 
pactag that it managed to elect its first congresarrien. 
Nevertheless, the POSIs voting strength in rarap&ca and 
Antofagasta showed a steady increase - in the coni-ressional 
elections of 19159 the POS polled 356 votes in these two 
nrovinces while in 19189 this total had Increased to 871. (63) 
Nattonallyg the POS's votinp, strenoth increased from 580 it, 
1915 to an estimated 49000 in 19? -0. 
(64) 
If the POS was unsuccessful in its early efforts to 
elect congressmen, it had preater success in municipal 
elections and in 1915, it had six municipal representatives 
in Tarapach alone. (65) The election of municipal council- 
lors was important for several reasons. Firstlyq it Pave 
the POS a public platform on which to air its views and 
(61) Ibid. 11-10-1913. 
(62) Recabarren cited Teresa Florns and Rebeca Bnrneaq 
the schoolgirl daughter of one of the founder mem- 
bers of the P03, as parLLculnrly effective orators. 
Ibid. 18-2,1915. 
(63) Ibid* 28.3.1915; 6.3.1918. 
(64) Ibid. 28.3.1915. El Socialista, Antofavastaq 
280-1920. 
(65) DTIQ 13-4-1915. 
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programme. Secondly, it gave the POS access to municipal 
jobs which could be given to activists and supporters -a 
development whichp in its turnp gave the POS an additional 
source of finance sinceq by 19179 it had been decided that 
all party members who received jobs in this way should 
contribute 10% of their wages to POS funds*(66) While 
POS municipal employees appear to have been rather lax in 
complying with this directiveg it was a custom which was 
carried over into the PCCh. 
In 1915, the POS held its first national congress 
in Santiagop a meeting which was attended by 11 delegates 
representing Iquiqueq Antofagasta# Taltals Valparafsog Vifia 
del 14arg Concepcidn and Puntas Arenaso(67) The Congress 
wax presided over by a reoently-elected Argentina Socialist 
deputy# Ram& Meryp and a declaration of principles and 
programme of action based on those of the Tarapaci FOS were 
adopted* Interestingly enoughq it had been the intention 
to adopt the principles and programme of the ArgentAne 
Socialist Party but Mary forgot to bring copies with him - 
and he had to leave the Congress early because he had neg- 
lected to obtain the necessary leave of absence from the 
Argentine Parliamento(68) The first POS, Congress decided 
to create a Comitig Eiecutivo Nacional(CNN), with its seat 
in Valparafso, to co-ordinate and direct the activities of 
the 17 sections which existed throughout the countryo(69) 
(66) Ibid, 14.11-1917- 
(67) See ibid, 20*5,1915; 26.5.1915; 27-5-1915; 3.6.1915 
for the official report on the POS's first National 
Congress* 
(68) I-mid. 20*5.19l5. 
(69) Ibide 26.5.1gi5. 
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The first action which the CEN undertook was to found a 
central newspaper, El SoCialista of Valparafso. I-lowever, 
despite the existence of the CEN9 local sections appear to 
have gone very much their own way. Most failed to respond 
to CEN demands to helo finance its activities and the new 
newspaper and CEN circulars were often is, ýnnred. Indeedg 
when the CEN tried to arrange another National Party Con- 
gress in 1916, only six of the nineteen sections bothered 
to reply and. 9 despite other efforts in later vearsq it was 
not until 1920, on the eve of a presidential electiong V-1at 
the PC$ held its second national congress. (70) Butt if 
the CEN lacked effectiveness in some directions, it was 
active in settling internal disputes in tl-ýe narty and did 
send delegates to the north and south to encourafre the 
growth of new sections and to create new newspappra. 
Like most new or. 7anisattons in the nrocems of 
formulating their structures ideology anti tacticsq tho POS 
suffered from a series of bitter internal conflicts - 
conflicts which were generally heavily larded by personal 
antaponisms. The issues which caused the POS most diffi- 
culty were concerned with electoral politics. In the first 
places many socialistsp particularly those on the nitrate 
pampas shared the anarchist antipathy towards electoral 
politics andq althou. 7h little direct evidence renjainss sinall 
groups of members ap, -)ear to have broken away when the POS 
(70) Ibid. 23.9.1916. El Socialista, Antofarasta, 
10 - 13.6.1920 contains the official reports on 
the P03's Second National Congress. 
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leadersbip insisted on participating in public ellections. 
Certainlyq the repeated and rather desperate declarations of 
the POS that it was $not a political party but part of the 
social and economic organisation of humanity which uses the 
political struggle in its redemntive and progressive work' 
give some indication of the strength of anarchist senti- 
ment. (71) Secondlyp after 1913 when the POS elected its 
first municipal reDresentativesv the Problems of whether to 
join or support a majority on the municipal council (in 
effectv to practice coalition politics at the local level) 
and of the POS's relationship with its councillorsq emerged, 
TI-ese particular issues caused the VOS to split In Santlaao 
in 1913; the POS section in Pisagua had a similar experience 
in l916. (72) 
The conflict in 1913 in Santiago is worthy of more 
detailed examination since it involved bianuel flidalgog later 
the leader of the Chilean Trotskyist Partyq Izquierda 
Comunista. In 19139 Hidalgo was elected to the municipal 
council in Santiago - the first POi inember to be elected to 
public offices According to his enemiesq Hidalgo's behaviour 
as a councillor left much to be desired. He failed to 
propagate the socialist programme at council meetinosq 
neglected to give regular reports on his activities to the 
POS in Santiago and used his influence to secure municipal 
funds for a nsutualist society to whicb he belonged. (73) 
(71) El SOcialistat ValT)arafso, 17*9.1915o Recabarren was 
still repeatinfT thi-3 statpinent in 1923 - after the 
FCCb I, ad been founded. Yederaci6n Obrera 17-5-1923- 
(72) See LCIq 16.4. ]. 916; 10-77.71-9-17) for (', Ptatlg of, tilp 
conflict in Pisaý,. Ita. (73) 3e e, S-1 i0ciallsta, Santia-o, 2nd f0x'trlifýht, Aurýustj, 
1913, for the cic; e at-, ainst Hidalgo. 
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Hidalgo was expelled from the 205 aection - the first of 
many disciplinary actions taken aFainst him - but with a 
group of supporters foundee his own FOS section and began 
to nublish his own nowspaperg La Voz 3ocialista. Articles 
in that newspaper attributed Hidalgo's expulsion to nersonal 
malice and to his refusal to find municipal jobs for the 
relatives of some of his ooponeats. (74) The conflict in 
Santiago dragged on for some time andq in 1915, one of the 
first acts of the newly-formed CiN was to dissolve both 
sections andq without expressing its opinion on the rights 
of the mattert to leave Hidalgo outside the POS for the sake 
of internal harmony. (75) Even so, the dispute continued 
to cause frictions. In 1916, the POS in Puntas Arenas 
declared its independence from the CEN partly because the 
reconstituted Santiago Section continued to be dominated 
by Hidalgo's supporters while Hidalgo himself incurred the 
wrath of many Socialists wheng late in that yearl he sug- 
gested that the FOS should rejoin the PD since their pro- 
grammes were now very similar. (76) The dispute in Santiago 
effectively undermined the work of the FOS in that area 
during the early years andq indeed, the Santiago section 
continued to be a source of considerable trouble for the 
national leadership - although, not always because of 
(74) La Voz Socialistal Santiago, 20.10.1913. Malgo's 
supporters Included Carlos Alberto Martfnozl later a 
founder member of the Partido Socialista de Chile 
and Snrique Dfaz Vora - both of them later opposed 
the affiliation of the POS to the Third Inter- 
national. 
(75) C41 Socialistap Valparafso, 31*12.1915. 
(76) Ibid. 174.10.1016; DTIQ 15-12.1916. 
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Hidalgo's actions. (77) 
In 1913, another conflict, of rather less importance 
but also worthy of menti. on since it involved Recabarrent 
occurred in Tarapacao On returning from a tour of the 
nitrate pampa, Recabarren found that in his absence a man 
of whom he did not approve had been elected by the POS In 
Iquique to fill the position of administrator of the Bakers$ 
Co-operatives Recabarren immediately launched a vituperative 
campaign against the now administrator and those who had 
elected him - an action which caused them to withdraw from 
the POS and to respond In kinde In an open letter entitled 
'Lordq mitigate your wraths have pity upon ust - printed in 
the right-wing daily El Tarapac& - they delivered a blister- 
Ing counter-attack# accusing Recabarron of over-concern with 
electoral matterep of mismanagement of the party press and of 
overweening pride and arroganco*(78) While the Incident 
was not important in itself it does suggest that Rocabarron's 
autocratic ways and imperious temperament were at least 
contributory factors to Internal conflict in both the POS 
and the PCCh -a fact which Communist historians tend to 
neglect. 
While the FOS appears to have experienced consider- 
able internal friction during its lifeg no now party emerged 
as a result of internal dissidence. Indeeds manyl like 
Salvador Barra Woll (a leader of the Tarapacl rebels in 1913) 
(77) In 19209 for exampleg the FOS section in Santiago 
practically ceased to function when it was dis- 
covered that one of its prominent membersp Evaristo 
Reyes -a notable figure in FOS politics nationally 
was quite literally a police agent. See Claridadl, 
Santiagos 11*12,1920; 23-12.1920. 
(78) El Tarapacat Iquiques 17-5-1913- 
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and Hidalgog were reabsorbed into the party at a 
later date 
and became prominent leaders of the PCCh. Other dissidents 
appear to have returned to their original allegiances or 
dropped out of politics altogrether. 
Electorally weakq its orpanisation dependent on 
the continued survival of the POS newspapers and tbe(nergies 
of Tlecabarren and a handful of close associatesq the POS 
might well have remained a party of only regional sirnift- 
cance or even disapneared altoiTatber if it were not for its 
efforts and increasine influence in the field of trade 
unionism. 
From the very beginninp the POS did its utmost to 
encourage the growth of trade unions and associated organisa- 
tions such as cooperatives and instruction societies. In 
the month immediately following its foundationg the POS 
created a series of craft unions amonpst the foundrymeng 
mechanics9 ligbtermeng cobblersq miners and carpentersq 
stokers and clerical employees of Iquique. (79) Most of 
these unions did not survive for long and the POS began. to 
look for some way of co-ordinating ane unifyinp the activi- 
ties of the various iinions. Its first effort in this direc- 
tion was to help create a Camara del Trabajo in Iquique - 
a form of organisation which had been influential in the 
early development of the Italian trade union movement. (So) 
Howeverv the Camara, had scarcely begun to function before 
unions of other political complexionsy most notably those 
(79) Dflq 18*2.1913- 
(80) jbLd. 2.10-1913. 
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with Radical and Liberal Democratic allegiancesq began to 
object to the narticioation of the POS in its nroceedings. 
the FOS -was forced to witkidraw andq aftor a few uncomfort- 
able months of existenceg the Camara perished. (81) 
TIY 19151 the POS bad come to the conclusion that 
existing trade unions were failing to fulfil two of th. eir 
essential functions - propaganda in favotir of trade union- 
ism itself and the regulation of relations between capital 
and labotir. ., oreoverq the POS felt that existing trade 
unions were not only failing tn these duties but were 
positively aidinp the bourgeoisie by retarding the uni- 
fication of the proleteriat. (82) The FOS suggested that 
the solution to this problem was to form trade union sec- 
tions on a craft basis inside the party itself and to give 
these the task of forming trade unions of all types6 There 
is no evidence to suggest that this solution was ever 
adopted and the POS soon returned to the search for a form 
of umbrella organisation. BY 1915, a UniSn de Obreros X 
Obreras en General was created in Valnarafso and Santiago 
with socialist support but it only had a fleeting existence. 
In 1917, some socialists were givinp sunport to the Union 
Federal do Chile, a trade union confederation dominated by 
anarcho-syndicalists which claimed a total mewbersbip of 
some 89000 in that year. (83) 
BY 1917p however, the organisation which was to 
(81) ibid. 2.10.1913. 
(82) Ibid. 25.3.1915. 
(83) E1 jocialista, Valparafso, 14.7.1917" 
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produce the first really ininortant trade union confedera- 
tion had already been in existence for softe eipht years. 
The Gran Federaci6n Obrera do Chile(GFOCh) was founded in 
1909 by workers of various trades emnloyed by the state 
railways whol assisted by Conservative lawyersq launched 
a campaign to retrieve a 101, ýý deduction from their wa! rýes sehich 
the govern, nent had imposed the previous year. (84) After 
this battle had been wong the GFOCh continued to function as 
a mutuali5t society and its conservative Drinciples earned 
it the hostility of Recabarren and the POS. Recabarren 
was incensed particularly by the custom of some GFOCh 
consejos. (branches) of having, their union hanners blessed 
in Chumb and he accused the GFOCh of being nothing but a 
'clerical societyq intended to corral the workers and 
guarantee liberty of exploitationl. (85) Recabarren's 
attacks on the GFOCh provoked a spirited response from 
Eduardo Gentoso, the editor of La Locomotoraq the jotirnal 
of the state railway machinists and an ex-colleagrue, of 
Recabarren in the PD. In a series of highly personalised 
ar ticlesq Gentoso accused Recabarren of being an ambitious 
tricksterg the self-appointed Tsar of the workin. g class 
inovenientg whose private life and public actions could not 
stand up to scrutiny. (86) 
The open hostilities between Recabarren and the 
GFOCh came to an end in 1915 and by 19179 Recabarren had 
(84) Jorge Barrfa Seron L- os movimientos sociales de, Chiles 
1910-1929 (Santiagop 1960) pp109-111. (Cited here- 
after as Moviniientos: 1910-26. ) 
(85) jYj'TQ 27.5.19.3. 
(86) La Loconjotoraq Santiagog 27-12.1913; 17-1.1914; 
30 - 7- _19'777 
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evidently been persuadedby other socialists that the GFOCh 
could become the basis for a strongg national and radical 
trade union confederation. By September 1917, the task of 
converting the GFOCh from an essentially conservative and 
mutualist organisation into a vehicle for the militant and 
left-wine sect(Irs of the working class movement was clearly 
underway. At a GFOCh National Conventiong held in that 
month in Valparalsop POS delegates and their allies managed 
to persuade the GFOCh to open its membership to all workers 
of whatever occupation. At the same Conventionp the de- 
cision was taken to change the name of the GFOCh to the 
Federaci6n Obrera de Chile(FOCh). (87) 
At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, November 
19179 the POS was beginning to become something more that 
a regional party but was still very much at the marf-, in of 
national events. In ideology and actiong the POS sometimes 
resembled a puritanical version of its parent, the PD9 and 
at others$ its anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist rivals. 
But despite its rather curious amalgam of revolutionary aiid 
reformist ideas and practiceng the POS's commitment to a 
revolutionary reorganisation of society and to the principle 
of working class internationalism was prominent and deeply 
rooted. i-Aoreoverg ift an yetp the POS lacked national con- 
sequencep it possessed two great assets -a leader of nation- 
al reputationg Hecabarrenq and a growing influence in the 
trade union movement. Events inside and outside Chile in 
(87) Jorge '3arrfa Ser6n . koviraienLos: 1910-26, pp112-115. 
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the years following the end of the First World War trans- 
, nifi- formed the POS into a political 
force of national sip 
cance and led it to take the decision to join the Third 
International and cham--e its name to the PCCb. 
The end of the First World War thrust Chile into 
an economic crisis of unusual sevoritye As demand for 
nitrates 3lumpedq a chain reaction was ignited w1iich drove 
the whole economy into a sharp recessiong affecting not 
only the -proletariat but also broad middle class sectors as 
well., Unemployment and rising prices generated an intense 
social unrest which drew political Inspiration from the 
Russlan Revolution and from the wave of similar attempts to 
sweep away the old order elsewhere in the worlds By 19199 
as a result of these pressures and influencesp FOCh had 
grown considerably in strength and had taken a sharp ttirn 
to the left by adopting a revolutionary declaration of 
principles which called for the abolition of the capitali. st 
system and its replacement by FOChp which would undertake 
the responsibility of administering the country and the 
economy. (88) In the same yearg the anarcho-syndicalists 
founded their most powerful and long-lasting national organ- 
isations the International Workers of tho 'Sorld(I'WW). 
, Liddle class groupsp together with workers, ! ýave their sup- 
port to the Asatablea Obrera de Al imen taci6n 
-, 
'i'aciorlal 9 an 
organisation which differed from earlier ittempts to campai-n 
for the reduction of food prices in its demands for general 
(88) Ibid. poll9-125. 
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radical reform. (89) Finallyp students, often of middle 
class oritýinsj began to coonterate with workers in strikes 
and demonstrations and to create nif-ht schools for the 
workersq drawing their inspiration not only from the 
Bussian Revolution but also from the University Reform 
movementsof Argentina and Feru*(90) 
Desvite the involvement of middle class sectors 
in Post-war social unrestv government did not adapt its 
traditional response to manifestations of popular dis- 
content. kiddle class university students suffered arbi- 
trary arresto torture and occasionally death together with 
the workers whose cause they bad espoused. ý, oreover, in 
the same year, the government cynically manipulated fears 
of war with Perug in part at least, to whip up popular 
feeling against students and labour leaders*(91) 
Social unrest and political turbulence reached its 
climax in 19209 the year in which Arturo Alessandri was 
elected to the Presidency of the Republic. By 19209 the 
sometimes weakq ineffective and corrupt povernments of the 
Parliamentary Republic had und, ermined not only public con- 
fidence in the constitutional system and brought politics 
into disrepute but had brougitinto question the ripht to 
rule of the traditionally dominant class. The tiphtly-Icnit 
(89) Jorge Barrfa 6er6n S1 movimiento obrero on Chile 
(Santiagog 1971) P51- 
(90) See Frank 11onilla and Ayron Glazer Audent Politics 
In Chile (New York, 1970) nP32-57 for the impact 
of the post-war crises on Chilean students. 
(91) Carlos Vicufla Fuentes La Tiranfa on Chile (2 vols. 9 3antiago, 2nd edition 1945) 1- Chanter 3 vives a 
lively account of post-war popular unrost a"d the 
mpasures the 3anfuentes government took against it. 
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Olif.,, archy which had successfully adapted itself to mid- 
nineteenth century economic and social change had lost its 
cohesion in the face of the massive cbanpes which the coun- 
try had experienced since 1880. With the Oli, 7archy divided 
anO the political system which it had devised discrpditedg 
the newly-eii. ergent middle class. supported by larle sectors 
of the proletariatg were ready to challenpe the traditional 
ruling class for power. In 1920 this challenge was nersoni- 
fied In the rival candidacies of Arturo Alessandri and Luls 
Barros Borgofto for the Presidency. Alessandri wis as much 
a product of traditional i--)olitics as Barros 13orpoilo but 
he presented himself as the protagonist of all those who 
wanted radical change,, In a demopogic campaign which 
aroused the wild enthusiasm of the masses - and the fears 
of his opponents - he promised a series of sweepinp social 
and constitutional reforms. 02) While 1ýarros Bor. ýrojlo wa. s 
no enemy to moderate reformg he found hemself cast th the 
role of defender of the status quo and of the Oligarchy and, 
in an extremely close and bitterly-foupht contestg lie was 
defeated in his attempt to become Presidento(93) 
Alessandrig on becoming Presidentv soon found that 
it was no easy matter to redeem his election pled, -es. A 
hostile Conpreas was controlled by his opponents who were 
motivated as much by a deep distrust and hatred of his 
personality and his demagogic mothods as by a rejection of 
(92) 3ee Ricardo Donoso, opecit, i. pp240-2659 for an 
account of the 1920 election campaign. 
(93) Ibid. p263. Alessandri received 177 votes in the 




his reform programme. They placed formidable obstacles 
in his nath. Indeedq shortly after Alessandri came to 
officeg he was locked into a bitter confrontation with Con- 
gress -a situation which was tenninated only by the mili- 
tary aolpe of September 1924. As confrontation continued, 
ministerial instability increasedt pressing economic and 
social oroblems were left without solution and even the 
routine tasks of government were neglected. (94) 
fly the time the POS took the decision to join the 
Third Internationalp the post-war crises had already con- 
verted it into a political force of importancep wainly 
because of its close links with the FOCh. The rapid growth of 
the FOCh in the pist-war years - from 4000 members in 19179 
to 209000 in 19199 to an estimated 80,000 in 1921 - had 
given a tremendous boost to the P03's fortunes. (95) 
Althoufýh the POS's numbers probably still remained relative- 
ly smallq it manared to consolidate its influence in FOCb andt 
indeed, in 19199 actins In concert with lefL-wino Democrats 
and anarchists, it had succeeded in ca*rinp control of the 
national executive - the JuUta Ejecutivo Federal(MF) - and 
in gersuading FOCh to adopt a revolutionary declaration of 
principles. As FUCb expanded, it rave the P03 access to 
(94) See Ricardo Uonoso opcit., J. %'ohaptors 159 17 and 18 
for a description of those , events from a viewpoint 
hostile to Alessandri. 
(95) Jorge Barrfa ýýerori %oviutinntos: 1ý10-26, p112 and 
p120. Other wkiters have suý,,, gested t1at FWAI Inew- 
bership roached as as 200,, 000 in the s-, arly 
1920s. Sees for exatuole, -I. J. Alexander Cowrlimism 
in Latin America (New Jerseyq 1957) P173. 
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additional means of propaganda ( Most notably a now national 
newspaper, La Federaci6n Obrera) and to new sources Of 
facilities and finance. (96) Where the POS was strongg 
particularly in the northern nitrate provinceal it could 
use FOCh premises for its meetings and as social centre3 
and it could ensure that the few paid provincial officials 
of the FOCh were Socialists. Nevertheleagg despite the 
growth of the POS's power and influences large sectors of 
the FOCh's membership remained apolitical or retained their 
allegiance for one of the established parties. Indeed# 
according to one sources 15% of the delegates to the FOCh's 
National Convention held in Deccember 1920 were Radicals and 
2% Conservatives and Liberalso(97) Even amongst the 
radicalised sectors Of the FOChq the POS was outnumbered. 
by Democrats and anarchists - and it was only by working 
with these groups that the POS was able to exert its influence 
over the FOCh. 
With the dramatic increase in the FOCh's membership, 
its potential as a political and electoral force became 
increasingly evident* Although the anarchists fiercely 
resisted the FOCh's drift into electoral politics, by 1920 
the FOCh was allowing local organisations to participate 
in elections on an informal basis - but it continued to 
endorse the principle of non-involvement in bourgeois 
(96) In 19249 La Federaci6n Obrera9cited hereafter as FederaciG Obreral was re-named Justicia. (97) Article by L*Oscar Guzman In Adelantes Talcahuanoy 
7.12.1920. 
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political contests. (98) According to one source, the 
FOCh contributed twenty votes to Alessandri in the Electoral 
Collee-e in the 1920 presidential elections - but, given the 
limited franchise and the high rate of abstentionism, twenty 
votes seems an excessive claim. (99) Nevertheless, it is 
by no weans improbable that FOCh support was decisive in 
Alessandri's victory sinceq in the event, AlessanOri won 
by the extremely narrow margin of one vote in the Blictoral 
College. horeover, if the FOCh*s voting strength had little 
to do with Alessandri's victory, the popular pressure 
exerted directly or indirectly by FOCh and other organisations 
on the Tribunal do honor (created to adjudicate between the 
two presidential candidates)p probably helped to tip the 
balance in Alessandri's favouro If it is difficult to 
gauge FOCh*s impact on the result of the 1920 presidential 
electionsq in the Larch 1921 congressional elections eight 
FOCh members of diverse Political persuasions (2 Socialistst 
I Radical and 5 Democrats) were elected to tho Chamber of 
Deputies with somo support from their local FOCh organisa- 
tions. (100) 
The FOCh's potential as an electoral force pave 
rise to the idea that the P039 the PD and the FOCh should 
fuse to form a new Labour Party a1on- British lines - an 
idea which evidently was given some encouragement by the 
(98) Jorge Barrfa Seron ,, ovimiento3 19lo-,? 6 PP132-1'j4. 
(99) Federacion Obrera 5.11.1921. 
(100) El fIerald_oq Aricaq 17-ý3-1921. The ýiocialist deputies 
were 11'ecabarren and Luls Victor Cruzv the Radical 
was ýiantlago Labarca ; vid the DemocraLs ., Tere Correa Hainfrazt -Pradonas iý, ufloz) Varzý. As Lar(ILIOZI Oscar Chanks 
and ý., anuel ý'4avarrete. 
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socialists. (101) By December 1920, when the FOCh held 
its Third National Convention in Santiagop a significant 
number of delegates were apparently in favour of this 
idea 
and only a last minute switch by Aecabarren prevented the 
immediate formation of the new party, (102) Instead the 
Convention agreed to defer the decision on the now party 
until December 1921 when the next FOCh Convention was 
scheduled to meet* At the same time, it was decided to 
consider affiliation to the Third International -a 
question which was also to be resolved in Decembor 1921. 
At the FOCh Convention which met at Hancagua in 
December 1921,, the issue of a new Labour Party was given 
short shrift by Recabarren who presented a motion which 
prohibited the FOCh from cooperating with any party which 
held collaborationist or reformist positions. This motiong 
which was passed by 77 to 33 votesq was aimed. directly 
against the PD which had announced, prior to the Conventiong 
that it intended to continue collaborating with traditional 
narties inside and outside Congress as it saw fit. (103) 
With the success of this motion, the special PD delegates 
who had conic to the Convention withdraw and discussion of a 
(101) 6orne Socialists were apoarently iwpressed by the 
11ritish Labour Party's evolution from 'gross empiri- 
cisin' to socialising as wanifested in its 1918 pro- 
gramme. They evidently hoped that the creation of 
a similar party in Chile would harness the tr. tcle 
union moveii, ent to political acttori - and help to 
overcome the apoliticism and anarchist mentil, injits 
of many workers. 3ee articles in 29-1'). 1921; 
2-7-1921. 
(102) Adelantep Falcahuanos 16.12.1920. LeLter from Juan 
Fradenas ,,, utioz. 
(103) La ýaci6nj Jantiagog 27-12-1921. 
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new Labour Party effectively ceased. 
The Convention then proceeded to consider the 
question of Joining the Third International, or rather its 
recently-created trade union wing, the International 6indical 
Roja(It; R)o Greatest opposition to this ster) appears to have 
come from the anarchists who argued that the ISH was already 
a failure. (104) However, some Socialists and other leftists 
also had misgivings about affiliation andq indeedg a Socia- 
list, Enrique Dfaz Veraq presented a motion which called for 
the postponement of the decision to join the I. ýM for one 
year. But in the eventg despite considerable support, this 
motion was defeated by 74 votes to 46 and a further motion 
affiliating the FOCh to the ISA was approved by 107 votes to 
12 with 7 abstentions. (105) 
Despite the overwholininf- vote in favour of affilt- 
ating the FOCb to the 16119 the decision of the Rancagua 
Convention was not quite the unqualified triumph for 
Recabarren and his allies that it might appear. In the first 
placeg it has been claimed that the twelve votes case against 
the motion represented some 40Oo of the membershipe(106) 
Secondlyp there is some evidence to stigrest that those who 
were deeply opposed to affiliation to the ISR had already 
withdrawn from the FOCh - cortainly, this was the case of 
some conservative railworkers who left immediately after 
(IL04) Federaci6n Obrera 29.12.1921. 
(105) lbid- 30-12.1921. 
(106) Seep James 0. k, orris Los Elites, los intelectu, 3L1 e9 
y_el consenso (3anttafýof 1967) ý)103- 
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FOCh decided to consider affiliation in December 1920 and it 
seems likely that lzroups of anarchists followed suit-(107) 
Thirdlyp affiliation was not approved without Recabarren 
making some concessions to contrary currents in the Hancagua 
Convention. Thus membership of the ISH wah to be reconsid- 
ered at the next rOCh Conventiong scheduled for December 1923 
in Chilling while the JEF elected at Rancapua contained 
representatives of those who had opposed or who had resorva- 
tions about affiliation* Indeedq the Secretary General of 
the JEF9 the Socialist Carlos Alberto hartfnezq appears to 
have fallen into this last category and another JEF memberp 
the anarchist Gaspar Baloffetq actually voted against af- 
filiation. (108) Nevertbelessq the JEF elected at Han- 
cagua was clearly dominated by those who had approved the 
decision to join the IS. R. (109) 
The POS9 which in 1920 bep-an the practice of holdinf, 
its national Congresses immediately after the FOCh conven- 
tions -a practice which gave a true indication of the POSts 
priorities during these years - aý,, reed to consider affiliation 
to the Third International in December 1920 and in December 
(107) Conservative railworkers founded a newspaper El 
' 
Faro 
0brero in Santiapo and attacked Recabarren and tgý_ 
'Bolsheviks' until June 1921. Some anarchist news- 
papers like El Productor of Iquique niso bogan to 
attack the FOCb in mid-1921 althouf, Federact6n ,h Obrera continued to have a working relationship with 
the IIVW until early 1923- 
(108) Piartfnez also opposed the POS99 affiliation to the 
Third International. Sees PoJ. Alexander op. cito 
p178- As Secretary General of the JEF9 Rla7t_fnýz 
dragged his feet over making contact with the ISR9 
alle. - ng that he did not have the ISR's correct 
addresso Federacio_n Obr_era 18-7-1922. 
(109) Seep El. QoCialista, 9 Antofagastat 5-1-1922 for those 
elected to the JSP at : Aancaz, rua. Of the 14 membersp 
only the two already mentioned are identtfiable as 
opt: )onents of affiliation. 
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19219 at Rancaguat voted to join the rhird International and 
to change the P0S's name to the PCCh. 
According to the official PCCh historian, Hernän 
Ramfrez Necochoaq the decision to Join the Third Interna- 
tional was hotly debated inside the POS during 1921. (109) 
Howevers the available evidence suggests that the decision 
was essentially non-controversial and placed little or no 
stress on the loyalty of the membership. Certainlys few 
Socialists of any prominence opposed affiliation and only 
one - Enrique Dfaz Vera - actively campaigned against the now 
party in the early dayso(110) It could beg of courseq that 
the apparent absence of opposition was the result of skilful 
manipulation by the FOS leadership - and it was true that 
the FOS Congress of December 1920 instructed the sections 
to carry out a purge of 'those who have doubts as to the 
efficacy of our action' and not to admit socialists of the 
old democratic school while the party was considering 
affiliation. (111) Howeverg there is no evidence to suggest 
that such a purge was carried out on any significant scale 
and sinceg in the past, PUS dissidents had usually found 
some way of makin, - their views known either through the 
established press or through newspapers of their own creationg 
the absence of any signs of such activity inakes it reasonable 
to assume that little real opposition existed& Indeedq even 
tf, ough the FOj instructed its newspapers to publish the 21 
(109) Hernan Ramfrez . ýecochea Ori. -en y Formfict6n del Par- 
tido Comunista do Chilef (S: ntiarrog 1965) PPI'5-7. 
(110) Snrique Ufaz Vera carried out a rather desultory cam- 
paign against the new PCCh in La Regi6n I'Anora. 
Coronel. 
(111) La Comuna, 
-Vifia 
del ýiarq 1.1.1921. 
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Conditionso(112) which the Third Communist International 
laid down for membership and discuss the issues involved. 9 
only oneq 81 Socialista, of Antofagasta did so in a system- 
atic mannerg suggesting that most local parties felt there 
was little need to convince the membership. (113) 
The factors which made the decision to join the 
Third International (Comintern) basically non-controversial 
seem clear enough. From its foundationg the FOS had shown 
strong commitments to revolutionary change and to working 
class internationalism and by 1920 both commitments seemed 
better served by association with the Third Internationalp 
the product of man's latest attempt to achieve the millent- 
ump than with the Second Internatiortall which had failed to 
meet the challenge of the First World War* Although the POS's 
initial reception of the November Revolution in Russia had 
been mixed - in contrast to the unqualified enthusiasm with 
which it had greeted the fall of the Tsar - by the beginning 
of 19189under the guidance of Recabarren (whose absence in 
(112) 'fl, (- ?I Gon(litLons were aimed at differentiatOia 
1-ietween the members of the Comintern and their 
roformist, social deviocratic riv-als. Phe (; ondittLons 
included the acceptance of' democratic centralism 
(see Aý-)peridlx A for ail explanation of this colle. of)t)f 
the purring of reformists and reformism, agitation 
amongst t1he Peasantry and the armed forces and the 
defence of the Soviet Union* 
(113) La Comuna of Viflaq published until June 19219 
important because of its proximity to the CEN9 did 
not publish the 21 Conditions let alone discuss 
them. 21YIIA( published the 21 Conditions once and 
Printed a few articles on them while Federaci6n 
Obrera published t'he Conditions four iiines ane-!, -ade 
some attempt to discuss the issues involved - but 
only between Au, cýust and mid-October 1921. At the 
same ti'lle, all POS newspapers gave glowinT accounts 
of events in Russia. 
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Argentina at the end of 1917 probably accounts for the POSIs 
uneven response) the POS was giving the Bolsheviks 
equally enthusiastic and almost entirely uncritical sup. 
port. (114) Thuag the as yet untarnished reputation of 
the Russian Revolution was a powerful factor in persuading 
the FOS to join the Third Internationalo Secondlyl the 
prestige and Influence of Recabarren was a key factor in 
the decision. By 1920# Recabarren was not only the unchal- 
lenCed leader of the POS but also the most prominent and 
respected working class leader in Chile* The Socialists 
who cared to challenge his decisions and recommendations 
openly were few and such was his stature in the working class 
movement as a whole that it is unlikely that any successful 
Communist Party could have been founded in Chile at that time 
had he opposed the idea* Finally# Recabarren and the POS 
leadership were careful to make the decision to join the 
Third International as easy as possible* Fulfilment of the 
21 Conditions was to be deferred until circumstances permit. 
ted and so the change of the POS's name was not to be accom. 
panied by any drastic changes in the way the party functioned 
or conducted Its buainess, (115) Indeedq the decision to 
affiliate to the Third International was presented and seen 
as a gesture of sympathy for the Russian Revolution rather 
than a step which would fundamentally transform the nature 
of the party* 
(114) For articles hostile to the Bolsheviks and the Novem- 
ber Revolution (mainly reprinted from foreign news- 
papers) 306 DTIQ 21-10-19171 10-11-1917; 13-12-1917- 
(115) La Comunap Vifta del Marg 1.1.1921. 
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lhe the rornot tll, '- (It-le s Lion of a Cf iILati on a rou s ed 
strong opposition in some sectors of the PC39 few stuns of 
it are evident in the official published accounts of the 
Rancagua Party Congress. (116) There, in the oresence 
of a Comintern delegate from the Argentine Communist Party, 
the POS unanimously approved a motion affiliattnp the party 
to the Third International. Although Hidalgo and others 
apoarently onposed a further motion changing the POSta name 
(a change demanded by the 21 Conditions) thisq toop was 
approved and on January lstq 19229 the PCCh formally came 
into existence. (117) 
(116) See, El Socialistat Antofagastap 12.1.1922; 13-1.22. 
(117) Ibid. 12.1.1922. Ramfrez Necochea has allerred that Hidalgo was opposed to affiliation (q_riffI2_nq P187-8)- Hidalgol howeverg has denied this althou., ýh he ad- 
mitted that he did oppose tbe chanpe of name. Article by Wilfredo , jayorgaj, Ercý_*Ilap 6antialTol, 21.4.1965. 
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Chapter 2 The Early Years, 1922-1927 
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In terms of national politics, the demise of the 
Parliamentary Republic and the re-emergence of the Armed 
Forces as the active arbiter of the nation's destiny were 
clearly the most striking developments which Chile ex- 
perienced between 1922 and 1927* The military golpes of 
September 1924 and January 1925 brought the Armed Forces 
into politics In a way not seen since the early nineteenth 
century and initiated a process which culminated in four 
years of dictatorial rule after the election in 1927 of a 
serving Army officers Colonel Carlos Ibafiez del Campog to 
the Presidency of the Republic* Important though these 
events were for the fortunes of the PCCh9 others had an 
equal impact on its development* The suicide of Recabarren 
in December 1924 left the PCCh without a dominant leader at 
a time of great political turbulence whileg more important 
stillp the closer interest which the Comintern began to 
display in the internal affairs of its Latin American 
affiliates in the mid-1920s brought changes which were to 
have lasting consequences for the PCCh. 
While Recabarren livedq howeverg the PCChO9 poli- 
ciesl tactics and organisational practices remained those of 
the POS9 adopted with little change. Revolutionary rhetoric 
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continued to go hand-in-hand with reformist policies and 
actions and the FCCh's attitude towards the g-overntrent of 
Alessandri and the September 1924 rolpe which displaced it 
clearly demonstrated that the PCCh had not acquired a 
revolutionary strategy along with its now name. 
5ince, Alessandri had come to power in 19209 he had 
been confronted by a hostile conservative iuajority in the 
Senate which used its powers to block his reform propramme 
and to make government as difficult as possible* Even 
though Alessandri managed to arrange the election of a 
Con! ýress which was nominally in his favour in March 1924, 
he had by that time so alienated some of his erstwhile sup- 
porters that the new Congress proved little more tractable 
than the olde(l) At various stages of their conflict 
both Alessandri and his opponents had approached the 
Armed Forces with the aim of persuading them to act in 
their respective favourse In the eventp the younger and 
more junior officersq who provided the motor force for the 
September 5th golpeg acted on their own initiative and for 
their own conception of the national interest* They forced 
Congress to pass much of Alessandrits reform programme but 
they refused to hecome the docile tools of the President 
who resigned his office and fled the country. (2) 
(1) Frederick i. i. Nurin Uhilean Politics 1920-1931 T)52-')3. (2) Ibid. rp55-66. 
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The POCh's attitude towards Alessandri an(I his 
opponents before jepteii, ber 1)24 was no different from that 
of the 110. i. In 19209 after first presenting Recabarren as 
a protest candidate in the elections for tile Electoral Col- 
leget the POS decided to support Alessandri in the second 
stage of the presidential election. It liad done so not 
out of any real belief in his merits but because his can- 
didacy appeared to present at least some possibility for 
radical change while his opponentis presented none. 
(3) 
Furthermoreq FOS support for Alessandri offered a prospect 
of receiving the cooperation of the Alianza Liberal in the 
1921 congressional elections in return. (4) Soon after 
Alessandri took up office he gave ample proof thatq for all 
his populist rhatoricp he was little better disposed towards 
working class aspirations than his predecessors. The FOS 
retreated into a po6ition of hostile neutrality towards his 
government and its right-wing opponents, a position which 
the PCCh took over without change* Thusq the PCCh stood on 
the side-lines in the conflict between Alessandri and the 
Senate and whilet at times, it appeared to veer towards 
supporting one side and then the other, it exhorted its sup- 
porters and the POW to remain aloof from bourgeois conflicts 
(3) Article by E4UI6 in W jocialistag Antofa7asta, 
14.8.19209 'Barros 0 Alessandril. 
(4) The POS rejected a formal pact with the AliaLiza 
Liberal at its 1920 National Co"gress - but hotli 
Victor Cruz and Aecabarren had local agreements with 
Alianza Liberal parties in the Warch 1921 congres- 
sional elections. El Jocialistaq Itofavastat 
11.6.1920; 12.6.1920; 3-3-1921.1LLIA 16-1.1921* 
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and preserve the independence of the working class 
movetilent. (5) 
The PCCh maintained this posture during the early 
days of the Sevtember polpe - although the party news- 
paiDers gave voice to a variety of emotionsq ranginp from 
hopes for revolutionary change to a deep forebodinp, that a 
wilitary dictatorship was iinwinent. (6) Howeverg when the 
military movement Issued a manifesto on September Ilth 
declaring that the Armed Forces would respect civil liber- 
tiesq that they intended to *abolish gangrened political ane 
to call a Constituent Assembly to frame a new Con3titutiong 
the PCCh's attitude changedo(7) The intention to 'abolish 
gangrened politics' struck a responsive chord amonpst broad 
sectors of Chileans and Recabarreng for his partq seems to 
have been particularly enthused by the prospects for radical 
change in general and for a Constituent Assembly in parti- 
cular. Taking the military's slotran that the 'moment is 
of creation and not of reaction' Recabarren called on the 
PCCh and the FOCh to help the Dillitary to implement the 
promises they had made. (8) Recabarren and other leading 
Communists like Hidalgo and Luis Victor Cruz began to 
actively encourage support for the military movement and 
its goals by addressing public meetings in the company of 
army officers, (g) But caution was not thrown entirely to 
(5) Federaci6n Obrera 15-3,1923. 
(6) Seev for examples DT14 5.9-1924; Justicia 7.9-1924; 
La Defensa Obreraq Tocopilla (hereafter cited as 
DOT) 7.9-1924. 
(7) Justicia 13.9.1924. 
(8) Ibid* 
(9) Ibid. 16.9.1924; 13.9-1924. 
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the winds; Recabarren only pledged the supnort of the 
workers in so far as the military redeemed their pledges 
and the party press expressed some doubts as to the wili- 
tary's ability and sincerity. (10) Furthers criticisms 
of Vie military movement and the Junta do rsobierno 
(com- 
x)osed of senior officers)q which had taken over after 
Alessandri's departure, wero not slow in cominp. By the 
end of September relations between the PCCh ani the Junta 
had grown noticeably cooler and on October 29th the FOChq 
by tI-en completely under Cot-Limunist controls issued a ti)ani- 
festo which accused the Junta of failinl,. - to keep its pro- 
mises and of betraying the goals of the militnry move- 
ment. (11) The FOCh made an appeal to thepunger ideali- 
stic officers to recover the control of the military move- 
ment from their more senior and conservative collea: 'Irues in 
tI, e Junta do Gobierno - anDeals which were cautiously 
repeated in the final months of 1924. (12) 
Although the PCCh showed itself to be indecisive 
and laclcimz- in a revolutionary strategy in the early 1920sq 
tbe choices before it were by no means easy. The PCCh's 
neutrality in the conflict between Alossandri and his 
opponents in tIe Senate sterumed from an understandable dis- 
like and distrust of both sides and from a realistic 
appreciation of the PCCh's weakness and the strength of 
(10) Ibid. 11.9.1924; 
(n) Ibid. 31-10.1)24. 
(12) Ibid. 8-11.1924; 
13.9.1924; 17.9.1924. 
JOT 16.12.1))24. 
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Alessandrils popular appeal. Similarly, the caution which 
the PCCh showed towards the military movement is equally 
understandable given that movement's initial lack of defini- 
tion and the role which the Armed Forces had played in the 
suppression of strikes and workers' organisations in the 
recent past* Even sog the suspicion remains that the PCCh 
was lacking in revolutionary resolve and consequence - 
although official PCCh historians have identified the early 
years of the party as being a period of 'revolutionary 
infantiliaml. (l: )) The Communists did believe that revolu- 
tion was both imminent and inevitable but they do notap- 
pear to have felt the need to take actions which would 
hasten the millenium. Thusy at various stages during the 
political crises of the early 1920s, the PCCh expressed its 
determination to avoid civil war at all costs while the 
FOCh9 when approached by the PR to launch a general strike 
against the military in the early days after the September 
golpeg insisted on guarantees, Firstp it demanded a large 
sum of money to feed the strikers andq secondq legitimacy -a 
strike call from Congress - before it would act, (14) From 
the beginning the PCCh appears to have been ruled by its 
hard-headed caution rather than its revolutionary romanticism. 
If the PCCh did not immediately acquire a revolu- 
tionary strategy on its foundationg neither did it possess 
(13) Ramfrez Necochea origen, PP255-278. (14) Carlo3 Vicufta Fue 
-3 
La Tiranfa on Chilegl3ppl5g-161. 
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the organisational structures and T)ractices anpronriate to 
a party intent on decisive revoluti. onary actiono Until 
1926, when the PCCh formally adopted the cell and democratic 
centralism as its organisational normsq the PCCh remained a 
rather loose association of sectionss composed of eleven or 
more members who met periodically in open assemblies and sent 
delegates to a Junta Federal which co-ordinated party activi- 
ties at the provincial level. (15) Maximum authority in 
the party was invested in the national party congress which 
delegated adminstrative powers to a Comitig U(tcutivo 
Nacional, (CEN)q which did not attempt to apply a rigrid 
military-like discipline to the other orpanisations but 
left the solution of thorny problems to the national con- 
gresseso Despite the absence of a strict hierarchical 
disciplineg most sections did follow the lead given by the 
CEN - andq at this stage of its developmentg the pnrty may 
have been helped rather than hindered by the absence of ripid 
discipline since it permitted the fairly peaceful coexistence 
of different currents of opinion until the national party 
congress was able to pronounce one way or anothero 
The PCCh not only mirrored the POS in its organisa- 
tion. but also in its overwhelming pre-ocoupation with elec- 
toral matters* After the orocess of convertinp the POS sec- 
tions into PCCh organisations had been completed in 1922 - 
a process whichp in goneralv was accoi; plished rapidly and 
with little resistance - the PCCh lapsed into a letharpy 
See Appendix A for an explanation of the cell and democratic centralism. 
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worthy of any Chilean party between elections* By the end of 
19229 the C&i PUCh was cowplaining that it was unable to 
assemble the five wenibers necessary to constitute a quorum 
and in January 19239 it excluded two of its membersp who had 
been lax, in attendance, to reduce the size of the quorum. (16) 
Even Recabarreng admittedly absent in kAoscow attending the 
Fourth Comintern Congress between November 1922 and February 
19239 did not become active in a local soction until karch- 
1923- 
on iiecabarren's return from i,. oscow - and with the 
approach of the 'Narch 1924 Congressional elections - there 
was an upsurge of party activitye Propaganda centresq com- 
posed of five or more memberay began to proliftrate and in 
bantiago and elsewhere Comites Centrales Administrativos(CCA) 
began to co-ordinato party activities in their respective 
areas* Indeedq by njid-19239 the CEN had found it necessary 
to restrict the powers of the sections to create now organi- 
sations such was the confiision caused by thoir rapid mush- 
rooming and even quicker dedline, (17) Neverthelessq the 
number of FCCh organisations increased ranidly during 1923. 
In July 1922 the FCCh had claimed 16 sections spread throur,, h- 
out the country but in December 1923 it claimed 70-(18) 
Howevery by September 1924, this fieure had fallen to 58 
and of t1jese only 38 were considered active. (19) Although 
the increase in the number of sections would appear to 
indicate a significant growth of party membership during 
(16) El Conjunistap Antofagastag 18,2.1923- 
(17) Federaci6n -0hrera 10.7-1923. 
(13) id. 21-7*1922; 31.12.1923- 
(19) justicia 30-9. L)24. 
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19239 Comintern statistics suggest that PCCh membership 
remained around 29000 between 1922 and 1924*(20) 
While the majority of the PCCh sections tended to 
be pre-occupied with largely internal propagandisingg with 
battles for sectional office and with electoral mattersq 
some took a more active part in the working class problems 
of their areas, This was particularly true of the powerful 
provincial parties of Antofagasta and Iquique but some sec- 
tion3 in Santiago also became active in renters$ leagues and 
in supporting strikes. But on the whole, the accusations 
which the POS had often levelled against the PD - that it 
was an organisation which only showed signs of life at 
elections time - could have been made equally well against 
the PCCh during Its early years. 
One of the main reasons why the PCCh presented 
this appearance was thatq for many Communistsq the FOCh 
tather than the PCCh remained the central focus of their 
attentions and energies. Indeedq given the choice of atten- 
ding important meetings of the PCCh and the FOChq some 
Cowmunists chose to attend the latter and some FOCh members 
elected to the CEN PCCh in 1924 were reluctant to take 
officep in part at leastq because this would reduce the 
time which they could spend on trade union affairao(21) 
Moreoverg the PCCh consciously placed itself in a secondary 
(20) Report of the Fourth Congress of the Corrmun13t 
international (Londong no date) p292. Re ort of 
the Fifth Congress of the Communist International 
(Londong 1924) p269* 
(21) Federacion Obrera 17-12.1923; Justicia. 17, io, 1924. 
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position to the FOCb; members were advised to pay dues 
to the FOCh rather than the FCGh if payment to both was 
financially impossible; (22) the PCCh held its national 
conpresses after those of the FOCh during the early 1920s 
and formally abandoned the elaboration of programmes of 
its immediate demands for those of the FoCh. Finallyg at 
times of national crisis it was the FOCh rather than the 
PCCh which was chosen as the vehicle for Communist declara- 
tions and pronouncements. Indeedq although Recabarren had 
formally rejected the idea of forming a Labour Fartyq during, 
its early years the PCCh appeared to be precisely tLat - 
the electoral and political arm of the countryts most power- 
ful trade union confederation. 
While the PCCh appeared to be the tool of the FCCh, 
formally rejecting party control over the FOCh as inimical 
to the FOCh's role as the oreAnisor of workers of varied 
beliefsq the reverse became increasinply closer to the truth. 
,h 
the PCCh did Althoulp not introduce the fraction technique 
to concert the activities of itsvembors in the FOCh until 
the later 19209 and though there was a complete divorce in 
terms of personnel between the JEF FOCh and the GEN PCCh 
until late 19239 the ascendancy of the Communists in the 
FOCh became Increasingly marked after 1922. (23) 1ndeedq 
Aecabarrenq who occupied national office in neither orx,, anisa- 




(23) See Appendix A for an exnlanation of the fraction. 
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the overall conduct of both through personal couLactsp 
through the columns of Federacifn Obrera andp after July 
1922, through the presence of his cowpaderal Toresa Floresq 
on the JEF FOChe 
During 1922 and 1923* the hold of the Communists 
over the FOCh was strengthened by tho largely negative 
process of a substantial decline in the FCCbOs membership. 
Although the lack of reliable statistics makes the exact 
proportion of this decline difficult to gauge, it seems 
likely that the FOCh's membership fell from around 809000 
in December 1921 to between 209000 and 30000 in late 
1922. (24) It seems probable that this decline levelled 
out at the very least during 1923; estimates of gross 
FOCh membership in December 1923 range from 309000 to 
6OtOOO. (25) Published dues payments indicate a total dues- 
paying membership of some 119000 in December 1923 -a 
figure which showed no improvement until December 1924 when 
12,000 dues payments were recorded. (26) After the steep 
decline In 1922, then, FOCh membership does not appear to 
have shown signs of a revival until late 1924. 
The reasons for the FOChla decline were several. 
Widespread unemploymentg governmental hostility and indif- 
forenceg the desertion of the powerful railway unions In 
(24) Joree 1-jarrfa Seron ý-iovimientos 1, )10-1926 o141; 
llamfrez ýJecoclifaj, OrD-en p93; Icci5n 'Directat 
Santia,, -o, Decomber,, 1922. 
(25) Jorge Ilarrfa 6(, ýr6n i,, oviwic. -ntos 1)10-1926 
FederaciO'n Obr, ýraq 3.1.1924'. 
(26) v4onthly dues paywents rocords shovir an average of 4tOOO dues payers !n early l')'214 aiid 79000 in mid- 1924. Fe(laraci6n Ohrera 1.1.192ý'-P; JusLicia -. 8.24; 
6.12.192T-, - 19-3.1)25; 20.3.1)25- 
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August 1922 and the withdrawal of non-cowmunists, in 
particular anarchists and radical Demottatsp as the 
Communists' grip on national and local FoCh organisations 
strengthened - all contributed to the decline. (27) The 
Communists themselvesp howeverp tended to emphasise ahother 
factor. The Rancagua Convention had decided to reorianise 
the YUGh along industrial rather than craft lines, groupinfý 
the membership in Conscias Industriales based on the wanu- 
facturings food processingg construction, transport or 
public servicos Industries; where this was not possible 
COnse-JOE do Oficlos Varios, were to be formed. (28) 
According to Federacion Obreral the reconstitution of the 
FOCh organisations caused much confusion and conflict which 
led to stagnation and declineo(29) 
Despite the increasing ascendancy of the Communists 
in the FOChq there was still considerable anarchist influence 
both in the FOCh and in the PCCh itself. This influence 
manifested itself in a repugnance towards electoral and 
coalition politics andq on Occasion, e , ave rise to strtipirles 
between local FOCh and PCCh organisations in which the 
protagonists on both sides were Communists, Thuss for exai. ipleq 
in Antofacasta in 19231 the local FOCh led the campaign 
against the leadership of the PCCh section which had joined 
a Provincial Civic Union tog Democratsq , other with Liberal 
(27) 'rho rail unions left because they felt their 
interests were beinq neglected in favour of those 
of the coal and nitrate workers and later joined the 
ISH on their own account. Alan Aný-ell Politics and 
the Labour ýiovewent in Chile (Londong 1971) p36- (28) Zederaqi6n Obrera 9.4.1922. 
(29) Ibid. 17-3.1923. 
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De. mocrats and- dissident tiadicals In order to 
break the hold 
of the PTI over the municipal council. 
('Ikq)) While the PCCh 
profited , -ýreatly from 
its close contacts with the FO'kahq 
one of the disadvantages of the association - and its 
unstructured nature - was that conflicts in one organisa- 
tion tended to spread to the othero 
9y mid-19229 the Junta Provincial(JP) of the FOCh 
In Santiago was showing signs of dissatisfaction with the 
work of the JEF FOChy at that time dominated by its Socialist 
3ecretary General, Carlos Alberto Martfnezq and its Com- 
munist Treasurerg Hidalgo* The JP criticised the JEF for 
being lax in the performance of its d"ttesq for proceeding, 
arbitrarily in declaring four of its seats vacant and for 
refusing to dismiss two JEF FOCh employees. (3X) The 
friction between the JP and the JSF increased when Hidalgo, 
standing as the Communist candidate in a congf-essional 
by-election in Santiagog was accused of making an electoral 
pact with the Conservative candidate, Tizzoni. Althourh 
Mdalgo dented the charle he was expelled from the Santiapo 
section of the PCCh for a five-year period. 02) Howeverp 
the two JEF employees, whom the JP had been trying to ro- 
move since the Rancanua Convention (possibly because they 
were not Communists) were accused of having worked openly 
on behalf of Tizzoni - an offence which so incensed one 
FOCh activist, Castor Vilarinp that he forcibly ejected 
(30) El Comunistas Utofagastag 23-3-1923; 4.4.1923; 
15.4.192-3; 25.4.1923; 26.4.1923; 16.9.1923. 
(31) Federacify Obrera 28.6.1922; 5-7-1922; 10-7-1922; 
22-7-1922. 
(32) Ibid. 24-7-1122. Uidalgo was readmitted to the PCCh 
in December 1923. 
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tbein from the J&F headquarters at pistol ooint. Vilarfn 
was suimijarily expelled for this offence. (33) The two 
strands of the conflict came toý-ether at a FOCh orovincial 
convention in Santiago where Vilarfn and his allies launched 
a full-scale attack on Martfnez and llidalgog attemptinp to 
prove that they had less riebt to sit on the JEF than the 
members they had excluded. (34) Although the attack failed 
and the JEF's decisions were upheldg in the elections held 
to fill the vacant seats one of the members who hAd been 
excluded from the JEF9 Ernesto Gonzalezq was re-elected 
with the second largest number of votes. More interestiný, Jv, 
the person who received most votes was Teresa Flores who 
duly took up her seat on the J0.05) 
, ests 
thatq in The appearance of Teresa Flores sugp 
face of the attacks which sobe of his older colleagues 
were experiencingg Recabarren had decided to take a more 
active part in FOCh affairs. Indeedq in the light of later 
events - and the personalities involved - itseems likely 
that the incidents in Santiago in mid-1922 constituted the 
first round in a conflict between younger activists of anar- 
chist leanings and the older generation of party leaders - 
a conflict which culminated in a full-scale assault an the 
leadership of Recabarren and his closest associRtes at the 
National Party Congress in Vifta in Septeinber 1924. 
(33) Ibid. 2.7-1922. 
(34) Ibid- 3.8-1922; 4.8*1922; 5.8.192290 8.3.1922; 
922 
(35) Ibid. 5.10-1922. 
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Although relations between the JP FuCh and the JKY 
continued to be strained after mid-1922, it was differences 
over electoral tactics and the PCChts failure in the &arch 
1924 congressional elections which occasioned the attack on 
the bld guard' at the September 1924 Party Congresso(36) 
For those elections, Recabarren argued that the PCCh should 
be allowed to pact with any party sincep as representatives 
of the bourgeoisie, they were all equally bado(37) The 
National Party Congress, hold in Chillan in December 1923, 
endorsed this policy wiLh the Proviso that pacts should have 
the approval of the GBA, which was enjoined 'not to lose 
sight of the morality of our prooramme or the concept of 
the class strugglele(A) In the eventg because of 
Alessandrils unscrupulous efforts to pack Congress with his 
own supporters, the PCGh failed to elect a single candidate 
although it polled its largest number of votes to date, (39) 
In an atmosphere of electoral defeatp not unlike that which. 
prevailed in the PD prior to the emergence of the POS, the 
ViRa Congress took place*(40) 
The immediate object of the attacks of the youngerg 
more left-wing activists at Vifta was not Itecabarren himself 
(36) For evidence of continuiriF tensioti I)otweoti t1in 
and Jý? zWitiagoq see Yederaci6n Obrera 25-1.1923; 
25.9-1923; 24.6.1924. 
(37) Ibide l#Ool923o 
(38) IXrlý 13o2.1924o 
(39) iee Ricardo Donoso op. cito 1. PP350-372 for an 
account of the 1924 elections. PCýýoh candidates 
polled some 13,000 votes compared to 5,000 in Iarch 1921. Federaci6n 07-)rera 7o3-192ý; 14. '3.1,924. No 
official statistics exist for the 1924 elections 
but it seems likely that under 200,000 votes were 
cast. 
(4o) 6ee Justicia 30.9.1924 to 16.10.19214 for Llhe official 
reports oýi the lVia Con: ýress. 
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but Luis Victor Cruzq a close associate of Recabarren and 
his colleaCue In the legislature. In the 1924 electionsg 
Cruz had stood as the Communist candidate in Valparafsov 
had made a pact with the PA andq worse still, had been 
implicated in the use of purchased votes. Since the CEN 
had approved the pact and had been directly represented on 
Cruz's election committeeg it was held to be doubly 
guilty. (41) After a long and heated debateg in which 
the vote on Cruz's punishment was taken nine times, Cruz 
was suspended for three years while others received sen- 
tences ranging from permanent expulsion to more limited 
periods of exclusion. (42) The Congress's leftist coin- 
nlexion was also reflected in resolutions which called on 
members not to have anything to do with bourgeois elenjerits it, 
or out of power and in a series of measures designed to pre- 
vent the PCCh's municipal councillors (some 20 were elected 
in April 1924) from falling Into reformist errors. (43) 
Interestingly enouphp the Congress appears to have accepted 
Recabarrents resolutions on the September military coup 
without opposition, 
The major party problems apparently settledg 
Recabarren left for Santiago before the Coneress*s formal 
closure and before the elections for a new C6N had been 
held* Before he had leftq howeverg Rocabarren had approved 
seven candidates for the new CEN - butq in Ihis absenceg 
(41) DOT 14.1o. 1924. 
(42) Ibid. 9-1091924. 
(43) Ibid. 1-5-1924; Justiciai 13.10.1924. 
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only three of the seveng one of whom was I)iriself . were 
elected* The remaining four new Cý., A members included 
Ernesto Gonzalez and others who had led or supported the 
attack on the told Guardt. (44) Aecabarren reacted fierce- 
ly to the prospect of being outnumbered on the C3N: he 
refused to accept his own seat and embarked on a campaign to 
destroy the now CENe In public circulars to the sections 
he claimed tha t the now C-EN was composed of persons 1who 
lacked the experience and the capacity to face up to the 
responsibility of their officot. (45) 1-iore privately, 
he enumerated the individual failings of each member which 
ranged from idleness and a total lacic of ability to boine., 
tunculturedg ignorant and grossly petulantt. (46) 
Recabarren specifically rejected their claims that they 
were young left-wing idealists and declared that this youth- 
ful group had contributed nothing to the partyq that their 
left-wing ideals were non-existent and tbat all they had 
was a profane desire for personal power. (47) For tbeLr 
part, the Vifta rebels attacked Recabarren for delusions of 
grandeur and re-iterated their determination to defeat the 
'old guard' which had been responsible for the party's 
electoral failure; they would not rest until the Opacttst 
conventionalism' of the party bureaucracy had been swept 
(4ß) away. 
(44) Justicia 3-10.1924; 4.10.1924. 
(45) Ibid. 6.1o. 1924. 
(146) Ibid. 7.10.1924. 
(47) Ibid. 15-10.1924. 
(43) Ibid* 17-10.1924. 
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The passionate exchanges between Recabarren and the 
Vifta insurgents in the party press came to an end in mid- 
October 1924 and# a little laterg the old CEN elected at 
Chillan called for fresh elections to be hold in the 
sections throughout the country to select a now CEN*(49) 
These elections were hold on November 30th and members were 
asked to select from a list of some thirty candidateaq 
vatted by the Santiago section to ensure thatp unlike some 
of those elected at Viffas they met the seniority require- 
mentq laid down by party regulations*(50) By that timep 
toog the Santiago section had suspended or expelled some 30 
members who were deemed to be responsible for the recent 
conflicto(51) The now CEN formally announced at the end 
of December Included four members who had been militants 
in the old FOS since 1912 or 1913; Recabarron himself was 
also re-olectedo(52) By the end of the yearg thong the 
triumph of Recabarren and the told guard' was complete* 
Ramfroz Necochea has suggested that the Vifla 
insurgents were 'inspired' by Hidalgo and that the CEN 
elected at ViA& was dominated by his adherentoo(53) How- 
everg while Hidalgo had been - and would continue to be - 
the stormy petrel of Chilean Communismq the Vifia rebels 
(49) Ibid* 24.1091924. 
(50) See DrIQ 21-11.1924 for this list of candidates* 
(51) Justicia 2.12.1924. Many of those disciplined had 
already withdrawn from the party in protest against 
Recabarren's activities; ibid. 4.11,1924. (52) Ibid- 31-12*1924. The now CEN included Galvarino 
G119 Lino Paniaeuaq Carlos A* SepUlvedaq Tomas 
Conellis L. E. Guzmanq Recabarrang Roberto Salinast 
So Barra Wolle Guzmalnq Conelli and Barra Woll had 
joined the POS in 1912; Gil in 1913e DTIQ 21,11*24. 
(53) Ramfrez Necochea Origen, PP195-199- 
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almost certainly did not draw any political inspiration 
from 
him at this point although, laterg it is true that some 
became prominent TrotskYists with Bidalgo. After allq 
Hidalgo*s habitual failing appears to have been a propensity 
for 'Collaborationism' with bourgeois groups and parties 
and if the ViRa rebels stood for anytbing at all it wig an 
omponents of stich behaviour. iýjoreoverg amart froin an aside 
in Lafertte's autobiographyg there is little direct evidence 
to suggest that Recabarren's relations with Aidalpo were 
anythine but harmoniouso(54) They had ap-oarently worked 
together well enough on Federaci6n Obrera In the early 
19209 and Alecabarren appears not to have objected when 
Hidalgo petitioned for re-admission to the PCCh in December 
1923-(55) Tbusq while Hidalgo and Recabarren certainly 
had their differences - over the change of t1, e POS's name, 
for example - there is no evidence to suf-, gest a bitter 
clash of personalities. Rýcabarren himself had no doubts 
whatsoever as to the architect of the assailit upon his 
leadersbip; he named Castor Vilarfn. (56) Vilarfn publicly 
admitted his guilt In a scathing letter in which be indicted 
tthe bureaucratsp the writinp-desk activists and those 
who believe that thirty years of strupele concede infallibi- 
lity' and terminated with an appeal to ISanta Teresa de las 
Florest to intercede on his behalf before the Ksar of the 
PCCh1*(57) It may be remembered that VilarAq not one to be 
(54) Elfas Lafertte Vida do un comunista (. ýantiapo, 1957) 
P159. 
(55) Federaci6n Obrera 4.1.1924. 
(56) Justicia 17-10-1924. 
(57) 
. 1-. T) i cl . 
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parsimonious in his attacks on those in authority in the PCCII 
and the FOCbj had delivered vigorous attacks on Ridallo in 
1922, Thus, while it is not possible to dismiss Ramfrez 
Necochea's suggestion out of handp it seems likely that in 
this particular casep lidalgo was not the villain of the 
piece. 
Although Recabarren was clearly winning his strup7le 
against the Virla insurýTents by mid-December 1924t on Decem- 
ber 19thq at approximately 7 a. m. 9 he committed suicide 
with an automatic pistol which he had boupht on his recent 
travels in liussia. The event caused consternation and dis- 
may inside the PCCh and the FOCh and such was Recabarrents 
stature that almost all political parties and national itows- 
papers publicly regretted his passing. Inside the Chilean 
workinf; class movementp the circumstancos of his death ands 
in particularl the several bullet wounds in his head FAnd body 
gave rise to the rumour that he had been murdered -a rumour 
whichq according to Lafertteg the PR urgnd the PCCh to en- 
courage as a prelude to latmhinp, a goneral Insurrection 
a-ainst the military Junta do Gobiern -(58) 10 The PCCh and the 
FOCh. howeverg had no stomach for such an adventure and set 
about calming the fears and disquiet which Recabarren*s death 
had caused by creating a joint commission to report on his 
suicide. In the published abbreviated version of this re- 
(58) Elfas Lafertte op. cit. ppl65-166. Juan Chacon, 
howeverg has clainted that the idea came from young 
officers who proj*ised to b, -Acl< the insurrection with their troops. JosC i'ý, ip,, uel Varas Chac6n (3antjap , og 1963) PP51-52- 
" 79 " 
portq it was established that Recabarren had been suffering 
from a progressive neurological coniplaintg the symptoms 
of which were excruciating nains in the head and eyes - 
pains which had made him increasingly irascible in the 
final months of his lifeo(59) It was also established 
that Recabarren had told his Closest associates that he 
would end his life when he felt that his mental powers were 
failing him andq indeedp that he had made a previous sui- 
cide attempt on August 30thl 1924. (60) If this was the caset 
the suggestions made by various commontators that he was 
dismayed and disillusioned by the workors' reaction to the 
military polpe and driven to desperation by his opponents 
inside the party appear to have little to do with h13 
deatho(61) His illness and the imminent break-tip of his 
relationship with Teresa Flores (62) appear to have beon 
the basic reasons for his suicide - although he probably 
was affected by the additional physical and montal strain 
of the burden of national events and party affairs durinf- 
the last months of his lifoo 
The death of Recabarren roarked the and of an era 
for the PCCho In the months which followed, events were to 
thrust the PCCh more firmly into the mainstream of Chilean 
political life and the partyls increasingly close contacts 
with the Comintern were to produce changes which 3ub3tan- 
tially altered the PCCh's character. It is by no mpans 
(59) DTIq 22.1,1925. 
(60) Ibide 
(611) nies 0. I-Iorris Los eliLes,, los intelectuales y el 
consenso n? -05, lisýs scline. of those stj-ýestions. (62) interview with J. cle La C. Leyýonq 3ajjLiat,, oj, ýarch 1973- 
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certain that Recabarren would have survived eitber set of 
experiences with his standing and reputation in the Cbilean 
working class inovement unimpaired. 
By the end of 19249 it had become clear to tbe 
younger and more progressively-rpinded officers who had pro- 
vided the impetus for the September 1924 golpe that the 
Junta de Gobierno was no longer worthy of their confid"nce. 
Not only was the Juntn failing to take steps to implement 
the declared goals of the military movement but it seemod 
to be preparing to hand over power to precimely those 
elements whose bitter opposition to Alessandri's reform 
programme had helped to create the conditions which pre- 
cipitated the September golpe. On January 23rdq the 3ounr 
officersq led by Colonels Carlos IbAftez and Narmaduque 
Grove and urged on by civilian alessandristaSg deposed the 
Junta de Gobiernol reaffirmed their commitments to con- 
stitutional reform and national regeneration and invited 
Alessandri to return to Chile and complete his term of 
office. (63) 
Although Alessandri's arrival in Santiago in March 
1925 ostensibly marked Chile's return to civilian rule and 
constitutional normality, the reality was somewhat different* 
The 1833 Constitution was in aboyancep Congress was closed 
(63) For the devolo-oments leaditir up to the Jam. tary 
1925 couzo se-9 Oarlos Charlin -)el- Avi6n-toi-o i Ia A8PUbliCa Socialista (6alltiagoq 1972) PT)5()-()9; 
lot? i'redericlc -4ujjn op. cit. 0 Pr)67-87; Carlos A,,. J. -lez 
Ai -ecuerdos de un ýoldado (jantia, -09 19-3-'ý4; I vols. ) 
1,1 ia ý1),,, o! r7- 
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and civil liberties rested on the tender mercies of the 
military. Similarlyq as Alessandri himself recognised on 
more than one occasiong his ability to govern rested on his 
loyalty to the declared goals of the military movement. (64) 
Noreovers although Alessandri had insisted that the military 
went back to their traditional duties and preoccupations 
as the pro-condition of his own return, he soon found that 
he had need of military support 5 overcome the resistance 
of those who opposed his constitutional reforms. Finally, 
in the months after Alessandri's return, another factor 
making for the continued involvement of the military in 
politics emerged - the presidential ambitions of Colonel 
IbaAezq the principal spokesman and leader of the young 
officers. 
Alessandrits overwhelming concern in the months 
which remained of his Period of office was to frame and 
promulgate a now constitution which would end the abuses 
of the Parliamentary Republic once and for a116 Yhen this 
tasic had been completed he no longer felt obliged to toler- 
ate the increasingly assertive military intervention in his 
conduct of the Covornmente In September 19259 when Colonel 
IbaTfiezq who held a cabinet seat as Minister of Wars allowed 
his name to go forward as a prosidential candidate it, the 
forthcoming presidential elections and refused to resign 
from cabinet as convention detrandedt Alossandri handed over 
(64) See, for example, Arturo Alessandri Recuerdos do 
Gobierno (Santiagop 1967; 3 vols. ) Wo PIT8. 
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power to his old rivalq Barros Borrofioq and resigned once 
again. (65) Ibafiez was eventually forced to drop his 
presidential candidacy in the face of opposition from the 
Navy and disgruntlement amongst some sectors of the Army. 
(66) 
however, there is evidence which suggests that he continued 
to intrigue to become president even though lie ha(, been 
forced to withdraw his candidacy* Ile insisted that the 
political parties should choose a single candidate for the 
October 1925 presidential elootionag apparently In the hope 
that they would fail and that he could press his own can- 
didacyg once more, in the name of national unity. When 
this strategem failed and the political parties did manage 
to agree on a single candidate - Emiliano Figueroa Larrafnq 
an eminently respectable if totally unimpressIve product of 
traditional politics - Ibafiez tried another* He encouraged 
the presidential ambitions of Jose" Santos Salasq a military 
doctor and a personal friend who as a reforming Minister of 
Health earlier in the year had won considerable popularity. 
In doing this, Ibafiez apparently hoped that Santos Salast 
who promised sweepine reforms and who was supported by the 
PCCh and by an ad hoc conglomeration of blue and white 
collar organisations (which later formod the Uni6n Social 
Republicano de Asalariados de Chile - usli,, tcii)p would be seen 
by the Armed Forces and the established partios as a powerful 
red menace which Figueroa Larrafn would be incapable of 
(65) Seep ibid. 1Iq pp263-282 for Alessandri's account 
of his resignation. 
(66) Carlos ,. ia'ezp op. cit. 9 119 pp29-31- 
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stonpine. (67) IbShez fplt that this would revive his 
own presidential chances as a transaction candidate butt 
once againg IbSRez miscalculated and both Figueroa Larrafri 
and jantos Salas went to the polls. Although jantos jalas 
received a remarkable Sp091 votesq YQueroa Larrafn romped 
home with 186,187-(68) 
Figueroa Larrafn took office as President of the 
Republic in December 1925 but from the first was at the 
mercy of Ibafiez who remained in the cabinet as ',. 'Linister of 
War* Ibafiez blocked the appointwent of ministers of whom 
he did not approve and took it upon himself to instrudt 
Kinisters of the Interior in thoir duties. At tho same tiltiev 
he continued to consolidate his personal support in the 
Army and worked to undermine the authority of the naval 
chiefs who had blocked his presidential candidacy in October 
1925. (69) By the beginning of 19279 Ibafioz was ready to 
act. Ile forced the resignation of the ýJnistor of the 
Interior and arranged his own appointment to tbat office* 
From that positiong in early February 19279 lie launched the 
first of many waves of persecution arainst his political 
opponents. In April 1927p Figueroa Larrafn resignedg dis- 
gusted at last by the political persecution which had touched 
(67) Carlos Vicufia ". 
_ cit. f 
119 PPBO-85 makes out a case 
along these lines and Carlos j6ez op. cit. $ 119 r)l, )33- 36 tends to agree v,, Lth him. lbafiez himself clai'mcd 
that his actions were dictated by circums-ances ar)d 
not ambition: Lttis (; orrea Prieto Sl Prosidente 
Ibafiez (jantiaf--ol 1926) pf)1-12-120.11,11t 11)'TileztS 
Claill's to patriotic disinLorest aro not ; Altoý,, etlier 
convin C ing. , tfiez Probably ri, -* as Nuno has stp,;, e: itWq it, a simj: )ly did not luiow wliaL L(: ) do in October 1-)? 5; 
OP- ci ý, Pl 05- (68) Julio U sar Jobet, Tý. 'l Partido Socialista cis Chile ( ýantia,, 7oq 19-11; 2 volv. T), -)20,29. (69) Carlos Anz oT). cit. , C . ['L 9n r) - 
3-'P7; Carlos Vtrijfia 
1"11prites, On. cit. t II, rnlr, -90. 
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his family and intimates, and handed over to IbSiFtez as Vice 
President. The following month Ibadez organised his own 
election to the Presidencyq polling an unsur"rising 
of tbe votes cast. (70) The remaining 21 were shared 
between a handful of candidatesq aTon, them one Communist, 
Elfas Lafertte, who by tbat time was already a detainee on 
the Island of Ao Afuera. (71) 
Although as late as January 16th, 1925p one cEiý 
memher bad been urging the workers to stand aloof from 
bourgeois conflictsi the CEN greeted the January 23rd coup 
with almost uqqualified enthusiasm. (72) The different ini- 
tial reactions of the C9N to the second Colpe, in part at 
leastp may have been tbo result of the emergence of Hidalgo 
as the PCChts most Prominnnt leader after the death of 
Recabarren. Howeverp since the CEN was still dominated by 
recabarrenistas and since the narty had been urping the 
young officers to recover control of their movement while 
Recabarren bad been alive, it is by no means certnin that 
the CEN would have responded differently had he survived* 
Indeed) while Hidalgo did become the PUCh's most prominent 
public figure, the CEN later claimed that he had always 
acted on their directions*(73) In any overktq once the 
(70) According to La i4acion 
,9 
Jantia? -, og 23.5-19279 1baAez 
polled 2229139 votes to his opponents' 89072* 
3029142 people were eli? -ihle to vote. 
(71) Lafertte received some 29000 votes nationally but 
only 593 from tfie Communist strongholds of Tarapacap 
Antofaý'asta and Concepcion. Ibid. 
(72) Justicia 
, 
16.1.1925. Arti. cle by -'ýalvador ! -ýarri "V*oll; 
ibid. ? ý-1.1925: CEN and FoCh imnifesto. (73) D'Mý 1, ý-1.1926. CEN report for 1925. 
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young officers had actedp the CE, ý POCh and the JEF FOCI, 
promptly pledged its suo-port and even offered to share in 
Fýovernment - an offer which shocked some sectors of the 
party but which was justified by the CEN on the grounds 
that this would be the best way to ensure that the military 
redeemed its pledges-04) The widespread consternation 
which the CENIs actioti apparently caused inside the party 
soon moved it to emphasise that its support for the military 
was a temporary expedientp conditional upon the military's 
perforniance. (75) Aoreoverg in the webIcs which followed, 
the CEN produced an increasingly sophisticated and tvarsuasive 
justification for its position - and in doing sog went some 
way towards evolving a revolutionary strategy. 
According to the CEN9 cooperation with the military 
brought both short and lonp term benefits. In the short 
terniq by supporting the golpe, tile PCCh had helped to al--)ort 
the threat of a handover to right-wing reaction which tbe 
old Junta de Gobierno had been planning andq at the sanie 
timet bad hastened Chile's return to civilian rule and the 
convocation of a Constituent Assembly to prepare a new 
constitution. In the longer term, the CEN arxýued thatq 
given the battle now beinp waged between the bourgeoisie and 
the oligarchyl to attack both combatants and to call for 
ininiediate revolution would only serve to unite both in a 
crusade against the working class movement. In those 
(74) Justicia- 25.1.1925. 
(75) Ibid. 27.1-1925. 
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circumstances, the FCCh's best tactics were to suT)port a 
flank of the bourgeoisie thus waintaininp close contacts 
with the masses who were still under bourpeois infltience. 
When these masses had learnt the emptiness of bouriýents 
reforms and promisesq as inevitably they would, the PCCh 
would be well-placed to harness their disillusion and utilise 
it in the development of the revolutionary strupples. 
Finallyq by maintaining close links with the militaryg the 
party would improve its strategic position in the event of 
civil war and increase the possibilities of providinFr, a 
revolutionary outcome to such a strugele, 06) 
The PCCh appPars to have clunj- fairly nmrsistently 
to this strategy durins momt of 1925t even though It soon 
began to criticise the military movement andf after his 
returnp President Alessandri. Two days after the coup, the 
PCCh belpeV to creite a ComitO Obrera Nacional(CON) in 
Santiagop which was presided over by Midallot and laterg 
similar committees were set up elsewhere in the country. (77) 
The CON, ýwhich included the representatives of a wide range 
of workers' orpnnisations, was especially created to pop"la- 
rise the aims of the military movement but it was by "o means 
the unconditional tool of the military since it maintained 
a constant pressure for the imnlementation of those aill's-(7,9) 
(76) These arguments can be found in JustlcLaq 27-1.1-925; 
29-1-1925; 3.2*1925. The ftillest and most coherent 
explanation of tile CA, ý Is reasons can be f ound in 
Flandera ! 10ja (-iantlaý-o) Year 1, jll)ril 19'25. (77) Justicia 27-1.1925. 
(78) id. 29.1.1925; 12.2.19? 5. 
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Howeverp in early February 19259 the PCCh withdrew its 
official delegate from the CON in an attempt to block the 
admission of other politioal parties to the committAeg 
leaving the exercise of Communist influence : Ln the hands of 
the FOCh representatives. (79) 
In April 19259 the PCChq in pursuance of its stra- 
tegy briefly joined a rather curious coalition of Democrats 
and arcb-conservatiVeS in the Frente Social Reptibli- 
cano(FS3). (80) The FSR bad been created to oppose the 
Frente Unico Civil(YUC). The FUC was formed by Radicals and 
Uonservatives ostensibly to defend civilian rule but wast 
, 
in effectp an expression of opposition to botb Alessandri 
and the military movement. 
Although by il-lay 1925 the FCCh had begun to express 
considerable disillusion both with the military movement 
and the Alessandri Governmont and had begun to call for a 
united front of all i(ago-earners in preparation for the 
elections scheduled for later in the year# It continued to 
maintain a posture of do facto suDport for the admini3tra- 
tion and to maintain close links with certain elements in 
the military movement - even though its confidence in both 
received some rude shocks in Jtjne and July of 1925, (81) 
One of the main reasons why the PCCh had supportod 
the January coup was the promise of an elected Con. -3tittient 
Assetubly which would prepare a new constitution. Indeedg 
(79) Ibido 9*2.19? 5- 
YI-Ad. 26.14,. 1925; Carlos Charlin op, cit- PPIJ-4-11-5- 
jee 4q'S(t4cia, 5.4.1925; 7.4-1925; 16.4.1925; Iýj. 5.? e5 
for early criLicismis of Alessard-I eatid the militarys 
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before Alessandri had returned to Chile the PCCh had called 
a constituent assembly of its owns the Constituyente Chicaq 
in which a wide range of workers$ organisations debated 
the type of constitution they would like to sese(82) 
Howeverg the elected Constituent Assembly promised by the 
military did not materialiss - Alessandri successfully 
arguing that time was too short and that the country should 
be returned to constitutional normality an soon an po3sibleo 
Insteadq Alessandri appointed a consultative commission which 
came to have 121 members - including seven 'communists' - 
but ensured that the real work of framing the constitution 
was done by a small sub-committee of 15 membersq one of whom 
was Hidalgoo(83) Although the PCCh claimed that it had 
influenced the resolutions of the Constituyente Chic& despite 
having been in a minorityq it had little or no influence over 
the now constitution which the Consultative Commission finally 
approved in July 1925. This constitutions which was approved 
under ill-disguised military pressures considerably strength- 
ened the Presidency in relation to the legislaturel it 
removed from Congress the power to remove ministers by votes 
of censures to delay the passage of finance bills and to 
control the presence of troops In Santiago. It also separated 
Church from State# instituted direct elections to the 
Presidencyp extended the periods of office of both the 
Executive and the Legislature and Incorporated some rather 
(82) See ibid. 9 13th-17th March, 1925 for reports on the 
proceedings of the Constituyente Chicae 
(83) According to Donoso opecitev Ip pp417-418; pp422- 4239 seven of the delegates were classified as 
goommunistal - only fourp howevert can be definitely identified as PCCh members at that time - Cruzp Hidalgot Contreras Labarca and Cordoba* 
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vague social principlezo(84) 
The FCCh objected vehemently to the *presidential 
Caesariaml enshrined in the now constitution and ordered its 
supporters to vote for the retention of the old parliamentary 
system in the national plebiscite hold to ratify the now 
constitution, (85) Although other political groups shared 
the PCChIs objectionag the now constitution was approved by 
1279509 votes to 69825. (86) 
Even as the Consultative CommIssion, van meatinigg 
an event occurred in the North whichg under other circum- 
stance3q might have caused the PCCh to revise its strategy, 
In June 19259 nitrate workers in Tarapaca and Antofagaata 
went on strike* Although the reasons for the strike were 
primarily economicp friction between the workers and the 
military administrations of the provinceng which had been 
preparing for a plebiscite on the Tacna/Arica problemp 
provided an explosive element to the dispute. (87) The 
strikep which was accompanied by the usual isolated acts 
of violence towards the managers of the nitrate companies$ 
truck stores and the company policep was dubbed a revolu- 
tionary attempt by the authorities andp with Alessandri's 
blessingg Colonel Ibanez - the Minister of War - ordered the 
troops to restore public order* Estimates of those killed 
(84) See Federico Gil El sistema polftico de Chile(Santiago 
1969) pplO5-8 for-a summary of the r925 Constitution* (8.5) Justicia 7.8.1925* 
(86) Ibid# 3*9elq25* 
(87) Ibide 19.6.1925* Sao alsol Carlos Vicufta Fuentes 
OP* Cites 119 PP38-50. The plebiscite to decide 
whether Tacna and Arica (seized by Chile in the War 
of the Pacific) should be returned to Perug was never 
hold. In 1929, it was agreed that Tacna should 
revert to Peru and Chile should keep Arica. See Luis 
Galdames Estudio do la Historia do Chile (8th odes Santiagos 1938) pp504-506. 
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in the bloodbath which followed range from under one hundred 
to three thousand and the occasion was used to launch a, full- 
scale offensive against the PCCh and FOCh organisations in 
the area. (88) PCCh and FOCh property was seized and des- 
troyed and Communist activists were arrested and deportedo(89) 
Despite the massacre of June 19259 the FCCh did not 
revise its strategy* Why it did not do so is not completely 
clear but it seems probable that the CHN based in Santiago 
felt It could do little more than lodge a formal protest 
against the killings andq indeeds it argued later that its 
passive response had saved the party from even greater per. 
secution and had enabled it to work for the release of 
detained labour leaderse(90) Howevers perhaps the main 
reason for the CEN's determination to continue with the 
strategy it had evolved earlier in the year can be found 
in the approach of the elections scheduled for October and 
November 1925, For those electionss the PCCh evidently 
hoped to maintain links with the military movement and 
profit from the widespread Popularity which the movement 
still enjoyed* Indeedt at that stagev the military were 
still considered to be amongst the fuersas vivas of the nation, 
intent on shaking off the dead-hand of the Oligarchy* 
Certainlyp the PCChIs relations with the military andq in 
particularp with Ibaftez (whose part in the June massacreq 
Justicia had sedately described as a 'gross error') grew 
(88) James 0. Morris op. cit. p209. Even Communist 
estimates varied from 29000 to a few hundred. 
Justicia 15.8.1925; DTIq 14.1.1926. 
(89) Justicia 19.6.1925; 10.7s1925o 
(90) irrl_q 14.1,1926. 
. 91. 
warmer in late 1925*(91) Indeodq the PCCh applauded 
Ibiftez's determination not to comply with the convention 
which demanded that cabinet ministers resign when they 
became presidential candidates and whens after the Octo- 
ber presidential electional Ibaftez offered his resignation 
to Vice-Pregident Barron Borgofto Justicia, waxed lyrical 
in his praiaeo(92) 'Ibaftez .... energeticq spiritualp just 
and trustingeeeha3 been the one man who has known best what 
the country needs at this moment* He has been the only 
one whog with flaming sword in his right handq has pro. 
tected the national treasury from the rodents and the Holy 
Altar of our liberties against the despotsol(93) if 
Justicia was making payment to Ibaftez for his refusal to use 
force to crush a general strike which the PCChg FOCh and 
USRACh had declared to protest alleged irregularities in 
the presidential elections or if it was playing to thegallery 
in preparation for the November congressional elections# 
the FCCh was well rewarded* In those electionag the PCChq 
vith the help of a pact vith the PD and the USRACh, elected 
one senator and six deputies - and in the following year 
in by; aulections elected a further representative to each 
chamber. (94) 
(91) Justicia 27*8.1925; editorial. 
(92) Ibide 2-10-1925- 
(93) Tb--ide 31*10*1925, 
(94) K-nuel Hidalgo (senator); Josi Santos C6rdobaq 
Pedro Reyesq Salvador Barra Wollq Ram6n SepUlveda 
Leals Luis Victor Cruzq Manuel Bart Herreraq Abraham 
Quevedo (deputies) were elected in 1925., Howeverp 
although the PCCh orginally claimed Bartj it soon 
transpired that he was not a party member but a 
FOChista and he later joined the PD* In 1926, Juan 
Luis Carmona was elected to the Senate and Carlos 
Contreras Labarca to the Chamber of Deputies. 
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The posture of support for the military movement 
began to change after the November 1925 elections* From 
the beginning of 1926, the PCCh became increasingly hostile 
towards the military and in April 1926 it delivered the 
first of many trenchant attacks upon lbaftozo(95) By 
October 19269 the PCCh had moved into a position of full 
opposition and had declared that the country was threatened 
by the Imminent danger of a military fascist dictatorshipo(96) 
The PCCh called for the formation of a broad united front 
of workerst organi3ations to combat this threat* Howeverg 
by that timep the PCCh had long lost the opportunity of 
creating such a front# largely because of its hostility 
towards an organisation which the party itself had helped 
to create - the USRAChe The USRACh had originally come Into 
existence to support the presidential candidacy of Jost 
Santos Salas and had attracted the support of a wide range 
of blue and white collar workers$ organisationso After the 
electionsp howeverg some of the leading non-communist mem- 
bers of the USRAChj who included Carlos Alberto Martfnez 
and Oscar -Sc, hnake (both to play important roles in the 
creation of the Partido Socialista do Chile(PS) in the 
19309) saw its potential as the basis for a now party of 
radicalg even socialistp ideology. While the PCCh was not 
unwilling that the USRACh should continue to exist after 
the electionas Suggesting that it became a permanent 
(95) Justicia 12.4.1926. 
(96) lbide 22.10.1926. 
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congress for the working class movements it did not view 
the emergence of a now radical partyppossessing considerable 
popular and working class supports with equanimityo(97) 
The USRAChj the PCCh declared in late 1925p was just another 
patty bourgeois party intent on mystifying the masses* 
Not content with polemicas the PCCh went ahead with the 
creation of a united front organization of its owns the 
UniSn General do Obroros y Empleados, which was intendedq in 
parts to undermine USRACh's working class support* By the 
end of 1926, the hostility between USRACh and the PCCh 
made the creation of a united front difficultq although the 
PCCh made somefroahp if half-heartedg, approaches to the 
USRACh as the dangers of a military dictatorship appeared 
to increase. Howevers although the USRACh became increasing- 
ly critical of Ibafiez and the military movements it seems 
to have retained some faith in their good intentions long 
after the PCCh had lost its own. Thusp the USRACh reaction 
to Iblftezts attacks on parliament and politiciansp which 
became marked after October 19269 was essentially ambi- 
valent - in contrast to the PCCh which called for the defence 
of parliament and the formation of anti-fascist committeex. (98) 
Since important sectors of the PR and PD shared the USRAChts 
ambivalencep when Ib9ftez made his first moves against his 
opponents in February 19279 the PCCh was isolated from its 
most likely allies* 
(97) Ibido 13ol2ol925; lolol926. 
(98) lbido 23olO. 1926; 18*11.1926; 23,, 11.1926; 3.2.19271 
12*2*1927; 1392*1927* 
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Ifq by early 19279 the PCCh was isolated politi. 
cally the FOCh was also in a weakened condition* During 
late 1924 and early 19259 the FOCh had experienced a con- 
siderable revival in its fortunesp partly the result of 
general improvements in the economy and partlyg perhapsy 
because of the hopes for radical change stimulated by the 
military interventions* Howevers although some authorities 
claim that FOCh membership reached the 1009000 mark in 
19259 by early 1926 only some 69000 members were regu. 
larly paying duese(99) The major cause of the rapid 
decline in FOChIs membership was the bloody events of June 
1925 - events which smashed the powerful regional organi3a- 
tions in the North and dealt a savage blow to the FOCh as 
a whole* Recovery after that date was hampered by a re- 
surgence of the country4s economic difficulties and by the 
implementation of now social legislation d6signed to give 
trade unions a legal structuroe(100) While the PCCh 
gru*ngly accepted the now trade uhlon lawsg their uneven 
and unequal application caused considerable confusion and 
confliot, (101) Ironically enoughl an the FOCh's strength 
declinedp the PCCh made its first concerted effort to struo- 
ture its relationship with the confederation. In December 
19259 two JEF FOCh members were elected on to the CEN PCCh 
while in September 19269 the CEN9 following the example of 
(99) Julio Ce-sar Jobet Ensayo Crfticog P172; Justicia 
20.4.1926. 
(100) See, James Oo Morris op, cit. for a study of this 
legislation and its political background* 




the Uruguayan Communi 
Sindical(CCS)*(102) 
and direct party work 
activities of similar 
levels* 
Although the 
at Partyq created a Comisi6n Central 
The CCS was designed to organise 
in the unions and to co-ordinate the 
commissions at the regional and local 
FOCh's strength appears to have de- 
clined dramatically after June 1925t the general political 
effervescence produced by the military intervention had 
enabled the PCCh to extend its influence to other working 
class organisations, In early 19259 anarchist agitationg 
seconded by Communistsq produced Ley 261 which created a 
series of tripartite commis3ions to control rentao(103) 
These commi3aionsl which included representatives of worker3l 
organization3g served as the basis for the revival of a 
traditional form of worker organisation - the Liga de 
Arrendatarione Under the impetus of the now law# the ren- 
ters$ leagues came together to form a Liga Nacional do Arron- 
datarioa, (LNA) in which Communists came to play a prominent 
role. Other workers' organisations in which Communistobs- 
came prominent during the mid-1920s included the Federacign 
Obrera Forrovariat the UniSn do Empleados do Chile(UECh) 
and the Asociaci&n General de Profesoreso 
If the USRACh refused to join a united front with 
the PCCh and the FOCh grew increasingly weakerp the PCCh 
did manage to achieve a degree of cooperation with other 
workers' groups in late 1926. It launched a campaign with 
(102) justicia 28.9.1926. 
(103) Seat 
, 
ibide 5o2*1925 for an account of the events 
which produced Ley 261. 
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anarchist organ13ations against the social security laws 
Lay 40549 whichq it was claimed9served to reduce wages and 
worked in favour of the employers, (104) In January 19279 
the PCCh and its allies launched a general strike against 
the governmentIs failure to solve the problems of the 
working classes* Neither movements howeverp appears to 
have had much success - the January 1927 strike foundering 
under effective police action and the opposition of 
USRACh*(105) 
While the death of Recabarren probably made little 
difference to PCCh policy in early 1925 and while there 
appear to have been no intense power struggles inside the 
national leadership as a result of his disappearancep the 
local organisations did become more forthcoming in their 
criticism of party policy. Varying degrees of opposition 
were expressed by the sections to the CHNIs support for the 
January coupq to its participation in the FSR, to its fail- 
ure to sufficiently condemn the June wassacrep to Its support 
for the Santos Salas presidential candidacy and to its also- 
toral pact with the PD and USRAChe But despite this opposi- 
tiong public criticism of the CEN remained a rare occurrence 
and the CEN was openly challenged only twice during 1925* 
The Antofagastan section vigorously attacked the CEN for 
supporting the *bourgeois reformistf January military 
(ioO Justicia l0oll, 1925o 
(105) 91 Na3ionalistaq Valparaf3ov lat fortnightp Feb. 
1927 for USRACh's position on the January strike. 
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movement whileg later in the yearg the Valdivian section 
claimed that the CENIS support for the military movement 
had resulted in the 'moral death$ of the party and accused 
the national leadership of $shameful bungling$ - worseq in 
its viewq than reformism and collaborationisme(106) 
Despite the evidence of considerable discontent in 
the sections during 19259 the party showed no signs of 
serious fractionalization* This was probably the result of 
a number of factors* Firstlyq the public criticisms of the 
CEN were not accompanied by any attempt to bring it to 
immediate account. Secondlyq the CEN itself adopted a 
conciliatory attitude towards dissidence in the party* 
Indeedq one of the first steps it took was to organise a 
poll of the sections to have the sanctions placed on Cruz 
and others at the Vifia Congresso lifted; nor does it 
appear to have objected wheng a little laterl Vilarfn and 
Ernesto Gonzalezq the leading Vifla insurgentsq were re- 
admitted to the Santiago Bectiono(107) Similarlyq the 
CEN took no precipitate disciplinary measures against the 
Antofagaatan and Valdivian sections but left the matter to 
be decided by the next national Party Congreasp scheduled 
for December 1925, 
But there may have been a more prosaic reason for 
the lack of fierce internal struggles during 1925a Once 
mores events and developments outside the party absorbed the 
energies of the membership. The January golpe had aroused 
(106) La Jornada Comunistag Valdivia (JCV) 8-3-1925 re- 
printed the Antofagastan attackg see ibid,. 18.9-25; 
23-9-1925 for the Valdivian attack* 
(107) justicia 6.5-1925; 22.5-1925* 
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high hopes for radical change and the pronouncements of the 
CON and the FOCh attracted more attention than party circulars 
while laws like Ley 261 absorbed the interests of party acti- 
vists* Such was the pull of events external to the party 
that in April 19259 the CCA in Santiago remarked that there 
was a 'complete lack of working spirit' In the area and claim- 
edy a month laterp that such was the state of dues' payments 
that the greater part of the membership was technically at the 
margin of the partyo(108) For their partp after June 19259 
the regional parties of the North were in complete disarray - 
Indeedq some 15 sections ceased to exist because of the re- 
pression precipitated by the nitrate strike. (109) 
Despite these difficultiesq by December 19259 when 
the Seventh Party Congress met in Santiagog the total party 
membership had probably grown from 29000 in 1924 to between 
4tooo and 59000, even though there were only 46 sections 
as compared with 87 sections in late 1924. (llo) The 
reason for this growthwas probably the PCCh's electoral 
successes in November 1925 - andq for this-reason toop the 
Congress does not appear to have been the scene of bitter 
disputes and recriminations. Howevermuch some sectors of 
the party disapproved of the CEN's political line during 
19259 its position had been rkdicated by the election to 
parliament of the largest body of representatives the party 
(108) Ibide 12.4.1925; 7-3*1925, 
(109) DTiq 14. lel926. 
(110) Following early PCCh custom, national party con- 
gresses are numbered from the first POS congress (1915) throughout this work* See Ramfrez Necocheag 
Origen, q p265 and WIQ 14.1.1926 for the figures on 
membership and sections. 
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had ever possessede 
After the study and muted criticism of the CEN's 
report for 19259 the Congress moved on to discuss the adop- 
tion of new organisational forms and practices - the cell 
and democratic centralism - to replace the old loose associa- 
tion of sectionse(111) The CEN had recommended the study 
of these organinational formas which had been formally adop- 
ted by the Comintern in July 19249 at the beginning of 
1925*(112) In the events the 1925 Coneress did not make 
the adoption of now forms obligatory although some sections 
did begin to create calls in the early months of 1926. If 
the Congress did not insist on the now organisational formal 
it did take other steps to tighten up the crganisation. It 
raised the minimum requirements for party membership and in- 
creased the qualifications needed to become a member of the CEN 
or a delegate to a national Congress* The party was exhortedg 
once moral to purge itself of anyanarchist elements which 
remained and it was decided to set up a central study insti- 
tute to raise the political and ideological level of the 
membershipe At the same times steps were taken to further 
structure the party's relationship with Its congressmen* 
They were instructed to pay their salaries into central 
party funds from which they would receive half back in wages* 
Party members were instructed to approach congressmen only 
through the CEN and the congressmen were told not to have 
any private dealings with bourgeois parties but to unmask 
Ull) See Appendix Ag for the place of the call and demo- 
cratic centralism in the PCChIs organisation. 
(112) DTIQ 30.1*1925* 
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them systematically in Congress*(113) 
Despite the apparent absence of fierce controversy 
at the 1925 Party Congressq the scene was set there for 
serious conflicts which challenged the party's unity during 
1926. With the election of several of the more prominent 
members of the older generation of party leaders to Congressp 
the CEN elected In December 1925 was dominated by younger 
activists who had no previous experience of serving on the 
CEN. (114) It was not long before the generational con. 
flict which had embittered Recabarren's last months emerged 
with even greater vigouro 
The first open challenge to the now CEN did not 
come from the congressmen but from the Santiago section and 
it came from the left rather thzn the righte In February 
19269 the Santiago section refused to accept the expulsion 
Of several of its memberaq ordered by the Party Congrosag 
for refusing to support the congressional candidacy of Cruz 
in November 1925*(115) It also criticised the Party Con7 
gross for failing to discipline Hidalgo for allowing his 
name to be used in a telegram calling on Alessandri to re- 
turn in early 1925 - even though the incident had been of- 
fically closed - and it critioised justicia for carrying 
explanatory advertisements on a now social security law 
(113) Justicia 3olol9261 5-1*1926. 
(114) The CEN elected in December 1925 did include two of 
the 'older generationIg Manuel Leiva (CEN POS and 
PCCh 1920-1923) and Lino Paniagua (CEN 1925) but 
these : o: n dropped out leaving effective power to 
Luis Hr andez, J. R* Bascuftan Zuritaq Maclovio 
Galdameas Jose Santos Zavalaq Rufino Roams. 
(115) Justicia 23.2.1926. 
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(ley 4054) -a law to which the PCCh was oppoaede Although 
CEN member Maclovio Galdames tried to defend the Party Con- 
areas's decisionag he was shouted down and in reprisal the 
CHN refused to publish news from the Santiago section andq 
in April 19269 ordered its dissolution& Fifty-nine members 
rejected this orders contacted other sections to justify 
their positions appealed to the South American Secretariat 
Of the Comintern and began to publish their own newspapers 
Rebell6n,, (116) Although the CEN did manage to organise 
a section of its own in Santiagop the Rebelign group con- 
tinued to function until it was eventually re-absorbed into 
the party later in the year* 
The second important conflict which the CEN had to 
face involved the whole question of its relationship with 
the partyls elected representatives* Although the Seventh 
Party Congress had made some attempt to structure this 
relationshipp congressmen still tended to go their own way 
and one congressman in particular distinguished himself 
by ignoring CEN Instructions. Abraham Quevedop deputy for 
Valdivia# not only failed to pay his salary into the central 
Party treasury an the 1925 Congress had resolved butq in 
August 19269 he disobeyed an explicit CEN instruction to 
abstain on a censure motion designed to remove the Cabinet 
from office. (117) The CEN immediately suspended Quevedo 
for his indiscipline but he took the conflict back to 
(116) Rebelignq Santiagog 1-5,1926. 
(117) JCV 24-7*1926; Justicia 6.8.1926. 
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Valdivia where his adherentsq who retained control over 
the PCCh newspapers La Jornada Comunistal took the name of 
doctrinarios. The CENp for its parts financed the acti. 
vities of an anti-Quevedo faction in Valdivia which pub- 
lished its own newspaper - La Batalla. (118) The split 
in Valdivia persisted during most of 1926 and the doctrina- 
rios claimed that they had the approval of both the 
Rebeli6n and the oficialista sections in Santiago*(119) 
In parts at leastq these conflicts were the product 
of the now CEN's determination to impose a more rigid dis- 
cipline on the sections -a resolve in which they were 
encouraged by the closer interest which the Comintern was 
paying to the internal affairs of its Latin American affili- 
&tOse Although direct contact between the PCCh and the 
Comintern pre-dated the offical foundation of the partys 
language differenceaq distance and lack of concern bedevilled 
the early Years of the PCChIs relations with the Comin- 
tern, (120) Nevertheless, the PCCh did respond to 
(118) La Satallay Valdiviaq was published fifteen times 
between August and October 1926. 
(119) JCV 28-7-1926. 
(120) Th-e first direct contact appears to have been 
made in September 1921 when the Latin Countries' 
Bureau of the Cominterng acting on information 
received from the Argentine Communistq Rodolfo 
Ghioldiq sent a letter (in French) prematurely 
welcoming the PCCh into the fold; photocopy in 
J, iuseo Recabarren. A CEN circular in Federacion 
Obrera 15*8*1923 comIlaina of the difficulties of 
finding trustworthy tranalatorsfor communica- 
tions from the Comintern which evidently often 
came written in German. 
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Comintern circulars calling for campaigns against the 
warg for the study of the new organisational forms and for 
financial a331stanceo(121) Moreoverp Argentine Communists 
regularly attended Party Congresses an Comintern delegates 
and there is some evidence to suggest that the PCCh was 
in direct contact with the Comintern over the golpes of 
1924 and 1925. (122) But although the Comintern set up 
a Secretariado Sud Americano(SSA) in Buenos Aires in 
September 1924 and appears to have approved the PCChIs 
general political line during 192, % at least to the extent 
of sending its warmest congratulations to the PCCh on its 
electoral success in Novemberg the SSA did not become ac- 
tive in the PCChIs internal affairs until 1926. (123) 
In 1926p the SSA undertook a campaign to tbolshovisel 
the communist parties of the Southern Cone - to introduce 
now organinational forms and practices and to purge the 
parties of the worst of their reformist ideasq policies and 
leaders, The technique used in each came was the samel 
the SSA studied the party in questiong published an open 
(121) FederaciSn Obrera 11-7-1924; IYrIQ 7-9-1924. The 
Comintern evidently called for financial aid in 
1923 and the FCCh began a campaign to that and in 
August* Federaoi6n Obrera 15,8.1923- It is un- 
likely that the PCCh raised much money - but it is interesting that whatever finance the PCCh later 
received from Moscowq the first flow of funds was 
in the opposite directionc. 
(122) See, for exampleg an article by Jaime Fortufto in 
Justicia 26.11*1925 and the minutes of a CEN meet- 
0-gin ibide 11-3-19259 which suggests this* 
Unfortunatelyq precisely what advice or comments 
the Comintern gave is not known. 
(123) Ibide 8*1291925, 
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letter detailing its strengths and weaknesses and suggest- 
ing future courses of action* The open letter was thrown 
open to full debate -a debate which was carried over to 
an amplified meeting of the national leadership which pre- 
pared resolutions for ratification in the national party 
Congress* In mid-19269 the Uruguayan Communist Party 
underwent this process and the proceedings of its amplified 
central committee mestingg ComitS Ejecutivo Ampliado(CEA)v 
were published in Justicia, j giving the PCCh a foretaste 
of what was in store and highlighting the most dramatic 
aspect of the whole procedure - the 1bublic criticism of 
old and respected party leaderx. (124) 
An SSA delegate arrived in Chile in September 1926 
on a fact-finding mission and in November the SSA published 
its open letter on the FCChe(125) The SSA found that 
while the PCCh was one of-the most powerful and popular of 
the Latin American Communist Parties it had serious defectsq 
ranging from the absence and malfunctioning of cells to 
the lack of links between the CNN and subordinate echelons 
In the partyp from the low political level of the party - 
which facilitated personalist strugglex - to the absence 
of systematic work amoript the peasantryg womeng youth and 
trade unions* Although the SSA criticised the CNN for left 
deviationism on the grounds that-it had failed to appreciate 
the need for a mass partyq had neglected concrete political 
(124) Ibido l8e8.1926; 25*8*1926. 
(125) Ibide 29*11.1926; 30*11,1926. 
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work and had made errors in the application of the united 
front policyp it found that the CEN's general political line 
had been correcte(126) In the struggle between the CEN and 
the Congressmens the SSA declared for the CEN and stated that 
the Congre83ments reformist proclivities were the greater 
danger to the development of the party* The SSA then pro- 
ceeded to criticise three congressmen in particular for their 
reformist conceptionsi these were Hidalgop Quevedo 
and Ram6n Sepu'lveda Leal* Had Recabarren been alive and 
a congressmens it is likely that hep toop would have been 
subjected to public criticiams(127) 
The SSA's letter was thrown open to debate in 
Justicia. and while some accepted the SSAIS commentsg others 
were angered by the public criticism of old party leaders 
and objected to the whole procedure of introducing bolshevi- 
nation through an open letter* One charge which the SSA 
made to the effect that the PCCh had been largely an elec- 
toral organisation to date aroused considerable angerg mem- 
bers pointing to the role the party had always-played in 
the FOCh and the trade union movement* Finallyp some con- 
tributor3 to the debate gave vent to anti-Argentine feeling 
and suggested that the SSA delegatesq both members of the 
Argentine Communist Partyt were hardly in a position to 
instruct the more successful PCCh as to its shortcomingso(128) 
(126) For an Sxplanation of the united front policy see 
belowp Chapter 3. p125e (127) One Of the SSA delegates to the CEA later indicated 
thatq despite his undoubted meritsp Recabarren had 
had his faults; he did not enumerate them. Justicia 
5-1.1927- 
(128) Ibid, 11*12*1926 to 27-12.1926; ITribuna LibreJ 
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The debate in the party press over# the CEA met in 
Santiago in late December 1926 with the attendance of the 
CHN memberal a few congressmang two SSA delegates and a 
scattering of provincial representativeso(129) Interest- 
ingly anoughg the debates in the CRA did not cantre around 
bolshavisation as such for all seemed to accept the need 
for the now organizational forms; similarlyg nobody ques. 
tioned the right of the SSA to Intervene in the internal 
affairs of the PCChp although some anti-Argentina feeling 
showed through again* Insteadq the debates revolved around 
whether the PCCh had been mainly an electoral organization 
in the past and the respective merits of the congressmen 
and the CEN in the struggles of the past year. Although the 
SSA had discerned a political perspective in the struggleag 
the sessions of the CEA revealed a yawning generational 
gulf and much wounded dignity and pride rather than any pro- 
found political and ideological differencese Most of the 
congressmen were prepared to admit that they had fallen 
into reformist errors in their speeches to Congress but 
they blamed their own lack Of political education and the 
absence of timely and adequate direction from the CEN for 
their mistakes* Only Hidalgop absent from the CEA until 
its final sessions later defended some of his 'reformist' 
positions at the Party Congress and crossed ideological 
(129) Seep ibid. 4th-7th Januaryp 1927 for the reports 
on the CEA* The two SSA delegates were evidently 
Rodolfo Ghloldi and Miguel Contreras - both Argen- 
tina Communists* Their pseudonyms were Vargas and 
G6mez- Lafertte op. cit. ppi84-187. 
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swords with the SSA delegatesa(130) 
Howeverg if the CEA revealed no deep ideological 
and political divisionsg it did show the extremes of dis- 
articulation and disorganization which the conflict between 
the congressmen and the CEN had produced inside the party 
during 1926, According to the congresamens the CEN had 
failed to respond to requests for directions as to the par- 
tY's line on certain legislationg it had not followed through 
when congressmen made propaganda tours and it had unfairly 
mingled out a few congressmen for criticism when all were 
guilty of similar offences* Furthermorej the congress- 
men denied that the CEN had played any useful part In the 
solution of the divisions in Santiago and Valdivial the 
first they claimed had been solved by a comrade who had 
been passing through Santiago at the time while the second 
had been solved through the persistence of a SSA delegateo(131 
for its partp the CEN accused the congressmen of making 
speeches without due preparation or respect for party 
doctrines of sometimes taking a different position on the 
same problem in Congress and of refusing to obey instruc- 
tions to make or return from propaganda tours. (132) 
Indeedq relations between the two groups had become so bad 
that in a senatorial by-election in the North in which Juan 
Luis Carmona had triumphadq Hidalgo had campaigned against 
Oarmona's adoption an the Communist candidate while the CEN 
(130) Justicia 12.1.1927. 
(131) ! bid. 
, 
4.1.1927; 5.1.1927; 6.191927- 
(132) Ibid. 4.1.1927; 8-1-1927. 
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had sent delegates to campaign against Hidalgo and for 
Carmona. (133) 
Recriminations and counter-recriminations in the 
CEA gradually gave way to admissions from both the congress. 
men and the CEN that they had committed some errors. By the 
final session of the CZA both sidesq encouraged by a small 
but significant group which had taken the middle course in 
the conflict between the CEN and the congressmen# had ra- 
solved to take steps to raise the ideological and political 
level of the party through the adoption of bolshevik norms* 
On January 15thq 19279 the Eighth Party Congress 
met in Santiago and the debates followed the same lines as 
those In the CEA*(134) Perhaps the highlight of the 
Congress was the appearance of Hidalgo who came specifically 
to defend himself against the charge of treachery levelled 
against him by the CENo The charge of treachery aroused 
protest from some delegates (like Salvador Ocampo) who were 
to fight bitterly against him in the 19309 and one of the 
SSA delegateog G6mez9 found the charge both funjust and 
inadequate$* After delivering a spirited defence of his 
actions Hidalgo declared that he would resign if found 
guilty of treachery but, the SSA representatives and the 
other delegates urged him to stay on. (135) 
Throughout the whole proceedings of the CEA and 
(133) Ibid* 8,191927- 
(134) Seep ibid, * 8th-16th Januaryq 1927 for reports on 
the Eighth National Party Congress* 
(135) Ibid* 1291-1927- 
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the Congress the SSA delegates had adopted a conciliatory 
manner and had tried to mediate between the congressmen 
and the CEN. G6mez described the conflict between the two 
groups as being the result of two unjust exaggerations; 
on the one handq the exaggeration of the older party leaders 
who despised the CNN for its youthful inexperience and on 
the otherp the exaggeration of the CNN which appeared to 
think that the party9s history before 1926 was completely 
without significanceo(136) Both SSA delegates insisted 
that the task of the CEA and the Congress was not to accuse 
and punish the guilty but to identify errors and correct 
them - and it was in that spirit that they had examined the 
speeches of the congressmen for reformist arrorso(137) 
By the end of its sessionsp the Eighth Party Congressp 
its passions apparently spentp had approved a number of 
measures designed to improve the party's internal function- 
Ing. The cell and democratic centralism were formally 
adoptedp the party press was placed more firmly under the 
control of the CEN - which now changed Its name to the 
Comitg Central(CC)e While a number of disciplinary measures 
were dealt withq further steps were taken against only one 
of the three congressmen who had been singled out for criti- 
cism in the SSA's letter - Quevedo's suspension was con- 
verted into expulsion* The moderating and correctional 
influence of the SSA wag given further expression in the 
(136) Ibide 
(137) Ibide 5*12,1926. 
0 110 . 
composition of the now CC* Expanded to nine members with 
five alternative memberaq the CC gave geographical represen- 
tation to the party and contained a careful balance of 
$old guard' members - including SeptIlveda Leal who had been 
one of the main targets of the CEN in the CEA and the 
Congress - and the $new guard' - members who had served 
on the CHN during 1926. A third groupp which included 
Carlos Contreras Labarca and Salvador Ocampo who had dis- 
tinguished themselves in seconding the SSA delegates# 
mediating rolaq was also represented* The balance of fac- 
tions was shown also in the creation of six interlocking 
sub-commissions of the CC*(138) 
On this occasion at leastg it vould appear that the 
intervention of the SSA was almost entirely beneficial to 
the party and that far from creating frictiong as one com- 
mentator has implieds it went some way towards re3olvine 
conflicts which were a serious challenge to party unity. (139) 
As one moderate member of the 'old guardIp who had earlier 
expressed antagonism towards the Argentine SSA delegate3p 
remarked $only owing to the visit of the SSA delegation who 
came to show us the way the party should go# has the party's 
unity been savedl. (140) 
The steps which the party took to improve and stren- 
gthen its organisation and political leadership In January 
1927 had no opportunity to achieve the desired results* 
(138) Ibide 15*1*1927, 
(139) Stephen Cligsold Soviet Relations with Latin 
America 1218-1968 (Londong 1970) p17- (140) Justicia 17012 6; 9.1.1927- 
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Early in February 1927v the military fascist dictatorship 
of which the PCCh had given repeated warning in the pre- 
ceeding months appeared to become a reality* The purge 
which Ibgftez initiated of his political opponents fell very 
heavily on the national and local leadership of the PCCh 
and the FOChe But despite the correctness of the PCChIs 
predictions it does not appear to have had much faith in 
its own prophecies* No steps were taken to set up an 
alternative leadershipp no special techniques had been 
evolved for use in clandestinity - in shortp the party 
was almost totally unprepared for the prolonged period of 
persecution and repression which ensued* 
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Chapter 3* Clandestinity and Third Period 
Policies, 1927-1934. 
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For much of the first five years of Its existence 
the PCCh had been allowed by government to function in 
relative freedom althoughq on occasiong It had been sub- 
jected to sharp persecution* During the same period* the 
Cominternts policies - and its neglect of its Latin American 
affiliates - had permitted the PCCh to maintain the general 
political line and the organizational practices it had 
inherited from the POS& Howeverg the coming to power 
of Colonel Ibiftez in early 1927 forced the PCCh into 
clandestinity where it stayed until his fall in 1931* 
Meanwhileg in 1928 the Comintern undertook a sharp left turn 
in its policies and began to make greater efforts to en- 
sure that all communist parties conformed to its political 
line and organizational norms* As a result of these pres- 
suresq the PCCh which emerged from clandestinity in 1931 
was in a sorry condition# its membership dispersed and 
divided by schism and its influence in the trade union 
movement and in the electorate vastly-, ' reduced* 
The PCCh emerged from clandestinity in July 1931 
determined to implement Comintern policiesq to capture the 
hegemony of the Chilean working class movement and deliver 
the final blows to the tottering capitalist system, How- 
evers while the Political turbulence and social distress 
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generated by the impact of the Great Depression on Chilefs 
economy may have seemed propitious for the rapid reconstitu- 
tion of the PCCh and the development of the revolutionary 
struggleg the years immediately following Ibgfiezve fall 
proved hardly less hostile to the party than those which 
it had experienced during his regime* The PCCh failed to 
achieve the ambitious goals of Comintern policy - indeed, 
it failed to make good the 108803 it had sustained between 
1927 and 1931 - but nonetheless the PCCh survived and its 
survival was no mean achievement given the conditions of 
those years* 
Although the PCCh had warned Chile of the Imminent 
establishment of a *military fascist dictatorship$ in the 
latter part of 1926s it was woefully unprepared for the 
purge initiated by Ibaftez in February 1927 and for the pro- 
longed period of olande3tinity which followed. Occasional 
articles had been published in the party press on the or. 
ganination of clandestine activities but there was no alterna- 
tive leadership and no special apparatus capable of directing 
the party's work in clandestinity, Howeverg not all the 
party's difficulties stemmed from a lack of preparation* 
The Eighth Party Congress may have gone some way towards 
finding solutions for the conflicts which the PCCh had 
experienced during 1926 but the personal rancours and 
antagonisms which had fuelled those conflicts were not so 
easily settled* Moreoverp military fascist dictatorship 
or notq Ibiftez's attack on a parliamentary system which was 
. 115 . 
generally recognised as corrupt and his appeals to the 
cause of national regeneration won him the sympathies of 
many Chilean3j including workers* By April 19279 a com- 
bination of both of these factors had caused four of the 
nine PCCh congressmen to break party discipline and make 
their peace with IbfAezq thus dealing a savage blow to the 
party's morals in the early months of clandestinityo(l) 
In the longer runs the PCCh1s work in clandestinity 
was made difficult by other factors. Firstlyp a revival 
in the fortunes of the nitrate industry and a massive 
programme of public works initiated by Ibaftezq aided by 
loans from the USA9 gave Chile a general prosperity in the 
late 19209 which tended to sap working class militancy. 
Secondlyq Ibaftez's policies towards working class activists 
and organisations made the Partyls work In clandestinity 
particularly difficult* 
Although Ibaflez had his working class opponents 
arrestedq jailedg torturedq banished to distant provinceag 
exiled and occasionally killedq he sought not to Wadioate 
all working class organisations but to encourage those 
which gave him uncritical suppcrtand to cow and contain 
Abraham Quevedo, Jose' Santos C6rdobaq Pedro Reyes 
(deputies) and Juan Luis Carmona (senator) soon 
made their peace with Ib9ftez. See, La NaciSn 
9-3-1927; 2.4.1927. Howeverg Quevedo and Santos 
C6rdoba were already at the margin of the party - the latter was suspended for six months in December 1926 for failing to attend the CEA and the Eighth Party Congress, 
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those which did noto(2) Thus the persecutions which he 
initiated were not total either In time or scope and while 
prominent activistsp like Elfas Lafertteq spent the greater 
part of the Ibaftez years in detention or banishmentq they 
were allowed some months of freedom - under close police 
surveillance - and given the opportunity to opt out of 
politics altogether by submitting pledges of good behaviour 
to the authoritieso(3) In exchange for similar pledgeag 
party congressmen were allowed to take up their goats in 
parliament; certain organi3ations in which the PCCh had 
played a prominent part were also allowed to survive - 
presumably under the same conditionse Thusq some FOCh 
organisations were allowed to function until August 1927, 
probably because JEF member Juan Briones pledged his support 
for Ibailezo and the Liga Nacional de Arrendatarios appears to 
have survived until early 1928. (4) 
Persecutiong howeverg was only one side of the 
coin. The formation of leeal unions alone the lines laid 
down by legislation passed after the September golpe was 
(2) Few Communi3ts of note apDear to have been killed 
during the dictatorship. Ramfrez Necochea cites 
only one by name - Casimiro Barriosq a Spaniard 
by birth who was active amongst white collar wor- 
kers in Santiago* Origen p163. For a chillingg 
if undocumentedq account of police methods under 
Ibaftez see Townsend y Onel La Inquisici&n Chilena 
1925-1931 (Santiagog 1932) 
(3) Lafertteq who spent most of the years 1927-1931 in 
jail or bani3hmenty was *free' from July 1928 to 
February 1929 and from January to April 1930. See 
Elfas Lafertte, Vida de un Comuni3ta ppl88-226 for an 
account of his experiences under the dictatorship. 
(4) See La Naci6n 23.3-1927 for Brione3la declaration 
of support for lbaftez. 
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given some limited encouragement under IbSftez*(5) 
Although this legislation was specifically designed to 
emasculate the trade union movement as a political forcep 
it did afford PCCh and FOCh members some opportunity to 
continue their union activities - if in a limited and 
cautious way* Indeedl in the northern strongholds of the 
FOCh and the PCCh it was practically impossible to form a 
union without the participation of old members of both 
organisations andq according to one of its participantag 
the delegates to a regional congress of legal trade unions 
held in 1930 had allp at one timep belonged to the FOCh 
or the PCCh9(6) Furthermoreq Ibaftez encouraged the 
oreation of now political associations especially designed 
to channel working class support for his regime* One such 
organi3ationt the Vanguardia Nacional do Obreros y--Emj2leados 
(VNOE) was created in April 1927 by a group of ex-communists 
of some standing and pledged itself to $cooperating fully 
in the labour of national construction and administrative 
purification underaken by Carlos Ibgftezfo(7) The VNOR 
disappeared shortly after the presidential elections of 
May 1927 and it was not until the approach of now congre3- 
sional elections in 1930 that a new associationg the 
Confederacign Republicana de Acci6n Cfvica(CRAC) was founded. 
The CRAC was supported by a wide range of workers' 
(5) James 0. Morris Los elite. 91, los intelectuales y el 
consenso p2lO* The year after Ihiftez's fall there 
were 421 legal unions with 55,000 members* (6) La Opinign Iquique 27-1-1930; interview with Juan 
de la C. Leytong Santiago 1972- (7) La Naci6n 2.4.1927. 
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organisationst including the mutualist Congreso Social 
Obrero(CSO) and the white collar UECh as well as a large 
number of legal unions which were encouraged by the authori- 
ties to support the new organisation. (8) Tndeedq the 
pressures placed on the legal unions to join CRAC meant that 
a few Communists appeared in its table of organisation - 
including Juan Leiva Tapiaq later murdered at Ranquil. (9) 
After the CRAC had served its immediate purpose as a par- 
ticipant in the electoral arrangement which Ibaftez sub- 
stituted for scheduled congressional electionag its public 
activities diminished sharply. Neverthelesag 14 CRAC 
representatives were appointed to the Congreso Termal - the 
name by which that particular Congress is known - and the 
CRAC lingered ong in name at leasto even after Ibaftezts 
fall in July 1931. (10) 
The great mass of the PCCh and the FOChq subjected 
to the pressures of coercion and co-optiong confused by 
conflicting appeals to their loyalties and deptived of their 
local and national chains of commandp accepted the change in 
(8) La Naci6n 5.2.1930. 
(9) See below'ppl43-145, for an account of the Ranquil 
uprising* Leiva Tapial who was later revered as 
a martyr for the causeq appears as a member of 
CRAC's regional committee for Victoria, La Naci6n 
18-1*1930, 
(10) See La Naciin 16.2.1930 for a list of CRAC 
congressmen* In the Congreso Termalp the PCCh 
only had one official representativet Hidalgoy who 
as a senator had three years of his term of 
office to run* Howevers two ex-Communist deputiesq 
Quevedo and SepUllveda Lealq were appointed as 
representatives of the PD* 
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circumstances which Ibaftez's accession to power signified 
and discontinued their political activities. Mostp after 
allp had families whose survival depended on their capacity 
to earn wages and they could not afford to spend long 
periods in jail or risk banishment to distant provinces 
where the chances of getting employment were slight. A 
fewq perhaps genuinely persuaded by the declared goals of 
the IbSftez government or motivated by fear or by hopes of 
personal gainp gave the regime an active support, Otheraq 
resisting blandishment and persecution alikeg determined 
to continue the struggle in clandestinity. 
For those who had decided to struL? gle ong the 
difficulties were enormous* The waves of repression 
unleashed by the authoritiesq the constant police surve1il- 
lance of suspected subversives, the pressures placed oh 
detainees to denounce their active colleagues meant that 
the PCCh soon ceased to function as a national organisationo 
Between 1927 and 19309 four Central Committees# largely 
different in terms of personnelp were denounced to the 
authorities and arrested and the PCCh deteriorated into a 
series of small isolated Groups often too cautious to 
maintain contacts with their closest neighbours lot alone with 
the CC of the dayo(Il) 
(11) See En defensa de la revoluct tesis 
-r-oxx %oar1v-jLagoq iviarcn L933) PP14-17- In future, this pamphletg published by the schismatic PCCh led by Hidalgog will be cited as En defensa. 
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In the atmosphere created by clandestinityg serious 
disagreements emerged inside the PCCh regarding the mecha- 
nics of the organisation of clandestine workq the attitude 
to be adopted towards Ibgftezla bourgeois opponents and 
whether the party should take advantage of the limited 
possibilities which existed for a legal opposition to the 
Ibifiez regime* According to official PCCh acoountsp by 
the end of 1928 a tripartite division of opinion had become 
discernible amongst the leadermhip. (12) One groups led 
by Isiaa Iriarte -a member of the CEN of the FOS and the 
PCCh from 1920 to 1923 and re-elected to the CC in 
December 1926 - argued for a completely isolationist 
Positions rejecting involvement with other opposition 
groups and refusing to use such opportunities as existed 
for a legal opposition to Ibaftez, A second groups led by 
Hidalgot argued that a completely illegal party was nothinG 
more than a $factory of martyrs' and advocated co-operation 
with other opposition Groups and the creation of a legal 
opposition to Ibafteze Finallyp a third group which included 
Carlos Contreras Labarca and Galo Gonzalez (13) rejected 
these left and right deviations (with the unerring wisdom 
proper to those who later emerged triumphant in the struggle 
for the control of the PCCh) and opted for a policy which 
called for the use of the local trade union structure as 
(12) Lafertte op. cit. pZO8* 
(13) See Appendix E for brief biographies of both 
Contreras Labarca and Galo Gonzalez- 
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the principle vehicle for the struggle against Ibgftez. 
' 
Whatever the state of opinion inside the leader- 
ship towards the end of 19289 until 1930 the party's 
general conduct appears to have been most heavily influen- 
ced by Hidalgols policies. In the winter of 1928 a 
clandestine group in Santiago managed to publish a news- 
paperp Alertaq which called for a middle and working class 
united front against Ibaftez and announced its intention to 
seek affiliation to the revolutionary committee based in 
Buenos Aires which was composed mainly of alessandristas 
and other bourgeois opponents of the dietatorship. (14) 
Moreovers in Nay 19299 after returning from exile Hidalgo 
took up his seat In the Senate with the permission of the 
CC - presumably after giving the authorities the appropriate 
undertakings - and towards the end of 1929 he was joined 
briefly by Luis Victor Cruz in the Chamber of Deputies*(15) 
Although official PCCh accounts claim that Hidalgo's per- 
formance in the Senate was already causing considerable 
dissatisfaction in the party by the end of 19299 no steps 
were taken against him until a Year later when he was 
summarily expelledo(16) 
(14) Alertaq Santiago 2.6.1928; no. 31 August 1928. 
(15) Whatever the nature of Hidalgo's undertakings 
they did not prevent his re-arrest and further 
exile in 1930. Ercilla No. 1561,21st April$ 1965. 
Article by Wilfredo Mayorga* Cruz sat in Congress 
during December 1929 and January 1930 but only 
spoke once to attack a government contract with the 
Chile Telephone Company* Boletines del Congresog 
Dii2utadoso Sesiones Extraordinarios 1929 Vol. 11 
P1830- 
(16) Manuel Hidalgo - colaborador profesional con la 
burguesia (Carta_del CC del PCCh a los trabajadores 
quo siguen a llidaigp) Santiagog rud. P54. 
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The expulsion of Hidalgo was probably delayed for 7 
a number of reasons, the most important being 
the arrest 
of two successive CCs during 1930 and the failure of the 
SSA to create a CC subservient to its wishes until late in 
that year. (17) Although the occasion of his expulsion was 
his failure to read a prepared CC statement on a new in- 
ternal security law being considered in Congress in 
December 1930, it is clear that there were more profound 
factors at work. Hidalgo himself attributed his expulsion 
to his deteriorating relations with the SSA - never very 
cordial since the Ejehth Party Congress* According to Ilidal- 
gog his relations with the SSA worsened dramatically after 
May or June 1929 when he tried to persuade a visiting 
Comintern delegate thatp since Chile was the more advanced 
country economically and since the PCCh was stronger than 
the grgentine Communist Party# the seat of the SSA should 
be shifted from Buenos Aires to Santiago-(18) Moreovery 
he argued that in the expected world capitalist offensive 
against the Soviet Unions which he thougit would be launched 
from the USA9 the countries of the Pacific would be of 
greater strategic importance than the Atlantic nations. 
Hidalgo claimed that the Comintern delegate was much impre3- 
sed by these arguments and invited him to visit Moscow but 
(17) The PCCh itself explained the delay in terms of 
its own Political immaturity. Ibid. 
(18) For Hidalgo's account of the reasons for his ex- 
pulsion and the subsequent schismg see En defensa 
ppl9-22 and Ercilla No. 15619 21st Aprilp 196-5-9inter- 
view with Wilfredo Mayorga. See also R-J. Aleiander 
T_rotskyism in Latin America (Stanfordl 1973) PP89-99* 
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that the SSA refused to give him the necessary permission 
because he was the public face of the party and too im- 
portant to leave Chile for any length of tiipe, (19) 
According to Hidalgog it was after this incident that 
the SSA embarked on a series of attion3 which he found 
unacceptable* In particularg the SSA by-passed the CC and 
entered into direct communication with the regional oreanisa- 
tions# refused to give requested aid and advice and Issued 
peremptory commands which the PCCh was in no position to 
carry outo(20) Matters came to a head in January 1930 
when a delegate sent by the CC to the SSA to inform it on 
conditions in Cbileq returned with powers to reorganiss 
the party* In January 1930 an amplified CC meeting was 
held in Santiago and Hidalgo and his allies expelled the 
delegate and elected a new CC - which was unable to function 
because of the arrest of its members. In August 19309 
another amplified CC meeting was held but it9 toop was 
denounced to the authorities and its members arrested. (21) 
Shortly after that dateg a new CC was created in Valparafso 
under the auspices of the SSA and it was this CC which 
began to take disciplinary measures against Hidalgo and his 
associates in early 1931-(22) 
The Valparafso CC justified its expulsion of 
Hidalgo in terms of his ideological reformism and his 
Ercilla, no, 156op interview with Mayorgao (20) En defensa_, pplq-22. (21) Ibido 
(22) This CC included Contreras Labarcal Juan Chac6n, 
Galo Gonzalezq Braulio Leon Pefta and Luis Pefiae 
Justicia 22.8.1931, 
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supposed collaborationism with the Ibaftez recime. (23) 
While it was demonstrably true that Hidalgo continued to 
make reformist statements in Coneress, despite the reprimands 
which he and others had received in the Eighth Party Con- 
gre339 the charge of collaborationism was rather more 
difficult to substantiate* Hidalgop after a119 never 
suggested that the legal opposition which he advocated 
should replace clandestine activity - on the contrary he 
argued that legal activity should be parallel but secondary 
to illegal activity -a Position perfectly consistent with 
standard Comintern practice which urged the combination of 
both legal and illegal methods where conditions permitted*(24) 
Moreoverg in as much as the CC gave its permission to 
Hidalgo to take up his Senate seat -a stop in which the SSA 
apparently acquiesced# if only temporarily - both the CC 
and the SSA must bear some responsibility for Hidalgo's 
'collaborationism', Furthermores leading members or the 
Valparaiso CC were not altogether innocent of similar Icrimes'. 
For much of the Ibiftez yearsp Carlos Contreras Labarcs. 
apparently abided by the police order which confined him to 
a relatively comfortable banishment in Santa Cruzp a provin- 
cial town in Aconcaguaq where his wife was employed by the 
local courts. (25) Similarlyp Jose Bascuflan Zuritaq a member 
of the 1926 CEN9 leader of a group which opposed Hidalgo in 
clandestinity andp laterp to become head of the PCChI9 Peasant 
(23) Ibid. 27.8.1931; 1,10.1931, For the fullest ac- 
Z-ount of the PCCh's reasons for expelling Hidalgo 
see Manuel Hidalgo - colaborador profesional con 
la burguesia, 
(24) En defensa pllq. 
(25) La Chispal, Santiago no. 29 Augustq 1931. 
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until his murder in 19359 petitioned the authorities for 
his release from jail in return for a promise to cease 
political activitieae(26) 
At the time it took placeg neither Hidalgo nor the 
official PCCh made any direct reference to one set of 
factors which probably coloured HidalW3 expulsion and 
which certainly determined the development of the schism 
which resulted from that eventq namely the sharp leftward 
turn in the Comintern's policies. During the mid-1920s, 
Comintern polioyq based on an analysis of world economic 
conditions which suggested that the capitalist system was 
enjoying a period of relative stabilityp advocated united 
front tactics as the means beat suited to the development 
of the revolutionary struggle in the prevailing circum- 
stances* United front tactics allowed the communist par- 
ties to cooperate with reformigtop social democrats and 
other proeressive forces in political and trade union 
activities. In the case of the PCChq for exampleg united 
front tactics had permitted the party to make the electoral 
arrangement in 1925 which had resulted in the election of 
seven Communist congressmen* Howeverp by 1927 a variety 
of factoras including changing economic conditionsq the 
bloody failure of united fronttactics in China and the 
imperatives of the Stalin/Trotsky struggle for power inside 
the Soviet UnLonq dictated a sharp change of tactics* This 
change was put into effect at the Sixth Comintern Congress* 
(26) En defensa pp131-132. 
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which met in Moscow during Julyq August and September of 
1928-(27) 
The Sixth Comintern Congress announced that a third 
period of post-war economic development was commencing. 
It would be characterised by accelerating economic criae3q 
the radicali3ation of the ma3sea# the sharpening of class 
conflict and a fresh series of imperialist wars leading to 
an armed assault on the USSR* In the coming crise3q which 
it was felt would culminate in the final breakdown of the 
capitalist systemp new policies were necessary. In parti- 
cularg the communist parties had to prepare themselves for 
the approaching decisive struggles for power by purging 
themselves of their ideological and oreanisational weak- 
nesses and by capturing the hegemony of their respective 
working class movements. Cooperation with social democrats 
and reformists was no longer possiblep since in any revolu- 
tionary situation such groups would reveal their essential 
community of interest with the capitalist system. Indeedq 
every effort must be made to liquidate the influence which 
the Ueft hand of the bourgeoisie* and the 'social fascists' 
exercised amongst the working classes* To achieve this 
objectivel the communist parties were instructed to main- 
tain positions of aggressive independence from other groups 
and implement 'united front from below# tactics. The 
'united front from below' tactics entailed savage attacks on 
(27) Seep A. I. Sobolev et al. Outline History of the 
Communist International (Moscow# 1971) PP272-289 
for the broad lines of the resolution adopted by 
the Sixth Comintern Congress* 
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communist leaders and determined actions to convince their 
vorking class supporters that their immediate interests 
were beat served by association with the communist parties 
and with the revolutionary trade union movement. Integral 
to these third period tactics was the use of the strike 
weapon which would not only educate the masses in the 
revolutionary struggle and show them which groups fought 
hardest in their interest but also help to precipitate 
the final collapse of the capitalist system* 
Another important event at the Sixth Comintern 
Congress was the promulgation of the Programme of the 
Comintern. (28) The Programme of the Comintern was an 
attempt to systematise and classify the nature and tasks 
of the communist parties and the revolutionary struggle in 
the countries of the capitalist worldv according to their 
stage of economic development* Chile fell into the category 
of being a semi-oolontal country* Independent in name 
onlyq Chile was dominated by a feudal land-holding aristo- 
cracy and a weak national bourgeoisie whose loyalties were 
divided between the rival imperialismg of Great Britain and 
the USA9 Given this basic situation, the tasks of the PCCh 
were to organise and lead an agrarian and anti-imperialist 
revolutionary movement which would l1berate the country 
from the rule of the imperialists and their Chilean allies. 
In the process of national liberationg the revolutionary 
(28) lbide PP275-283- 
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movement under the direction of the PCCh would thrust 
Chile through the bourgeois democratic stage of its develop- 
ment which the indigenous bourgeoisie had been unable to 
accomplish and open the way for socialist revolutiono(29) 
According to the Cominternp the principal motor force for 
the achievement of these objectives was to be a broad mass 
movement based on analliance between the less prosperous 
peasantry and the urban proletariat, dominated by a strong 
and disciplined PCChe When the capitalist system was 
brought to the point of final collapsel both by Its inherent 
contradictions and by the determined actions of theýPCCh 
and its allie3p soviets (committees of peasants$ workers and 
soldiers) were to be formed and the tasks of the bourgeois 
democratic revolution undertakeno(30) 
Although the strategy outlined in the Comintern's 
Programme did not have an immediate bearing on the expulsion 
of Hidalgot the burden of third period policies ran counter 
to Hidalgols efforts to organise a united front with the 
bourgeois opponents of Ibifiez, Moreovers third period 
policies led the SSA to issue instructions to the PCCh to 
(29) The Comintern postulated five stages of economic 
development in historyl socialism representing the 
conclusion of the historical process# preceded by 
capitalism* See Kermit McKenzie The Comintern and World Revolution 1928-1941 (London, 1964) p63. (30) The Sixth Comintern Congress itself did not work 
out the details of the application of its strategy for Chile. The Bur6 Bud Americano(BSA) - the SSAIs 
name was changed when it moved from Buenos Aires to Montevideo in 1930 - did this in conjunction 
with the PCCh. See Las Gran_des Luchas Revolucion- 
arios del Proletariado Chileno (Santiagoy 1932T and Hacia la formacion de un verdadero partido do clase (Santiagop 1933). Hereafter these two documents 
will be cited as Las Grandes Luchas and Hacia la formacion* 
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withdraw Hidalgo from the Senate and to take the struggle 
against Ibiftez into the streets - instructions which 
Hidalgo rojected. (31) Howeverg third period policies also 
ran counter to the central tactic advocated by the group 
which later emerged triumphant in the struggle to control 
the FCCh - namelyp the use of the legal trade union struc- 
ture as the vehicle for opposition to Ibaftezo Indeedq 
third period policy demanded the destruction of legal 
unionism* Thusp it was Hidalgo's refusal to accept the now 
policies and the directions of the SSAq rather than the 
reformism and collaborationism, of which he was acousodg 
that led to his expulsion. Hidalgots intransigence soon 
after the PCCh had been accepted as a full member of the 
Comintern and at a time when the Comintern was busy rooting 
out Trotsky and his supporters and imposing a greater 
degree of uniformity on its Latin Americanmembersq could 
not be overlooked. There is also some reason to suppose 
that the SSA was by no means unhappy that Hidalgo took the 
stand he did* Certainlyp by arranging for the expulsion of 
Hidalgop the SSA conveniently accomplished a number of 
objectives. Firstlyp it enabled the SSA to create a leader- 
ship in the PCCh which owed its position largely to the 
SSA$s intervention and whichp for that reasong should prove 
tractable in the future* Secondly, by arranging for the 
expulsion of Hidalgoq the SSA brought the PCCh into line 
with international communist experience by purging a figure 
of Trotsky-like proportions and provided the PCCh with a 
useful whipping-boy for its past failures and mistakes. 
En defensa plg, 
o 130 - 
The expulsion of Hidalgo and the campaign against 
his supporters which the Valparalso CC began to wage in 
the early months of 1931 did not become public knowledge 
until after Ibaftez's fall in July 1931* Howeverg the 
Valparafso CC had begun to take steps to bring the PCCh's 
actions into line with third period policies in the latter 
part of 1930* In November 19309 Contreras Labarca stood as 
an independent candidate in a congressional by-election 
for Valparafso andq eschewing electoral pactaq used the 
opportunity to indulge in some emotional rhetoric and ful. 
minate against 'social fascists and opportunL-ts' - without 
leaving the seat of his relegation. (32) In the new yearg 
the FCCh and FOCh managed to publish clandestine manifestos 
which spelt out the most salient features of the new poli- 
cies. In one such manifestog the workers were exhorted to 
use the strike weapon to mount an insurrection against the 
Ibaftez reeimee Furthermoreq they were instructed to break 
with the legal trade union structure and warned against 
'false working class parties'. 03) But the PCChIs exhorta- 
tions to the workers to undertake determinedg independent 
and revolutionary actions had little effect, Whilst Ibaftez 
remained in officep it was as much as the PCCh could do to 
oreanise the occasional public meeting and distribute 
(32) La UniOng Valparafso 16.11.1930- Contreras Labarca 
polled 39400 votes - lo% of the votes cast. (33) FOCh Manifesto A la clase trabajado node but 
probably published in early 1931. it contained no 
attacks on the hidalguistas. Photocopy Museo 
Recabarren. 
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clandestine tnanifestos. (34) 
Agitation inspired by the PCCh or by any other op- 
ponent of Ibaftez had little to do with the final collapse 
of his government in July 19319 although the PCCh claimed 
that he was brought down by the struggle of the masses. 05) 
Ratherg It was Ibifiez's failure to find solutions to the 
economic crisis generated by the Wall Street crash and the 
subsequent 'World Depression which caused his allies to 
withdraw their support and impelled his departure from 
office. The impact of the world economic crisis on Chile 
was of such proportions that by 1932 tax revenue from the 
exports of nitrates and copper which usually provided the 
Chilean exchequer with 70% of its incomep had declined by 
87%-(36) By the end of 19319 according to the British 
ChargS d'Affaires in Santiagop Chile wasp to all intents 
and purposeeg bankrupto(37) The social cost of the 
economic crisis was catastrophic. Between 1929 and 19329 
real wages fell by 40% and in 1931 alone 1009000 workers 
lost their jobs and an estimated 1209000 people were 
forced to migrate from the northern nitrate provinces to 
the centre and south of the country. (38) The crisis 
(34) El Trabajador Latino Americanop Montevideop Year 39 
karch/April 1931 reported two public meetings which 
the FOCh and the PCCh managed to hold in early 1931. 
But these were not reported in the Chilean press. (35) Las Grandes Luchas p9; Bandera Roja 13-8*19319 
(36) Frederick B& -Pike Chile and the United States 
1880-1962 (Notre Damet 1963) p209. (37) Foreign Office Records (FOR) FO 371/158209 A730/ 
2199 H. Chilton to Sir'John Simong 9.1-1932. 08) Frederick B. Pike ope cito p209; FOR FO 371/150809 
A7384/1832/99 H. Chilton'to Sir John Simong 20*11*31* 
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continued unabated during most of 1932 and only towards the 
end of that year were some chinks perceived in the pervading 
gloomo(39) 
The economic crisis and the social distress it 
generated produced a political turbulence which has rarely 
been paralleled in Chile's history as an independent nation. 
Until the worst effects of the economic crisis began to 
recedeq no Chilean government was secure from revolutionary 
threats. Six weeks after Ibaftez had fled to Buenos Airesq 
the patty officers and men of the Chilean Navy mutinied in 
protest against proposed wage cuts and for a brief moment 
Chile appeared to teeter on the brink of a revolutionary 
abyss* Even the election of President Juan Esteban Montero 
in October 1931 and the formal restoration of civilian rule 
did not serve to calm Political passions* The inability 
of Montero to find rapid and acceptable solutions to the 
economic crisis alienated his erstwhile supporters and pro- 
duced a series of conspiracies against his government. In 
December 19319 a group of PCCh members and sympathisersp 
intoxicated by third period rhetoricl tried to ignite the 
flame of revolution in Chile by assaulting the local Army 
barracks in the provincial town of Copiap&. (40) Howeverg 
a far more serious threat to Montero's government came from 
the supporters of Aleasandri and Ibaftez who souaht to oust 
(39) FOR F0 371/16565 Department of Overseas Trades 
Report on Economic Conditions in Chiles March 1933P 
Refe no* C4126 pp-15-16. (40) The beat single contemporary account of this event is an article by Osvaldo Quijada Cerda in Cuadernos 
Libresq Santiagol 1932# entitled 'La Pascua Trigica 
de Copiapo y Vallenar'. 
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Montero from power and replace him by their respective leaders* 
Moreoverg to the conspiracies of the alessandristas and 
ibaftistas were added those of a new force which had emerged 
in the aftermath of Ibaftez's fall - the sociali3ta. (41) 
In June 19329 Monterog provoked by the intense atmosphere 
of conspiracy and expectancy which had been building up for 
some monthsq precipitated his own downfall by sacking 
Colonel Marmaduque Grove from his post as Commander-in- 
Chief of the Chilean Air Force. (42) Grovel supported 
by socialists and ibaftistap and egged on by A1833andriq 
forced President Montero from office and estqblished the 
short-lived Socialist Republic. (43) After twelve days 
the more conservative officers of the Armed Forces re- 
asserted themselvesq forced Grove and the gocialistg 
Eugenio Matte Hurtadop from the revolutionary Junta and 
allowed an ibaflistap Carlos Davilaq to take control* 
Davila remained in office for a further three months until 
the Army decided to act once more and return the country 
to constitutional rule in September 1932. In the following 
monthp fresh presidential elections were hold and Arturo 
Alessandri emerged triumphant from a five-cornered fight 
(41) See Julio Ce'*aar Jobet El Partido Socialista do 
Chiles Is p3l for an account of several now socia- 
list parties which emerged after Ibaftez's fall, (42) Carlos Charlin Del Avion Roja a la Regublica 
Socialists. (Santiagog 1972) p6229 p684; Carlos 
Slez OP* cites 111i P131o (43) See Carlos Charlin opo cit. pp610-789 for a detailed 
account of the rise and fall of the Socialist Republic. 
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to occupy the Presidencyfbr the second time. (44) 
The restitution of constitutional normality mar- 
ked by the return of Alessandri to the Presidency and the 
gradual retreat of the economic crisis did not automatical- 
ly signify the return of political tranquility to Chile. 
For the first few years of his second term of officep 
Alessandri felt threatened by the activities of opponents 
whose methods were conspiratorial and whose ends wore the 
unconstitutional seizure of powers In dealing with both 
real and imagined threats to his government# Alessandri 
relied on special police powers granted by Congress for 
limited periods of time and on the ability of the police 
to watch and harass his opponents when these powers were 
not in effect* 
It was against this background thong that the 
PCCh sought to implement third period policiesq capture 
the hegemony of the Chilean working class movement and 
deliver the final blows to a tottering capitalist system* 
Andp indeedq from its viewpointq conditions did seem pro- 
pitious for the rapid reconstruction of the PCCh and for 
the development of the revolutionary struggle. Widespread 
unemploymentq the bitter struggles for power amongst com- 
peting sectors of the bourgeoisiev the evidence of unrest 
(44) Alessandri received 1879914 votes; Grove, 609856; 
two candidates of traditional parties received 
909000 between them and Elfas Laferttej the 
candidate of the offical PCCh polled 4,128 votes. .0 German Urzua Valenzuela Los Partidos Polfticos 
Chilenos (Santiagot 1968) P7&-. 
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amongst the Armed Forcess the failure of successive govern- 
menta to grapple effectively with the problems produced by 
the economic crisis and the growth of support for socialist 
remedies to ease Chilets ills - all seemed to suggest that 
revolution was fast approaching* Moreoverg despite the 
PCChts weak and fragmented nature as it emerged from clan- 
destinityp there seemed to be little reason to doubt that it 
would be able to recapture the loyalties of significant 3ec- 
tors of the working class movement which its and the FOCht 
had led in the heroic struggles of the recent pasto Not 
least of the factors which appeared to bode wall for the PCCh 
was the closer interest which the Cominternp through its 
Bur6 Sud-Americano(E35A)p was showing in the party's internal 
affairs and public activities, With the expert aid and ad- 
vice of the BSAq with a clear strategy and policies designed 
to reap theýmaximum advantage from the prevailing crisis 
conditionsq the PCCh seemed set for a period of success and 
achievement* 
In the months following Ibaftez's downfallq the 
PCCh did indeed manage to reactivate some of its local and 
provincial organisation3l resurrect the FOCh and to re- 
commence the publication of PCCh and FOCh newspapers in 
Santiago and a series of provincial cities. (45) In the 
(45) The most important PCCh newspapers during the 
early 1930s were Bandera__Lioja (Santiago) and 
El Comunista (Antofagastal-; for its partq the YOCh published Justicia in Santiagop Antofagasta 
and Iquique. PUblication of all these papers was frequently interrupted by lack of funds and police 
persecution, Other PCCh and FOCh newspapers included 
El Despertar del Pueblo (Iquiqueg 1931-33)9 La De- 
fensa Obrera (Tocopillas 1931-33)9 La Voz Obrera 
(Concepci6n-, 1931-32)9 Unidad Obrera and Frente Cnico (Santiagog 1934-35)o 
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longer rung howeverg the PCCh failed to make good the losses 
it had sustained under Ibifiezq let alone achieve the ambitious 
goals indicated by Comintern policy* Why was this the case? 
Perhaps the most important set of factors in the 
PCChI. j failure in the early 19309 concerned those same crisis 
conditions whicht at first aightq had seemed so favourable 
for the PCCh. Widespread unemploymentq for examplep may have 
been seen as a sure sign that the capitalist system was col- 
lapsingg but its immediate practical consequences did not 
benefit the party. Although some of the workers forced to 
migrate from the mining zones took the Communist message to 
other parts of Chilet many lost all contact with the PCCh 
with the result that the partyls strength was sapped in its 
traditional strongholds without producing commensurate advan- 
tages elsewhere. Furthermoret widespread unemployment made 
those Communist3 who had been fortunate enough to retain 
their jobs reluctant to undertake activities which could en- 
danger their livelihoods. Finallyq since many party members 
were unemployedp few could afford to pay dues and the PCCh 
was desperately short of funds throughout the early 19303*(46) 
Furthermoreg if the political turmoil of the early 
(46) R. J. Alexander in Communism in Latin Americaq P178 
has suggested that the PCCh was in regular receipt 
of Comintern funds during the early 19305- Not un- 
naturallyp Chilean Communists deny this and claim 
that the party was self-financingg relying on duos 
payments - and on donations from one wealthy member, 
Amador Pairoa. JosS Vega Dfaz Aftos de Lucha (San- 
tiago, 1962) pp64-65. But Pairoaq a film and theatre 
impresario with commercial links abroad (EI Siglog 
1.3.1941), would have been an ideal chann; _1 for Com- 
intern funds. On balanceg it seems probable that the 
PCCh was in receipt of some Comintern funds during 
the early 19309 - if only to finance the trips of Chilean delegates to Montevideo and Moscow - but it is unlikely that such funds constituted a regular 
or imT)ortant source of revenue for the party, 
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19309 suggested that the revolution was at hand, it also 
moved governments to use all the means at their disposal 
to deal with their more dangerous opponents. Although the 
PCCh wasp in fact, too weak to fall into this categorypýas 
the self-procljimed party of revolution it was the logical 
target for the hostility of the authoritiesp guilty or 
not of involvement in specific efforts to overthrow the 
government. Party activists were detainedp tortured and 
banished; party newspapers were ceneoredp seized and des- 
troyed. In shortp at no time during the early 19303 was the 
PCCh free from the hostile surveillance and harassment of 
the authorities. 
Finallys even the growth of popular support for 
socialist solutions to Chile's current difficulties did not 
work automatically to the benefit of the PCCh. Established 
parties like the PR and the PD incorporated socialist planks 
into their programmes in an effort to attract popular support 
whileg of even greater concern to the PCCh, a series of now 
socialist parties emerged after the fall of Ibaflez which 
competed directly for the loyalties of the worker3o(47) 
Although the PCCh was hostile to these new partieng the 
popular enthusiasms ignited by the Socialist Republic hads 
by the end of 19329 converted the socialists into an electoral 
force of significance* When the socialist parties came 
together to form the Partido Socialista do ChilO(PS) in 
(47) The most important of these now socialist parties 
were Nueva Accion Pdblicaq Partido Socialista Marx- 
istal Orden Socialistap Acci6n Revolucionaria Socia- 
lista and Partido Socialista Unificado, Julio Cesar 
Jobetp El Partido Socialistat 19 P31. 
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19339 the PCCh was faced with a formidable challenge to 
its pretensions to the leadership of the revolutionary left 
in Chile* From the first# the PS counted on considerable 
popular and trade union support; it had impeccable revolu- 
tionary antecedentas boasted a marxist ideology and was led 
by two charismatic figures of national prominence - Marmaduque 
Grove and Eugenio Platte Hurtado. (48) 
Ifq despite first appearanceng the conditions genera- 
ted by the economic crisis hindered rather than helped the 
PCCh's revivalt the Comintern policies designed to assist the 
recovery of the party proved inappropriate and counter- 
productive* Broadly speaking, the success of third period 
policy rested on two assumptions; firstlyl that the capital- 
ist system was on the point of collapse and secondlyg that the 
PCCh could rapidly acquire the strength to influence decisively 
the outcome of eventso Unfortunately for the PCCh9 neither 
assumption proved to be correct, 
Although the capitalist system was subjected to 
enormous pressures by the economic crisisq it did not reach 
the expected point of collapse. Perhaps more important stillq 
the political forces which had an interest in its survival 
remained basically intact - if in some disarray* Despite 
the emergence of the socialists as a notable political 
force during 19329 the key political groupings in post-Ibafiez 
(48) Eugenio Ratte Hurtadop was the the civilian caudillo 
of the Socialist Republic and a key figure in the 
foundation of the PS. See Julio Cesar Jobetq ibideq 
Iq pp99-104. See also Paul W. Drake 'Socialism and 
Populism in Chile; the origins of the left-ward 
movement of the Chilean electorate 1931-330 (unpub- 
lished Ph-Do thesiag Stanford Universityq 1971) for 
a thorough treatment of the oriCins and early years 
of the PS. 
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Chile continued to be the military and civilian supporters 
of the rival caudillo3g Ale33andri and Ib1ftezq while the 
non-aligned sectors of the traditional parties also re- 
mained a force to be reckoned with, While alessandri3tas 
and ibafti3ta3 were prepared to use extra-con3titutional 
means to return tq powerg neither they nor the traditional 
parties had any wish to see Chile plunge into the abyss Of 
social revolution* Thuss although ale33andristas and ibaft- 
ista3 attempted to use the Naval Jklutiny and the Socialist 
Republic for their own andsp when those movements proved not 
to be susceptible to their manipulation and controll they 
soon threw their support behind existing institutions* 
Furthermoreq the political turbulence of 1931 and 1932 pro- 
duced a reaction in favour of public order and the existing 
political system in many Chileans* In the aftermath of the 
Socialist Republicq non-revolutionary sectors helped to 
create the Milicia3 Republicanast a paramilitary organi- 
sation dedicated to the defence of constitutional order. 
While the Miliclas R932ublicanas were of dubious military 
value# they did represent the clear determination of broad 
middle class sectors to resist all attempts to impose 
revolutionary change in Chileo(49) The Socialist Republic 
also precipitated a fundamental change of attitude in the 
Armed Forces towards their own involvement in politics. 
Alarmed by the spectre of revolution and civil war which 
that event had raisedq most officers decided to restore 
(49) The General Staff of the Chilean Army reckoned that 
30% of the Milicias were too old, 40% would be 
needed at home or at work in an emergency and 30% 
were of no use as allies or enemies. FOR F0 371/ 
165679 A4222/73/99 dispatch from H. Chil on to 
Sir John Simong dated 18-5-1933* 
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civilian rule to Chile and to return the military institu- 
tions to their constitutional role - although small groups 
of officers and NC03 continued to conspire in favour of one 
caudillo or another. 
The social misery and political turmoil produced 
by the economic crisis during 1931 and 19329 thong did not 
presage the final collapse of the capitalist systeme While 
some Chileans sought revolutionary solutions to Chile's 
problemsp most sought the remedy within the existing poli- 
tical system andq indoodp in the face of revolutionary chal- 
lenge rallied to its defence* Thusq by the time Alessandri 
took office as President of the Republic for the second 
timeg he could count on the support of practically all the 
political parties bar those of the extreme leftq the Milicias 
Republicanas and the bulk of the Armed Forces. 
The second assumption on which the success of third 
period policies rested, namely that the FCCh could rapidly 
acquire the strength to influence the outcome of events 
also proved unfounded* Indeedq given the condition in 
which the PCCh emerged from clandestinity in 19319 it was 
a very optimistic assumption. During the Ib4ftez dictator- 
shipp the PCCh's electoral support had been dispersedt its 
membership had been reduced by an estimated 90% and its 
trade union armg the FOCh9 had all but perished. (50) 
Ploreoverg soon after Ibaftez'3 fall the division between 
Hidalgo and his supporters and those who backed the officialo 
BSA-sponsored CC was plain for all to see. The first 
(50) En defensap P83. 
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task undertaken by the official CC was the justification 
of its expulsion of Hidalgo and the purgingýof a number of 
his more prominent 3upporter3. (51) Although the hidal- 
guistas petitioned for re-admittance to the party and for 
a National PCCh Congress to consider their case - as was 
their right under internal party regulations - the official 
CC was intransiaento Unable to return to the PCCh except 
on terms of the most abject surrenderl the hidalguistas 
rapidly assumed the Trotskyist role which had been assign- 
ed to them. They began to create their own organinationg 
published their own newspapers, became active In trade 
unions and in elections on their own account - and in 1933, 
after all efforts to re-enter the PCCh had failedl founded 
their own partyg the Izquierda Comunistao(52) Although 
the hidalgui3tas do not appear to have made important in- 
road3 into the party's support - exceptq perhapsq in the 
Santiagoýarea where Hidalgo polled more votes than Lafertte 
in the 1931 presidential elections - their activities caused 
the official PCCh much difficulty and embarrasomento(53) 
Until 1933, the hidalguista3 continued to use the same 
name as the PCChq causing considerable confusion amongst 
(51) Bandera Roja 22,8,1931, 
(52) La Chispa-T-Santiago) was the hida1guistast first 
newspaper but it only survived for a few issues* 
, 
Izquierda (Santiago) howeverp was published regu- 
larly between 1934 and 1936. In Coneralt the 
hidalguistas did not have much success in trade 
unionism but they controlled the powerful Central 6nico do la Construcci6n(CUC) and had some in- fluence In the Federaci6n do Maestros (Teachers' 
Union)* 
(53) In that election Hidalgo polled 337 votes to 
Lafertte's 380 in Santiago and also made a role- tivelY fair showing in Antofagasta and Valparaiso. Bandera Roja 4.10.1931- 
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the electorate and undermining the official FCCh's ability 
to appeal for popular support. Moreoverg their attacks on 
third period policies and their advocacy of c"peration with 
other left-wing groups fomented indiscipline in the parent 
party - as did the charges of supercentralism (servile obedi- 
ence to the Comintern) and bureaucratism (the entrenched rule 
of bureaucrats) which they levelled against the leadership 
of the official PCCh*(54) 
Weak and divideds the PCCh wag in no condition to 
contend with the extraordinary pressures which confronted it 
during the early 19309 and was unable to carry out the system- 
atic work of organisational and ideological improvement 
needed to convert it into a strong and disciplined party 
capable of the successful execution of third period policieso 
Indeeds subjected to constant harassment by the authorities 
and faced by political forcesp both old and newq which showed 
disconcerting signs of vigourg third period policies drove 
the party further and further into isolation and locked it 
into a vicious circle of weakness and defeat* 
Practically all of the characteristic features of 
third period analysis and policy hindered the FCCh's recovery 
during the early 19309. The belief in the imminent collapse 
of the capitalist system led the party to make repeated calls 
to the workers to embark on revolutionary actions. The calls 
were rarely answered and alienated many workers who were more 
concerned with the struggle to survive; in addition thoy 
(54) See La Chispap no*29 August 1931; noo3v September 
19319 for these criticisms - which were Common cur- 
rency in the world struggle between Trotskyists 
and Stalinista. 
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gave the authorities all the pretexts they needed to perse- 
cute the party* Perhaps more seriously stills third period 
revolutionary rhetoric seduced some party members into 
revolutionary adventures which had no chance of success* 
Thusq on Christmas Eveq 19319 a group of PCCh and FOCh mem- 
bersq urged on by local alessandristas and a government 
1% agent provocateurp attacked a military barracks in Copiapgg 
a small town in the Norte Chicol apparently in the belief that 
they were igniting the revolutionary spark in Chileo(55) 
Far from provoking the collapse of the capitalist systemg 
the insurgents only succeeded in causing the death of seven 
of their own numberg the murder of 23 assorted Communists 
and workers in Vallenarg some 200 kilometre3 awayq and in 
bringing down a further wave of persecution on the PCCh 
nationally. (56) 
Three and a half years laterl this same revolution- 
ary rhetoric probably played a part in the Ranquil uprising 
in Ralleco province. Thereg colonos evicted from their 
land in the middle of a harsh winter joined with starving 
workers from two public works projects (gold washings and 
the Tunel Las Rafces) in a spontaneous jacqueries(57) The 
(55) See Osvaldo Quijada Cerda's article in Cuadernos 
Libres for a full account. 
(56) See Bandera-Rola, 14.2.1932; 21.2.1932 for the Com- 
munist account of the uprising and the repression 
which followed. See also El Comunista (Antofagasta) 
29*12*1931* 
(57) The best single account of the Ranquil uprising may 
be found in Hugo Morales Ben(tez's 'Polftica Social 
de la Segunda Administracion del Presidente Ales- 
sandri Palma' (Memoriat Universidad Tecnica del Estadol 
Santiago, 1969) pp44-60. For contemporary accounts 
of the conditions endured by the workers on Tunel 
Las Rafceaq see Archivop Direcci6n General del 
Trabajoq Providencias 2§01-3100 r-1934). -Report 
dated 26.7=1931"T-. 
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insurgents rampaged over a wide area of the desolate and 
sparsely populated lands of the Alto Bfo-Bfog killing a 
few landowners and storekeepers in the process* Although 
the movement was undoubtedly precipitated by the great 
hardship suffered by all three of the groups involvedq the 
involvement of a FoCh trade union, the Sindicato Agrfcola 
de Lonquimayq and the activities of its founder and presi- 
denty the Communist Juan Leiva Tapias were enough for the 
authorities to dub the movement a revolutionary attempt 
mounted by the Comintern from Montevideo (the seat of the 
BSA). (58) 
An expeditionary force of Carabineros was sent 
in to restozoorder -a task they performed with macabre 
guatog killing over 200 inaurgents. (59) Although geo- 
graphical considerations alone make it extremely unlikely 
that there was a revolutionary plot based on Montevideo or 
anywhere elsep the PCCh and the FOCh immediately pledged 
their support for the in3ureentsp called for the widening 
of the insurrection and the overthrow of the Idiotatorship 
which starves and and assassinates the manses' and urged the 
formation of soviets. (60) Not surprisinglyq the 
(58) El Mercurio 4.7-19341 5-7-1934. 
(59) Fernando Pinto Lagarrigue Cronica Polftica del 
Siglo XX (Santiagol 1972) p242* See also J036 Vega Dfaz$s article 'El Aprendiz de un Comunistat 
in Principio-slFebruary/March 1970 and Luis Corvalan Ricardo Fonseca -combatiente ejemplar (Santiago, 1971) p98 for accounts of the murder oý Leiva Tapia and other PCCh activists. (60) Unidad Obrera July 1934, lst and 4th weeks. 
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authorities proceeded to arrest and detain Communist leaders 
throughout the cauntrye 
According to the F3SA9 the same belief in the 
imminent collapse of the capitalist system led the PCCh 
to make tactical errors in relation to the Naval Mutiny of 
September 1931. (61) Even though the mutineers were 
clearly motivated by financial and professional considera- 
tiohsg the PCChIs first response was to call on them to 
form soviets and launch the revolution -a call which was 
rudely rebuffed by the mutineers in Coquimbo who threatened 
the FOCh delegation with a duoking and who took some pains 
to disassociate themselves from the Communists(62) 
Although the PCCh managed to overcome some of the mutineers$ 
misgivings in the final stages of their movementg the BSA 
alleged that the party's hard line approach at the crucial 
early stages of the Mutiny prevented the PCCh from exerting 
an influence over its development. (63) 
Other aspects of third period policy had equally 
adverse effects on the PCCh's recovery during the early 
1930s. Thestruggle to capture the hegemony of the working 
class movement and the insistence on strict independence 
of action hindered the PCChIs revival as an electoral and 
trade union force. Although other factors played a part in 
the PCCh's poor electoral showingg the party was deprived 
of an instrument which had served it well in the pastq the 
(61) Las Grandes Luchas PP17-21. (62) El Mercuriog Valparafso 3.9-1931. 
(63) Las Grandes Luchas p2l* 
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electoral pact* The PCCh won no congressional by-elections 
in the early 1930s and even when it managed to elect two 
deputies in the October 1932 general electionsp its achieve- 
ment was overshadowed by thatcff the hidalguistas wbop with 
less support nationallyq managed to elect one deputy and 
one senator in the same elections through the judicious 
use of the electoral pact. (64) Even after the PCCh con- 
gre33men had taken up their geatep third period policy 
prevented them from forming part of one of the political 
committees which negotiated for parliamentary timep thus 
limiting their effectiveness. (65) Moreoverg the failure 
to elect more congressmen not only deprived the party of 
additional opportunities to give its Views a public airing 
but deprived it of valuable sources of finance and patronage. 
AlthouCh the hostile economic conditions might well 
have recommended courses of action designed to bolster wor- 
king class unity in the face of what was seen as a capi- 
talist offensiveg third period policy and its insistence 
on independent action dictated otherwise. Thusq the PCCh 
determined to resurrect the almost moribund FoCh and to 
destroy legal unionism - orp indeedg any union which did 
not accept the tutelage of the IFOCh, The FOCh and the PCCh 
(64) Communist candidates polled 59076 votes in October 
1932 and Joag Vega Dfaz and Andr6s Escobar Dfaz 
were elected deputies for Antofagasta and Santiago 
respectively. Bandera Roja 5,11.1932* With the 
aid of pacts with the Partido Socialista Unificado 
and the Partido Radical Socialista Hidalgo was 
elected to the Senate for Antofagasta and Emilio 
Zapata to the Chamber of Deputies for Santiago. 
En Defensa P30. 
(65) Boletines del Congresol Diputadosq Sesiones Extra- 
ordina =ios =, session 28aq 22ollol933p- P1306. 
Speech by Andres Escobar Dfaze 
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delivered savage attacks on non-communist trade union 
leaders and attempted to demonstrate to their supporters 
that their interests would be better served by joining the 
FOChe Instructions were issued to sympathizers to re- 
constitute the old FOCh consejos and to form oposicion63 
sindicales revolucionarios(OSRs) inside rival unions in an 
attempt to win them over to the FOCh*(66) While the FOCh 
did manage to resurrect some of its provincial and local 
organisations during 1931 and 19329 the tactics it used 
against rival unions appear to have failed - at least in 
general. Few OSR3 were formed and while some appear to have 
succeeded in splitting the unions in which they were activep 
they generated considerable hostility against the Communists 
and no significant gains appear to have been 3corede(67) 
Despite the FOCht3 antagonismg legal unions continued to 
flourish and few of them opted to join the FOChs At the 
FOCh's National Convention held in Santiago in early 19339 
only 15 of the 150 delegates came from legal union3s(68) 
Furthermores given the hostile economic climatei-the FOCh's 
efforts to launch strikes at every conceivable opportunity 
were doomed to failure. Although the FOCh claimed some 
successes during 1931 and 19329 these appear to have rested 
(66) Boletfn del Cc no. 4, February 1933. (67) See the introduction to lResoluciones do la 
primera conferencia, do la CSLA (Confederaci6n 
Sindical Latino-Americana) (Santiagop 1933) 
for an account of the deficiencies of OSR3 in Chile* 
(68) Justicia, 9 Antofagasta 1593*19339 
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on parallel calls by other trade union and political groups. 
Certainlyý by 1933 and 19349 the FOCh was having difficulty 
in persuading Its own members to respond to strike calls 
let alone the masses as a wholeo(69) 
Strict independence of action and tile battle for the 
hegemony of the working class movement also prevented the 
PCCh from forming fruitful alliances with other political 
groups during the early 1930s and prevented the party from 
increasing its admittedly slight chances of influencing events. 
This was particularly evident during the Socialist Republic. 
The PCCh's reaction to the June 4th coup was confused; the 
CC did urge a qualified support for the revolutionary Junta 
butq at the same timep it called on the workers to form 
3oviets (Consej_o3 Revolucionarios de Obreros y Campesinos - 
CROCs) and to press for the implementation of a full-blooded 
revolutionary programme. (70) Witb the arrival of a t3SA 
delegate in Chiley howeverl the CC dropped its conditional 
support and relations between the Junta and the party de- 
teriorated; on the eve of his own fall from powerp Grove 
promised to deal with the Communists *a mano dura*. (71) 
Although local PCCh groups showed a tendency to 
co-operate with socialists and even hidalpuistas'during, the 
events and the elections of 1931 and 19329 third period 
hostility towards all non-communist groups took an 
(69) See f3olet: fn del CC, no. 4, Feb* 1933 and Izquierdaq 
lst quincenas June 1934 for details of strikes call- 
ed by FOCh to which its members did not respond, (70) CC Manifesto, 6th Juneq 1932 entitled 'Guerra on- 
carnizada contra la reacciSn monterista Y clerical* Fuera el lbailismotg published in El CoMunista, 
Antofagasta# 15.6.1932. 
(71) La Opini6n, 11.6.1932. Radio speech by Grove. 
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increasing hold. As the extent of the socialists$ popular 
appeal became clearerl the grovistas were identified as 
the principal obstacle to the PCCh's struggle to capture 
the hegemony of the working class and Communists launched 
a series of vituperative attacks on Socialist leaders who 
were denounced as social fascists and class traitora. (71) 
The PCChts attacks on the now Socialist Party and its hos- 
tility towards all attemptst other than its ownp to unite 
the left against the Alessandri administraticnq progressively 
isolated it from the mainstream of political life* 
In general,, ther;, third period policies hindered the 
PCChts recovery by forcing it into profitless confronta- 
tions with the authorities and by widening and deepening 
the breach between the PCCh and its most likely allies* 
Third period Policies tampered with the PCChts 
internal affairs as well as hindering the party's recovery 
as a politicalp electoral and trade union force* In parti- 
cularg third period policy demanded that the PCCh be pro- 
letarianisede Proletarianisation had three major facetse 
First, the principal objectives of the PCCh93 recruitment 
drives were to be workers employed in the fundamental 
industries - nitrate3p copperg coal mining and transport* 
Secondlyp the whole party structure was to be imbued with 
proletariang that is bol3havik, virtues; this meant that 
See Hacia la formaci6n pp20-25. See also Juan 
Siquieros El Grovismo, pr ncipal obstaculo para 
la revolucro'-n-obrara y camposina on Chile 
(Santiagol n. d. ). Juan Siquieros was th-e pseudo- 
nym of Gerardo Seguelp a CC member@ 
0 150 . 
the membership had to belong to a cell for political 
activityq belong to a fraction for trade union work and 
be properly acquainted with the use and function of 
democratic centralism and self-criticism and with bolshevik 
theory in general* Finallyp proletarianisation signified 
that each directive level inside the party should include 
a Majority of active (as opposed to unemployed) workers 
amongst its members; they should be $workers* both from 
the viewpoint of social extraction and from the perspec- 
tive of identification with bolshevik theory and Comintern 
PolicY*(73) 
The FCChts record of success in these organisational 
tasks was no more impressive than its achievements in other 
spheres of third period policy* Urged on by the BSAs the 
PCCh launched a number of recruitment campaigns in the 
early 19303 with targets which ranged from the national and 
ambitious #Double the party in two months' to the regional 
and frenetic $Quintuple the party in one monthlo(74) 
These targets were rarely reached and when they werep 
external events rather than systematic party work appear to 
have been the cause* Thusp for examplep the Antofaeastan 
party reported a massive influx of new members during the 
period of political effervescence which preceded and accom- 
panied the Socialist Republic. (75) Immediately after- 
wardsp howeverl the party was thrust into another period of 
clandestinity and probably lost most of its new recruits. 
(73) Las Grandes Luchas PP34-35- (74) Bandera Roja 22-el0e1931; El Comunistas Antofagasta 
117--1932- 
(75) Ibid. 8.5-1932; 11.6.1932. 
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The PCChts effective national membership was probably no 
more than a thousand during 1931 and 1932 andq while a 
calmer political climate during 1933 and 1934 may have 
allowed the party to make some slower and steadier gains 
it is unlikely to have equalledtl2b, 1925/26 highpoint of 
some 49000 to 59000 members until 1935, 
The PCCh was no more successful in recruiting from 
those working class sectors most coveted by the Comintern. 
The peasantry and industrial workers were to be the motor 
force of revolution in Chile but the PCCh reported minimal 
success in both sectors during the early 19309. According 
to the BSAq in May 1932 the PCCh had few active organisations 
in its traditional strongholds of the coal and nitrate 
industries and none at all in the copper industry; despite 
the nominal existence of Peasant Commissions in the PCChI9 
tables of organisationg no significant gains had been made 
in the countryside eithero(76) 
Although there is evidence of party work in the 
other sectors indicated as targets for recruitment by the 
BSAq such as womeng the unemployedq members of the Armed 
Forces and the Araucanian Indianag successes were again 
minimal* The PCCh did recruit some naval mutineers dis- 
missed the service but it was so chary of approaching 
serving members of the Armed Forces that some soldiers 
evidently approached the PCCh independently and asked to 
participate in the soviets set up in June 1932*(77) 
(76) Las Grandes Luchas PP31-32- (77) El Comunistag Antofagastag 15.6.1932* 
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As for its efforts to organise among the Indiansq these 
foundered on the party's lack of cadres able to converse in 
the Indian languages and on the cultural poverty and apathy 
of the Indians themselves. (78) 
Ironically the PCCh made its most striking gainsq 
such as they weres not amongst mature workers forced into 
revolutionary positions by bitter experience but amongst 
the young and the educated - who were often of middle class 
extraction. According to the 13SA9 these successes owed 
little to the organisational efforts of the PCCh itself. (79) 
Ratherp the creation of the Federac16n de Juventudes 
ComunistaS(FJC) and the Grupo Avance were the product of 
the spontaneous reaction by young workers and young univer- 
sity studentsp respectivelyg to the social misery generated 
by the economic crisis* Both the FJC and the Grupo Avance 
proved to be mixed blessings for the PCChe By the end of 
19329 the PCCh was complaining that the FJC had rejected its 
tutelage and regarded itself as the vanguard of the revolu- 
tionary movement in Chile. (80) Grupo Avancef on the 
other handq which published its own newspaper and had 
branches in several provincial citiesq proved susceptible 
to the appeals of Trotskyism and in 1933 foundered mainly 
because of bitter disputes between the Trotsky4sts and the 
oficialistas. (81) Despite the difficulties which the 
(78) Justicia 23*2,, 1933. 
(79) Las Grandes Luchas p32. Boletfn Polftico No, l 
November 1932, 
(80) Ibid 
(81) See Josi Miguel Varas ope_cit. p84 for Volodia 
Teitelboim*s account of the split in Grupo Avancee 
See also QuQn dividi6 el Grupo Avance? (Santiagog 
n. d. ) for a hidalguista account* 
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PCCh had with both groupap howeverp they provided the party 
with a useful supply of cadres and future leaders* 
The PCCh attributed its failure to reach its 
recruitment objectives to a variety of reasons though not 
to the third period policies it was trying to implement. 
According to the PCCh9 its failure to recruit was the pro- 
duct of an ingrained reluctance on the part of many members 
to accept the need for a mass partyq a reluctance which was 
exacerbated by fears of recruiting members wh& might later 
prove to be police 3pies. (82) Furthermorep accordine 
to the BSA9 recruits were often expected to have a prior 
grasp of marxism and were frequently given tasks beyond 
their capabilities. Failure to recruit was blamed also on 
the party's frequent retreats into clandestinity - and the 
reluctance of some local groups to re-emeree from cland- 
estinity when conditions changed - and on a new system of 
dues payments which expected members to contribute 1% of 
their income to party funds. (83) 
Recruitment should have been accompanied by ideo- 
logical and political training butq where it did exist, 
such training seems to have been of a rudimentary and hap- 
hazard nature. Not until January 1933 did the CC announce 
a detailed and ambitious plan for the training of 575 
activists throughout the country. (84) In July of the same 
year, it announced anotherl less ambitiougg plan butq 
according to the PCCh itself, neither plan was realised to 
(82) Sandera Roja, 5.3.1932 
(83) Ibid 
Plan do estudios do un curso do capacitacioon (Santiago9t933Y 
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any significant degree. (85) Howeverg the chief instrument 
for training was not the special course for cadres but the 
party press which reCularly published articles on the 
proper use and function of the calls the fractions demo- 
cratic centralism and self-criticism* But as an instru- 
ment of instruction the party press left much to be desired 
since it was frequently forced to close by police harass- 
ment and by lack of funds* 
These efforts to create a powerfull algileand 
disciplined party were clearly Ineffective* Cells and 
fractions rarely functioned properly and on average only 
10% of the membership paid dues during the early 1930ag 
even though the payment of dues was considered a sacred 
dutye(86) More seriouslyg there was at times an alarming 
lack of effective links between the various echelons of the 
party. Local and regional organisations often did not 
respond to circulars and directions sentby the CO. Such 
was the lack of communication that the Communists of Coquimbo 
did not inform the CC that a naval mutiny was brewing until 
the last possible moment even though they had knowledge of 
the movement several days before it occurredl the Communists 
of CopiapS apparently launched their uprising without in- 
forming or consulting the CC. (87) 




Bandera Roja 17.2,1934. 
Por la Paz v nor nuavAm 
jropu. Lart Resoluclones del XI Congreso del_PCChg San- 
tiacov 19399 finance report by Andr6s Escobar, p5e 
Conferencia Regional del PC-Ch (Coquimbo) p2; Elfas 
Lafertte op. cit. p239- 
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appreciation of third period policy led some CRs and local 
PCCh groups into political errors during the early 1930se 
The most dramatic of these was the Copiap6 $uprising' 
an action which was classified by the CC as being the 
product of putchismo -a leftist deviation which stemmed 
from a belief that the revolution could be brought about 
through a golpe del estado rather than through a mass 
movement. (88) Howevery according to the CC9 rightist 
deviations -a tendency to collaborate with other political 
groupsp to lack independence in the face of class enemies 
and to make ideological concessions to adversaries - 
represented the greater danger. (89) Indeedq during 1931 
and 19329 local PCCh groups and CRs showed a natural tendency 
to cooperate with other political groups* In the aftermath 
of Ibaftez's fallt many local PCCh groups joined civilist 
committees designed to prevent any attempt to return Ibaftez 
to office and during the Socialist Republic, some joined 
committees designed to support Grove and the revolutionary 
Juntao(90) In OleCtiOn39 toog during 1931 and 1932s local 
PCCh groups made deals with other political parties or sup- 
ported candidates of other parties. (91) And in September 
(88) Boletfn del CC9 no. 6, February 1933. 
(89) Ibid, 
(90) Conferencia Regional del PCCh (Coquimbo) p3l p4. 
See also Justiciag Antofagasta 31*1.1932 and 
2.12.1932 for evidence of PCCh cooperation with 
the Partido Socialist& Marxista and the Nuova 
Acci6n Pdblica in committees and oreanisations 
designed to defend public libertiese 
(91) The Communists of Combarbalaq for exampleg sup. 
ported an hidalguista In the 1932 congressidnal 
elections on the principle that a working class 
deviationist was better than any Igancho de la 
burguesfat. Conferenci 
,a 
Regional del PCCh (Coquimbo) 
Othersp in Iquique for example,, cooperated with 
grovistas. Barid_era Roja 19-11-1932. 
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19321, the CR9 of Antofagasta and Iquique joined committees 
with other political forces to support General Vignola in 
his confrontation with General Blanche - the confrontation 
which led to the restoration of civilian rule after 
Divila's fallo(92) 
How far these left and right wing deviations were 
the product of a conscious rejection of third period policy 
and how far they were a product of a sincere misunderstand- 
ing of that policy is difficult to say. Whatever the causeq 
it is clear that the CC was at least partially responsible. 
Often the CC's instructions arrived too late to influence 
the actions of subordinate organisations; sometimes no 
instructions were sent. Moreoverg like the lower echelonal 
the CC itself showed a tendency to drift into right and 
left wing IerrorsI* Thusp for examplet in January 19329 
the CC cooperated with a whole range of political and 
workers' groups - including alessandristas - in a protest 
strike against the Montero regime. (93) Similarlyp during 
the Socialist Republicq the PCCh did lend the Grove Junta 
a limited support. (94) While the CC appears to have been 
less disposed to commit errors of the leftq it was accused 
of having known of the strength of grolpista sentiment inside 
the party and of having done nothing to clarify the party's 
attitude to such movements - an omission which contributed 
(92) Boletfn del CC no. 49 February 1933- For details of 
the confrontation between Generals Vignola and 
Blanche see Frederick Nunn Chilean Politics 1920-31 
PP173-176. 
(93) Bandera Roja 10.1,1932; 14.1*19329 
(94) See El Comunist-19 Antofagastaq 15.6.1932 for a copy 
of a CC kanifesto dated 6.6.1932. 
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to the bloody fiasco of Copiapoo(95) 
According to the CC9 one of the reasons why It 
committed political errors was because of the absence of 
collective work in the CC* And indeedg although the CC was 
expanded to include thirty members in February 1932t mem- 
bars in charge of commissions formed to deal with specific 
tasks such as organisationg trade union affair3p work among- 
st the peasantryq agitation and propagandag tended to run 
them as private domains without much reference to the CC as 
a wholeo(96) According to one disgruntled CC member, 
Victor Gonza'Olezv during 1932 the whole CC was run by a small 
clique of intellectuals which kept the contents of corres- 
pondence with the BSA and the provincial organi3ations to 
itself* Furthermoreq he claimed that as a member of the CC 
for eight months and as a member of the Buro' Polftico for 
six weekag he was no better informed than any party member 
in Santiagoo(97) 
The complaints of Victor Gonzalez were one of the 
manifestations of a bitter struggle which afflicted the CC 
during 1932* By June 19329 the failures of party policy 
and continued harassment by the authorities had evidently 
caused considerable discontent and despondency in some 
sectors of the party. When the BSA launched its campaign 
to proletarianise the party in biarch 19329 disgruntled 
members of the CR Santiago took the BSA's instructiong that 
all directive levels inside the party should include a 
(93) Conferencia Regional del PCCh (Coquimbo) p3. 
(96) Bandera Roja 14*2.1932- 
(97) Boletfn del 'CC no. 6, February 1933- 
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majority of workerep to their hearts and launched an attack 
on the leadership of the group of 'intellectuals$ who, they 
claimedq dominated the CC. How far the dissidents were 
motivated by working class antagonisms towards 'intellectuals' 
is difficult to say but It was certainly true that the CC's 
Secretary Generalq Contreras Labarcaq was a professional 
man of middle class extractiong as was his assistantv Marcos 
Chamudeze Moreoverp a number of other members of the 
Grupo Avance had risen to prominence inside the party in 
the months following Ib9fiez's fall* Nonethelessq the basic 
reasons for the emergence of the Grupo de OposiciOn in 
Santiago in mid-19329 which came to Include a majority of 
the CR Santiago and three CC memberst appear to have been 
politicalo Although the Grupo de-Oposict6n changed its name 
to the Novimiento hacia la bolchevisact6n del partido in 
order to avoid confusion with Trotskyist opposition group3q 
the charges which it levelled against the CC were very simi- 
lar to those which were being made by the hidalnuistas., The 
Novimiento claimed that the CCWasdominated by intellectualst 
that it had mismanaged party funds and that it suffered from 
supercentralism and bureaucratism. tiorefundamentallyp the 
Movimiento accused the CC of lacking a real strategy and 
following policies which only served to bring down government 
oppression and persecution on the partyo(98) 
The CC accused the Movimiento of using Trotskyist 
tactics and suggested that the Movimientols mechanical 
application of the concept of proletarianisation was a 
(98) See ibid. for an account of the Movimiento's chargeso 
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product of its members' lack of political education and 
their envy of the rapid rise to prominence of recently re- 
cruited young activists. According to the CC9 the Novimientols 
advocacy of a proletarian as opposed to an agrarian anti- 
imperialist revolution aligned it with the socialistsl 
while the charges of bureaucratiamp financial mismanagement 
and the demand for an independent Marxist analysis of 
Chilean reality aligned it with the hidalpuistas,. (99) 
Although the CC accused the Movimiento of disarticu- 
lating party work in Santiago at a time when the PCCh was 
experiencing sharp persecution, its challenge had no rami- 
fications outside Santiago and was apparently defeated with 
ease. By December 1932* the three CC members who had joined 
the Movimiento had been prevailed upon to make public con- 
fession of their errors butt according to Victor Gontalezo 
they had recanted only because the CC had accepted a good 
part of their criticisms. Certainlyq the CC PCCh and the JEF 
FOCh later took considerable pains to prove that the majority 
of their members were not intellectualss(lOO) And the 
expulsion of one party member in July 19339 in part for 
describing the proletariani3ation process as @police terror 
and worker demagogy' suggests that the CC did take more 
determined steps to proletarianise directives. (101) 
Furthermoreq the CC apparently accepted the charge of super- 
centraliamp notp howeverg with regard to its own rigid 
(99) Ibide 
(100) Ibide Justicia 18.1,1933. 
(101) Hacia la formaciSn p8. 
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obedience to Comintern directions but in relation to the 
tendency of subordinate organisations to await CC instruca.. 
tions before proceeding to act. (102) 
If the challenge of the 1-iovimiento inside the CC 
was defeated with relative easeq the PCCh continued to 
have difficulties with members who were inspired by hidal- 
guista and Trotskyist criticisms of the party* According 
to the CC9 a Party Congress called in April 1933 could not 
function properly in part because of the activities of the 
Santiago opposition groupq while in July 1933 a number of 
fairly prominent activigtag mainly university students, 
were expelled for advocating co-operation with the Socialists 
and with Hidalgo ( and for echoing charges of supercentralism 
and bureaucratism)o(103) Even after these expulsionag 
the PCCh continued to have difficulties with its young 
activists; in 19349 Luis Hernandez Parker and Juan Vargas 
Puebla were both expelled for Trotskyist crimes but later 
returned to occupy Posts Of some importance in the Pcch. (io4) 
Broadly speaking there appear to have been three 
basic reactions to third period policies and the failure 
they brought. Some simply ignored third period policy when 
the preasure of eventa dictated other courses of action# 
others began to question the wisdom of the policies them- 
selves while most responded by retreating into apathy 
(102) Plan deastudios do un curso de capacitaci6n 
oDecites L3 7* 
103) Tac-la la_I-ormaci6np299pp7-8 
104) El Imparcialg Santiaeo929-7: 1937. Hernindez Parker 
later became the head of the FJC until his expulsion 
in 1937; Vargas Puebla became a CC member and is still 
a member of the PCCh - see Appendix 9 for further 
details of his career. 
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and passivity. Watched closely by the BSAq howevers the 
CC could not afford the luxury of prolonged inactivity and 
the idea of rejecting third period policies outright was 
quite simply unthinkable& For the CC third period policies 
were correct by definition and if they failed to produce 
the expected resultag the faults lay in the FCCh's own errors 
and weaknesses. With the help of the BSA9 the CC tried to 
correct the party's most glaring deficiencies and applied 
itself to third period policy with renewed vigouro In May 
19329 after consultation with the PCCh9 the BSA issued 
Las Grandes Luchas Revolucionarios del Proletariado Chileno 
which examined the PCCh's most striking weaknesses and gave 
instructions on how these were to be overcomee Howeverp 
the events of June 1932 and the months of clandestinity 
which followed prevented the CC from taking effective 
action along the lines suggested by the BSA. It was not 
until December 1932 that the CC held an amplified meeting 
which dealt with the Movimiento and detailed the party's 
left and right wing deviations anewo(105) 
Apart from those deviations already mentionedg errors 
of the left included the neglect of work amongst the peasan- 
try and gectarianiams which prevented the PCCh from becoming 
a mass party* Other right wing deviations included liquida- 
tioniam (a local PCCh group had apparently changed its name 
to avoid persecution)q 'hiding' (some CRs had evidently 
failed to re-emerge from clandestinity in time to fight the 
(105) Boletin del CC no. 4, February 1933- 
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October 1932 elections) and disdain towards trade union 
work and activity amongst youth. (106) 
In April 1933 the PCCh hold a Congress to continue 
the work of organisational and political improvement but 
this Congress was aborted because of the activities of the 
Santiago opposition group and because it was raided by the 
police. Indeed, the Congress finished its sessions in the 
Santiago penitentiary. (107) 
The FCCh finally managed to hold a National Con- 
ference in Santiago in July 19339 unimpeded by police inter- 
ference. At that Conferencep the PCCh adapted the resolu- 
tions of the 12th Session of the Executive Committee of the 
Communist International (ECCI) to Chilean conditions* The 
Conference declared that the revolution was fast approaching 
and warned against the twin perils of passivity and sectari- 
anism which prevented effective links being forged with the 
masses. (108) Notwithstanding its strictures on sectarian- 
ismp, the Conference proceeded to indicate that grovistas and 
hidalguistas were a greater danger to the revolutionary 
struggle than ftlessandri and instructed the PCCh to create 
a deep abyss between itself and other political parties. 
Perhaps the most dramatic feature of the Conference was the 
public criticism of Recabarren which$ although expressed 
in measured termsq had a profound psychological impact inside 
and outside the party and effectively underlined its commit- 
ment to third period isolationism. (109) 
(106) Ibid., 
(107) Jo-s-Tblieuel Varas op. cit. p87- 
(108) Hacia la, formaci6n pp5-8. (109) Ibid. 
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After criticisng Recabarreng the Conference pro- 
ceeded to expel a number of fairly prominent activists for 
Trotskyist and hidalguista 'crimes' and took steps to 
strengthen the authority of the CC by ensuring that the 
provincial organisations were represented on the CC and by 
3uppres3ine all Political Bureaux other than that of the 
CCO(110) Despite the instructions and exhortations is- 
sued at the July 1933 Conferencep a plenary meeting of the 
CC in January 1934 found that party work since the Confer- 
ence had been deficient in almost every re3peCte(lll) 
Third period policiesq tho'k failed to produce the 
desired results and actively hindered the PCChIs recovery 
during the early 19309* Neverthelesag the persecution and 
ideological conflict which those policies helped to bring 
down upon the PCCh were not without their advantaCe3 - at 
leastq from the partyts standpoint. Strong bonds of allegi- 
ance were forged amongst those members who managed to stay 
the course and a body of activists emerged who could conceive 
of no life other than that offered by the party. And by the 
same tokensp a leadership emerged which was particularly 
loyal to the Comintern and whichy with the aid of the BSAq 
successfully established its control over the party -a con- 
trol which was not to be seriously challenged for many years 
to come. 
Ibid. p48. 
Bandera Roj_a 17.2-1934. 
* 164 . 
Chapter 4 The Popular Front Strategy, 
1935-1938s 
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The signs of success and achievement which the 
PCCh began to display in the later 19309 were all the more 
dramatic for their sharp contrast to the failure and defeat 
which almost engulfed the pArty in the years immediately 
following the fall of Ibafteze By the end of 1938, the 
PCCh had ceased to be an insignificant party at the margin 
of the mainstream of political developmentag rivenby in- 
ternal dissensions and persecuted by the authorities* By 
that timep the PCCh had elected seven representatives to 
Congressp wielded considerable influence in a unified trade 
union movement and had played a key role in the electoral 
coalition which had place an active member of the Radical 
Party in the Presidency of the Republic for the first time 
in Chilean history. Like the failures which had preceded 
themq the PCCh's successes were the product of interaction 
between Chilean conditions and Comintern policies. 
By the beginning of 19349 Chile was clearly on the 
road to economic recoveryp helped by an upturn in world 
trade and the rigorous measures taken by President Alessan- 
drits Finance Ninisterp Gustavo Ross, The key factor in 
Chilets economic recoveryq as it had been in its previous 
collapsel was the nitrate industryo During the first 
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quarter of 1934, nitrate exports were almost 
three times 
as great as they had been during the same period 
in 1933 
and the number of workers employed by that industry 
had 
almost doubled. (l) As the fortunes of the nitrate indus- 
try improvedv so did those of the whole economy and by kay 
1934 unemployment had dropped from its official high point 
of 1609000 in December 19329 to 40,000. (2) 
Although there were occasional signs of desperate 
social unrest after early 1934, like the Ranquil uprisingg 
the recovery of the economy helped to reduce social ten- 
3ions and nap the vehemence of revolutionary passions* 
Neverthelesag President Aleasandri continued to feel that 
his regime was in danger and he used special police powers 
granted by Congress to keep his opponents In check* In- 
deedg Alessandri's ill-concealed support for the illegal 
paramilitary 14ilicias Republicanasp his frequent recourse 
to special police powers and his harassment of even the 
legitimate activities of his opponents played a large part 
in destroying the political consensus which had accompanied 
him during his first wonths of office* 
When Alessandri took office as President for the 
second timeq in December 19329 he pledged himself to restore 
order and prosperity to Chile and he pursued those objec- 
tives with the same single-mindednessp realism and lack of 
scruple which had characterised. his less orthodox efforts 
FOR FO 371/17507l A 4658/230/99 dispatch from 
R. Aitchell to Sir John Simon, dated 22-5,1934, 
(2) Ibid. 
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to return to power after the fall of lbafiez. (3) Deter- 
mined to construct a solid majority for his administration 
in Congressq he offered the plum posts in his cabinet to 
members of parties which had opposed his re-election in 
1932 (to Liberals andq in one ca3eq to a Conservative dis- 
gui3ed as a technocrat) while he gave the PR9 his principal 
support in those electionsq two cabinet seats and three 
ministries of minor importance. (4) For the first few 
months after Alessandri took officeg the PR was prepared to 
accept this situation and co-operate in government with the 
right wing parties in the cause of re-establishing order and 
firm government. Howevery it was not lonir before the PR 
made its sense of grievance felte In July 1933P it began 
to make determined efforts to force Alessandri to choose 
between the right wing parties and the PR as the principal 
support of his Government. (5) Although Aleasandri made 
some attempt to meet the Radicalal demands by promoting a 
Radical to the Ministry of the Interior in that month and 
by increasing the PR13 share of cabinet seats to three 
(controlling four ministries)q Radical thirst for office 
was still unslaked. (6) 
(3) See Ricardo Donosoq Ale3sandri, agitador y denioledorg 
II, P95P P57 for accounts of Ales3andri's manoev- 
rings during the Naval ýlutiny and the June 1932 
coup. See Carlos Charlinj, Dal Avi6n Rojo a la 
Repdblica Socialistaq PP535-544 for an account of 
plots against liontero in which alesaandristas 
were involved, 
(4) The Conservative was Mirzuel Cruchagap Minister of Foreign Relations. The two Radical ministers con- trolled the Ministries of Justicey Education and Fomentoo Arturo Alessandri Recuerdos de Gobi_erno 
III, pp6-8. 
(5) FOR FO 371/165689 A 5398/73/9. Dispatch to Sir 
John Simon from 11. Chilton dated 5-7-1933- 
(6) Arturo Alessandri op. cit. 9 III, p47- 
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Thwarted desire for cabinet office was not the 
only reason for the growth of opposition towards Alessandri 
inside the PR* Some Radicals objected to aspects of his 
administration's economic policies while still more were 
alarmed by his cavalier attitude towards civil rights and 
public liberties* By the end of 19339 a number of Radical 
congressmen were prepared to vote against his request for 
a six month extension of his special police powers. (7) 
In April 19349 Radical opposition to Alessandri was given 
an additional fillip by the results of two senatorial by- 
elections. In Antofagastaq Alessandri successfully used 
unscrupulous means to arrange the election of his Liberal 
song Pernandog to a seat to which the PR felt it had a 
better claim; in Santiagog harmaduque Grove defeated the 
&9overnment-sponsored candidate in a contest which was 
generally hold to be a plebiscite on the government's 
record. (8) The first result offended by its naked nepotism 
and by Its disregard for Radical aspirationsg the second 
appeared to indicate that the tide of public opinion was 
running against the government* The PR therefore decided 
to present another ultimatum to Alessandri designed to 
force him to choose between Radical and right wing supports 
Alessandri reJected the ultimatum and the PR ordered its 
ministers to resign from cabinet but the party did not move 
into full-scale Opposition. There were probably two basic 
reasons for thise firstly, the PR wanted to protect the 
jobs of those Radicals who continued to serve in the 
(7) Aicardo Donoso, op. cit., II, p135- (8) Jbide PP136-138- 
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administration in non-cabinet positions andq secondly, in- 
fluential Radicals continued to feel that the party*s inter- 
eats would be better served by continued association with 
the Alessandri administratione Indeed, by early 1934, the PR 
was divided between the wealthier and more conservative 
Radicals who preferred the safety of an understanding with 
Aleasandri and the right wing parties and youngerg profes- 
sionally-trained members who saw little hope of their ambitions 
for office being satisfied in the present situation and who 
preferredq inateadl to seek an understanding with Alessandri's 
left wing opponentse Although the youngerg left wing Radicals 
won a battle in April 1934 and succeeded in withdrawing 
the PR from cabinets the struggle between the left and right 
wings was by no means overe Until 19379 Alessandri had some 
success in persuading Radicals to return to his cabinets 
sometimes In direct disobedience to PR instructionao(9) 
The PR was by no means the only party to experience 
difficulties in deciding on its attitude towards the 
Alessandri administration* A number of less important left 
and centre parties like the Partido Social ]Republicano(PSR) 
an off-shoot of the PRt and the Partido Demo_cratico hovered 
between support and oppo3itionq torn by their desire for 
office and by a growing dissatisfaction with the actions 
and policies of the government* Moreoverp even right wing 
parties like the PC were occasionally moved to protest 
against what they saw as Alessandri'3 abuse of civil 
(9) Peter G* Snow El Radicalismo Chileno (Santiagog 
1972) pp85-86. 
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libortieso(IO) Only one sector of political opinion ap- 
pears to have avoided the quagmire of indecision - the extreme 
left, The P59 the PCCh and the Izquierda Comunista(IC) 
opposed Alessandri from the outset. Howeverg none of these 
parties had the individual strength to mount an effective 
opposition to Alessandri either inside or outside Congress* 
Clearlyp if the right wing policies of the government were 
to be restated and its abuse of public liberties chookedg 
some form of left wing unity had to be organised but neither 
the PS nor the PCCh were prepared to countenance any left 
wing unity which was not under its own control* Thusq when 
the anarcho-syndicalist Confederacion General de Trabajadores 
invited the parties of the left to form a Fronts Antifacista 
in August 19339 the PCCh joined only to make use of the 
opportunity to denounce other members as enemies of the 
proletariat. (11) A year later, Grove attempted to create 
a Frente %acional do Defensa de la__Repdblica with the help 
Of the PS9 the IC and dissident sectors of the Radical and 
Democrat partiese But this particular effort was denounced 
by the PCCh and came to nothingt(12) Similarlyq attempts 
by both the PS and the PCCh to create a united trade union 
movement foundered on the obstacle of their mutual antagon- 
ism. (13) It was only in the final months of 19349 when 
Alessandri's harassment of his opponents reached new heightsq 
(10) For elcampley Conservatives protested against the 
destruction of the satirical magazine Topaze in 
1938* Alessandri was furious. See Arturo Ales- 
sandriv op. cit,, 1119 p9l, 
(11) ChoquO (Santiago) 8-8-1933. 
(12) Unidad Obrera (Santiago) 1-7-1934. 
(13) 'The PCCh rej-eoted the P61s call to join a Frente 
Sindical Proletaria in 1934. Jus-ticia 9.6.1934-. 
The PS rejected PCCh unity calls made in 1933 and 1934. ! Lusticia 5-1-1933; 9.6.1934. 
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that the PS began another attempt to organise a united 
front of left-wing parties* The decision of the government 
to resume payments on Chilets external debt provided the 
catalyst. In December 1934, the PS9 the IC9 the Democratic 
Party and the Radical Sociali3ts(PRS) formed the Block do 
Izquierda (henceforth, Block) to combat this measure andq 
more Generallyg to defend public libertieso(14) 
True to Third Period policyq the PCCh greeted the 
formation of the Block with hostility - it was yet another 
manifestation of class collaborationism which could only 
serve to strengthen the 'feudal bourgeois imperialist 
dominationt of Chile. (15) Howeverg by February 19359 al- 
though the PCCh maintained its critical attitudeq its lan- 
guage in dealing with the Block had become markedly more 
restrained -a development which did not go unnoticed by 
the IC which began to predict a sharp change in the PCCh1s 
policies. (16) In April 19359 the PCCh undertook that 
change by announcing that policies had to be attuned to 
changing world conditions and that in the light of the 
world offensive of fascism and the reactionary offensive 
in dhileg unity of action had become a *vital necessity' for 
the Chilean working classe3-(17) It is clear that the 
PCCh did not decide to change course because of its own 
independent deliberations. 
Ever since the coming to power of Hitler in 
Germany in 19339 the problem of sternmin the rise of fascism 
(14) La Opiniodn 6.12.1934. The PRS had been formed by 
left-wing Radical dissidents in 193le 
(15) Frente, Cnico 26.12.1934. 
(16) Izquierda 27.3.1935. 
(17) Frente Unico lst week of Aprilq 1935. 
9 172 . 
had been the subject of some debate inside the Comintern* 
When the Frencb Communist Party joined together with 
socialists in the early months of 1934 to prevent a 
threatened fascist take-overg that debate took on a new 
urgency. (18) By July 19349 a leading member of the 
Cominternp the Bulgarian Communist Georgi Dimitroffq was 
arguing that the dangers from fascism were now so great 
that attacks on social democrats should cease and 'united 
front from belowl tactics should be dropped and trade 
union movements should be unified irrespective of whether 
communist parties managed to secure hegemony over them. (19) 
Although the main lines of Dimitroffts recommendations 
were later adopted by the Seventh Comintern Congress in 
August 1935f the third period policies which he questioned 
remained nominally intact until then. Nevertheleasp during 
19349 the French Communist Party and other European Communist 
parties were urged to seek united front alliances with 
socialist partiesl the Latin American Communist partiesq 
which met in conference at Montevideo in October 1934, also 
Issued a call to form the Owidest possible anti-imperialist 
frontst. (20) Howeverg according to one recent account of 
that conferenceg the delegates were unable totcompletely 
overcome a sectarian attitude towards the national reformist 
and petty bourgeois partieal. (21) For this reasong and 
probably also because the leaders of the PCCh were loath to 
(18) See D. R. Brower The New Jacobins - the French Com- 
munist PartZ and the Popular Front (Cornel-l, --J9-6-8) 
pp3l-34. Seep alsog Fernando Claud in The Communist 
Movement from Cominto rn to Cominform (London, 1975) 
ppl76-179. 
(19) A. I. Sobolev et al., Outline Histor y of the Com- 
munist Internationalp PP375-378- 
(20) Ibid* p36FF. 
(21) ibid. 
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fall into the error of right deviationismg the PCCh clung 
to the policies which it had only managed to digest with 
difficulty between 1930 and 19339 and attacked the Block 
with familiar invective* 
Despite the re-orientation of Comintern policy 
during 1934 and the signs of a partial re-adJU3tinent in 
the PCCh's attitude towards other left-wing parties in the 
early months of 19359 the call for united action which the 
PCCh made in April 1935 appears to have been the direct 
result of the arrival in Chile of a special Comintern team 
led by the Peruvian Communistj Eudocio Ravine3o(22) 
According to Ravine3q two countries in Latin Americaq Chile 
and Brazilq had been selected to test two variants Of the 
popular front strategy which was later adopted by the 
Seventh Comintern Congress* The basic objective in both 
oountr103 was to origanise the broadest united front of demo- 
cratic forces that was Possible butq once this had been 
achievedq the Brazilian Communists were to seize power 
through force while the PCCh was to come to power through 
the normal means afforded by electoral proC633eS. Ravines 
states that the differences in tactics for Brazil and Chile 
was the product of divergences between two Comintern leadersq 
Planuilsky and Dimitroff - the former maintaining that outside 
the developed countries Of Europeq popular fronts could not 
achieve power except through armed in3urrectiono(23) 
(22) The team included Ricardo 1111artInezq a Venezuelan 
trade union expertq Federico Glaufbaufq an Austrian 
specialist in ideological traininp. 9 Planuel Cazonq 
a German$ Kazanovq a Ru3sian and Marcuccit an Ital- 
ian youth expert. Eudocio Ravines La Gran Estafa 
(Santiagol 1954) p312. 
(23) Ibid. p287. D&R. Brower op. cit. 9 p82. 
--l 
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Whatever the precise reasons for the different tactics used 
in Brazil and Chile - and it is worth noting that the adop- 
tion of insurrectionary tactics for Brazil also obeyed the 
particular experience of the leader of the Brazilian Com- 
munist Partyq ex-army officer Luis Carlos Preates - the 
basic strategy remained the same in both cases. (24) 
Although there was no real fascist threat in Chile 
at the time (the local 'Nazi Partyq the Movimiento Nacional 
Socialista, (MNS) being noisy but weak)q by April 1935 condi- 
tions did seem propitious for the organisation of left-wing 
unity as a preliminary to the formation of a popular front 
coalitiono(25) Important left-wing parties were already 
grouped together in the Block and Alessandrils actions 
continued to give grounds for fears that democracy was in 
dangero Indeedq the government's brutal and over-energetic 
repression of a national rail strike in January 1935 out- 
raged not oftly the left but also the PR and even some members 
of right-wing parties and in March 1935, they joined to- 
gether in Congress in an unsuccessful effort to impeach the 
Minister of the Interior. (26) Neverthelesss formidable 
obstacles still remained to the creation of united action 
(24) Prestes was an Army Engineer who leaped to world 
fame in the mid-1920s by leading a revolutionary 
column of soldiers through the Brazilian junale* 
Although not a Communist at the timep he later 
became leader of the Brazilian Communist Party* 
(25) The PINS was founded in 1932 by Jorge Gonzalez 
von Plarees and others. Although it gained some 
notoriety through street battles with Communists 
and Socialists in the mid-1930st it always claimed 
to be socialist as well as nationalist and in 1938 
declared itself to be anti-imperialist. (Claridad, 
27-5-1938). After the abortive coup of September 
1938 (see belowq P197) it supported the Popular 
Front candidate in the October 1938 presidential 
elections. 
(26) Aicardo Donoso op. cit., 119 PP155-159- 56 Congress- 
men voted for impeachment and 76 voted against. 
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between the PCCh and other parties of the left. The PS and 
the IC harboured deep resentments and antagonisms towards 
the PCCh whileg according to Ravinesq there was considerable 
resistance to the new tactics inside the PCCh itself-(27) 
The first stop which the PCCh took towards organi- 
sing unity Of action with the left was to suggest to the 
Block that joint May Day celebrations be held# a suggestion 
which the Block parties rejected unanimously. (28) At 
the same timeg the PCCh also mooted its own incorporation 
into the Block in a letter to Oscar Schnaket the Secretary 
General of the PS, (29) Schnake replied with a scathing 
letter in which he congratulated the PCCh for finally re- 
cognising that its tactics in recent years had been mis- 
taken but regretted that this change of course had only 
come about because of fresh orders from abroad. Before 
agreeing to united actiong Schnake demanded that the PCCh 
Cease its attempts to win over the lower echelons of the 
PS to the idea of united action behind the backs of the 
Socialist leaders and that it stop its efforts to sow 
intrigue inside the PS-(30) Schnake also indicated that 
the PCCh'3 conduct in. an approaching Congres3 of Trade 
Union Unity would be carefully 3crutini3ed for evidence of 
the Communist3l good intentiona. (31) The PCCh's fir3t 
effort to join the Blockg theng wa3 rebuffed - the nominal 
reason on this occasion being that it was against Block 
(27) Eudocio Ravines op. cit. P313,321. Alsov see 
below p204. 
(28) jzquierda 15,5,1935, 
(29) Frente Unico 2nd week Of Mays 1935* 
(30) Oscar 3-ch'nake polftica Socialista (Santiagog 1938) 
PP85-89. 
(31) Ibide 
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policy to admit fractions of the same party* As the IC 
newspaper Izquierda reported with some gleep the Block 
advised the PCCh to seek an accommodation with the IC 
before applying for admission again. (32) 
Undeterred by the rebuffs it received in May 1935, 
the PCCh persisted in its efforts to form a united front 
with the PS, Howeverg it soon became clear that the PCCh 
was not prepared to make the concessions of the type de- 
manded by Schnakee At the Congress of Trade Union Unity 
held in Valparafso in June 1935t the PCCh resorted to mani- 
pulations of card votes and the fabrication of paper trade 
unions in a successful attempt to prevent the Socialist- 
dominated Confederacion Nacional de Sindicales Legale3(CNSL) 
from unifying the trade union movement under its own aus- 
pice3o(33) If the PCCh's conduct on that occasion did noth- 
ing to win the P513 confidencep relations between them became 
even cooler when it became clear that the PCCh'3 new tactics 
went beyond unity of action ofi the left. In July 19359 at 
the funeral of the flamboyant Radical Senator for Santiagop 
Pedro Leon Ugaldeq the PCCh launched its historic call for 
a Popular Front which would unite all democratic forces in 
the struggle against reaction and imperialism*(34) While 
the PCChIs attempts to join the Block represented a retreat 
from Third Period extremismg its call for a popular front 
signified a sharp turn to the right and opened the doorg 
at least as far as the PCCh was concernedg to c(>operation 
(32) jzquierda 15,. 5 1935. 
(33) See La_ppini6n 18.7-1935 and Consigna 8-6-1935 
for Socialist descriptions of the PCCh's tactics 
at this Congress. 
(34) La. opini6n 8-7-1935- 
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with parties of the centre ando in particularg with the 
PRo The initial reactions of the major Block parties were 
not favourable. The IC denounced the now formula as an- 
other Stalinist attempt to sell out the proletariat and 
declared that the PCCh was passing from the 'plantations 
of rabid stridentism to the swamps of class collaboration- 
ism'. (35) The PS9 for its partq insisted that the Block 
was the vehicle for the struggle against Alessandri and saw 
no need for the creation of a now organisation along popu- 
lar front lines. Moreoverg the PS expressed serious doubts 
as to whether the PR9 clearly divided between those who 
continued to collaborate with Alessandri and those who did 
notv could be incorporated into an alliance of the left. (36) 
Despite the hostility and opposition of the PS and 
the IC towards the popular front ideaq the PCCh pressed 
ahead with its efforts* The by-election to fill the Senate 
seat left vacant by Pedro Leon UGalde's death Gave the PCCh 
the opportunity to demonstrate Popular Front"tactics in 
practice* The PCCh nominated a non-communistp Juan Luis 
Mery, as its candidate and invited the other left wint: and 
centre parties to support him. The choice of Mery as can- 
didate was particularly shrewd since he was a member of a 
Block party (the Partido Radical Socialista)g a known 
ibaftistal director of La Opini6n (the principal opposition 
newspaper) and on the run from the police who were trying 
to serve an exile order on hime The PS, which had planned 
(35) Izquierda 24-7-1935. Article anon. $Bajo las 
banderas de Juan Antonio*. 
(36) Consigna 3-8.1935- 
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to present Oscar Schnake as it candidate in the by-electionp 
was thus placed in an awkward positione Refusal to support 
Mery would lay the PS open to the charge that it was 
not prepared to make the slightest self-sacrifice in the 
cause of left-wing unityp contrasting unfavourably with 
the FCCh whichq for all its past sectarianismg was now 
clearly prepared to mend its ways. Moreoverg refusal to 
support Mery might well have caused the PRS to leave the 
Blockt beginning the process of disintegration which had 
characterised previous efforts at left-wing unity. The PS 
decided to drop Schnakels candidacy and to support hery - 
nott howeverg without signs of bad grace. (37) The PR9 for 
its partq had ozLginally intended to present its most pro- 
minent left-wina leaderp Juan Antonio Rfosq as its candidate 
in the by-election but since the left-wing Radicals had been 
looking for an alliance with the parties of the left for 
some time, the PR9 toot was prevailed upon to drop Rfo3l 
candidacy and support Mery. (30) The by-election was final- 
lY fought between Mery and the government-sponsored candidate 
Arturo Ureta Schazarretaq and was seen by both sides as a 
test Of the governmentis Popularity, In the eventv Ureta 
won but by such a narrow marain that the result was seen 
as a moral victory for the left and a defeat for the 
(37) The Socialist newspaper Consipna was very cool 
towards Mery and the PCCh claimed that some 
Socialists boycotted his candidacy* Frente Unico 
lat week of Augustq 1935- 
(38). Eudocio Ravines o 30 cite p3l9- See alsot FOR 
FO/371/18664 A 65129/11/'g dispatch Charles Bentinck 
to Sir John Simon dated 15.7-1935- 
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government. 09) 
In the same month that the FCCh launched ita call 
for a Popular Fronts the Comintern was in the process of 
formally adopting popular front policies at its Seventh 
World Congress in Ploscowe Interestingly enoughy the analy- 
ais of world economic conditions which underpinned the now 
policies was not dissimilar to that which had been used to 
support Third Period policies* The capitalist world was 
tentering a period of sharp clashes as a result of the 
internal and external contradictions of capitaliamt. (40) 
Howeverg on this occasions the approaching economic and 
political crises were seen to favour the rise of fascism 
rather than the rapid development of the revolutionary 
strugglee In order to check this threats the communist 
parties were instructed to form broad popular fronts of all 
parties and organisations which were interested in defend- 
ing bourgeois democracy - nowq for all its faultsp recog- 
ni3ed as being preferable to fascism* The communist parties 
were directedg theroforep to co-operate with the recently 
despised social democrats and reformists in coalitions of 
trade unions and political parties. In colonial countries 
or semi-colonial and dependent countries like Chiles the 
principal enemy was not fascism so much as imperialism. 
The task in those countries was to form wide anti-imperialist 
fronts and work for the installation of national popular 
revolutionary governments whichq once in offices would 
(39) Ureta Echazarreta polled 29,437 votes to Meryos 
289134. According to the British Ambassadorg Ikery lost because of massive bribery and manipulation of 
the electoral roll* FOR FO 371/18664 A 7289/11/9 
despatch Bentinck to Simong dated 12.8.1935. 
(4o) Seeg Jane Degras The Communist International 1919- 
1943 (3 vols. , London, 1960) 1119 
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undertake fundamental reformso(41) If conditions permit- 
tedq a single mass revolutionary party was to be created on 
the basis of unity between the socialists and the commun- 
ists. (42) With regard to themselvesq the communist parties 
were exhorted to dispense with 'self-satisfied sectarianism' 
which seriously retarded growth and warned against right 
opportunism which tended to gloss over the differences be- 
tween communist and other political parties. (43) 
Although the FCCh's initial presentations of the 
Popular Front strategy emphasised that it was not a retreat 
from revolutionary principles but simply the continuation 
of the revolutionary struggle by means better suited to 
prevailing circumstances# and although the PCCh evidently 
had some success in winning individual Socialists over to 
the Front ideaq the PS and IC leaderships remained uncon- 
vinced of the need for a new popular front coalition and 
they continued to resist Communist efforts to join the 
Block. In November 19359 the PCCh claimed that an applica- 
tion to join the Blockq made on its behalf by the PR59 was 
turned down because it was not made in writing and that a 
subsequent written application was rejected after an inord- 
inate delay - even though all the Block parties had publicly 
agreed to the admission of the PCCh*(44) 
If the PS and the IC proved intransigenty the 
Popular Front idea was gaining acceptance elsewheres In 
(41) International Press Correspondencel Vienna and Londong 
ýVsl. 159 No-34,10.8-1935. 
(42) Ibido 
(43) Ibide 
(44) F-re-nte-Unicog 2nd weeks of Septemberp October, 
Novemberg lgj5. 
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particularp left-wing Radicals were attracted by the idea 
while other Block partiesp like the PRS and the Partido 
Democratico which did not share the PSIs and the IC's deep 
antagonism towards the PCCh was also quick to see the 
advantages of a broader coalition*(45) Howeverg if the 
PCCh was making some progress in Its efforts to gain accept- 
ance for the Popular Front ideaq it was the pressure of 
events rather than Communist tactical skills which finally 
precipitatod the formation of the Popular Front in March 
1936. Despite the signs that the left and the PR were 
moving towards cooperationg the Alessandri government con- 
tinued to give grounds for fears that democracy was in 
danger* In September 1935, the government attempted to choke 
off one critical voice by buying shares in the Radical news- 
paperp La Hora. (46) In the following month, the authori- 
ties claimed to have discovered another revolutionary plotq 
banished a number of politicians to the provinces and started 
proceedings designed to deprive Grove of his parliamentary 
privilege as a prelude to prosecution. (47) In Novemberl 
the Minister of the Interiorg ordered Intendentes not to 
meet with representatives of trade union confederations 
(organisations which were technically illegal) - an action 
which caused all of the working class to protesto(48) 
More important than thiag howeverg was the debate on the 
Ross Calder agreement which raged in Congress during late 
1935 and 1936* The passions aroused by this agreement by 
which the government dropped charges of tax evasion against 
(45) Eudocio Raviness op. cit. p316. 
(46) Consi na 14.9.1935. 
(47) Ibid. *10-1935- (48) 1-b-id- 30-11-1935- 
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the US-owned Compafifa Chilena de Electricidad in exchange 
for shares in the companyp drove a further wedge between 
Alessandri and his Radical and left-wing opponents. (49) 
These event99 together with a growing pressure inside the 
party in favour of the Popular Front ideaq led the PS to 
approve a resolution calling for the amplification of the 
Block at a National Congress In January 1936. (50) Buto 
although it was decided to expand the Blockq the question 
of forming a Popular Front coalition was specifically 
avoided and at the same Congressp the FCChts most bitter 
enemlesq the IC9 were given permission to join the PS on 
an individual basis. Only after a fresh series of hostile 
acts by the Alessandri administration was resistance in both 
the PR and the PS overcome* Over-reaeting to a national 
rail strike In February 1936, Alessandri declared a state 
of sieges closed La Hora and La OpiniSn, q discovered another 
revolutionary plot and arrested a number of_prominent 
ibaftistasq including Juan Antonio Rfosq the leader of the 
left-wing Radicals. (51) In responses the Asamblea Ritdical 
of Santiaeog the most important Radical regional organisa- 
tion in the countryq approved with enthusiasm a resolution 
calling for the formation of a Popular Front -a resolution 
presented by the Radicalq Justiniano Sotomayor but evidently 
prepared and typed by Contreras Labarca and Marcos Chamu- 
des. (52) In the following months March 1936, the Popular 
Front came into being. (53) 
(49) Ricardo Donoso op. cit-9 119 PP179-180* 
(50) j, Ce Jobet El P; -rtido Socialista de Chile, Is ppl24-7- 
(51) Ricardo Don op. ci_t. 9 II, ppl82-r83* 
(52) Interview with Karcos Chamudeaq Santiago, 1969. 
(53) Peter C. Snows op. cit. p82. 
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The formation of the Popular Front in I-larch 1936 
was a significant victory for the PCCh and its now tactics 
but the loyalties of its two most important memberaq the 
PR and the FS were by no means totally secure and at times 
the PCCh was hard pressed to maintain the unity of the coali- 
tion which it had put so much effort into creating* 
Resistance to the Popular Front inside the PH came 
essentially from right-wing Radicals who disliked association 
with the PCCh and the Left in generalt who had serious 
doubts as to the Frontt3 effectiveness as an electoral 
coalition and who believed that the PR would be better 
served by continued association with the Alessandri admin- 
istration. During 19369 then, the loyalties of the PR to 
the Front fluctuated in accordance with the results of con- 
gre331onal by-elections and in response to various attempts 
by Alessandri to persuade the PR to return to cabinet& 
Indeedq by the end of that yearg the division between fren- 
t13tas and anti-frenti3tRS inside the PR had assumed serious 
proportions, Three Radicals took up cabinet seats without 
the PRIs permission and were supported in their indiscipline 
by-the Radical senators. (54) For their partv the Radical 
frentistas had been strengthened by a solid vote of provin- 
cial oreanisations in support of the Front and by the passage 
of a new internal security law through Congress which was 
seen by many to be a further proof of Alessandri's dictator- 
ial intentions*(55) By December 19369 thong the unity of 
(54) La Hora 27-10-1936; 2.12.1936. 
(55) In December 1936,13 Radical provincial organisa- 
tions voted for the Popular Front, 6 voted against 
and 4 abstained. Ibid. 21*12-1936. 
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the PR and its future policy towards the Popular Front 
appeared to rest on the Outcome of the harch 1937 Congres- 
31onal electionsy elections in which the local PR organisa- 
tion3 had been Given a free hand to pact or not with the 
Popular Front parties* In the eventg the results of the 
March 1937 congressional elections were not as clear cut 
as either the frentistas or anti-frentistas would have 
W13hede Although the Pit polled 769941 votes as compared 
with 59,413 in the last General election in 19329 its share 
of total votes cast only increased from 18*2% to 18.7% while 
the number of members it elected to the Chaqkber of Deputies 
actually fell from 34 to 29*(56) Although the Radical 
frentistas argued that the PR lost precisely in those con- 
3tituencie3 where it did not pact with the Front and although 
they pointed to the considerable gains the left-wing parties 
had made in those electionsg Radical anti-frentistas con- 
tinued to serve in Alessandri0s cabinet, (57) In May 19379 
the PH convened an Extraordinary Convention to decide the 
issue once and for all. That Convention gave an overwhelming 
vote in favour of continued participation in the Frontq 
instructed the Radical ministers to resign on pain of expul- 
sion and made it clear that the PH expected Popular Front 
support for its presidential candidate in the presidential 
elections scheduled for October 1938. (58) And it was this 
last factorg rather than any freshly acquired sense of dis- 
cipline that moved the Radical ministers to comply with 
(56) German Urzua Valentuela oD. cit-9 P739 p87- 
(57) La Hora 23.3-1937- 
(58) lbido 16-5-1937; 17.5-1937. 
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Convention instructions and resign from office. By May 
1937p the problem of who was to become Chile's next President 
had assumed some urgency* It also seemed increasingly like- 
ly that Gustavo Rossq Alessandrits Minister of Financeq a 
man celebrated for his tough political attitudes and his 
almost pathological dislike of the FR9 would be the can- 
didate of the Right andq as such* would receive the support 
of the government machinee(59) In the light of this 
probabilityp most conservative Radicals no longer saw any 
advantage in continued participation in Alessandrits cabinets 
and recognised that if one of their number was to be Chile's 
next Presidentq they would have to accept the Popular Front 
in line with majority opinion inside the PR. Thusq after 
May 19379 the struggle inside the PR shifted away from the 
question of Radical membership of the Front and towards 
the contest for the PRIs presidential nomination* The prin- 
cipal contenders were Juan Antonio Hf039 the leader of the 
Radical frentistass and Pedro Aguirre Cardap a much-respected 
conservative Radical whop although one of the more important 
Radical anti-frenti3taslp had not occupied a front line 
(59) Gustavo Ross was a financier and speculator who 
had made a fortune on the Paris Stock Exchnageq 
before becoming active in Chilean politics* As 
Alessandri's Finance Minister between 1933 and 
19379 he successfully pursued fiscal policies which 
wereq perhapaq unavoidably unpopular with the Left. 
Although something of an economic nationalist# as 
the Ross Calder agreement demonstrated (see abovet 
page 182) he sometimes gave voice to savagely anti- 
democratic and anti-popular sentiments a4vocatingt 
amongst other measureag massive white immigration 
and a 'touch of the lash$ for the workers* Poll 
FO 371/18665 A 9193/11/9* dispatch from Rentinck 
to Anthony Edenq dated 25-10-1935- Hicardo Donoso 
op. cit.,, II:, p166; the Communists dubbed him 'the 
last pirate of the Pacific'. 
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position in the recent internal strugglese(60) In 
November 19379 the PR hold an internal election to decide 
between the two and Aguirre Cerda won by 5,611 votes to 
4,091. (61) The victory of Aguirre Cerda strengthened the 
loyalty of the conservative Radicals to the Popular Front; 
Rfosq howeverg did not accept his defeat with good grace 
and embarked on a campaign to outflank Aguirre Cerda by 
advocating the presidential candidacy of General Carlos 
Ibaftez to his follow Radicalso(62) 
The PCCh's attitude towards the PR and its internal 
struggles was dictated by the paramount need to keep the 
PR inside the Popular Front. To this endq the PCCh played 
upon the PR's presidential ambitionst did as much as it 
could to support the frentistas in their struggle to control 
the PR and tried to neutralise the centre and combat the 
right-wing Radical3o(63) In additiong the PCCh progre3- 
sively diluted the programme of revolutionary change which it 
first suggested as the basis for the Popular Front coaltion. 
Thusq although the PCCh programme of August 1935 had called 
for the confiscation of latifundia and the lands of the 
(60) The political differences between Aguirre Cerda and 
Rfos were slight for all that they led the right and 
left wings of the Pit, Indeed, personal styleso 
backgrounds and their ambition to become Chilels 
next President separated them more than issues ando 
ironically enou, -h, the $right wingl Aguirre Cerda 
proved to be a more socially aware and popular 
President than the 'left wing' Rfos. See Florencio 
Duran Bernales El Partido Radical (Santiagog 1958) 
for a description of the careers and achievements 
of both. 
La Hora 29.11-1937- 
(62) Ibid. 8-1-1938- See also article by Wilfredo Mayorga 7rcillap No. 1619,16.6.1966. 
(63) See, article by Contreras Labarcat krincil)ios 14o. 1209 July-August 1967 entitled 'La Gran Experiencia del 
Frente Popularl, P33- 
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Churchp for the nationalisation of the important public 
service industries and the return of lands stolen from the 
Indiansp these proposals were soon droppedo(64) By early 
19379 the PCCh was proposing a programme which had no direct 
reference to the confiscation of land or nationailsation 
(except for those foreian-owned industries which refused 
to comply with Chilean law) and which talked in more moder- 
ate terms of the subordination of foreign capital to national 
interests and of the need to protect and aid national apri- 
culture and industryo(65) 
Pursuing its policy towards the PR9 the PCCh made 
it clear that it was not categorically opposed to Radicals 
participating in Alessandri@3 cabinets$ provided such T)arti- 
cipation was the basis of a clear programme which brought 
benefits to the masses. (66) Sintilarly9 although the PCCh 
attacked Radical anti-frentistas it was careful to reserve 
its most virulent invective for those Radicals who had 
openly broken Radical discipline* Moreover# although the 
FCCh supported Rfos in the struggle for the PRIs presidential 
nominationg it did so without great enthusiasin and without 
vicious attacks on his rival. Clearly if the price of the 
PRIs loyalty to the Popular Front was the acceptance of 
leadership by conservative Radicals* it was a -orioe the PCCh 
was prepared to pay. 
The other major Popular Front partys the PS9 had a 
(64) Frente Onicoq last week of Augusty 1935. 
(65) Frente Popular 23-1-1937. 
(66) ibid. 23. -5-. 1936; 17.6.193 (Although the Communist 
Frente-Popular began publication in September 19369 
it was preceded by a publication of the same name 
which included Aadicalsq socialists and Communists 
on its editorial board. ) 
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rather different attitude towards the coalition. Although 
the P59 like the P119 had its frentistas and anti-frentistas 
most of the Socialist leaders were never more than luke- 
warm towards the Popular Front. The PS9 after allq had 
created the Block as a vehicle for the struggle against 
Alessandri and saw no need for a new coalitiong particularly 
one in which the PS was unlikely to have the deciding voice* 
Ploreover, most Socialist leaders shared the fears of the 
anti-frentistas that the Front would lead the PS Into a 
morass of reformism and that it would only serve to revive 
the flagging fortunes of its most conservative member$ the 
PR. (67) Since the PS entertained such reservationsg why 
then did it agree to join the Front? Firstq because Alessan- 
dri continued to give grounds for fears that democracy was 
in dangere Secondlyt because the Socialists regarded the 
Front as essentially an amplification of the Block, a de- 
clared objective of the PS before the formation of the Fronto 
and they could find no good reason for opposing the form which 
that expansion finally took. (68) Thirdq because the Front 
had been accepted by other Block parties as well as by some 
Socialists and to ignore these facts would have been to run 
the risk of isolation and fractionalisation. Fourthlyq the 
PS9 like other parties which joined the coalitiong was influ- 
enced by the world battle then raging between fascism and 
democracy. Finally, the Popular Front offered some immediate 
advantages in the electoral and trade union fields as well 
as the possibility of the Frontts support for the PS1s 
(67) Jobet El Partido Socialista do Chileg It p125. 
(68) Consiff;; a 31-8.1935, 
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own presidential candidateg kiarmaduque Grove. (69) 
In effectg thong the PS joined and remained in 
the Popular Front because it could offer no realistic al- 
ternative and becauseg even at worst$ it could expect to 
receive some concrete advantages* Nevertheles3l the PS's 
loyalty to the Front waas at timeag placed under great 
strainsp notby the machinations of Ale3sandri butby the 
activities and policies of the PCChe Leaving asideg for 
the moment, the struggles between the PS and the PCCh in 
the trade union movement and the squabbles which occurred 
during various election campaignsg three areas in particular 
strained their relations between 1936 and 19389 These re- 
volved around the PCCh's efforts to create a single revolu- 
tionary party in Chilep a Partido Onicop its attempts to 
broaden the Popular Front by incorporatinig now allies and the 
question of who was to be the Frontfs presidential candidate* 
The creation of a Partido Vnico had been one of the 
central objectives of the Popular Front strategy as outlined 
by Dimitroff at the Seventh Comintern Congress* Dimitroff 
urged the formation of a single revolutionary party on the 
basis of unity between socialists and communists provided 
that the socialists agreed on the need for the revolutionary 
overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and accepted the organisational principles of 
(69) The advantaiges included a cessation of hostilities 
with the PCCh in the trade union movementp Communist 
cooperation in the creation of a unified trade union 
movement and key posts in that now organisation. 
Electoral help from the Front enabled the PS to 
elect 19 Deputies and 4 Senators in 19379 in con- 
trast to the 5 Deputies Lhe now Socialist parties 
had elected in 19329 prior to the PS's foundation. 
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of democratic centralism - amongst other conditionso(70) 
The PCCh began its campaign for the formation of the Partido 
Unico in late 1936 by approaching the PS as well as other 
frentistas parties* Howeverg the PS found the PCCh's 
proposals vague and pointless; there was no need for a 
revolutionary Partido Onico since the PS itself fulfilled 
that function andq moreoverp while the PCCh still belonged 
to the Cominternp the formation of such a party was clearly 
impossibleo(71) Yet despite the PS99 hostility to the 
idea and its formal rejection of it at a National Party 
Congres3s held in Talca in blay 19379 the PCCh continued 
its agitation for the Partido ICnico. (72) 
The questions of broadening the Front and of who 
was to be the coalition's presidential candidate were Inter- 
related since the PCCh used the carrot of the-presidential 
nomination to attract new allies to the Front. Perhaps Its 
most controversial use of this 3trategem was in connection 
with ex-President Ibaftezq the PCCh99 old arch-enemy. In the 
early months of 1937t the PCCh began to make conciliatory 
overtures towards Ibaftez and later in that year, publicly 
declared that it was prepared to support Ibaftez for the 
Presidency provided he accepted the Frontts programmeq broke 
his links with reaction and proved to be acceptable to the 
other frentistas partieso(73) Althoughp at first sightq 
the PCChts approaches to IbAftez might seem strange# there 
(70) International Press Correspondence Vol-159 No-34 
10-8-1935. 
(71) Consigna 27-2-1937; 27-3-1937- 
(72) Ibid* 22-5-1937- 
(73) Frente Popular 2.2-1937; 10-11-1937. 
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were compelling reasons for its action. Firstlyq since all 
the major frentista partiesq except the PCChq included a 
more or less powerful ibaftista current amongst their membersq 
it was important to prevent Ibaftez from presenting himself 
as an independent presidential candidate since this would 
place a severe strain on their loyalties* Secondlyq it be- 
came increasingly clearl especially after the municipal elec- 
tions of April 19389 that ibaftsta parties outside the 
coalition - the Union Socialista and the MNS - hold the 
electoral balance between the Front parties and their right- 
wing opponents. (74) Third# the PCCh did not view either 
of the probable Front presidential candidates who had emer- 
ged by the end of 19379 with much enthusiasme The PCCh 
doubted that the Socialist Grove would have much appeal out- 
side the PS and the working classest while the Radicalq Aguirre 
Cerdat was compromisedq so far as the PCCh was concernedq by 
his long association with governments of the centre and by 
his ties with reaction. (75) IbSftezq on the other hand. 9 had 
led a reforming administrationg whatever his other ainsq and 
he could count on support from many different sectors of 
Chilean society. Moreoverg Ib9ftez was thought to be personal- 
ly better suited to deal with the abrasive challenge of the 
candidate of the Higbtq Gustavo Ross-(76) Apart from these 
(74) According to Claridadq 14-7-19389 the parties of the 
Right polled 17879910 votes in the April 1938 muni- 
cipal elections while frentistaparties polled 
16l, 950. The Union So; ialista and NNS held the 
balance with 2ý9037 votes. see 'below, pp194-195P 
for the origins of the Union 'ýocialtstft- 
(75) Frente Popular 10-11-1937. 
(76) Article by Wilfredo Nayorga in Ercilla, No. 1619, 
jL5.6. i96G. 
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more or less praginatic reasonsp the PCCh was also influenced 
by theoretical considerations. It was part and parcel of 
the Popular Front strategy to isolate the Right by drawing 
all the popular forces within the Front almost regardless of 
their ideology andq furthermoreq communist parties in other 
parts of the world like China and Cuba had supported 
'popular wilitary governments' in the stituggle against 
imperialism and fascisino(77) 
Althoughq according to one sourcey Oscar Schnake 
(the Socialist Secretary General) entered into secret nego- 
tiations with Ibaftez's electoral committeep in public the PS 
reacted angrily to the PCChls approaches towards Ibafiez 
and vehemently rejected the idea that the Uni6n Socialistap 
an ibafiista party created by PS dissidentsq should enter the 
Front. (78) By April 1938 when the frentista parties met 
to select the Front's presidential candidateg negotiations 
between Schnake and Ibaflez had evidently broken down and the 
PS put up a vigorous struggle on Grovels behalf. In the 
eventq howeverp Aguirre Cerda won the nomination larpely be- 
cause the PCCh abstained after the first round of voting, an 
action which prevented either candidate from gaining the 
necessary majorityp thus forcing the PS to choose between 
acquiescing in Aguirre Cerdals selection or taking the res- 
ponsibility for breaking the Front. In a dramatic gesturey 
Grove sacrificed his personal ambition in the cause of unity 
and withdrew his candidacy and the PS levelled passionate 
(77) See belowq page 205- 
(78) Consigna 2.11.1937; Claridad 24.2-19389 27,2.1938. 
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charges of betrayal against the PCCh. (79) Neither Grovels 
gesture nor the charges of treachery were entirely sincere. 
Ones the PS had discarded the idea of supporting Ibafiezq 
there was no real alternative to the Aguirre Cerda candidacy 
since the Front would need the whole-hearted sunport of the 
PR if it was to win the October 1938 elections - support 
which would not have been forthcoming bad Aguirre Cerda not 
been selected* Indeedl according to some sourceaq Schnake 
had often declared that the Grove candidacy had no real chance 
of success. (80) Noreoverg while the PS accused the PCCh 
of treacberyg and while in the past the PCCh had given the 
PS some grounds to hope for Communist supportg by early 
1938 relations between the two narties were so cool that 
the PS would have been extremely naive if it had sincerely 
believed that that support would be forthcoming. If this 
was the caseq why did the PS put up such a vigorous strugele 
on behalf of Grove at the Convention? Firstlyq because 
it was necessary to show the rank and file Socialist that 
all reasonable efforts had'been made to secure the nomina- 
tion for Grove -a man of great ijersonal porularity inside 
the PSe Secondq and more important, it was a useful way 
of impressing on the PR Its indebtedness to the PS - an 
indebtedness which could be converted into concrete relvards 
should Aguirre Cerda win the election. Vinallyp it gave the 
PS the opportunity to score some useful political points 
(79) Claridad 21-4-1938- 
(80) Seeq 6n 4.11-1937 for this allegation whichq 0 illi Ilon 
althoýý ýeanonymously, probably came froti. it Socialist dissidente See alsot Wilfredo Mayorga's 
article 'Las intriga3 electorales del 1938' in 
Ercillaq No. 1619, June 1966. 
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against the PCCh. 
Essentiallys howevers it was not the PCCh's policies 
in themselves which produced heated reactions from the PS 
but rather the methods which the PCCh used to gain the accep- 
tance of those policies inside the PS. Broadly speakingg 
the PCCh methods in relation to the PS were twofold; on the 
one hand ittried to win individual Socialists to its view- 
pointq regardless of whether or not the CC PS had pronounced 
on the matter in questiong andq on the otherp it attacked 
any opponents of its policies inside the PS as Trotskyistse 
Thuaq even as the PCCh began its approaches to the PS leader- 
ship for unity of action in early 1935t it wooed members of 
local PS organisations and attempted to penetrate the PS with 
cells. (81) Despite the PS's protestsp the PCCh continued 
to use these methods with some success. In May 19379 Social- 
ist deputy-elect Oscar Baeza was expelled from the PS9 
according to his own account because he was an advocate of 
the Partido 11nicoq and he was promptly incorporated into the 
PCCh. (82) In October 19379 a group of Socialists were 
expelled for creating a Partido [Tnico, (which they called the 
Partido Nacional Revolucionario) and for advocating the can- 
didacy of Ibaftezq activities in which they were encouragedg 
according to the PS, by the PCCh*(83) For similar reasonst 
some 200 Socialistak including two deputies (11icardo Latcham 
(81) Frente Unico, last week of Februaryq 1935- 
(82) Frente Popular 9.5-1937. The PS claimeds howeverp 
that Baeza was expelled for having appointed an ex- 
pelled Socialist to direct his election campaignq 
for denigrating the CC PS and for revealing, the con- 
tents of secret PS Congress sessions to outsiders. 
Ibid. 12-5-1937. 
(83) Consigna 23-10-1937- 
e 195 - 
and Amaro Castro)q were expelled the following month; this 
event led to the formation of a now party, Union Socialista, 
which rapidly declared itself in favour of the nresidential 
candidacy of Ibafiez. (84) Although the PCCh was cool towards 
the emergence of the UniSn Socialista because it did not de- 
clare promptly for the Popular Frontq there is some reason 
to believe that at least one of-its leadersq Ricardo Latchamq 
had close links with the PCChe Latcham publicly blamed his 
difficulties inside the PS on his enthusiastic frentismog 
which had earned him the hostility of Schnakeq and also on 
his efforts to prevent IC members and Trotakyists from enter- 
ing the PS - both activities of which the PCCb whole-heartedly 
approved, (85) Furthermoreg Latcham praised PCCh leaders 
and declared that one of his principal objectives was 'sin- 
cere and loyal unity with the PCCht. (86) 
The PS also objected strongly to the PCCh's attacks 
on 'Trotskyistst within the PSO that is, those Socialists 
who did not agree with the PCCh's policies - both because it 
implied that the PS took orders from the Fourth International 
just as the Communists took theirs from the Third and because 
they saw it as an attempt to foment disunity inside the PS. 
The PS declared that It alonedecided its policies and that 
there was no Trotskyist fraction acting inside the party. (87) 
Neverthelessq it seems to be clear that anti-frentismo 
inside the PS was strengthened by the influx of IC members 
who continued to attack the Popular Front and press for 
(84) Ibide 13-11-1937- 
(85) La O-pinion 7-1-1937; Frente Popular, Iquiqueq 
12.12.1931ý- 
(86) Frente Rýopularj Iquiquet 12.12-1937. 
(87) Claridad 2-1-. T-. 1938. 
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the creation of a Frente Proletarlaq a coalition composed 
only of vorking clas3 partie3* 
After the selection of Aguirre Cerda as the Front's 
presidential candidatep negotiations between the ibaftista. 
coalition (the Alianza Popular Libertadora -APL) and the 
Front reached a temporary deadlock but soon started up again. 
Indeedq during April and May 1938 Ales3andri's activities 
almost managed to bring about a unity of action between the 
two coalitions which negotiation had failed to achieve. His 
refusal to meet with frentista congressmen to discuss guaran- 
toes for the approaching presidential elections led the UniSn 
Socialista to agree to united action with the Front ands a 
little laterp after police had brutally man-handled congress- 
men during an incident in which the MNS leaderg Gonz9lez von 
Mar6esq fired a pistol shot Inside the Chamber as Ale33andri 
was formally opening the ordinary sessions of Congressothe 
Frontq the Uni6n Socialista and the MNS agreed on united 
action. (88) Howeverp on the 4th June, Ibaftez formally 
announced his candidacy for the presidency and the Front 
newspapers began to make all-out attacks on him. At 
the same timeg it appears that Radical and Communist leaders 
continued to have secret negotiations with Ibifiez until Sep- 
tember 1938 when events intervened once again to solve the 
problem. (89) On September 5thq the MNS tried to pre-empt 
the presidential elections by launching a coup in favour of 
Ibafiez - evidently without his expeess consent - and seized 
public buildings within a stone% throw of the Presidential 
(88) Frente lop lar 29.4.1938; Claridad 27-5-1938 !L (89) Rene Plontero Moreno Confesionea-Vo-Ifticoa(Santiagoo 
t959)PI01 . 
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Palace-(90) The Army, however, did not respond as the 
golpistas had hoped and they were rounded up by the police 
and slaughtered - allegedly on Alessandri's orders. 
(91) 
Althoup, h one policeman had been murdered in the process of 
the attempted coupq the massacre of sixty one Nazis (many of 
them young middle class students) shocked the nation and 
eventually forced Ibaftez to withdraw from the presidential 
contest. From gaolq Gonzalez von Marees instructed the MNS 
to vote for Aguirre Cerdaq an instruction which was endorsed 
a few days later by the APL. (92) As a resultq Aguirre 
Cerda defeated Ross by 2229720 votes to 218,609.03) 
Although accident played almost as great a role 
as design in Aguirre Cerdals victoryq it was the crowning 
triumpb for the Front strategy which had already given the 
PCCh and the PS - impressive gains in the congressional 
elections of March 1937 and the municipal elections of April 
1938. (94) Rut the electoral achievements of the Popular 
Front strategy were not won in isolation from successes in 
other directions. A prime objective of the Front strategy 
was the creation of a unified trade union movement on the 
basis of the Communist FOCh, the Socialist CNSL and the 
Anarchist CGf. Although both the PS and the PCCh had 
(90) Ibaftez apparently helped to plan the coup but 
vacillated over puttinr it into action. See, ar- 
ticle by Iloi3a Bicbeno 'Anti-Parliameritary themes 
in Chilean History; 1920-19701 in K. Nedburst (90. ) 
Allende's Chile (Londonp 1972) p123- 
(91) iee Ricardo Donosolop. cit. 9 119 pp258-261. (92) I\iaria Infante Barros 'festipos del treinta X ocho 
(93) Ibid. p90. 
(94) iee belowq page 2129 for the PCChIs electoral gains. 
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made calls for trade union unity during 1933 and 19341 
neither party had been prepared to make significant conces- 
sions to achieve it. By early 1935g boweverg conditions 
had changed; inside the CNSL there was considerable dis- 
illusion with legal unionism which on a number of occasions 
had been disregarded or manipulated by the authorities to 
favour the employers whileg for its partq the FOCh was now 
prepared to accept legal unionism and to campaign for its 
reform rather than its abolition. (95) Despite the PCCh's 
change of heartg it was not prepared to capitulate tamely 
to the ambitions of the CNISL and accept its hegemony in a 
unified trade union movement. for that reasong the FOCh 
successfully used rather dubious tactics to defeat the U&SLIa 
unity formula at the June 1935 Trade Union Unity Congress 
and managed to have its own formula adopted* Not surprising- 
lyp relations between Communist and Socialist trade unionists 
deteriorated after that Congress and it was not until July 
1936 that they agreed to form a Frento 13nico Sindical which 
in December of that year finally laid the basis of a unified 
trade union movement - the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores 
do ChilO(CTCh). Although the FOCh was forced to accept the 
dominance of the Socialists on the now Confederationis 
National Executive Committee (CDN) as the price of unityq 
in the process of hard-fought negotiationsl they secured for 
themselves four of the thirteen CDN seatsq the sub-Secretary 
Generalship and the promise of the Secretary Generalship 
when the Socialisto Juan Dfaz Nartfnezq had completed his 
(95) Seeg La Opini6n 11.2-1935 for criticisms of legal 
unionism by CNSL memberse 
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term of officee(96) Essentially thoughq it was political 
pressure from the PS and the PCCh on their trade union 
supporters which was the deciding factor in the creation 
of the CTChq rather than any agreement between the FOCh and 
the CN. SLo Indeeds the political nature of the GICh was 
clearly illustrated by its concern with the struggle against 
fascism and its membership of the Popular Fronto(97) 
Between 1936 and 19389 relations between the Com- 
munists and the Socialists in the CTCh were never very cordial 
although it was not until 1939 that a major row developed over 
the election of a now CDN and seriously threatened the unity 
of the confederationo(98) In the early yearsp Socialist and 
Communist trade unionists were encouraged by their respective 
political leadership to keep their animosities in check and, 
by operating independently as far as possible and by directing 
their energies towards recruiting non-aligned workers and 
creating new unionsp they achieved an uneasy modus vivendi, (99) 
Howevers in some areas they found that they could cooperate 
fruitfully. The GrCh launched campaigns for the reform of 
certain aspects of trade union lawq for the reduction of the 
cost of living and against the new internal security law 
and collected funds for the Spanish Republican3. (100) 
(96) CTCh, Santiago,, 10.9.1943. 
(97) Alan Angello op- cit. P107- 
(98) Frente Popular 7-8-1939- 
(99) The efforts of the PCCh and PS to create new unions 
had considerable success. Between 1936 and 1938, 
the total number of legal unions grew from 670 to 
932 and the total number of inembers : rrom 849699 to 
1259978. Fstadfstica Chilena June 1947, plOO. 
(100) Frente Popular 6.1-1937; 15.3-1937; 9.4.1937; 
7.7-1937. --- 
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The advent of the Popular Front strategy not only 
facilitated the creation of a unified trade union movement 
but it also altered the PCCh's attitude towards strike actions. 
., 
ed the workers During the Third Periodp the PCCh had encourag 
to launch strike actions at every conceivable opportunity in 
order to accelerate the revolutionary process. Under the 
Popular Front strategyp workers were encouraped to conduct 
their disputes within the confines of the C6dlgo del Trabajo 
and to use the strike as the weapon of final resort - takinp 
care to ensure victory by the mobilisation of moral and mat- 
erial support for the strikers. According to the CTChj this 
policy (which the PS had always professed to follow) led to 
a high propoirtion of the industrial disputes being settled in 
favour of the workers during 1937 and 1938. (101) 
Although the PCChts now trade union and strike 
policies were part of the more general concern to allay the 
fears of the Radicals and the middle classeaq they also 
served other purposes* According to Ravinesq the PCCh's 
acceptance of the C6digo del Trabajo enabled it to consolidate 
and expand its influence in the trade union field. Care- 
fully selected non-aligned trade union leaders were offered 
legal and technical assistance by the PCCb in an effort to 
win them over to the party. If they refused these approaches, 
they were isolated and destroyedo(102) Ravines also claims 
that the PCCh's new policies won it adherents in the Inspect- 
orate Charged with the working of the C45digo del Trabajo 
whol in gratitude for the cooperation which the PCCh now 
(101) Juan Dfaz kartfnez Treinta heseade Accion en Favor 
del Proletariado de Chile (Santlapog 1934- PP3-4-3-6. (102) Eudocio Ravines, opo cit., PP325-327- 
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extended in the field of industrial relationsp allowed the 
party to extend its control over the trade union move- 
ment. (103) Howeverg HavinesO claims should be treated 
with caution since by the time he made thomq he was an 
avowed anti-communist fighting Cold War battles. In parti- 
cularg his allegations that the Direcci46n General del 
Trabajo(DGT) in some way afforded the PCCh unfair or under- 
hand advantages in extending its trade union control seem 
suspect. Not only were the 1ýjinistros del Trabajo between 
1936 and 1938, hostile or, at best# indifferent towards the 
PCCh but the role of the Inspectorato was strictly oirctim- 
scribed by the C6digo del rrabajo and its members were for- 
bidden to take part in political activities. Certainlyp 
when Ravines claims that in their anxiety for a quiet life 
the authorities of Trabajo jettisonod the rights of workers 
and employers alike,, he misses the mark since the trans- 
accionismo which he affects to despise was precisely the 
central function of the DGT. Indeedg while Ravinest des- 
cription of the Communists' trade union tactics probably 
contains some truthq the expansion of the PCChIs influence 
in the trade union movement probably owed far more to its 
new constructive role in the settlement of workers' disputes 
and to the general popularity of the Popular Front line than 
it did to any of the machiavellian practices be describes. 
The passion for unity which the PCCb displayed in 
its efforts to create the Poplilar Front coalition and the 
CTCh was also evident in other areas of party activity. 
(103) Ibid. P328. 
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Under the leadership of Luis Hernandez Parkerg the FJC 
created an Alianza Libertadora de la Juventudq designed to 
channel the support of youth from all classes for the Popular 
Front and the anti-imperialist struggles(104) Most of the 
youth organisations of the frentista, parties subscribed to 
the ALJ and in 19379 the FJCq flushed with this auccessp for- 
mally dissolved itself - its members being absorbed into the 
FCCho(105) Howeverl the Federaci6n do Juventudes Socialistas 
(FJS) attacked the ALJ with Passion* arguing instead for the 
unity of working class youth and echoing the attacks of anti- 
frenti3ta Socialists on the PCCh and the Popular Fronto(106) 
The struggles between the FJS and the FJC were closely paral- 
leled by similar developments in student politics. The Com- 
munist3 founded a Grupo Vnico Antifaci3t&(GUA) to group 
together democratic university students but it was opposed 
from the first by the Brigada Socialista Universitaria(BSU). 
Indeeds the struggle between the GUA and the BSU became so 
bitter thatq on occasion# the GUA preferred to cooperate 
with the NaZi student movement in elections for office in 
the Federaci6n. do Estudiantes de Chile, (107) 
The PCCh created a series of other organi3ations 
designed to encourage and channel support for the Popular 
Front cause. The Movimiento pro-Emancipaciign dela Mujer 
Chilena(MEMCh) was founded by a group of wives of prominent 
(104) Frente Onicos 3rd week July, 1935; Bandera Roj-a 
lat week Of Rays 1936. 




Opular 29.7-1937,27.8-1937; see also, the 
issues Of Barricadag Santiago, (an FJS publication) 
for Septembert October and Novemberg 1937. (107) Claridad 24-6.1938; Barricadap 2nd fortnight, 
Septemberg 1937. 
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PCOh leaders and campaigned for women's rights as well as 
for the Front. (108) The Liga de Defensa de los Derechos 
flumanos(LDDT4) founded with the help of prominent members 
from all the frentista, parties gave effective aid to the 
victims of political persecution while the Alianza de 
Intelectuales de Chile(AICh) associated an impressive array 
of intellectuals with the frentista cause. (109) The 
Spanish Civil War provided another issue which helped to 
channel support for the Frontq the PCCh and other frentista 
parties setting up committees to raise aid for the Republi- 
can cause; the committees may not have been very effective 
in their declared objective but they attracted support from 
diverse sectors, (110) 
The campaigns and organisations launched hy the 
PCCh probably helped to attract the sunport of some of the 
tincommitted to the Front cause and undoubtedly helped to 
strenp, then the resolve of those who already sunported or be- 
longed to frentista parties. These campaigns and orranisa- 
tions also gave the Communists repeated opportunities to 
demonstrate to their allies that co-operation with the PCCh 
was not only possible but fruitful and that they were willinf,, 
to undertake the onerous and routine tasks of administration 
and leave the more prestipious positions to others. 
(108) See karta 
I 
Vergara hemorias de una mujeE irr2verente 
(Santiago , 1962) PP135-6. also La Wer NueM;, 
Santiago, 8-11-1935. 
(109) The LDDH claimed to have helped some 2,000 victims 
of govern ment persecd tion in late 1937. Frente 
Popular 1 3-12.1937. Leading fiEures of the AlCh 
includei Pablo Neruda, Alberto Romero, Vicente 
Huidobro and Pablo de Aokha. Ibid. 4-11-1937. 
(110) According to Frente Ponular 4.1-1937t such presti- 
gious and conservative historians as Wenio Pereira 
Salas and Aicardo Do"oso were among those associated 
with the camnaign. 
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What effects did the Popular Front strategy have on 
the PCCh itself? Unlike the policy changes of 1928 to 1930, 
the introduction of the Front strategy produced no aignifi- 
cant casualties nor did it give rise to schismatic groups. 
Nonethelessq RavLnes recounts that tbere was considerhble 
resistance to the now strategy from the CC9 a product of 
the low calibre of its members and their attachment to Third 
Period conceptions and policieso(lll) According to 
Ravinesq he had to take extraordinary measures to shake the 
CC out of the siege mentality and the inertia to which years 
of persecution and factional strife had condemned it* To 
jolt the CC into action along the correct linesq he first 
savagely attacked CC members for their pant errors and mis- 
takesq inculcating a sense of guilt and inadequacy* Rejec- 
ting advice from Comintern colleagues to replace them with 
now meng he allowed them to keep their posts and gave them 
the opportunity to redeem themselves by identifying with 
the new line and working energetically for its success. 
Secondlyq he promoted a number of younger man to assist the 
old leaders in their tasks and placed new men in charge of 
the important regional conuiiitteea. (112) 
Ravinesi account of the difficulties he faced and 
the methods he used to overcome them is endorsed by other 
ex-Communists and is probably correct in substanceo(113) 
Howeverg the resistance shown by the CC probably had little 
to do with the low calibre of its members or with any genuine 
(111) Eudocio Ravines oD. cit. p3139 p321* 
(112) Ibid- PP336-338- 
(113) See, for exampleg imarcos Chamudes Chileg una adver- 
tencia americana pp39-50. 
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attachment to Third Period policies on 
their parts Ravines, 
after a119 was a foreigner - and a Peruvian at 
that - who 
arrived in Chile at a time when the party was 
in clandestin- 
ity and when Secretary General Contreras Labarca was out of 
the country* He wanted to impose a radically different 
political line in a matter of weeks when the party had taken 
years to absorb Third Period changes and he issued peremp- 
tory instructions and threatened the jobs of the leadership. 
Moreoverp he came at a time when the party had barely re- 
covered from the factional strife of 1931 to 1933 and when 
the CC was particularly sensitive about fallinp into the 
errors of right deviationi3me Furthermore, it seems that 
not all the: -Cqinintern team members agreed on the tactical 
details of the new strateCys Manuel Caz&no a German Com- 
munistp who was possibly Manuilsky'3 man on a team dominated 
by Dimitroff appointmentsp had arrived in Chile before 
Ravines and had apparently been urging the CC to work for the 
installation of a 'popular military democracy' with lbaftez 
at its head. (114) Caz6n had been the architect of the 
Mery candidacy in August 1935 and apparently continued to 
press for co-operation with Ibifiez in subsequent years. (115) 
Indeedg according to one sourceg Caz6n was encouraging 
Communist student groups to launch an insurrectionary move- 
ment in favour of Ibifiez during 1938. (116) Given all 
these factors th*N it was scarcely surprisinig that some CC 
Interview by Wilfredo Mayorga with Oscar Sacuess 
Director of Investigaciones (internal security) 
under Aguirre Cerdao Ercilla No. 16189 8.6.1966. 
(115) Ibido See alsog the article by J. C. Jobet in Arauco, 
Santiagog February 1967, entitled 'El PS Y el Frente 
Popular an Chile'* 
(116) Interview with Ramfrez Necocheaq Santiago 1972. 
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members were reluctant to embrace the new strategy enthusi- 
astically. Significantly enoughg howeverg none of them 
openly questioned the right of the Comintern to impose the 
new line andq apparentlyp none attempted to reply to Ravines' 
onslaught on their past records by pointing out that some 
of their failures had stemmed from Comintern policies which 
were inappropriate to Chilean conditions. (117) 
Although the CC was still complaining that some of 
its own members had not embraced the now strategy with 
sufficient enthusiasm in early 19369 sipns of open resist- 
ance inside or outside the CC were rare. Howeverg some 
Communists were moved to lDrotest when the now strategy was 
put into practice. Thusp in mid-19369 when the PCGh en- 
dorsed the congressional candidacy of Cristobal Saenzq a 
right-wing Radical latifundistaq for Qautfn, some Communists 
objected. (118) Similarlyq in early 19389 Communist 
University students and members of the FJC in Santiago pro- 
tested against the party's approaches towards Ibailez*(119) 
Converselyq a few Communists were expelled for continuing 
to work for the Ibafiez presidential candidacy after they 
had been ordered to desi3t. (120) 
Despite the absence of open and determined opposi- 
tion to the new strategyq the task of adapting the party's 
organisation to the demands of the new tactics was not 
easy. In effectl the new strategy called for now methods of 
work and new organisational forms which would transform 
(117) Marta Verigara Op. cjý, p120 
(118) Eudocio Ravines op. cit* P321- 
(119) Claridad 16-3-1951,214-3-1938- 
(120) Fre-ite Popular 22.2.1938. 
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the PCCh from an introverted sectq iiiade timid by fears of 
oersecution and deviationismg into a more open partyq self- 
confident and extrovertq capable of winning, mass support. 
To that endp the PCCh introduced two now organisational 
forinsg the sector industrial and the radio de calle. (121) 
Unlike the fractiong which was designed basically to func- 
tion 'in a particular plant or factoryq the sector industrial 
had the task of encouraging the formation of new prout)s in 
the factories and of supportinp., moves towards trade union 
unity. The radio do calleg on the other bandq bad the 
particular task of helpinp to create Pooular Front commit- 
tees and organisations and of recruiting for the party, 
Initially at leastq these now organisations appear to have 
been more of a hindrance than a help; complaints were made 
that they complicated the chain Of commandq generated con- 
flicts of authority and impeded the transmission of the 
party's line to the unions. (122) 
If the now "organisational forms produced difficul- 
tiesq the party was still afflicted by some of the orplanisa- 
tional defects which bad been indicted durinp the early 1930s. 
Aegional party conferences hold durinp 1936, indicated that 
the local organisations still suffered from sectarianism 
and bureauoriktism and that there were still too few trained 
cadres. Cells continued to be orpanised on a territorial 
rather than a f, actory basis, party work was still dependent 
on the energies of small nunibers of militants and party 
13oletin de la CoiuisiOn Nacional de Orgranisacion 
No. I9 L'-jay 193 
(122) ibid. 
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tasks'were still not beinp distributed to those best suited 
to perform them. (123) Despite the exhortations of the 
leadershipp the situation had not improved by 1937 andq 
insteadq not only were the old faults persisting but new ones 
bad crept ine A plenary session of the CC on organisation 
in March 19379 attacked the tendency of soine local groups 
to submerge themselves in Popular Front bodies and to neplect 
their own institutional life. (124) Even though most of the 
important CR9 were reporting an overall improvement in the 
performance of their organisation by early 19389 complaints 
of the low ideological and organisational level of the triember- 
shipp of the lack of control over the performance of party 
tasks and of slow recruitment of new members continued to be 
made. (125) 
Butq despite the repeated and ritualistic flagella- 
tions which the party gave itself for its organisational 
shortcomingsq there is some evidence which suggests that it 
began to experience a general improvement soon after the forma- 
tion of the Popular Front coalition. In May 1936p the CRs of 
Antofagasta and Concepcion were coneratulated for correcting 
some of their organisational deficiencies andq during that 
yearp the party were able to hold a series of regional con- 
ferencesq sometimes in provinces like O'Higgins which simply 
did not figure in party news of the early 1930so(126) 
kjoreoverg while the CH Santiago was lambasting itself for its 
(123) Bandera Roja 4th week of I-, ay 1936; 20.6.19361 
3rd week of August, 1936. 
(124) Boletfn Interno del CC Afto 1. No*Zv l ... no date, p20. (125) Seeq for iole t7ffn eXamplet ý, - 
go 
bepartamento Regional 
_ qIe Urpanisncion del PCGh, 6antiapo, k'ebruary 1938. 
(126) 
-Bandera , ', O, ja 4th week of 1%ýay 193r), 
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organisational deficiencies during early 19389 it revealed 
that 401ý of its membership now vaid dues -a statistic whichq 
although cited as a matter for concern, was a considerable 
improvement on the early 1930s - and that it intended to 
employ two full-time functionaries for work in trade union, 
peasant and youth activities in the region. (127) 
At the X National Party Congressq held in Anril 
1938 In Santiago, the PCCh indulged in some justified self- 
congratulation on the nrogress it had made since the last 
Congress which had finished its sessions in the Santiaýro 
Penitentiary in 1933-(128) The PCCh's organisational 
preoccupations at the X Congress demonstrated a new-found 
confidence and strength and while old deficiencies and 
errors were criticisedg the central concnrn was now to 
create control machinery which would reguliLte the members' 
performance of party tasks and provide a structi-tre of dis- 
cipline for a membership swollen by new recruits. Distrtic- 
tions were Issued to the ref-ional and local orr,, nnisattons 
to set up Control Commissions, composed of t1ireo members of 
at least five yearslstandiniýrq which were to be directly 
responsible to the National Control Commission in Santiaeog 
headed by Galo Gonzalez. (129) The X Congress also instruc- 
ted members to foria closer relations with the Socialints 
and even to prosolyttse the TrotskyJsts *one by onel. (130) 
Finally, the Congress issued instructions for the 
(127) Boletfri cle DGpartamento Aegional de Orf, -anisaci6ri 
del PCChq ýiantia,,, oq W. 3r;, ary-1, )33O 
(128) El Congreso do la Victoria. I'lesumen de los informesq 
discuslOtles y resoluciones del X Com_-roso del pCCýjq 
jantia, -og 193, ", 9 r)15- (129) Ibid. p44. 
(130) Ibid I--, ) '-ý 5- 
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compilation of accurate statistics of the membership and 
to institutionalise the payments of duese(131) All in 
allp X Congress resolutions on organisational matters 
showed the PCCh laying the basis for a far more effective 
and professional party machine than had existed to date. 
If the PCChOs own criticisms of its organisational 
shortcomings are taken literallyp its growing strength after 
1935 had more to do with the popularity of its new political 
line than its efforts to correct organisational deficiencies. 
In effect, the Popular Front strategy enabled the PCCh 
to cease its costly confrontations with government and 
with other working class partiesq confrontations which 
had prevented any effective organisational improvement in 
the early 19309 and which had placed a severe strain on 
the loyalty and enthusiasm of the membership, Moreoverv 
the new strategy demanded that the PCCh made extraordinary 
efforts to appeal to different social classes and to capture 
mass support* To that endp following the example of the 
French Communist Partyp the PCCh began to use the appeal of 
patriotism and tried to create a gulf between the masses 
who wereq by definiti&ng democratic and progressive and the 
anti-national oligarchyq the 'fifty familieBO who had ruled 
Chile for so long and sold the countryls patrimony to the 
Imperialists. (132) In sharp contrast to the 1920s and early 
193039 thong when the PCCh had treated the institutions and 
founding fathers of the Republic with indifference or 
(131) Ibide p44. 
(132) Carlos Contreras Labarca PrinciRiosp July/August 
19679 P29. 
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contempt, it began to celebrate patriotic holidays and to 
praise the Armed Forceso(133) Similarlyq the PCCh's 
attitude towards heroes and events celebrated by other 
political parties also changed* Communist Deputies paid 
homage to the nineteenth century Liberal leaders Jo34 
Victorino Lastarria andq closer to current eventop the PCCh 
even managed a few words of praise amongst more of measured 
criticisms for the Socialist Republic and its leadara. (134) 
The PCChts new orientation not only facilitated 
its approach towards more moderate political opinion but 
also helped it to avoid police persecution and harassment* 
Although party activists continued to be subjected to ar- 
bitrary arrest and impri3onment at timesp now that the PCCh 
was no longer calling for violent revolutionary struggle 
and now that it was a member of a powerful coalition which 
could protest vociferouslyq police harassment became more 
circumspect. (135) 
If the PCCh99 increasing strength is difficult to 
measure in terms of organ13fttional improvementg it was 
clearly demostrated by electoral statistics, In April 
1935* the PCCh fouaht municipal elections without allies 
(133) Sometimesp howeverg the PCCh's perspective on pat- 
riotic holidays was different, Navy Day in 1937, 
for examplev was used to celebrate the Naval Nutiny 
of 1931. Frente Popular 21-5-1937. 
(134) Boletines del COngreso. Diputadoal Sesiones Ordin- 
arios, 1938. Vol. It P797 e Bandera Roja 4=1936 
and Frente Po2ular 4.6.1937 for PCCh comment on the Socialist Republic. 
(135) For descriptions of police persecutiong see Bandera Roja 4th week of May 19369 2nd week of July r-9 t 
week of August 1936t Frente Popular, ConcePci6nq 
25.12.1937* Glaufbauft one of the Comintern team 
memberst was unfortunate enough to fall into police hands and was tortured before being deported. 
La OpiniSn 6.9.1935; 7-9-1935- 
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and polled roughly 49000 votes nationally and elected some 
five regidores. (136) In the I-larch 1937 congressional 
elections, the PCCh polled 179162 votes (4.16% of the 
votes cast) and elected one Senator and six Deputies. (137) 
In the April 1938 municipal elections, it polled some 
279175 votes (some 7% of the toal votes cast) with 
frentista help and elected 42 regidores. (138) 
Significantly enoughq the CC was careful not to 
allow the party's congressmen to constitute an alternative 
centre of power as they had in the mid-1920as Most of those 
elected to Congress in 1937 were CC members prior to that 
date and the PCChI9 chief officersp Lafertteq President of 
the partyp and Contreras Labarca, the Secretary Generalt 
were elected to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies res- 
pectýively. In line with previous practicag the PCCh 
coneressmen were instructed to pay their salaries into the 
Party Treasury and they recelved rather less than half back 
in waiges, (139) 
The PCCh's membership probably did not grow quite 
so rapidly as its electoral Support between 1935 and 1938. 
Despite the broad appeal of the Popular Front campaien 
(136) No official statistics for the 1935 municipal elec- tions exist* The figure of roughly 4tooo PCCh votes 
was arrived at by an exhaustive study of the regiobal 
press* 
(137) Sergio Guilisasti Tagle Los Partidos Polfticos 
Chilenos (Santiagog 1964) P319. The six Deputies 
were Juan Guerrat Amador Pairoap Andris Escobar Dfass 
Jose Vega Dfazg Marcos Chamudes and Contreras Labarcae 
They were later joined by Oscar Baozap elected as a Socialist* 
(138) Entadistica Chilenal June 19389 p281. (139) Frente Eojýu=ifar, Iquique, 18-7-1937. Out of a monthly 
salary of 29000 pososq PCCh Deputies received 
700 pesos. 
o 
a, id a recruitment nolicy whLch o-, (--iied the doors of tile 
PCCh 
to i-ipw meishers from all Classe-99 includinf- the middle classest 
some established party member. 1; evL! nnt. ly found it difficult 
to overcome their class atitagonisms and Cie babits of 
caution and susnicion learnt in the clandestine years. (V4,0) 
Nevertbelessq if previous estimates of 4,9000 to 59000 
tr. em, bers in 1935 bcar any relation to the Lrutli, it seems 
likely tV'Ilt thiS fi'ýLire Ooul)led or even tripled by October 
1939- Indeed, in early 19379 tl,, e FJZ; alone, althou-b 
a0ij. ittedly not part of the F_-Cli ! )ror)erg claimed 
0,000 ritem- 
hers in contrast to the few litindreds of t))e early 19309-(141) 
And by Cocei-jiber l')389 thP CR Antofapasta claimed a repional 
me(i. bership of 7,000, over 1.9000 of whom flad joined tile. 
party after Aguirre Cerda's trtumph. (142) Even nllowimT 
, asta, one of 
for exa, pýgeration,, tho clailos of tbe CR Antofaf, 
the three princioal stroniýf, olds of tf, e PCC1,, would , 5u,,, rf-, qt 
that a total national membership of between 10,000 and 
15,0009 just prior to Aj-, uirre Cerda's election, would not 
be an unreasonable estiwatp. 
If the prowtti in tile PCCh's wembershii) between 1935 
and 1938 must reiiain a iuatter for conjecttire. 9 the party 
showeO increasimý simis of' strfmýýtli in other directiong. 
In ýeptember 19369 it heýýan to pul-Aish a national. daily news- 
paperg an objective which had otily been achieved for hriof 
periods in tie 1920s. 'ý'rente Popular was tl, e PCCI? ls first 
successful effort at nopular journalism and it soon achieved 
(14o) T3andera Aoia 2nd week of i,. ay 1936. 
(141) '101ctfri Litenio del (; C PCCh - Atio 19 No. 2. p28. (142) ;. A Ponularg Antofapastag 14-. 12-1938. 
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a wider circulation than the tytaid and doctrinaire news- 
papers which the FCCb had previously published. Some power- 
ful regional committees followed jantiago's example and 
published similar newspapers - for exawpleg Frente Popular 
in Iquique and El Popular in Antofagasta* 
Despite the signs of increased strentth FAnd relative 
prosperity which the PCCh had begun to sbow by 19389 it 
might well be argued that the party failed to achieve the 
more profound objectives of the Popular Front strategy. 
As originally envisagedp the Popular Front was intended to 
be a vast structured movement which would draw support from 
all social classes and all political parties except tile 
most intransi-ent elements of the extreme right and which 
would roll relentlessly forward until the goal of national 
liberation had been achieved. Howeverg althoueh the PCGh 
was able to create an electoral coalitiong a unified trade 
union movement and a series of auxiliary Front organisationag 
it failed to create a Popular Front movement which measured 
up to the orilkinal conception either in scope or momentum. 
Interparty rivalries and suspicions delayed the formal 
structuring of the Popular Front until September 1937 and 
effectively prevented it from becomine anything more than 
an electoral coalition of a type familiar to Chilean poli- 
tics, held together by external circumstances and political 
ambition rather than by any common comwitment to fundamental 
reform. (143) ýIoreoverq as the October 1938 eloction 
(143) La ilora 7.9.1937, 
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result showedg despite the PCCh's efforts to make the Front's 
appeal as broad as possibleg it failed to make substantial 
inroads into the popular support enjoyed by the right-wing 
parties. Indeedq just as world events and the battle be- 
tween democracy and fascism contributed towards the victory 
of the Frontq the same events and the rise of the Powlar 
Front in Chile caused conservative elements in the country 
to feel that Christian civilisation and order was threatened. 
The Popular Front strategy had been envisaaed as 
the means by which the revolutionary struggle in Chile could 
be continued and even accelerated. One of its principal 
objectives was the diminutiong If not the liquidationg of 
the influence of the 'national reformist bourgeoisie' amongst 
the masses. As the CC graphically put it in February 1936, 
'if the (national reformist bourgeoisie) is disposed to 
take one step with the proletariat, we will seek the way 
to make it take two; if it tries to stopq we will pass over 
it together with the masses which it influencesl*(144) 
Butv in the eventp the PCCh found itself in a very similar 
position to that in which it had hoped to place the 'national 
reformist bourgeoisielo or at least that part of it repre3en- 
ted by the PR. It was the PCCh which was forced to make 
the significant concessions in order to create and hold to- 
gether the Popular ]Front coalition andq in the endq it was 
the 'proletariat' (the PCCh and the PS) which was harnessed 
to the political plans and ambitions Of the 'national 
reformist bourgeoisiel rather than the reverse* 
(144) Bolet: fn del CC PCChq March 19369 Noý, 8. 
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If the PCCh failed to create the type of combative 
mass movement wbich it hadhoped for itnd failed to realise 
the offensive potential of the Popular Front stratepy in 
the class strugf-, leq it did claim that the Popular Front had 
succeeded in defending democracy in Chile. ilow far this 
claim was justified is difficult to judpe. While the exist- 
ence of a more or less united opposition probably did check 
some of Alessandrils more autocratic impulsesq the frentista 
charge that he was planning to set up a dictatorship is ques- 
tionable. Howeverg Ross's dictatorial leanings are well 
documented and it seems likely that the Popular Front's 
triumph in October 19389 at the very leastg saved Chile from 
a more authoritarian period of rule than it subsequently 
enjoyed under Aguirre Cerda. (145) 
If the PCCh1s record in achieving the more profound 
goals of the Popular Front strategy was mixedg the benefits 
which it reaped in attempting to implement the strategy were 
substantial. As a member of the Popular Front coalition, the 
PCCb was able to operate with a considerable degree of free- 
dom from harassment by the authoritiesp inake effective contact 
with broader sectors of the communityq increase its inember- 
ship and electoral support and imnrove its organisation. 
, vioreoverg the Popular Front strategy enabled the PCCh to 
create a working- relationship with the Pit and with other 
parties of the left which enabled it to break out of the 
(145) The British Ambassadorp for example, reported tinat 
; -toss had told him that Parlinw; nt should be disponsecl 
withq that democracy was Inmracticable for Chile and 
that the country needed a sharp turn to the right. 
FOR FO 371/18664 A 6375/11/99 dispatch Bentinck to 
jir John Simong dated 12-7-1935- See also boijoso 
02- cit-9 fit PP173-179- 
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vicious circle of isolation and (Infoat into whic! -i it had 
been locked by Third Period strategy. In sum, the Popular 
Front helned týie PCCh to move from the mar-, in of Chilean 
nolitical life into its itiainstream -a joiirney wl-ich may 
iiot ! lave brought the party any closer to its revolutiot)ary 
f. ýoal in the short term, but which enstir(! d its survival and 
even prosperity as an or(ranisation aridg ill the longer run,, 
increased its chatices of really inf Luencinjý the course of 
Chileaii POlitical development. 
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Chapter 5 Pedro Aguirre Cerda and the Popular 
Frontg 1938-1941 
a 219 0 
President Pedro Aguirre Cerda governed Chile from 
December 1938 until November 1941 when the ravages of tuber- 
culosis forced his resignation from office andq shortly 
afterwards, caused his death. Despite the high expecta- 
tions andq Initially at leastt the enthusiastic support of' 
his Popular Front alliesq no now Chile emerved froto Aguirre 
Cerda's brief administration and promises to raisethe stan- 
dard of living of the working masses were only partially 
and temporarily redeemed. 
The failure of the Popular Front government to 
implement its reform programme stemmed from a nurnber of 
factors. Amongst the most Important were the economic dif- 
ficulties facing the country and the activities of A", irre 
Cerda's right-wing opponents who controlled Congress unt1l 
Narch 1941 and who used all the means at their disposal to 
frustrate the now regime. Partly as a result of' the bitter 
and intransigent opposition of the Right, Aguirre Cerda 
began to retreat from Popular Front goals and policies and 
the old rivalries and tensions Inside and between the 
frentista parties re-enierged with fresh vigouro By early 
19409 the PS had split over the issue of continued particil)a- 
tion in the government and the PR had forced the first of 
several cabinet crises on the government without informinp 
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or consulting its Popular Front allies. At the same timeg 
the PCCh began to atove away from the policy of unconditional 
support for the government which it had pursued during 1939 
and its relations with Aguirre Cerda, never close, deteri- 
orated. The almost moribund Popular Front was finally 
destroyed by an explosion of antagonisms between the PS 
and the FCCh in December 1940. Howeverl, neither the destruc- 
tion of the Popular Front nor the defeat of the ri, ýht-wingr 
parties in the ýiarch 1941 congressional elections made the 
task of governing any easier for Ap,, uirre Cordat qy April 
1941 an open breach had developed between him and his own 
Radical Partyq after "larch the largest single party in 
Cotigressq and he was forced to govern- without Radical par- 
ticipation in his cabinet between June and September 1941. 
Only on the eve of his resignation from office did he make 
his peace with the PR. 
Despite the failures of the Popular Front (Povernment 
and coalitiong the years 1938 to 1941 were probably the most 
successful and prosperous the PCCh had experienced since 
its foundation. During that period the PCChI9 membershin 
and electoral support expanded dramatically and it was able 
to extend and consolidate its influence in the trade union 
movement. As in. previous phases of its existencep the PCChIs 
successes - and failures - were governed by both national 
circumstance and Comintern policy and it was to the party's 
good fortune that both sets of factors tended to point in 
similar directions at roughly the same time. For this 
reasonq arnonast otheral the PCCh did not suffer from any 
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great internal conflicts between 1938 and 1941 nor did the 
CC have to contend with any serious challenges to its 
autborityo 
The economic background to the political develop- 
inent of the Aguirre Carda administration wang on the wholes 
sombre* By the time Aguirre Cerda took office, Chile was 
already in the grip of a mild recession causedp in the maing 
by a decline in world demand for copper - by then Chile's 
principal export and a major source of revenue for the 
state. (l) 
Two events in 1939 seriously exacerbated i-hilets 
economic difficulties. In January 1939, an oarthquake 
destroyed Chillan and the important manufacturing zone 
around Concepcion andq later in that yearp the outbreak 
of the Second World War disrupted L; hile's traditional trad- 
ing patterns. These events were the main cause of a decline 
in industrial and mining production during 19399 although 
the right-wing parties blamed frentista-inapired labour 
unrest and the Frontq right-wing economic-sabotage. (2) 
Howeverg in 19409 partly because of US economic aid and 
trading agreeinentsp both mining and industrial production 
surpassed 1938 levels and continued to improve in 1941. (3) 
Largely because of the closure of European marketaq ar-, ricul- 
tural production - which had had a bumper year in 1939 - 
FOR FO 371/2238 A 6078/324/99 Economic Report from 
A. J. Pack to Lord lialifaxi dated August 1939. 
(2) 6ee Appendix B for the indices of production 
during these years. 
(3) lbid. 
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fell during 1940 and ig4i. (4) 
Ifq by the time Aguirre Cerda left officaq the 
economy had appeared to have recovered from some of the 
reverses it had experienced during 19399 the situation of 
the working population was being eroded by inflation. 
During 19399 the government had taken firm steps to keep the 
cost of living down and had encouraged the granting of favour- 
able wage settlementag with the result that broad sectors 
had enjoyed a real improvement in their standard of living. 
But, during 1940, inflation (causedq in the maing by govern- 
ment fiscal policies and the rising price of imports) began 
to take hold. (5) From 3% in 19399 the rate of inflation 
rose to 12.6% in 1940 and 15.2% in 1941 and while cash wages 
apparently kept abreast of the rising cost of living in 
some industrie3q in others they did not and in real terms the 
general living standards of the masses suffered from a slow 
but persistent erosion. (6) 
Howeverv Aguirre Carda's most pressing problems 
when he came to office were political rather than economic. 
The major right-wing partieg had not accepted their defeat in 
October 1938 with good grace and they determined on a policy 
of ferocious opposition to the new regime. In Congressq the 
right-wing parties were generally able to assemble a majority 
in the Chamber of Deputies and they had an absolute majority 
in the Senate. Using their control over Congressq they 
Ibid. SeepalsopSalvador Valdge Cinco Aflos de 
Gobierno de Izquierda(Santiago9l94U)pplog-112, 
for a full-e--rvif right wingg explanation for 
the decline in agricultural production. (5) P. T*Ellsworth ChiletAn Economy-in Transition(New 
York9l945)PP107-118 
(6) See Appendix D for a comparison of inflation rates 
and wage increases in the mining industries, 
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systematically blocked government legislation, introduced 
measures designed to embarrass the government and to cause 
dissension amonnst Its allies and impeached ministers In at- 
tempts to disrupt and alter the composition of cabinets. (7) 
outside Congressq members and sunporters of the right-wing, 
parties created difficulties for the regime. Some alessan- 
drista appointees to semi-fiscal agencies refused to resign 
from office as co"vention demanded and rtrht-wing state 
bureaucrats were unco-operative or obstr"ctive. (8) The 
riebt-wing press, more numerous and influential than that 
of the frentista partiesq conducted virulent campaigns 
against the government and its supporters while, according 
to someq others embarked on more sinister efforts to sabotage 
the economy. (9) Indeed, according to the frentista partiesq 
the right-wing parties were intent on re-creating the same 
conditions of stalemate and deadlock which bad preceded the 
September 1924 Colpe andq whatever the truth of these allega- 
tions) General Ariosto Herreraq witb the encourapement of 
riobt-wing extremistsq did launch an abortive coup (lown 
as the Ariostazo) in August 1939-00) 
Ily the beginning of 1940, the opposition of the main 
(7) For descriptions of the activities of the ripht-winp 
opoosition seep Florencio Duran 81 Partido Radical 
PP197-220; John Keese Stevenson Wean Popular 
Front (Philadelphiag 1942) pp96-106o 
(8) Aevista MY 11.5-1939; Frente Popular 29. K. 1939- 
(9) See, for example, Pablo report to the XI 
PUCh Congress (December 1939) in which he accuses 
mine ownprs of sabotaainp coal production. Frente 
Popular 25-12.1939. in 194op British Embassy obser- 
vers also claimed that there had been 'mild sahotaget 
from ripht-wing industrialistst FOR FO 371/24182 
A 418/51/9, despatch Chnrles Orde to Lord Oalifax, 
dated 11.10.1940 
(10) See Leonidas Bravo Lo quo supo un Auditor de Guerra 
(jantiaqo, 1955) ppl? 2-141 for account oft-he ArLostazo- 
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body of the Rip-ht had lost some of its savagery mainly be- 
cause the government's visible drift away from Popular Front 
policies and objectives made recourse to extra-constitutional 
methods unattractive and unnecessary. Howevorg the Aight 
continued to present stubborn opposition to the government 
and although they were persuaded to make a deal with the PH 
to secure the passage of a package of government legislation 
through Congress in July 1940, it appears that they were 
blackmailed into it by Aguirre Cerda who threatened to re- 
veal that certain major right-wing parties had receivod 
financial aid from Germany. (11) In late 19409 relations be- 
tween the government and right-wingr parties again deteriorated 
when they threatened to boycott the congressional elections 
scheduled for March 1941 because of the violent tactics adop- 
ted by frentista supporters in a senatorial by-olection. (12) 
Aguirre Cerda, howeverg took steps to ensure that those 
elections were fairly conducted and the right-wing parties 
did participate - and lost their control over gongress. 
(13) 
After March 1941, the right-wing parties had lost some of 
their congressional teeth but by that timeq toog the Popular 
Front was in ruins and the government no longer seemed to 
pose a threat to right-wing interests. 
The right-wing opposition wasq by no meansq the 
only political group which caused Aguirre Cerda concern. 
He soon found that the ability and willingness of his 
frentista allies to support his government was limited and, 
(11) Fox YO 371/24182 A 2839/51/99 despatch from Bentinck 
To Lord iialifaxg dated 19-7-1940. 
(12) El 6iglo, 19.11.1940. 
(13) John Reese 3tevenson op. cit. P115- 
* 225 - 
indeecb that some of them could be as troublesome as his 
declared enewies. Frictions between the Front nArties 
prevented tbem from co-ordinatiný_- the activities of their 
representatives in Congress until August 1939 and it was 
only after the Ariosta. zo that they managed to put together a 
combination of centre and left-wing parties which gave the 
government a tempurary majority in the Chamber of Deputies. (14) 
By early 19409 all the major Front parties had expressed 
varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the government's 
performance and in February the PH underlined the coalition's 
ineffectiveness by forcing a cabinet crisis without consul- 
ting or informing its allies - an action which it repeated 
the following Julyq despite their protests. (15) 
Howeverg the effectiveness of the Front was not 
only conditioned by differences between its members but also 
by Aguirre Cerdals attitude towards them,, individually and 
collectively* As a conservative Hadical who had only accep- 
ted the Yront as part of the price he had to pay for the PRIs 
presidential nominationg Aguirre Cerda had no liking, for the 
coalition's more far-reaching goals nor for its left-winp 
members* Forced by the intransigence of the Right - and by 
the PhIs refusal to share government office with ripht-winp 
parties - to rely on the Front's support, he was not prepared 
to P , ive it a decisive say in his governnient* Still less was 
he prepared to allow the Front to develop its role as the 
mobilisinp ament of massive popular support around Front 
and government goals as the PCCh wished. Indeedq e1guirre 
(14) Frente Popular 23.8-1939; 7-9-1939. 
(15) Yb--id. 8.2.1940; 18.7-19'40. 
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Cerda's attitude towards the Front was conditioned by the 
fact thats with the incorporation of the Pit and the PS into 
governmentq the coalition became one of the principal means 
by which the PCCh (the only major Front party not to share 
high office) could seek to influence poverrijuent policy arid 
actions* Aguirre Cerda was prepared to lot the coalition 
survive until the PCCh moved away from unconditional support 
for the government and until international developments made 
the association of the PCCh with his administration a source 
of Increasing embarrassmente 
In contrast to his distant coolness towards the 
Popular Frontp his relations with his own Radical Party were 
both close and turbulent* According to most commentator3s 
the major cause of turbulence was the insatiable desire of 
Radicals for government posts and appointments -a desire 
so intense that one Radical was moved to remark that Aguirre 
Cerda would have had to arrange a loan of public posts from 
Argentina to satisfy it. (16) Those thwarted in their ambi- 
tions for office converted the P11 into a veritable battle- 
ground as facLion strupgled with faction to capture the 
Junta Central liadical(JCR) the body which had the power to 
grantq deny and withdraw the permission which all Radicals 
needed to occupy high governwent office* once in controls 
the victorious faction used the JCH to impose a series of 
cabinet crises on A-guirre Cerda by instructiný- ministers to 
resign. In February 1940, the JC,, ( instructed the incumbent 
Hadicals to resif-1, ii because they had become identified with 
(16) Alberto Cabero 11ecuerdos do don Pedro APUirre Cerda 
(3antiago. 1948) p24H. CT, e iladical was- Z-u--i . 1fer, 110 
Laharca. 
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the shortcomings of the refime. (17) While Apuirre Corda 
accepted the crisis with frood prace anti tised the opportunity 
to ! ýive his cabinet a more conservative complexion by in- 
corporatinfr, conservative Radical magnates (thus creatinýý the 
so-called millionaires' cabinet)9 he was ftirious when the JCR 
forced another cabinet crisis in July 1940 on the pretext 
that the Radical Mnister of the Interior was responsible 
for the over-enereetic police repression of some riotous 
disturbances in Santiago. (18) Indeed, on that occasinný 
Aguirre Carda drafted his resipnation from office protestin.! ý 
that it was impossible to govern because of the contintial 
Radical interference. (19) The struggle between Aguirre 
Cerda and the PR came to a head in April 1941 when the JC119 
on a disputed majority decision,, instrticted the Radical 
ktinisters to resign in protest against the closure of' two 
newspapers by the Radical Minister of the Interiorg Arttiro 
Olavarrfa 13ravo. (20) The Ministers resigned but Atuirre 
Cerda. refused to accept their resilgnations and they con- 
tinued in office in defiance of JCR orders - an offence which 
led to their expulsion from the PR. (21) The followinr, 
month all the Ministers (except for Olavarrfa Bravo) made 
their peace with the PR and Aguirre Cerda. decided to form a 
cabinet of administration without formal Radical participation 
and with Olavarrfa Bravo as his Linister of Interior. (22) 
(17) La hora 9.2.1940. 
(18) John., 11eese Stevenson op. cit. ppgg-100; 0abriel 
Gonzalez Videla Memorias (2 vols-0 Santiago, 1975) 
I, pp261-263. 
(19) Alberto Cabero op. cit., pl3214,9-252. 
(20) La Naci6n 25.4.1()41. 
(21) ibid. 29.4.1941. 
(22) Ibid. 11.6.1941. 
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The PR remained outside cabinet until September 1941 although 
it did not give up its non-cabinet posts. In that monthq 
Aguirre Cerdaq realising that he did not have long to liveg 
took the opportunity of Olavarrfa Bravo's resignation to 
make his peace with the party. (23) 
Although personal rivalries and an unbridled passion 
for office probably were the central cause of the difficul- 
ties between Aguirre Cerda and the PR9 the old battle between 
left and right-wingersl submerged and distorted by competi- 
tion for officet still persisted* Right-wing Radicals were 
pressing for the withdrawal of the PR from the Front in 
early 1939 while during 1940# Juan Antonio Rfos began his 
campaign for the PR's presidential nomination by making 3imi- 
lar calls. (24) Moreovert according to one sourcep the 
February 1940 cabinet crisis had been forced by right-wing 
Radicals who hoped that the resignations of the Radical 
ministers would precipitate a sympathetic resignation of 
Socialist ministerap leaving Aguirre Cerda free to re-organiae 
his cabinet thoroughly and come to an arrangement with the 
Righto(25) If this was the caseq and the PS evidently 
thought that it was,,, % the Socialist ministers refused to 
resign and the strategem failed. (26) Similarlyq the July 
1940 cabinet crisisp ostensibly a protest against the conduct 
of the Ninister of the Interior, was evidently also intended 
to secure the removal of the conservative ministers who had 
(23) See Arturo OlavarrIa Bravo Casos X Cosas de la 
Polftica (Santiagrop 1950) p 109v for the cir-cum- 
stances of his resignation. 
(24) Frente Popular 16.1.1939; El Sip,, lo 4.9.194o. 
(25) Gabriel Gonzilez Videla op. cit-9 Iq pp261-263. 
(26) Consip , na 17.2.1940. 
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been incorporated into tho cabinet in February. Itinallyp 
since OlavarrIa Bravo had incurred Pit displeasure by obeying 
Aguirre Cerda's instructions to restore 'social discipline$, 
by forcing the Radical ministers to resign in April 1941 
the JCR was expressing opposition to government policy as well 
as indulging in its customary power play. (27) 
Aguirre Cerda's relations with the PS, the only 
other major Front party to share povernment officeq were 
more harmonious in the long run than those he had with either 
the PR or the PCCh. This harmony did not stem frow any 
profound agreement over government policy and actions - 
exceptq perhapaq in the field of foreign affairs - but was 
the product of other factors. In the first placoo tho Pi 
did not constantly iwportune Aguirre Corda for government 
posts andq secondly, its antagonisms towards both the PR and 
the PCCh made it the President's natural ally in týie context 
of the internal politics of the Popular Front. 
. Despite the harniony which developed between Agrilirre 
Cerda and the PSI howevert the Socialists were the first 
persistent Popular Front critics of the government's short- 
comings. Indeedg it was not until late 1940 that the PGCh 
overtook the PS as the government*s most vehement frentista 
critic. Thus, in July 1939y the PS urged the President to 
(27) Seeg Olavarria 3ravots casos y Cosas p63 for Aguirre 
Cerda's instructions to 5M. He was ordered to 
suspend the right to strike in the countryside, 
prohibit strikes in public service industries and 
deal with newspapers which tnreatened public ordor, 
social tranquility and Chile's relations with other 
countries. 
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take more resolute actioll to achieve Popular Front roals 
while in 3eptember 19399 it instructed its ministers to 
res1pnj in part at leastp because it wanted to replace thein 
by Socialists of greater weipht who, it was hopedp would 
be able to press for Popular Front goals and policies with 
greater successo(28) In late 1939 and early 1940, the 
PS continued to urge the government to implement Popular 
Front policies and to take firmer measures to deal with its 
ri, -ht-wing opponents. (29) 
Towards the end of 19399 it became evident that the 
PS's criticism of government failings was not only the pro- 
duct of an objective assessment of its inadequaOies but also 
the response of the PS leadership to fierce internal pressurese 
By the end of 19399 an influential ntinorityg dissatisfied 
with the party0s participation in an administration which 
had failed to bring about radical reforms and which seemed 
unlikely to do so in the futureq accused the PS leaders of 
having become compromised by government office and of forget- 
ting their revolutionary T)rinciples, The inconformista82- as 
they were called, argued that the PS should leave the admini- 
stration and adopt a policy of conditional support towards 
the governmento(30) Using many of the arguments fashioned 
by the anti-frentistas in their campaign to prevent the PS 
from joining the Frontp the inconformistas sought to oust 
(28) Consigni 30.9-1939- 
(29) Seeg for examplep PS manifestos and declarations 
in Consigna 8-10-1939; e5.11-1939; 2.12.1939; 
13-1-1940; -- 20.1.1940; 16.3.194o. 
(30) See Cesar Godoy Urrutla Is paniphlots Adonde va el 
3ocialismo? (. iantiago, 1939) and (4uqg es el iriconform- 
isivo (Santiaszo, 1940) for tl-ie position 6-f -the 
inconformistas. 
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the PS leadership at the National PS Congress held in Decem- 
ber 1939- Defeated at that Congresag the inconformistas 
continued their attacks on the PS leadership and were ex- 
pelled in April 1940.01) Led by Godoy Urrutiag the 
inconformistasq who Included five PS congressmeng created 
the Partido Socialista de Trabajadores(PST) in bay 1940.02) 
With the expulsion of the inconformistasg the PS 
became even more firmly committed to a policy of continued 
participation in the governmentg andq indeedq Socialists 
served in all Aguirre Cerda'3 cabinets. Nevertheleasp the 
PS continued to make public criticisms of the governmentle 
short-comings and continued to press for the adoption of left- 
wing policies, 
Undoubtedly the strongest factor in the harmony which 
developed between the PS and Aguirre Cerda were the differ- 
ences they both had with the PH and the PCCb. The PS always 
had the revolutionary's contempt for the bourgeois reformism 
of the PH and had struggled with the Radicals for place and 
influence inside the Popular Front* After Apuirre Cerda 
took officep the PS and the PH competed for government posts 
and appointments and once these had been distributed# the 
partisan activities of Radicals and Socialists in office were 
a source of constant friction between the two parties. The 
PR accused the Socialist ininister of Health of carrying out 
a purge of Radical functionaries in the departments under 
his control and the Socialist 
(31) Consigna 13.4.1940; 
(32) Sees Jobet El Partid 
and Alejandro Ghelgn 
(T3uenos Aires, 1967) 
Sn1it. 
ýjinister of Fomento of 
30.4-1940. 
0 jocialista de Chile, is qjýp3 
Hojas Trayactoria de. 1 60ciallspio 
PP97-101 for accoullts Of tile 
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circumventin,, ý normal diplontatic and commercial channels - 
under the control of Radical ministers - by sending 'his own 
missions to do business abroad. 
(33) Socialists alleged 
that the Radical IýAinister of 'Education unduly favoured his 
own party in his appointments and that the Radical ivitnister 
of binance deliberately sabotaeed the work of the Socialist 
Plinisters by keeping them short of fundso(34) Frictions 
between the two parties extended to the provincial govern- 
ments; the Radicals of Iýubleq for exampleg doing, their ut- 
most to get rid of the Socialist Intendente. 05) 
An additional factor in the creation of a climate 
of hostility between the PR and the P. S was thO PR*s Close 
relationship with the PCCh. This relationshinp largely the 
, product of the PCChts determination to keep on good terms 
with the PR irrespective of which political or personalist 
current dominated it at any particular timeg resultedq accord- 
inp to the PS in an 'unholy alliance$ desi! ýned to limit the 
prowth of Socialist influence. (36) The PS was particularly 
annoyed by Radical-Cotomunist co-operation in the trade union 
movement whichg it claimedg prevented the election of Sociall. st 
union Officials and the adoption of Socialist policies in a 
number of unionsp includint- teachers' and railway workers' 
unions. (37) 
The Socialists' hostility towards the PCCI,. g howeverg 
was of more importance to thn ceirentirip of -ood rolations 
(33) Luis Palma Zdfliga Pedro Afy, -uirre Cerda (Santiago, 
1963) P159; La Rora 3-5-194o. 
(34) Consigna 16.9-1939; 16.12.1939- 
(35) Ibid. 16.2.1940 
(36) Ibid. 20.1.1940: Article by Jobet. 
(37) Ibid. 20.1.1940; 2 6.1.19 1ý0 ; 'ýO-'1-1940. 
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with Aguirre Cerda than was its conflict with the PRe 
Ironically enoughp although the PS and the PCCh frequently 
agreed in their appraisal of the government's errors and 
shortcomings9 their deep-seated rivalry and antagonism en- 
sured that they were never far from open warfaree Indeed. 9 
some incidents of local and even national conflict occurred 
when the leaderships of the two parties were ostensibly on 
the best of terms. Thusq in Coquimbo in January 1939P there 
was some street ; Qighting between Communists and Socialists 
while in July of the same yearg a more serious and national 
struggle developed between Communist and Socialist trade union 
leaders over the election of officers to the national executive 
(CDN) of the CTCh*(38) . 'Accusing the 
Socialists of using 
underhand methods to ensure the election of their candidates 
to the CDN9 Communist union leaders refused to accept the 
election results and the CTCh split into two warring factions. 
Only strong pressure from the political leaderships of both 
parties secured a compromise peace in October 1939 -a peace 
which once again j; ave the Socialists control of the CDN but 
which increased the size of that body and gave the PCCh two 
additional seatso(39) By that timeg howeverg another source 
of friction had emerged to bedevil PS-PCCh relations - the 
Second World War. Although the outbreak of the war did not 
lead to drastic changes in the PCCh'a domestic policiesp the 
PCCh's defence of the Nazi-Soviet pact9 the partition of Poland 
and the Russian invasion of Finland brouGht forth a wave of 
acid criticism from the PS - and in some area3 helped to lead 
(38) Frente PUular 16.1-1939; 7.8-1939. 
(39) Ibid 
,a 
26.10--1939. The CDN was expanded to 16 mem- bersq six of whom were Communists. 
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to a recrudescence of street clashes between the two 
parties. (40) Leaving asideq for the momento a more detailed 
consideration of PS_PCCh relations during 1940, hostilities 
between the two parties were a nrincipal cause of tho break- 
up of the Popular Front in December 1940 and, indeed, con- 
tinued unabated until July 1941. 
it seems that relations between Aguirre Corda. And 
the PCCh were not strained by Communist ambitions for high 
government office. The PCCh made it clear before the 1938 
presidential elections that it would hot play a dominant 
, overnment 
formed as the result of a frentista role in any p 
victory nor would it accept cabinet office and when Aguirre 
Cerda did invite the PCCh to serve in his government in 
December 1938 the party refused. (41) The reasons which 
the PCCh gave on that occasion were that in the present cir- 
cumstances - when the Hight would be using all the means at 
its disposal to block the implementation of the Front pro- 
gramme and when Aguirre Corda needed all the international 
support and sympathy he could got - Communist particiration 
in his government would be inadvisable. The PCOh added that 
it had no wish to exacerbate the fears and anxieties of the 
Armed Forcesq which had in the recent past prompted them to 
intervenedirectly in politics. (42) 
(40) 5ee Consigna 
, 
9-9-1939; 16-9-1939; 30.9-1939 for 
PS attacks on the PCChOs now international line. 
Jeeg Frente Popular 
, 
14-10-1939; ýý-11-1939 for ac- 
counts of street clashes between Socialists and 
Coitanunists in Lota in which differences over foreign 
policy played a part. 
(41) Frente Popular 7.10-1938; 10.12.1938. 
(42) Ibid. 10-12-1938. 
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Des, nite the PCCh's ptiblic refusal to serve in 
cabinet and the convincingg not to say praiseworthyy reasons 
which it pave for that decisiong there is evidence which 
suggests that the party did ask Apuirre Cerda for ministerial 
positions. According to Gonzalez Videlaq who was a close 
ally of the PCCh at that timeg the party asked him to 
inter- 
cede with Aguirre Cerda in order to procure the Ninistry of 
Labour and the top positions in two government agencies for 
Communists*(43) Gonzalez Videla reports that Aguirre 
Cerda rejected these requests; firstly, because lie did not 
want to further inflame his already hysterical ripht-winicr 
opponents and, secondlyg because the PS had categ-orically 
refused to serve in cabinet witb the P(; Cho(44) ('xonzilez 
Videla states that he fully approved Afýuirre Cerda's decision 
sinceg in private conversations with Comintern representa- 
tives in Chile, he had been assured that the PCCh wo"Id con- 
tinue to support the government whether or not its ambitions 
for office were satisfied. (45) 
Gonza'lez Videla's evidence stiggests thong thatt 
apart from the hostile political cliik, ate., the PCC1h was deprived 
of cabinet office by the opposition of the Socialists - and 
by Comintern policy which assured Aguirre Cerda of Communist 
sup-oort j%rithout haviný, ý to pay for it in the traditional manner. 
Thus2 Aguirre Cerda's offer of povernment office to Ole P(jCV, 
and the narty's public rejection of cabinet nosts were matters 
of form. Py calling on the PCCh to serve in his governmentq 
Ch while Aguirre Cerda publicly recof-, k, nised hi-9debt to the PC 
(43) Gabriel "Yonzglez Videla op. cit-9 I, p26. 
(44) fbids n207- 
(1+5) 11 1-) i (I .p2.16. 
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the Cornmunistst in rejecting cabinet office, roco! ý, nised the 
realities of the situation and sout-ht to make what political 
capital it could from a gesture of self-sacrifice. 
The same evidence also suggests that the darker 
speculations which sorne commentators have made on the PCCh's 
'real# reasons for refusinp cabinet office arn irrelevant. 
(46) 
If there was no real possibility of serving in cabinetq the 
notion that tbe PCCh refused office because it wanted 
to 
profit from its association with the regime's successeso 
avoid responhibility for its failures and capiLaliso an 
the 
discontent which those would inovitably cause seems unfounded 
even though this was, in effect, what happened* lioweverg it 
could be argued that the PCCh asked for the Plinistry of 
Labour specifically to elicit a negative response since, 
given that ministry's Importance in the struggle for trade 
union influenceg the Socialists would be bound to object* But 
there is no evidence to suggest that Aguirre Cerda made a 
counter-proposal of' a less sensitive ministry and indeed, 
since he also failed to give the PCCh a proper share of posts 
in the public administrationg it seems reasonable to Suppose 
that he did not want tile PCCh in government, at all. (47) 
ýiince it seenis unlikely that tho PCCh had any real 
(46) Seeg for example, jI. J. Alexander Communism in Latin 
America p192; Alberto Cabero op. cit. P335- 
(47) 'ýýrnst Halperin suggests another reason for the P. ', 'Ch's 
refusal to participate in cabinet - residual Third 
Period repupnance towards collaboration with the 
bourgeoisie. Nationalisiti and Communism in Chile 
(ýiass-, 1965) ; 79-2. The same objection applios to 
his ti, eory andq in any eventg since the narty accep- 
ted the Front strategY with little difficulty it 
seems unlikely that, had other conditions boon ii, ore 
propiti6usq the Y)arty would have found SLICII feelintrs 
an in surujoun table obstacle in 1939. 
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expectation of high government officog it also seenis iwprob- 
able that it was IT, )rofoundly aggrieved' at havinp its ambi- 
tions tt, warted as Gonzalez Videla has claimed. (48) In any 
eventq while the party may well have been annoyed at not 
receiving its proper share of administrative postsq no sense 
of gtievance characterised its attitude towards the govern- 
ment during 1939 - indeedp during that year the PCCh gave 
the government its unconditi6nal support. 
This support was particularly marked in the field of 
labour relations. In response to Aguirre Cerda's requestag 
in April 1939 the FCCh (together with the PS) agreed to a 
moratorium on the organi3ation of peasant unionag an activity 
which bad increased spectacularly in the inonths after October 
1938 and which had allrmed landowners and the right-wing 
parties considerably. 09) In early 1939, the PCCb also 
agreed$ with minor reservationag to the creation of a series 
of special tribunals designed to find peaceful solutions to 
labour conflicts in a number of industrios and paid some 
attentiong though not muchl to the problems of increasing 
production. (50) More generally, ti-e PCCh called on its 
supporters to keep their labour conflicts within the C6difro 
del Trabajo and exhorted them to consider all conflicts from 
the j: )erspective of whether or not they causod the government 
difficulty or embarrassmont. moreoverg trade unionists were 
told that there was no excuse for illegal strikes now that 
a popular government was in power and they should, if possible, 
(48) Gonzalez Videla oý* cit . 19 p216. (49) Frente Po 131.1lar 5.4-19'39: 
(50) lbid- 3.4.1939; 14.4.1939; 14.5-1939. 
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avoid striking altogethero(51) Partly as a result of the 
efforts of the PCCh - and the PS - there were fewer strikes 
in 1939 than in 1938p although the number of labour disputes 
increased from 248 (involving 489078 workers) in 1938 to 525 
(involving 1049048 workers) in 1939. (52) Howeverp the 
government was also expected to play its part in maintaining 
industrial peace by persuading employers to grant favourable, 
wage increases and to avoid unnecessary eackings. (53) 
Although the PCCh gave its unconditional support to 
the government during 19399 it was not entirely uncritical 
of its performance. In July 19399 the party began to urge 
the government to take firmer steps to deal with the activi- 
ties of its right-wing opponents and to pursue Popular Front 
goals with increased vigour - calls which were repeated after 
the Ariostazo in August 1939. (54) But in the final months 
of 19399 the PCCH dropped its mild criticisms of the govern- 
ment almost entirely and began to attack the inconformistas 
in the PS and elsewhere who were demagogically demanding 
precipitate action from the government. (53) The PS replied 
by wryly congratulating the PCCh for having acquired an 
'admirable spirit of resignationt. (56) Thus# at a time 
when the PS was openly predicting that the Nazi Soviet pact 
(51) Ibid. 22.4.1939; 25.12.1939- 
(52) See Appendix JZ6 for strikes during the Aguirre Carda 
years. The statistics on labour disputes come from 
Estadfstica Chilenag March 1939 and May 1940. 
(53) Frente Popular 8-11-1939; 11,12*1939* 
(54) Ibid. 19-7*1939; 28.8-1939. 
(55) Ibid, 28.8.1939; 4.11-1939. See also the resolu- 
tions of the PCCh's X1 National Conigresal December 
1939 Por la Pazt ]ýor nuevas victorias del Frente 
Popular (-S- iago) p18. 
(56) Consigna 2.12-1939- 
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and the outbreak of the Second World 
War would produce a 
dramatic revision of the PCCh's policies similar Ln that 
which had occurred in early 19359 Chile was presented with 
the spectacle of a PCCh which energetically condemned the 
government*s critics and with a PS whicbg nartly in response 
to internal pressuresq was becoming increasingly critical 
of the government. Although the PCOh took considerable 
satisfactton in dumbfounding its enemies and rivals by not 
proceeding to a dramatic revision of its policies in response 
to international events, its very inaction in that diroctton 
was a product of Comintern policy -a fnct which 
the PCOhq 
to give it its dueg made no attempt to dispuise. 
Accordinp to the Cominterng the Second World War, 
like the First,, was the oroduct of rivalry betweon competing 
imperialisuisq neither of which desorved tile syli, patby or sup- 
port of the working classes. On the contraryq the rulinpr 
classes of tt-ose nations embroiled in tile warg with the st, ip- 
nort of social democrats and reformistst sou! rht to enstire 
that the workers bore the brunt of the conflict. The Comin- 
tern predicted that the war would lead to a shnrp increase 
in class anta? -ýonisms and that revolution woiild follow. 
As 
& result of this analysis, the Comintern aýave the communist 
parties of' the world two major tasks, firstlyq to struý-F. le 
apgainst this *predatory wart and secondlYq to liqtiidate 
the influence of the social democrats and reformists in the 
workinp class movementq since these had shown by their siip- 
port for the war thatq in the final analysisp tý, ey ii, pre tools 
of the bourgeoisie arid untrustworthy allies for the 
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proletariat. (57) For the Comintern theng the war marked 
the return to hard line policies similar to those which had 
prevailed during the Third Period* However, one class of 
communist party was specifically excluded frok this re- 
orientation - those parties in colonial and semi-colonial 
countries whichl in alliance with reformists and social demo- 
cratss were struggling for national liberation, (58) These 
partiesy including the PCCh9 were instructed to continue 
applying the Popular Front strategy whichg with the advent 
of warghad acquired added significance and seemed to have 
greater chances of success* Not only would the imperialist 
nationa be less able to block the path of movements for 
national liberation butq once these movements had been 
successful* they would deprive the imperialists of the econo- 
mic resources and political support which they needed to 
prosecute the war. 
So far as the PCCh was concerned, thong the reorien- 
tation of Comintern policy after the outbreak of the war de- 
manded no drastic changes in overall strategy or in domestic 
policies. Howeverg it did serve to redirect the party's atten- 
tion to the fact that the goal of the Popular Front strategy 
was nothing less than the economic and social transformation of 
Chile and its liberation from imperialist tutelage and it was 
partly because of this renewed concern with fundamental objec- 
tive3 that the PCCh began to move away from the policy of un- 
conditional support for the government. But by early 1940t 
there were also powerful domestic factors pushing the PCCh in 
(57) World News and Viewst Londong llell-1939* See alsol 
Frente Popular 4.11.1939 where the Cominternts mani- 
festo for 7th November was re-printede 
(58) Ibid. 
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a si. milar direction. 7, y 
that tiii, e, the very survival of' tt-. e 
Iront seemed to be tI)reatened ', )y dan, c_,, ýers 
from boLb Lhe Left 
and the -, ight. On ttie Leftq 
the iticonformistas cliallonped 
the unity of' the IF3 and the intef, rity of 
the codLlition while, 
on the . 
"tightg the p: overnment's retreat from 1'ooular i, ront 
objectives andq in particular, the cabinet clian, ýes of 
: obruary 
191ý09 se-med to lie a clear in(ILeation that ttie -, ýovernment was 
inovin! - towards an accoiiii,, L00ation wit)-i its opponentsq, an accom- 
modation which would woan the total sacrifice of 
Front i-onls. 
i, ýoreoverq tliere was another powerful pressure which 
Lou,, ýI-)(Illod 
the PCch's attitude toi,,,, xrcts the (-overriment. J'uriwý ]. ')31)1 
the PC,:; ]-! had had considerable sticcess in contaltiLw- imlustrLal. 
unrest 1)y nersuading worknrs thaL restraint, woulcl onable Lhe 
, 7overnment to Press ahead witi, the iniplementation of' Front 
policies. Rut by early 1940, this argument was wearini, thin 
since the government had few concrete achievements to its 
c red it and If urthe more 9a9 
it, f'l at ion a ry pres su re s i! ic rp. aq e(l 
the PCCh was in Oan. -'er of losini), pround In the trnde uniOn 
movement to tl-)e more militant incotiformisLas both inside nrid 
outside the 1-3. 
lithoux, ii the continued to exhort tiýie povernmont 
to iii. plement Pootilar Front policiesy tile party's retreat from 
unconditional support for týle -, 7ove. rnwent was not accompanied 
by sava! -e attacks upon it - indeedg stich tactics could only 
have forced the govermient into more Oeterml. ned efforts to 
come to an arranLTei, -ient with the i, 'Jffht. tiather the PCCh souj+t 
to rally the Popular Front parties around the government and 
to check its drift towards the illi, -ht by virulently attacking 
t'he Aipht in general and the Jociedacl Nacionnl de Ax, ýricuTtura 
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( j, qA) - the lan(jowners I association popularly idetitif ied as 
the bastion of tt-e Olil-archy - in partioularo. (59) Al t 1) ou ý,, h 
some inconformistas accused the PC(; h of deliberately tryinp, 
to channel workinf, class discontent away from the governiziont, 
its attacks on the SiýA were not well received by the Fýovern- 
juent since the Presi(lent himself was a wealthy landowner and 
Lwo of his Radical ministers were members of the 6ý4A. 960) 
Indeedg the two ministers had signed a manifesto condernninf- 
the PCCh for stirring up unrest in the countryside and although 
they were eventually forced to withdraw their signaturest 
La NaciOn (the government newspaper) took the PCCh to task 
for its totalitarian attitudes and defended the SNA as a res- 
pectable professional inatitution. (61) 
It was at this time toog that tile PCCh begran to 
change its attitude towards industrial unrest., Once again, 
howevert the PCCh did not unleash a full-scale industrial 
offensive. On the contraryq it continued to insist thatq 
under the present regimep there was no place for illegal 
strikes and that conflicts should be kept within the C6dIC2 
del Trabajo. (62) 71ut the PCCh also began to tell its 
supporters that ti-ere was no need to be passive in the face 
of government deficiencies and that they should be combative 
within the law. (63) Perhaps more ominous for the future 
development of labour relationst the PCCh also argued that 
the problems of increasinf, ý, r production should not be solved 
(59) Seeg for examplet Frente Popular 18.2.1940; 28.4. ig4o 
for two savage attacks on the 
(6o) . 6ee Trabajo (Santiago) 3-5-1940 for the inc0iiform- ista, allegatiorl. 
(61) ra-7acion 25.4.194o; 28.2.1940. 
(62) Irente Pormlar 2.2-1)40; 15). 2.1, )4o. 
(63) Ibid. 15 -2- 19'A - 
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at the workers' expense but rather by the granting of wage 
increases which would expand demand. (64) But the net 
result of the PCChIs changing attitude towards industrial 
conflicts was not an upsurge of strike activity. According 
to the available statiaticso there were fewer strikes during 
the first six months of 1940 than there had been during the 
same period of 1939 and it is also worth noting that there 
were no serious strikes in the industries where the PCCh 
had most influenceq the coal and nitrate industrieso(65) 
Nevertheleasp the right-wing parties mounted a campaign 
denouncing the POCh for stirring up labour unrest during 
the early months of 1940 probably in an attempt to prepare 
the way for the presentationg in July 19409 of a bill to 
Congress outlawing the PCCh. (66) Moreover, if the avail- 
able statistics do not appear to support the allegations 
of the rir,, ht-wing partiesp two strikes (by newspaper and 
bread workers) in Santiago during March and April 1940 did 
appear to give substance to the Rightls accusations. But 
these strikes wereq in factt supported by the CTChq that is, 
by the PS as well as the PCChq and in the case of the news- 
paper strikes (which affected all the major newspapers except 
for Frente Popular) the PCCh's efforts to find a prompt solu- 
tion earned the opprobrium of the inconformistas. (67) if 
the PCCh was not guilty of launching the labour offensive 
as its enemies claimed, it wasq in generalq less willing 
(64) Carlos Contreras Labarca La conspiraci6n do 105 
enemigos 
- 
del pueblo (Santiago) eb _ ruary 1940-9-plo. 
(65) See Appendix (; for strike details. 





pP13-151 for the congressional speeches of the bill's 
principal architect. 
(67) Trabajo 17.3-1940. 
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to use its influence to contain industrial unrest and this 
alone was enough to strain relations with Aguirre Cerda. 
Boweverg it was differences over foreign affairs 
which placed the #reater strain on relations between the 
President and the PCCh. Prior to the signing of the Nazi 
Soviet pactp the PCChq in accordance with Soviet foreign 
policyq was favourably disposed towards the USA and the 
European democracies. fluts after August 19399 the PCCh 
swiftly discovered that the European democracies were as 
nasty and perfidious as their Uerman opponents and by the 
end of that yearg the PCCh newspapers were giving greater 
coverage to propaganda against the Allies than they were 
apainst Germany. The PCChI9 attitude towards the USA also 
cooled andp after the USA repealed neutrality laws enabling 
it to supply arjus to the Alliesp became openly ho3tile. (68) 
While the reversal of the PCCh's attitude towards foreign 
affairs earned it the hostilecontempt of the PS, it did not 
place an immediate strain on the party's relations with the 
government. (69) Indeedq since Aguirre Cerda had declared 
Chile neutral at the outset of the war -a neutrality which 
was in complete accord with Comintern policy - the PCCh had 
an additional reason for supporting the Covernuient. (70) 
Buts in the longer rung the war had consequences which sorely 
(68) Frente Popular 28.10-1939. 
(69) The PCCh most certainly did not suddenly begin to 
attack the government after the signing of the Nazi 
Soviet pact as James Petras sui; gests in Politics 
and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley, 
1969) p124. 
(70) Frente Popular 20.11,19399 
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strained relations between tho POM and Aruirre Cerda. In 
the first place, the war exacerbated Chile's economic diffic- 
ulties causing unemployment and rises in the cost of living 
which fuelled worker unrest which the PCCh was increasingly 
reluctant to contain. Second, by closinp Cbilefs traditions] 
European marketsq the war made the cnuntry increasLn-ly de- 
pendent on the USA9 the only nower in a'position - 7oo7raphic 
and economic - to rive Chile two help It needed to overcome 
the difficulties caused by the war. Fhusq Chile became in- 
creasingly dependent on the UQ and the PCCh regarded this 
dependence both as a threat to Chile's nentralityg since It 
was evident that the UM was heinj sucked into the war, and 
as an obstacle to the implementation of any fundamental 
reform which might affect US economic Interests* 
In July 1940, when t, ýe conference of Werican states 
called by the USA met in Havana to co-ordinato the OcOnOmics 
political and military defence of the continentv the PCCh 
was openly hostile to Chile's participation and its hostillLy 
increased when it became evident that the conference had 
taken resolutions to deal with *subversive$ threats. (71) 
Outp recognising thile's need for US economic aid, Aruirre 
Cerda and the other frentista parties were prepared to rive 
the USA a measure of diplomatic suoport and co-operation and 
they found the PCCh's attacks on the USA both reprebensLble 
and embarrassing. (72) 
Thusq by July 1940, the PCCh and tine Vovernment 
were driftine rapidly apart for both domestic and international 
(71) Ibid. 22-7-1940. 
(72) Gonjigna 6-7-1940; La hora 23.7-1940. 
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reasons. Indeedg durinp t4at monthq Aguirre Cerda declared 
privately that he wanted to end thA PCCh's association with 
his regime but was prevented from takinj action because of 
the night*s determination to outlaw the PCCh. (73) However, 
it seems highly likely that he did take one step towards dis- 
solving the link with the PGCh when be chose the Socialist 
Sinister of Fomentog Oscar Schnakey to lead the Chilean dele- 
gation to the havana conference. Although Aguirre Cerda him- 
self justified his selection of a junior Socialist Sinister 
to lead the Chilean delegation to an imoortant internaLional 
conference in terms of not wisbina to provoke yet another in- 
ternal squabble in the PR9 he cannot have been ignorant of the 
probable impact of the appointment of Schnakep one of the P615 
most noted anti-communists, would have on ps-pCCh relations. (74) 
Although the days of the Popular Front appeared to 
be numbered by July 1940p the coalition survived until Decem- 
ber 1940 in its original form and until Narch 1941 without the 
PS. Between July and December 19409 relations between the 
PCChq Aguirre Cerda and the PS fluctuated somewhat in accord- 
ance with events but in general they grew cooler. 
In July 1940p Aguirre Cerda announced thati, the econo- 
mic difficulties which the country faced were so serious that 
Chile had to lorgranise or parishl. (75) kroduction had to he 
increasedg sacrifices had to be made and the government would 
no longer countenance indefinite strikes or unnecessary sack- 
ings. Although the PGCh greeted Aguirre Cerda's declarations 
(73) F011 FO 371/24182 A 2389/ J/9, despatch Iýeritinck to 
Lord Halifax dated 1-0-7-1940. 
(74) Alberto Cabero o. cit- P354. 
(75) Erente lopu-lar_ 11-7.1,940. anif estog 10 organizamos 
o perecemos 1. 
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with reserved anprovalp it became onenly ho3tile when some 
of the effects of the government's now policies made themselves 
felt in the field of labour relations. In Aup"st 1940, the 
Vinister of the Interior instructed the carabineros to keep 
strict vigilance on Ilabour aritators' while later in that 
yearg the internal security law was used against the leaders 
of railway workers' unions which had threatened to strike. (76) 
However, while the PCCh condemned these actions, it vigorously 
applauded the povernment for taking over a nitrate oftcina 
which was threatened witb closure in October 1940-07) 
As Chile's economic difficulties increased and as 
the government began to take a firmer line tovards industrial 
unrestg the PCCh formally completed the process of reorientn- 
tion which it had begun in early 1940. At the Ninth Plenary 
Session of the CC9 held in late September and early October 
19409 the PCCh criticised itself for its former policy of 
blanket support for the povernment and for its failure to deal 
with the vacillations of its allies as being both reformist 
and opportunistic. (78) The governmentg the PCCh claimcdq 
was dominated by pro-reactionary elements and the only way 
forwards was for the workers and peasants to conquer the direc- 
tion of the popular movement and to press for tho fundamental 
transformations of Chile's society and economy which the 
Popular Front programme had promised. In future, the PCCh 
declaredg it would continue to sunport the government but 
only to the extent that it pursued anti-imperialist and anti- 
oligarchical nolicies. ! be FCCh also promised to work for 
(76) Frpnte jonular 18.8.1940; 81 Agio 17-10.109, 
15-11-1940. 
(77) u 4.10.1940. 
(78) LbLd- 
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unity of action with the PS an0, most strikinply of allq 
stated that the party would go to the vanguard of the struggle 
of the workers for better pay and conditions. (79) The Ninth 
Plenum was the culmination of the process initiated by the 
Comintern after the outbreak of the war but was alsog to some 
extent at leastg the product of the PCCh's reaction to the 
genuine discontent inside the working class movement with the 
shortcominfýs and failures of the government. However, as 
the PS cynically pointed outq the PCCh9s more militant atti- 
tudes were nrobably also due to the fact that the iýiarch 1941 
congressional elections were fast approachinpe(80) 
Although neither the froverrintent nor the other fren- 
tista parties seemed unduly alarmed by the harder line and 
aggressive tone of Ninth Plenum resolutionso both WeOtatelY 
before and after the Plenum there wore clear signs of the 
growing estrangement between the PCCh and the government. A 
few days before the Plenum, the Communist Sayor of Valparafso 
(the only official link of importance between the PC= and 
the administration) was dismis3ed from his post while In 
naguna Verde, just outside Valparafso, Communists led an Il- 
legal strike of electricity workerso(81) After the Pleniiiii 
there was an upsurge of industrial unrest as Communist labour 
(79) Ibide 
(80) Consigna 9.11.1940. 
(81) T), p ýiayorj -Pedro Pachecol, had been the object. of con- 
stant attack from Socialist and other rng-dores for 
lack of attendance at council mor. -tingsq porsecution 
on non-Cojimunist inunici-)al workers atid profl! )-, tte tise 
of' funds. '_; oletfnv, ttn1cir)a1 do VaLp; irafso 
27.5.19'4, (); 7 U) J, 7. 'it 8-'q ()'to ""11 ro'r 
claijitedp Pacheco was orobably the victim of tha 
, 7en- eral deLerioracion of rolations boLwven A-1111'ro Cerda 
-IIId the Pý; ý; h; ihl. e. N. 1.1.19., 40. jo 0 
ý; hile, una advertoncia amoricana or)103-1-07 for an 
account of' the lw; ifuria Viýrdfi strilce. 
. 24, ) . 
leaders were pivo:, i their heads. 'rho first serious stitice 
in the nitrate flelds during A,, Tuirro Corda's prmsidericy com- 
menced In November andq in the south, the coal winers I)egan 
to collect money for a strike fund. (82) The ur)surg 
,, 
e of 
industrial unrest alarmed the governnient, the PAq the PS al-I(II, 
apparentlyg the FCCh as well. Comtýiunist labour leaders were 
sent to the Coalfields to ensure that the miners did not om- 
bark on strike action without due prenaration and that they 
kept their conflict legal. (83) woreoverp at the CC's Tenth 
. Plenuing held in January 191419 a nuiiiher of labour loaderss 
particularly in Valparafso, were condemned for precipitately 
unleashina a series of ill-prepared strike actions. (84) 
AlthouAý, b the PS showed no undue alarm at &Lnth Plo- 
num resolutionsl confining itself to a reasonod defence of 
Schnake's efforts to obtain US economic aid (which had come 
under fire in the Plenum)j it reacted sharply when the PUCh 
tried to win over local Socialist groups to the Idea of united 
actiono(85) moreover, in Aovember 1941, the PS boaan to 
argue, with increasing forcep that the PCCh could not maintain 
a foreign policy different to that of its allies and the 
government and expect to remain inside the coalition and in 
early December, the 60cialist minister of "ealth, Salvador 
Allende, provoked a brief eruption of public polemics betwoen 
the P6 and the PCGh by publicly condemninj-, the Communistsl 
labour and foreign policies. (86) 
(82) El Si, -l_o 10,11.1940; 23-11-191PO. 
(83) Police reported ýialvador Ocampo making a speech to 
this effeCt in Lota. Archivo Direcci(Sn General del 
Trabajoi Frovidericiasq 1ý)41, 'iOl-11, -ef- 110-31999 
OaLed 9.12 
(84) iLl 6i4lo 30.1-19141. . 5peech by humherto Abarca. (85) La -ritica (janLiago) J. 10.1940; Consip'na 9.11.19140. (06) Gonsi-lia 7 W. 4.11.1940; La Union (Val---- 
"I -- 
"I"anso) 7.1?. 1940; 
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Despite the increasing coolness between the P3 and 
tbe PC-Ch in the final months of 1940, in early Decemberg PS 
congressmen refused to vote for tle rirýht-winfr weastire de- 
, ned 
to outlaw the PCCh andp indeeds prior to Schnake's sip 
return to Chileg the frentista parties had rriade some pror-ress 
towards settling their differences. (87) on December 12th, 
the President of the PR announced that he had taken several 
successful initiatives to persuade the PCCh to respect the 
terms of the Popular Front pact and a little laterp the PCCh 
claimed that the frentista parties had been so successful in 
ironing out their differences that they had even managed to 
produce an agreement on foreign policy wbich was accertable 
to all the members of the coalition - includinr the PS. 
(RB) 
Neverthelesst on December 15tho Oscar Schnake delivered a 
furious attack on the Communist International and on the 
PCCb. Declaring that the PCCh no longer had any riobt to 
speak on behalf of the workinR classes or to consider itself 
a friend of the PS, Schnake reclaimed liberty of action for 
the PS and presented the Front with the choice of either ex- 
cluding the PCCh or losinp the PS. (89) Althouph other Front 
parties responded by exhorting the PS to remain in the coali- 
tion and although there were some last minute efforts by 
Socialist leaders like Grove (who had evidently been caupht 
unawares by the tenor of Scbnakels speech) to save the coali- 
tiong Scbnake was intransiment. (90) In January 1941, the 
(87) El : ýii-lo 7.12.1940. 
(88) Ibid. 13-12-1940; 14.12.1940; 21.12,1940. 
(89) La Oora 16.12.1940. Aenort on Schnake*s speech. 
(90) Seep 81 Siglo 20.12.1940 and Haul Mpuerols La Iz- 
quierja en punto muerto (Santiago, 1969) piqT nrove 
made efforts to knoo the PS in the Front ""til the 
end of December. it APlo 24.1?. 1940; 30.12. ig4o. 
o 2ý31 . 
Socialist delevates withdrew from the Front and a little 
later the PR also reclaimod its liberty of action. (91) 
it seems hipbly likely that without Schnake's 
ultimatum and his attacks on the PCChp the Front would have 
survived at least until after the biarch 1941 coný,, ressional 
elections* Whyq th" did Schnake decide to destroy the 
Front and why did the PS go along with him? Firstlyp It 
seems very nrobable that the termination of the PGCh1s asso- 
ciation with the government was part of the price which Chile 
bad to nay for the US economic aid which Schnake had helped 
to negotiate. Althoufrhq notsurprisinglyg the PCCh favoured 
this exrlanationq it is also given some support by the 
3ritish Ambassador in Santiago who reported to his superiors 
In London on December 14th that 'it appears that the U-S 
authorities are Insisting on the elimination of Communism 
from the -overnment before sponsoring any industrial loans 
to Chilel. (92) Pioreoverl such an insistence from the US 
government was consistent both with its own recent trentment 
of the US Communist Party and with havana Conference re-solu- 
tions on subversive threats. (93) Secondly, however# there 
were also nowerful domestic reasons for 6chnake's action. 
The PCCh's increasinfrly hard line policies were a direct 
threat to the PsIs influence at a time when the cost of living 
was accelerating and when congressional elections were fast 
approaching. Furthermorep the P. S was wearied by the PCCh's 
(91) %l 7.1-1941; 16.1 . 1941 . 
(92) FOR FO 371/25876 A 283/2,93/99 despatch Charles Orde 
to Lord Halifaxt dated 14.1?. 1)40. 
(93) jAie Smith Act (June 1940) and the Voorhis Act(()cto- 
her 1940) forcod the '-, j ComwunisL Party to Jillit its 
i, e, obershij) to citizeris aod made 11"',: 9 wLL'i LIie 
Comintern ille, ýal. )oeq 1,1., 6.1, oster ti. LstoýX of tile 
Gorýoami, sL Pti-ty of te UiA ( ew 1 p-jj?. 
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efforts to concert united action with local Socialist groups 
in defiance of the PS leadership's wishos- The PS's declara- 
tion of war on the PCCbq thong probably served a number of 
purposes. it helped Chile to meet US conditions for economic 
aid and it allowed the PS to satisfy its genuine and deep- 
seated hostility towards the PCCh; it helped to divert any 
dissatisfaction with the PS*s continued participation in 
government towards the struggle with the PCCh and ralliod 
the bank and file around the leadership. kinally, by breaking 
the Fronts the PS probably hoped to destroy the 'unholy alli- 
anceO between the PP, and the PCCh and to deal a mighty blow 
to the Communists' electoral ambitions* 
If Schnake and the PS had powerful reasons for des- 
troying the Frontp sop toop did Aguirre Corda. Indoedp prior 
to ý', December 15thl, Aguirre Gerda and the Radical minister3 
had given Schnake undertakings that they would do their best 
to keop the PR neutral in the coming I')attles and to swing, the 
Pii into an alliance with the PS and it alight well be that 
Schnake would not have launched his offensive at the time he 
did without the encouragement and support of Aguirre Cerda-(94) 
Aguirre Cerda*s reasons for wishing to see an end to the Front 
were similar to those of the PS but not identical* For 
Aruirre Cerdaq the PCCh's move towards tougher policies during 
1940 and Cbilefs increasingly pressing need for US economic 
aid simply converted the PCCh from a usefulq if unsavouryq 
ally into an embarrassing liability to be disi, osed of at the 
first opportunity. 14oweverg Aguirre Cerda did not want a 
direct confrontation with the PCCh since this could produce 
(94) La liora 1-3.1.941. Letter froto ichnake t0 A, ý, uirre CP-rcla. 
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an explosion of industrial unrest which the country could III- 
afford and further embitter his relations with the Pit. 'I'hus, 
Schnake's decision to force a breach with the PCCh presented 
him with considerable advantages; it enSUred that the PS 
and not the government bore the brunt of Communist hostility 
and it avoided immediate complications with the P11. 
The break-up of the Popular front was not the siý- 
nal for violent Coiwiunist attacks on the government nor for 
any sustained campaign to promote industrial unrest* Al- 
tbough coal production (an industry dominated by Communist 
trade unions) fell in early 1941 and although there was a 
record number of strikes in Januaryq by the end of that 
month, the PCCh was again Insisting that disputes should be 
conducted within--tho'COdit-o-dal Trabajo and that precipitate 
strike actions should not be launchede(95) Partly as a 
result of the PCCh's effortsp strikes tailed off after Janu- 
ary and by marchg coal production was almost back to normai(96) 
The reasons for the PCCh's restraint lay primarily 
in the now vital need to maintain the alliance with the Ph. 
Without the FR9 the PCCh ran the risks of losing electorally 
in the "arch 1941 congressional elections and of being forced 
into complete isolation, which might well have resulted in 
a return to clandestinity and the loss of all the grains made 
since 1935. To avoid this danger, the PCCh courted the F; ý, 
(95) irlumberto Abarca Cowo orffanizar la vicLoria ( , og ig4l) P23. (lie-port to the ý'. Plenuml, CC LICCji) '11he fali of coal i)ro(luction occa5ione(l a -overi-mient erl- 
quiry, headed by jeýieral ! Ier, tiiio. Jee ')(-Jow, p2r)6-7- (96) See Appendix C for the strike oattern in early 1, )141. 
Coal production for ., arch 1941 5110w0d all increase 
over that for Ljarcli 1940 - but was -still bel. ou, tl,,, It for , -arc! i in 1)379 1)),, wid 193)- . ýOe ý; Stfj(j[SLLcn Coilena, toril for all tile ,, e'irs mwittoiie( 
-' 
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with fresh vigours curbed its attacks on the governmentg 
offered the PR advantageous terms for the March elections and 
restrained its supporters in their struggle for better wages 
and conditions. Indeedq according to one Socialistp in its 
efforts to remain on good terms with the PRp the PCCh even 
offered to submit all the labour conflicts in which it was 
involved to Radical 3crutiny and approvalo(97) 
Howeverl, the passage through the Senate of the bill 
outlawing the PCCh probably also imposed restraint on the 
party - at least until Aguirre Carda formally vetoed it in 
late February 1941 - as did the activities of the Minister of 
the Interiorg Arturo Olavarrfa 13ravoo(98) Given a brief by 
Aguirre Cerda to clamp down on political and industrial unreatq 
Olavarrfa Bravo harassed the pressq including the Communist 
El Siglog prevented strikes in the public service industries 
and prosecuted Communist labour leadersy amorWt others, 
under the internal security law. (99) 
The restraint which the PCCh showed towards the 
government during early 19419 contrasted sharply with the 
bitter hostility it showed towards the PS. In January 1941* 
the PCCh declared that Schnake and his 'henchmen' were the 
Inew shock brigade of the reactionary rightIq doubly dangerous 
because of their leftist face, (100) What amounted to a civil 
war ensued within the working class movementp accompanied on 
both sides by press campaigns of singular virulanceg by 
physical violence and by a desperate struggle for elective 
(97) Consirna 1.2.1941. Article by Rudolfo Borzutsky. 
(98) Fl Si,, -I-o 16.1.1941. El Mercurio 22*2.1941. 
(99) 91 Siglo 5.1.1941; 18.2.1941; 10.5.1941. 
(100) Ibid. 4.2.1941* apeech by Contreras Labarca to the X Flenume 
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office both in the congressional and municipal contests of 
blarch and April 1941 and in the trade union elections which 
followed in May and June*(101) It was not until the end of 
July that hostilities between the two parties began to dimi- 
nish and they left a taste of bitterness which linpered on 
for some time* 
If the PS entertained any real hope3 that the PH 
could be plucked from its old association with the PCCh after 
the Popular Front Coalition had been destroyedl these were 
swiftly dashed* The PS was unwilling to offer the sort of 
electoral advantages which the PCCh was eager to give with 
the result that the PR chose to fight the March 1941 con- 
gressional elections with the PCCh and less important ex- 
frentista parties, (102) Howeverp after those electionsp 
the PR did begin to move towards an accommodation with the 
PS9 making pacts with the Socialists to co-operate in the 
elections of the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies and in the elections of alcaldes on municipal coun- 
cils; in Juneq the two parties made a general pact for mutual 
political and electoral supporto(103) It says much for the 
PCCh13 continued need for its alliance with the PR that It 
accepted the L-rowing ral! -nrocherient between the PR and the PS 
with little public protest, Howeverg such was the strength 
of the links between the PCCh and the PRIs rank and file - or 
such was the strength of factional strife inside the PR 
(101) The battle in the trade union movement was particul- 
arly vicious. See La CrItica 3.4.1941; 8.4.1941; 
28.4.1941; 12.5.19411 15.5.1941; 7.6.1941 for 
Socialist attacks - El Siplo responded in kind* 
(102) El Siglo 16.1.1941. 
(103) La-Naci6n 16-5-1941; 25.6.1941. 
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that these pacts soon ran into difficulties. The Radicals 
of Santiagop for exampleg preferred to support the Communist 
sponsored PST candidateg Godoy Urrutia rather than the 
Socialist candidateg who had official Radical supportg in a 
congressional by-election in July 1941. (104) But despite 
such set-back3o the PS and the PR gradually moved closer 
together and the PCCh found itself increasingly at the mar- 
gin of the mainstream of political events* 
The German invasion of Russia on June 22nd 1941 did 
not bring the FCCh's drift into isolation to an Immediate 
haltq nor did it bring any immediate changes in the PCChts 
domestic policies* In the days after the invasionq workers 
were informed that the beat way to help liussia was to con- 
tinue their struATgle against the Oligarchys imperialism and 
its 95chnakist agency' and to continue to prom for the 
satisfaction of their just demands for improved wages and 
conditions, (105) Despite such declarationag the PCCh 
became markedly less hostile towards the PS after the and of 
July 1941 and rather less passionate in its defence of wor- 
kers' demands for better wages and conditions and even more 
circumspect in its criticisms of the , Pýovernmento Although 
the changed international conditions were probably the Im- 
portant factor in the PCCh's low profile during the winter 
of 1941, domestic factors also played their parte The 
publication of the Bergufto report (which indicted the Com- 
munists as the principal cause of a decline in coal produc- 
tion during the early months of 1941) coupled with an 
(104) Ibido 10-7-1941. 
(105) Tl--; i gIo25-6.19141 5.7-1941- 
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attempt by the right-wing parties to exclude Communist re- 
presentatives from Congreasp imposed caution on the PCCho(106) 
Indeedq it was probably because the PS refused to vote for 
that measure# on the request of the PRp that the PCCh drop- 
ped its attacks on the PS. (107) 
By the end of Julyq the PCCh had also given clear 
indications of the now priorities which the changed nature of 
the war had given the party* on July 31stv the PCCh announced 
the creation of a new coalitiong the Uni6n Democratica Anti- 
nazifacista do Chile(UDACh) which was intended to appeal to 
even broader sectors than the old Popular Front-(108) 
Significantlyq the UDACh had none of the reform objectives 
of the Front but wags insteadq dedicated to the defence of 
democratic liberties and the maximisation of Chile's contribu- 
tion to the Russian and Allied war offorto(109) 
The PCCh completed the formal re-orient&tion of 
its policies begun in Julyq at the Eleventh Plenum in 
October 1941* Although the Plenum showed some concern for 
the problem of rising price3q by then gaining momentumq 
it showed none for the cause of fundamental social and 
(106) See El Mercurio 25.7-1941 for a re3umen of the 
Bergufto report. Although the General blamed the PCCh 
for the fall In coal production even he commented on 
the appallinp, working conditions and the lack of 
medical and social security provision* Indeedg 
rather than any active agitation on the part of the 
PCChq it seems likely that tile fall in coal produc- 
tion was simply the result of the party lifting the 
pressures it had previously exerted to maintain 
industrial peace durin- 1939, 
(107) La liacion, 30-7-1941. 
(108) El Sie, 0 31,7,1941- 
(109) Andr6s Escobar Dfar. Unidad Nacional contra el 
-facismo y on defensa do In democracia y-la_patr a* Report to 
the XI Plenum CC PCCbq Santialgog October 1941, p22. 
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economic reform but again re-iterated its commitment to 
the Allied cause and enjoined its workers to press for the 
rupture of commercial and-diplomatic relations with the Axis 
and the elimination of nazi-fascist elements in Chileo(110) 
Although the Plenum did not exhort the Communists to avoid 
strike actions altogetherg El Siglo soon made it plain thatq 
in futureg the strike was to be used as the weapon of final 
resort. (111) 
But the PCCh's new policies did nothing to end tho 
Isolation into which it had been thrust by thegrowing co- 
operation between the PR and the FS* Indeedq both of those 
parties refused to join the UDACh and it was not until 
after the resignation afid death of Aguirre Card& in November 
1941 that the approach of new presidential elections allowed 
the PCCh to edge its way back into the mainstream Of Chilean 
politics once more. 
Although the POCh may not have refused cabinet 
office with the specific intention of leaving itself In a 
position to profit from both the successes and the short- 
comings of the Aguirre Cerda administrationg this wast in 
effectq what happened* The PCCh profited from the very 
real support and sympathy which Aguirre Corda enjoyed during 
his first year of office and continued to benefit an this 
sympathy began to dissipate and as the internal disarray of 
the PS and the PR became increasingly obvious* Absent from 
cabinet and high government officeg the PCCh took little of 
the blame for the government9s failures and shortcomings. 
Ibide P31. 
F. 1 siglo 26.11.1941. 
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Yet the PCCh received few of the spoils whicb., a 
member of a coalition which had elected a President of Chile 
could normally expect. While the PR and the PS took the 
lion's share and while even small frentista parties like the 
Radical Socialists and the Democrats sometimes enjoyed cabi- 
net officel the PCCh was given only three posts of any signi- 
ficance at all. Pedro Pacheco was made Mayor of Valparaiso 
by Aguirre Cerda wbile, other Communists were appointed 
to the boards of two state agencies - the Junta do Exporta- 
ci6n Agrfcola(JEA) - whichq amongst other functions control- 
led the prices of bread and wheatg and the Caja_de Seguro 
Obreroq concerned with workerst health and social security 
benefitse(112) Although the appointment of Pacheco -a 
leader of the 1931 Naval Mutiny - to the Mayoralty Of 
Valparaisog Chilels principal naval and commercial portq 
afforded the PCCh considerable emotional satiafactiong none 
of those posts gave the party much real power. Neverthe- 
lessp Pacheco and the other PCCh appointees used what in- 
fluence they had to secure jobs for other party members - 
indeedq Pachecots blatant favoritism was a constant cause of 
friction between the PCCb and other frnntista parties on the 
Valparafso municipal council. (113) Partly because of their 
effortsy partly because some Radical Ministers also appointed 
(112) For details of Pachecots early life and career, see 
Frente Popular 28-3-1939. Aftor being Playor of 
Valparaiso and a CC member (1939-41) he driftod away 
from the PCCh. The two other Communist presidential 
appointees were Contreras Labarca (JEA) and Pianuel 
Piuftoz (Caj_a do 59&uro Obrero). 
(113) See Footnote 81. 
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Coramunists to jobs but mainly because Communists were no 
longer automatically personas non pratas wben it came to 
normal recruitment to the civil servicel the influence of 
the PCCh in the public administration grow during the Aguirre 
Cerda years - though notq by any weaneq draniatically. 
(114) 
Although the PCCh did not receive its proper share 
Of the spoilsq it was well rewarded in other ways. In the 
first placeg Aguirre Cerda performed a number of nolitical 
favours for the PCCh- He publicly invited the PCCh to serve 
in government and the invitation, if inainoereq set tho 3eal 
of respectability on the PCChe Moreover, on a number of oc- 
casions Aguirre Cerda publicly defended the PCCh from furious 
right-wing attacks and be vetoed the bill which the Right 
pushed through Congress to outlaw the PCCh. (115) According 
to Ravinesq Aguirre Cerda permitted Spanish refugees to settle 
in Chile at the express request of the PCCh - altboughl since 
their cause was---popular enough amongst all the frentista 
partiesp that permission way not have been given specifically 
to satisfy the PCCho(116) The British Ambassador to Santiago 
allegedg alsop that Aguirre Cerda'3 refusal to sign a Pan 
American declaration condemning the Russian invasion of Finland 
was the result of PCCb pressure. (117) Finallyt in April 
1941p Aguirre Cords. reduced sentences of exile on three 
Spanish refugees to relegation inside Chile on the request 
(114) According to Luis Palina Zulfftiga Pedro Aguirre Cerda 
pl6l, Oie Radical ýXinister of Foreign Relations, 
Abraham Ortegas gave 4 Communists jobs - although 
what jobs* he does not make clear* 
(115) Frente PoPular 21-5-1940; El Si 22*10.1940; 
El Mercurio 22.2,1941. 
(116) Eudocio Ravines La Iran Estafa 9486. 
(117) FOR FO 371/24182 A 111511115/99 Charles Bentinck 
to Lord halifaxt 31-1.1940. 
9 261 . 
of the FCCho(118) 
Rather more important than these favoursy howeverg 
were the advantages which accrued naturally to the PCCh 
from having a government in power which was not actively 
hostile to it. Although there were isolated incidents of 
harassment# the PCCh was able to operate with a freedom it 
had not known before and was able to approach the author- 
ities on behalf of its supporters and expectq if not action# 
at least a sympathetic hearinge Similarlyp the PCCh - like 
the PS - was able to profit from the explosion of trade 
unionism during the Aguirre Cords. administration. wheh-.. 
the number of unions rose from 932 with 125#978 members In 
1938 to lp985 unions with 2089775 members in 1941. (119) 
Finally the PCCh enjoyed a number of fringe bens- 
fits from its association with the government - loans and 
credit facilities from both private and state agencies became 
easier to obtain and the party press began to receive a share 
of government advertising revenue*(120) Indeedq even private 
companies like Braden CoT)per and Yarur (textiles)q in the 
past the object of furious Communist attackq occasionally 
felt it worth their while to take out advertisements in 
the PCCh presso(121) 
The bensfitag direct and Indirectq which the PCCh 
received from Its association with the government resulted 
in a dramatic increase in the party's electoral support and 
(118) El Siglo 22.4.1941. The rofugees were evidently 
being deported at the request of the Spanish Am- 
bassadore 
(119) Estadfatica Chilena June 1947- 
(120) Eudocio Ravines ope cit. p485. (121) Frente Popular 16*9*1959; 21*11*1939* 
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membership. In congressional elections in 1937, the PCCh 
polled 179162 votes (4.16% of the votes cast) and elected 
one senator and six deputies; in 1941, it polled 53s 144 
votes (11.8% of the votes cast) and elected three senators 
and sixteen deputies. (122) Similarlyq in April 19419 the 
PCCh elected 122 regidores as opposed to 42 in April 1938. (123) 
The available evidence indicates thatp if anythinap the grow- 
th of the partyls membership was even more dramatic* 
Contreras Labarca reported in December 1939 that the member- 
ship had grown by 'various tens of thousands# during that 
year and cited the particular case of Lots whereq he claimedq 
membership had leaped from 82 to 49000. (124) In April 1940, 
the Chilean delegate to a Mexican Communist Party National 
Congress claimed that the PCCh had L-rown from a thousand 
members prior to 1935 to a current 509000 members. (125) 
Galo Gonzalerq in October 1940, also claimed a membership of 
509000-(126) 
Howeverg since in normal circumstances it is almost 
axiomatic that a party's electoral support is much greater 
than its membership and since the PCCh only polled 53,144 
votes in March 19419 it seems likely that the claim of 509000 
members was an exaggeration. There wereq after all$ powerful 
reasons to exaggerate membership gains; firstlyt to impress 
(122) German Urzua Valenzuela Los Partidos Polfticos 
Chilenos P86. 
(123) El Siglo 9.4.1941. NO Official statistics of PCCh 
votes appear to have been published for the 1941 
municipal elections. 
(124) Contreras Labarca Por la 12az, por nuevas victorias p64. (125) World News and Views, 20.4.1940. Article by 13ell 
Keats 'The Congress of the CP of Mexico's (126) Galo Gonzalez La Lucha por la formacion del PCCh 
(Santiagop 1959) P52o This work is a compilation 
of various speeches and articles by Gonzalez. 
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the Comintern and other Communist parties as to the scale 
of the PCChts success and# sooondlyg to remind other Chilean 
parties that the PCCh was an electoral ally worth havinao 
Neverthelesss if the 50POOO figure is taken to include the 
juventudes Comunistas(JJCC) which claiined a membership of 
59000 in Santiago alone in December 1938 - that iaq at the 
beginning of a period of massive membership gains for the 
PCCh - it is not altogether impossible that the 509000 figure 
may have been rouehly accurate. (127) In which caael the 
membership of the PCCh proper might well have been in the 
region of 259000 to 309000 during, 1939/40. Which ever 
estimate is accepteds the PCCh experienced dramatic Crowth 
during 1939 by any criterion and since it was reported to 
the XII National Conares3 in December 1941 that membership 
remained roughly that which it had been in December 19399 
it seems that the party managed to hold on to the bulk of 
its recruitso(128) Certainlyp althouGh tbere is some 
evidence to sugaeat that membership did fluctuate at timesp 
it was not a problem which loomed large in the party9s pre- 
occupations during the Aguirre Carda yearso(129) 
If the precise scale of tt-8 FCCh *a growth between 
1938 and 1941 is difficult to gaugeg so toog is the social 
character and the geography of the expansion. It seems 
reasonable to assume$ howevers that the PCCh Crow rapidly 
in those areas where its electoral support expanded* In 
(127) Iliundo Nuavog Santiaeop lat week December, 1938, (128) PrinciQosq Becewber 1941. Article by Humberto 
Abarcal P79 
(129) Humberto Abarca commented on fluctuations in member- 
ship to the X Plenum in January 19419 but it was not 
a topic which caused much concern* RI-2irlo 31.1.1941. 
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which caseq a comparison of the results of the 1937 and 1941 
congressional election results suggests that the party grow 
most in Santiagog the mining zones of the North and Souths 
Coquimbo andq alsog in some rural provinces like CuricO and 
Talca. (130) With regard to the social character of the 
expan3iong the PCCh probably continued to have most appeal 
for worker39 skilled and unskilledq buty at the same tiniep 
it made some gains amongst white collar workers and peasants. 
Although there is some evidence to suggest that 
there was some friction between old members and new recruits 
the PCCh apparently absorbed this ma3eive, influx of now mem- 
11 
berg with little diffiCulty*(131) Certainlyq tho PCCh 
does not appear to haVS suffered from serious internal con- 
fliCt3q sharp fluctuations in membership nor# indeedq from 
any real challenge to the authority of the CC during the 
Aguirre Cerda years* 
The internal harmony which the PCCh apparently 
enjoyed between 1938 and 1941 was the product of many fac- 
torso Firstlyp its political line did not place severe 
stress on the loyalty of the membership* Thust the party*3 
drift towards tougher policies during 1940 seemed to be amply 
justified by domestic events and by the increase of infla- 
tionary pressure - andy indeedp the recruitment gains reported 
in the months following the IX Plenum of October 1940 sueeest 
that the partyls harder line was generally popularo(132) 
(130) See Appendix F. 
(131) Seep for exanipleg Contreras Labarca's Unidad para de- 
fender la victorlaq Report to the VI Plenum CC PCCh) 
'T_ November 193 9 Santiagov p24; and Consigna 18.1.1941 
for evidence of friction between new and old members. (132) El Siplo 31.1.1941. Between October 1940 and January 
19419 the PCCh claimed 49000 now recruits* 
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Furthermore# at no time did the PCCh repeat its cardinal error 
of the early 1930s and engage in bitter confrontations with 
the government and its most likely allies at the same timeo 
Secondlys the CC took steps to secure its own 
authority and to avoid unnecessary friction. Thusq during 
1939 and for much of 1940,, the CC made no severe demands on 
the now members, showing far more concern for even greater 
recruitment and with raising funds to finance the expan- 
sion of the party than with the inculcation of bolahevik 
ideological and organisational norms* At the same tiniag 
the CC took steps to improve its own internal orRanisation. 
In December 19399 the CC expanded Its ranks to include 32 
full and 10 alternative members creating the largest andl 
in social and geographic tormsp probably the most represen- 
tative CC the PCCh had had since its foundationo(133) Nione- 
thelessq the expanded CC was comprisee entirely of members 
who bad been active either in the party or one of the Front 
organisations since the early 19308 and the one new member 
of the CC'3 important Political Cotmnissiong Humberto Abarcaq 
hadq in fact been a CC member in 1932. (134) Thu3q although 
the PCCh had grown enormously since 19359 control remained 
(133) The new CC included 2 doctors, 2 industrialistsp 
teachers, white collar workers as well as workers 
and trade union lea0ers in the printing, railwayp 
bakingg coal, copperpnitrate and metallurgical 
industries. It also Wcluded uwo peasant acti- 
vistsq 4 congressmen, 2 mayors nAd 4 repidorosl. 
El Popular, Mtofagastat 3.1-1941- 
(134) El SiglO 20*2.1941. See Appendix E for Abnrcals 
biojraphical detailse 
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firmly in the hands of the older generation of party acti- 
vists andq moreoverg in the hands of a small group amongst 
that generationg comprised cf Lafertteq Contreras Labarca, 
Galo Gonzalez and their immediato followers* Indeedq with 
the success of the Popular Front strategyp this group was 
T3robably far more secure from external challenge than it 
had ever been before. 
Probably the most important single atop which the 
ruling group took to enhance its authority and to educate 
and assimilate the new members was the initiation of a nurgre 
in the early months of 1940* This purpeq which began quiet- 
ly in April 19409 reached its climax at the IX Plenum in 
October and ran parallel to the PCCh's adoption of a general- 
ly tougher political line. In response to Comintern direc- 
tions to correct its internal weaknesseag Contreras Laharca 
announced in April 1940 that the PCCh had begun to examine 
the conduct of Communists who had been appointed to central 
and local government office*(135) As a result of this 
examinationg the cases of the Playor of Iquique# the PCCh 
consejaro to the Caja de Sepuro Obraro and the secretary to 
the Gobernador of La Calama - accused variously of drunken- 
ness* lechery and of being Ivulpar bureaucrats$ - were sent 
to the Control Commission. (136) Howeverg it was not until 
the IX Plenum that the purge bepan to acquiro a national 
dimension. At that Plenump Galo Gonzalez (head of the 
National Control Coriwission)l taking as his example the 
(135) Frente Pol2ula_r 6-5-1940. 
(136) Ibide 
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deliberations of a recent Congress Of tbO Mexican Communist 
Partyq examined the PCCh for evidence of Trotskyismg masonry 
and 'counter-revolutionary inmoralityte(137) Although 
Gonzalez found little convincing evidence of Trotskyist 
influence inside the partyp he was more successful - though 
hardly more convincing - when he turned to examine the 
nefarious activities of the masons. According to Gonzilez, 
masons had introduced false concepts of tolerance and class 
collaborationism in the party ane the Frontv they had sought 
to win converts inside the partyp sabotaged the work of va- 
rious regional and local committees and had led some PCCh 
officials astrayo(138) In futuref Gonz9les announcedq 
membership of a waaonic order would be incompatible with 
membership of the PCCho(139) 
Turntag to the question of 'counter-revolutionary 
immorality' - moral laxity which laid members open to ex- 
ploitation by class enemies - Gonzalez announced that the 
three cases preaent6d to the Control Commission in April had 
been decided in favour of expulsion and that two repidore. 9 
had been expelled for similar offences. (140) Howevarg 
the expulsion which caused most impactq botb inside and 
outside the partys was that of karco3 Chairude3 - ex-student 
leader, one-time personal assistant to Contreras Labarcaq 
PCCh Deputy for Valparafso from 1937 and founder and editor 
of a PCCh news-inagazine QuS Y. Tubo. Despite having held res- 
ponsible positions on the CC since be joined the party in 
(137) Galo Gonzalez op_. cit. p24. (138) Ibide pp28-34. 
(139) Ibid. P34. 
(140) Ibid- PP35-36. 
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1931,, Chamudes was now found to be tcorruptq depravedg full of 
duplicities (and) unworthy of belonging to the PCChl*(141) 
After October 1940, the,, purge was extended to the 
provinces and continued well into 1941. Although the total 
number of victims claimed by the purge was probably not more 
than a couple of hundreds each local and regional committee 
was vetted by the Control Commission and generally lost, one 
or two members in the processe Howeverg in a few caaesp the 
casualty rate seems to have been considerably higher - in 
Antofaga3taq for examples only two out of fourteen members of 
the CR appear to have survived. (142) Whether or not the 
CC initiated the purge with the precise intention of pre- 
venting the emergence of any challenge to its authorityp the 
vast majority of victims seems to have come from that sector 
from which such a challenge was most likely to have come - 
members who had been active since the early 19303 and who 
held posts of respon31bility in the organisatione 
Apart from enhancing and securing the authority of 
the CG9 the purge was clearly intended to identify and dis. 
cipline individual scapegoats for the terrorat which the 
party had fallen into during 1939* The attacks on masonry 
and the 'rotten liberalism' which it had smuggled into the 
party wereq in factq attacks on the political line which the 
FCCh had pursued in 1939 and on the men most closely identi- 
fied with it* Thusq in the IX Plenumv Secretary General 
(141) El Siglo 30.9.1940. See Marcos Chamudos El Libro 
Blanco do mi Leyenda Negra (Santiagot 1964) pp6 
for his account of his expulsion. (142) Comparison of membership of the CRs elected in 
Antofagasta in December 1939 and November 1940. 
El Popular 5*12*1939; El Sirlo 15.. 11.1940. 
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Contreras Labarca and his assistantq Raul Barra Silva - both 
evidently masons - were heavily criticised. (143) Similarly, 
while Chamudes was ostensibly expelled for 'counter revoltition- 
ary immoralitytq he toop had become heavily identified with 
the old Oerroneoust political line. Indeedg in many cases, 
as well as that of Chumudesq victims of the purge were 
accused of a mixture of political and moral offences and 
while it may have been true that in some instances moral 
laxity did lead to political errorp the suspicion remains 
that the PCCh was attempting to achieve the total Iliquida- 
tiont of the purge victims by proving that they were not 
only mistaken but also corrupt. 
The suspicion also remains that the tougher 
political line adopted by the party during 1940 and the 
purge itself were used by factions on the CC to settle old 
scores. Thusq Chamudess who had been recruited into the 
Peruvian Communist Party by Ravines when a student in Lima 
and who had eventually become an enthusiastic adherent to 
the new political line brought to Chile by Ravinesq may have 
been purged, in part at leastq because the ruling group on 
the CC wished to repay the indignities which Ravines had 
heaped upon them by getting rid of one of his protep,; s. (144) 
Ploreoverp although the evidence of differences inside the 
ruling group is sparse, it may be that Galo Gonzalez used 
the PCCh's re-orientation during 1940 to clip the wings of 
Contreras Labarcaq who appears to have gained a certain as- 
cendency over the CC during 1939 and who certainly received an 
(143) El si,., Io 6.1o. 194o. 
(144) See Via a Chamudes Chile una advertencia americana 
pp44-50- 
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unusual degree of personal praise in the party press during 
that year. (145) Indeedy It may have been partly because 
of a subterranean struf,,,,,,,, Ie between Contreras Labarca and 
Gonzales that there was an abnormally hiph rate of turnover 
in the CC membership between 1939 and 1941. Of the 42 CC 
members elected in 19399 only 20 were re-elooted in Deceruber 
ig4i. (146) Howeverp of the 22 not re-elected only oneq 
Barra Silvas can be positively identified as a personal 
adherent of Contreras Labarca and rather rr, ore apl-sear to have 
lost their seats because of left-win! - deviations or just 
plain inefficiency. (147) ý, oreoverg since the 1941 CC had 
ten fewer members than the 1939 CC9 it may be that a good 
proportion of those not re-elected lost their seats because 
the decision had been taken to reduce the CC to a more man- 
agreable size rather than because of any political or fac- 
tional stru, ýgle. 
The purpe which the CC undertook in 1940 and 1941 
was merely the most dramatic feature of a concerted effort 
to , 7ive the PCCh an organisational machine 3uited to ita ex- kI 
panded size aýad increased importance. Along with exhorting 
(145) See, for examplep the articles (and poem by Nicanor 
Parra) praisine Contreras Labarca on his birthday In 
1939. Frente Popular 27-11-1939. While Recabarren 
had received even more extravagant praise during and 
after his lifeti, el apart from Contreras Labarcaq no 
otber Comu'luttist leader was so treated in the 19308 
anc, 19403. 
(146) Seel El Sitjo 2.1.1942 for the CC elected in December 
ig4l. 
(147) Raul 3arra Silva %fas one of the few wlýo defeneed Con- 
treras Laharca in December 1945 when be was effective- 
ly demotee from Vie Secretary Generalship. See Chap- 
ter 69 PP322-325.3 CC rrk-Oers not re-elected in 
1941 were criticised i, t t1he X Plenum (January 1941) 
for refusinp to co-operate with nemocrats to impede 
the election of Trotskyists at a provincial CTCh Con- 
., Yress -a 
left-win - d"virttion. 11: 1 A: r10 30.1.1941. 
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the wenbership to exercise 'revolutionary vigilance' to 
the full, Galo Gonzalez also turned his attention to more 
traditional problems, At the I'< PlenuLaq Gonzalez announced 
that the CC was over-bureaucraticq over-specialised and did 
not work collectivelyo(146) Similarlyp the cell structure 
suffered from serious defects - many met irregularly# others 
were still organised on a Ceopraphical rather than a plant 
basis and in some plantag blue and white collar cells opera- 
ted independently of onsanother* linallyp Gonzalez called 
for an ambitious policy to promote new cadres and to dispense 
with excessive familiarity between members which was inimical 
to (rood digcipline. (149) 
Concern with the proper functionine of the party's 
organisation dominated both the X Plenum of January 1941 
and the XI Plenum of October 1941. According to Humberto 
Abarca in January 19419 the work of the CC was still not 
collectives members of the CC who lived in Santiago often 
had no contact with local trade unions or with the CR while 
the four CC members who lived in Valparaiso operated in- 
dependently of one anothere(150) CC inembers in other 
provinces failed to pursue partyobjectives with sufficient 
energy while in Chilling a CC momber had perwitted. factions 
to fight over the party's nomination of a congressional 
candidate and had refused to send electoral funds to the CC 
in Santiago. (151) Turning to the CRsq Abarca reported 
that most continued to operate on the enerVies; of one or two 
(148) Cialo Gonza'lez or). cite pp42-44. (149) Ibid 
,e 
pp4g-50 
(150) El 5i.!: Io 30-1: 1941. 
(151) Ibid. 
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members who refused to delegate responsibility or train 
now cadres. Noreoverl the C. 1 3antiagog which had received 
most help from Vie CC$ was in a sorry state; its work was 
*stagnant' and mechanical - the faultg accordinr to Abarcap 
of its Secretary who had packed the CR with personal 
frionds. (152) Howeverg despite Abarc&13 strictures on the 
party's organisational shortcomings,, he reported that dues, 
payments had increased to an averaGe of 50', ýo in contrast 
to the 253ý cited in Ddcomber 1939 and he also reportod that 
recruitment I-ad improved in recent ajonthse(153) 
The proceedings of the XI Plenum in October 1941 
were interesting for a number of reasons* In the first 
placep it became apparent that there had been some resist- 
ance amongst trade unionists on the CC to certain CC inatruc- 
tions. The Comision Nacional, Sindical, had evidently refitsed 
to push for a CTCb conference as instructed, had maintained 
amicable relations with Socialist CDN members during the 
battles of early 1941 and had resisted instructions to 
Idemocratisel (that is, # give union office to non-Communists) 
in the unions under their control, (154) Jocondlyp the 
Plenum revealed ti-at the purge initiated at the IX Plenum 
did not always have happy results. me ON Antofagastat for 
exampleg which had been almost entirely renovated in November 
1940, came in for Yarsh criticisii, for its laci Ic of collective 
(I r1Z) Ibid, 
(153) Ibid 
(154) PrinCipios November 1941 nr)12-15. This last cow- 
plaint was perennial - Contreras LahRrca aired It 
as 1-rell at tl-, e VI Plentim in November 19399 see 
Unidad para. eofender la victorliiq 05- 
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works for regionalist tendencies and for a disposition to 
resist CC instructions. (155) Indeedg some of those chosen 
to fill posts left vacant by the purge had turned out to be 
as unworthy as their predecessors. Known drunl-cards bad 
been appointed to a number of positions in local or-anisa- 
tions in Me Nortb while the newly-appointeO Organisation 
Secretary of the CR ktacama had been previo"sly expelled 
from a Front organisation for embezzlemento(156) Despite 
tl-, e continued shortcomings of aspects of the party's activ- 
ities and organisationg howevorl the Plenum reported that 
the CCIs works both individual and collectiveg had im- 
provedo(157) 
It would seem theng from the proceedings of the 
various plenums hold during 1940 and 19419 that the PCCh 
was still far from being the efficiento disciplined and 
professional machine of the 3olshevik ideal. Yet durina 
those years the PCCh took important steps towards improving 
its organisation and it absorbed a massive influx of new 
recruits without serious upset. Tbus, for the PCChj the 
heritage of the Aguirre Cer0a years was not only an expanded 
membership but the bepinnin7s of nn orpanisational wachine 
which was to serve the party well in t4e future* 
(155) Ibid* pp9-10. 
(156) Ibid* 
(157) Ibid. 
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Chapter 6 President Juan Antonio Rfosq National 
Unity and the War Years., 1942-1946. 
v 275 o 
Juan Antonio Rfos ! Toverned Chile frow April 1942 
until his death in June 1946 but was forcedl by illnesss to 
hand over the day-to-day running of the administration to a 
Vice-Presidents Alfredo Duhaldeq in January 1946. (l) 
Although Rfos had been a leader of the left-wing of the 
Radical Party in the 193039 his reginie was rjoro consorva- 
tive in style and character than that of Aguirre Cerda* 
Elected into office by a confýination of parties which in- 
cluded the principal members of the Popular Fronts Rfos had 
also received support from right-wing groupsp inclu(iing 
important sectors of the PL and ho sought, throughout his 
presidency, to govern with Liberal help and co-operation. 
This determination to govern with Liberal support had several 
consequences; it helped to keep the right-winjr, parties in 
the disarray into which they bad fallen after the March 1941 
congressional elections and to prevent the emergence of a 
ferocious opposition of the type which Aguirre Carda bad had 
to face* T3ut it also placed an increasin- strain on Bfos*s 
relations with the PH and the PS - and, indeodg helped to 
foment fierce internal strurCles between the left and rl, aht 
wings of both parties* Conflicts inside the PS forced that 
party to withdraw froat the cabinet in January 1943 and 
(1) Alfredo Duhalde first served as Vice President in 
late 1945 wlýen Afos was visitin, ýj L'-O USA but lie 
Oid not begin to control Vie ,, -, overn! ý, ent uAtil after 
January 1946. Luis Palma IUfiIg,, i Tlistoria Oel Partido 
Radical (3antia, ý-. O. 1967) P:? 32. 
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eventually led to the creation of the schiswatic Partido 
Socialista Aut4ntica(PSA). (2) Siwilarly, conflicts inside 
and between the PH and Rfos led the President to dispense 
with formal Radical participation in his cabinets between 
July and September 1943 ancl frow Vay 1944 until kiay 1945-0) 
Although Rfos and the P11 patched up their differences in 
i, iay 1945 when Rfos finally agreed to form a cabinet without 
Liberalss their co-operation was shortlived. Rfos withdrew 
from public life in January 1946 and the PIA soon fell out 
with the Vice Presidentp Dubalde. Only after Rfos had died 
and new presidential eloctions had been held. did the PR 
officially return to the responsibilities of cabinet office. 
In contrast, Rfos'B relations with the PCCb, initially 
cools grew increasingly harwonious - at least while the 
Second World War lasted* Roweverg this harmony was not the 
product of any profound agroewent over tho policies and con- 
duct of the government. Aatherq it reflected Rfos's difficul- 
ties with the PR and the PS and the policy decisions of the 
international Communist 14ovement (effective even after the 
Comintern had been formally dissolved in June 1943)- After 
the German invasion of Russia in 1941s the Comintern had 
begun to ur-fe support for tho democracies and for the Allied 
war effort and had produced a new concept - National Unity - 
to replace the old Popular Front idea. (4) National Unity 
couunitted the PCCh to a policy of general support for the 
Rfos regime -a support whichs altbouah conditional and at 
(2) See below, p235. 
(3) See belowg pp281-284. 
See belows pp288-283 for a fuller explanation of the 
National Unity concept. 
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times critical, became a source of increasing friction between 
the PCCh and the PR and PS as those two parties became more 
hostile to Rfoso However, as the Second World War ended and 
the Cold War beCang the goals of National Unity cbanged; 
relations between Afos and the PCCh cooled and by early 1946 
the party had exchanged its policy of eeneral support for one 
general oppositi6n and, Indeed, was openly hostile to the 
Mhblde administration. 
Although, while the war lasted, National Unity com- 
mitted the POCh to supporting an administration which was 
generally more conservative than that of Aguirre Cerda, on 
the whole the party manaeod to maintain its influence in 
both the electoral and trade union fieldse Noreover, unlike 
the PR or the PS9 the PCCh survived the war years without 
experiencing fierce internal conflicts and managed to make 
some progress towards creating a more professional and effi- 
cient party machine. Neverthelessq in December 1943, inter- 
nal differences inside the ruling group on the ComitS Central 
led to the effective demotion of Secretary General Contreras 
Labarcat although he was not formally removed frow office 
until he was 'promoted' to the I-Ainistry of Ways and Public 
Works in Gonzalez Videla's first cabinet in November 1946. (5) 
Sefore proceeding to exaoine tlýe PCChIs actions anti 
policies In , -Teater detail, mention must be rade of the econo- 
mic problews wbich confronted Iifos; al: ýo iiore attention sliould 
be paid to his political probleo, s since botli belped to shape 
relations between týe President ancl the PCCh dijrinp the war 
(5) iee below, p-, o3*? 2-326 
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years. 
The Second World War lay at the root of mogt of the 
economic problems wlAch confronted Rfos durinfý bis adnjinistra- 
tion. The war stimulated demand for certain of Milels ex- 
ports but it effectively lirt-itecl the r. iarlcat place to tl-. o UsA 
and the Latin Americalt continent - altý, our. rbt (4espite the pro- 
tests of the FcCht wbich argued that goods exported to Spain 
found their way into tbe Axis war machines t'here was also some 
trade witb tý,,, t country. (6) rlýtit only tl, e U3A wns in st posi- 
tion to purchase Chile's corper in lar,, Te quantitiest with t'he 
results according, to some CIAlean critics, that Vie country 
received low prices for its i, iost important exporto(7) INjore- 
overp the war curtailed dewand for Chile's other staple ex- 
port, nitratesq forced up tf, e price of imports and sometimes 
made tI-e su., )-, )Iy of essential coirmodities like petrol itncer- 
tain. (8) A. 11 in allq the war forced Chile to sell cheap 
and buy dear andp according to Roberto Wacholzq Gonzn'les 
Videla's first finance minister, the war cost Cl, ile sorre 
149000 million pesos. (9) Whether tI-is claim was accurate or 
not, the economy did not flourish duriný- the war years. Des- 
pite increases in coal and copper output hetureen 1942 and 19449 
the index for mininj production fell steadily while industrial 
I 
production did not surpass 1941 levels until 1946. (10) Only 
(6) El Sialo 9-2-1943; 20.2.1943; 6-1-1943 
(7) 6ee, for exaýplep F. Dur6n El Partido Radical, P383- (8) FOA FO 371/5? 007 A5656/52/9, report from OrdTto 
Edenp dated 27.5-1942. 
(9) FOR FO 371/52007 AS8008/18/9, report from Leche to 
9eving dated 23.12.1946. 
(10) jee Appendix B for the indices of proeuction. The fall 
in tho mining index was caused ltiainlY by t', P decline 
of nitrate production from 1.5 millions in 1942 to un- 
der a million tons In 1944. Bstadfstica Chilena 
December 1949, p634. 
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agricultural production shwed some tendency to increase 
over the same period. (11) 
Inflationg however# was Rfoals most pressing econo- 
mic problem. Caused by the rising price of imports and 
increases in government spendingg the rate of inflation 
increased from 15-2% in ig4l to 25.6% in 1942 and 29.4% in 
1943-(12) Although the rate dropped to 11.8% in 1944 and 
to 8.8% in 1945, it rose to 15*9% in 1946. (13) Wages ten- 
ded to lag behind inflation and by 1943p real wages had de- 
clined by 15% since 1938.04) While wage increases tended 
to be more in line with inflation after 1943, they did little 
to make up this loss of purchasing power. (15) As a resultp 
there was a fairly strong undercurrent of labour discontent 
throughout the war year3e 
If the economic problems which faced Rfos were 
similar to those which confronted Aguirre Cerdaq the politi- 
cal problems were different in one vital respect - Pfos did 
not have to contend with the furious opposition of a united 
and powerful Right. A left-wing Radical leader in the 1930st 
Rfoz had won the PROs presidential nomination in 1941 by adop- 
ting a conservativeg anti-frentista and anti-Communist stance - 
a posture which proved crucial to his election to the 
(11) See Appendix Be 
(12) Anfbal Pintop Chile, un caso de desarrollo frustrado 
p205- 
(13) Ibide 
(14) Ae Pinto 'Anotaciones sobre los efectos de la 
guerra en nuestra economfal Principiosq July 1945. (15) See Appendix D for an indication of the effects of this process in the important mining industries. 
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Presidency. (16) Determined not to become over-reliant on 
the Lefts whether inside or outside the PR* Rfo3 insisted 
on incorporating Liberals into his governments even though 
the old frentist2. partiea controlled Congress between ivIarch 
1941 and iiarch 1945 and even though they had provided the 
bulk of his support in the presidential elections. Indeeds 
Rfos probably agreed to form a cabinet based on the exclusive 
support of left and centro parties in ýiay 1945 only because 
the Right bad regained control of Congress in March and could 
be used to discipline the demands and actions of the left- 
wing government parties. (17) 
Quite apart from Idos'3 personal political leaninizap 
howeverg there were good reasons for not forminp an administra- 
tion based exclusively on the old frentista parties when he 
took office. In the first placeq there was a powerful anti- 
Rfos current in the PR and the experience of the Aguirre 
Cerda years suggested that fierce competition for government 
office and appointments would exacerbate factional strife 
and undermine the PRIs stability and reliabilityo(18) 
Secondlyp relations betureen the PS and the PCCb were still 
(16) Afos defeated Ills only rival in the 1942 presidential 
elections, General Carlos lbaflez by 260,000 votes to 
204,854 votes. Urzua Valerizuela Los partidos polfti- 
cos chilenos p86. Rfos claimed that ripbt-wins- 
parties gave him sot-e 509000 votes. 91 Sirlo 
22.4.1944; 27.4.1944. 
(17) After ýýarcb 1)45, t'-ie ri!! ht-u-iný7 parties controlled 
23 Senate seats an, -' 75 Deputy seats; the left 22 a! id 
72 seats respectively. FOII 1`0 371/449249 AS 3023/ 
291/9, Santia_-o Chancery to South American Departii-, entq 
22-5-13 5. 
(18) 
-Ios only defeateO 4-Ionzintlez Videlap the left-sirinf, can- 
didate for the Pki's presidential nomination in 1941 
by 14P753 to 149222 votes. La Crftica 16.12.19'Pl. 
Seep 6hapter 5. pp226-229, for a-i account of intornal 
struý-ý: les in the I-mtxveen l)33 ancl 1941 a, ie their 
iillprýct on 'ladical relations with A, --, uirre Cor, 41a. 
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cool and no coalition like the old Popular Front existed to 
give Rfos even that minimal assurance of cohesive left-winp 
support. Moreoverg when the PH, PS and the PCCh did manage 
to create a now coalition in October 1942 - the Alianza 
, 
Demo-cratico do Chile(ADCh) - it did not bogin to function 
regularly until March 19439 by which time old tensions and 
rivalriesq similar to those which had destroyed the old 
Popular Frontq had already begun to emerge. 
Whatever the exact reasons for Rfos's refusal to 
govern with the exclusive support of the old frentista 
parties - and he himself made much of the argument that the 
extraordinary conditions created by the war demanded that he 
seek the co-operation of all political sectors - his insist- 
ance on incorporating Liberals into his administration helped 
to alienate both the PH and the PS from his governmento(19) 
Although there were signs of Radical discontent with 
Rfos during 19429 it did not assume serious proportLens 
until June 1943 when a group of fifteen left-wing Radical 
congressmen - who became known as the Young Turks - issued a 
manifesto attacking the President for giving Liberals plum 
cabinet po3tsp forfailing to carry out a promised administra- 
tive purge (thus leaving semi-fiscal agencies under the con- 
trol of right-winger3 and ib&Fxiatas)g for undue procrastination 
in severing Chile's links with the Axis powers and for failing 
to control prices and check speculation. (20) Howeverp the 
main target of the Young Turks' attack was the Minister of 
(19) Seep for examplep Hfo3's letter to the PCCh in 
August 1944. El Sirlo 4.8.1944. 
(20) El Nercurio 3.6-1943, 
o 282 , 
the Interior, haul horales Beltramig who, it was allegadq 
had used unscrupulous means to secure a pro-government 
majority on the iCli. (21) 
Annoyed by the Young Turks' attack, uncertain of 
Radical support for important government legislation then 
before Congress and anxious t1lat the Chilean military should 
not be terupted to emulate their colleagues who had recently 
seized power in Arj; entinaq Rfos responded by dissolving the 
cabinet and forming another without the formal participation 
of the political partieso(22) AfosOs first cabinet of 
administrationg which included two Armed Service chiefay 
lasted frow June to September 19439 when the PH was invited 
to return to cabinet araine Even though the new cabinet 
included two Liberalss thinly disryuised, as tochnocratsl tbo 
PH aereed. (23) howeverp left-wing fiadicals continued to 
gain ground and at the PR's National Conventions held in 
Concenci6n in January 19449 they managed to have their politi- 
cal resolution adopted as Official P11 Policy. This resolu- 
tion instructed the Con"" r"-iecllt: LvO Nacional(CEN) -a new 
naue and structure for the Old JCR - to neeottate with Rfos 
for the formation Of a cabinet based excitisively on either 
the ADCh parties or the PR and empowered the CEIV to withdraw 
71adical su-oport from his government if he proved recalci- 
trant. (24) In April 19449 tl, e CEIV approached Rfos in order 
(21) Ibid. 
(22) FOR 1FO 371/337549a. 6361/324 99 dis! )atch Charles 
Orde to Edens clateel 22.6.19ý3- 
(23) La Hora 3-9-1943- 
(24) El -Alercurio 24.1.1944. The resolution -as Passed by 341" to 32) votes. 
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to implement the Concenci6n resolution and was rebuffed. (25) 
The Radical i-Anisters were ordered to resipn ane although 
they compliedg LfOs refusod thoir resignations and they 
stayed in office - and trere expelle(I from the PR*(26) 
From Ilay 1944 until oay 191459 rifos govorned witiout 
official F-11 co-oo, ýration ands indends in September 19449 all 
attempts at comprot-Ase 1-aving faileds the Pn eleclared itself 
to 1-: )e in forxal onposition to his government and instructed 
all Radicals who held govrirni-. jent office as a result of their 
party affiliationg to resien*(27) Altl-ou. fý'h few MqOical 
office-hol(lers co; i, plie(Ig Rfos forr., ed anotPer crtbinet of' 
administration in October 1944 (which again included military 
,, Gerheads until . men) and 
he and tine P-I reii, ained at log " -, FA y 
1945-(28) T-ly that timet t! -e Pit's failure to impose its 
fiat on Vie Radical office-holders and the victory of the 
rlght-win. ý parties in M-le Narch 1945 conarossional elections 
had altered the political cliriate. Rfos apreed to form an 
administration based on the ADCh parties and the centrist 
, 
Falange Nacional(FFil; ) while Vie PIR accepted the inclusion of 
two technocrats in t1le cabinet. (29) '3ut the peace between 
(25) :, -; l si, 7-, lo 
(26) Ibid. 27-04-19414; 28.4.1944; 30-4.191ý4. 
(27) ",;, 'l -, orctirio 12.9.19'44. 
(2,3) Only one -ý', adinal Intendente 
(out of 20) resi, -ned and 
only 5 'ýadical con. sejeros Ill semi-f'15cal a-t-ticles 
resijgned. Cuents de la actuacio; i del Cl,; ', T P, J a la 
XVI Conveici6n vacion; -O (ýr(! iiiaria. En, )r; 1)44-SiTero 
1946 (Santia: ), -o, 194G) )11. 
(29) 11 P Falango -ý'acionalj formed by tl-e social-cl-iristian 
current of t, ie Partieo Cons-rvador in late jWaS 1)3's tl-ýe precursor OF V-ý(-- wo, -'rrn 11arti0o Deu(Scrata Cristiano. See George 
, ýrayson Sl Parti0o Dem6crata 
Cristiano Chileno (Jvitiago, 1ý)6B) )P193-247 for an 
account of the F-'ý Is dPve1on: Ient and nolicies during "i"os Is ad,. Anistratio, i. 
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Rios and the PR was uneasy and although prolonged by Rfosts 
absence abroad in late 19459 it broke down again in January 
1946. 
In that monthq illne3s forced 11fo3 to withdraw from 
public life and he handed over power to another conservative 
Radicalg Vice President Alfredo Duhalde. Duhaldeq actine 
with Rios's approvalp took energetic steps to stem a rising 
tide of industrial unrest which had begun to affect the 
country in late 1945 - steps which provoked massive protest 
demonstrationso(30) When police opened fire killing eight 
demonstrators in Plaza Bulnes in Santiago in January 19469 
a sequence of events was set in motion which resulted in the 
PRIs resignation from cabinet and the exacerbation of fac- 
tional strife between the left and right win, 79 of the party. (31) 
After the left-wing Radicals had declared tho P11 to be in 
opposition to the Duhalde administration and had succeeded in 
winning the partyls presidential nomination for their candi- 
dateg Gabriel Gonzalez Videlal the right-wing Radicals left 
and created a new partyt the Partido Radical Democratico 
(PRD)*(32) Only after Rios's death and Gonzalez Videla's 
triumph in the September 1946 presidential electiong did the 
PR return to the cabinet. (33) 
While R: fos's relations with the PR closely resembled 
those of his predecessorg his relations with the PS were 
rather more cool and distant. Although the PS participated 
(30) See Chapter 7, pp337-340 for a more detailed account 
of events in early 1946. 
(31) Ibide 
(32) Although the PRD was formed by opponents of Gonzilez 
Videla's candidacy, the new party pledped its support 
for his government in October 1946. La Ifora 22.10.46. 
(33) Ibid. 7.9-1946. 
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in the early cabinetaq it had always maintained a critical 
attitudeq towards Rfos's government andp in any eventq lost 
much of its usefulness as an ally when fierce Internal strul-,, - 
gles led to its division and decline as a coneressional 
force. 11, oreovers for wucb of the war ycarsq 11foa found tbe 
PCCh a more useful - and cheaper - ally than the F: 3 arid thus 
the essential factor in the cordial relations between Aguirre 
Cerda and the PS -a coý,,, mon determination to curb Communist 
influence - was lacking. 
Although personal rivalries and difforine attitudes 
towards the PCCh and its policies had their iaipacL on the 
factional struggles which afflicted the rS durinjr, the 'afos 
yearsp the central divisive issue wasp once againg urhethor 
the party should participate in a covormiont which showed 
little cowmitiaent to the cause of social atid econowic reform. 
Clashes between collaborationists and anti-collaborationists 
became marked in late 1942t and in January 1943 the Socialist 
ministers resigned from cabinct. (34) The struLglo con- 
tinued durinn 1943 but it was not until July 1944 that the 
collaborationists loft and formed the Partido Socialista 
AutAtia(PSAW35) After July 1944, thong there were two 
socialist parties; the PSA led by Grove which was prepared 
to collaborate with Moss almost regardless of terms, a"d the 
P39 by then led by Bernardo lbaRez, which became increasingly 
critical of MASKS) The split had a dramatic effect on 
(34) See La Nacio"nn 13-10-1942 and ýU !,,. ercurio 29.12.1942; 
25.1-1943; 26 . 1-1943; 30-1.1943- 
(35) B-1 ! -, ercurio 4-7-194ý- 
(36) ! ýeriiardo lb'afiez, the son of peasantsp trainod as a 
teacher ajid ')ocauio active in tbe trade urtion uovementq 
first as a mewber of the ? Cý.; h tlien as a 60cialist. 
in 19449 he liras also 3f-cretary Ueneral of Crr, ' . 5ce C. T. Oh 10.9.1943 for (letails of bis early aareer. 
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the PS13 electoral fortunes and in the March 1945 elections 
it only managed to elect 6 deputies as compared witb 17 
in 1941; the PSAj for its part$ elected 3 deputiC3. (37) 
The PSAO despite its weak coneres3ional followings 
was invited to participate in cabinet in 1*1ay 1945 and the Ps 
continued to become increa3inely critical of the Rfos admini- 
stration. Howeverp as Cold War pressures beean to make them- 
selves felt in mid-1945, the PS also became increasingly criti- 
cal of the PCCho In July 1945* the PS adopted a policy of 
independence from both the government and the PCCh (the so- 
called Third Front policy) and in August threatened to with- 
draw from the ADCh unless the coalition adopted a more left- 
wing programme. 06) When the ADCh rejected the PS's ultima- 
tum and added insult to injury by allowing the PSA to join its 
ranksp the PS left the coalition. (39) Although the Third 
Front policy was nominally concerned with the #conquest of 
power and the implantation of Socialism'. the PS allowed Its 
anti-communism to drag it into the Duhalde government in Janu- 
ary 1946 - an administration no less conservative than that of 
Rfos. (40) Ironically enoughg by that time, the PCCh had 
embraced the left-wine policies and ageressive postures that 
the PS had been advocating in July and August 1945. (41) 
Superficially at leasto the election of Rfos to the 
(37) Urzu'a Valensuela op. cit. p86. Estadfstica Chilona 
December 19459 PP708-723. 
(38) J. C. Jobet E-I Partido Socialista do Chilep It PP187-192- (39) La Opini6n 7.8.1945. 
(40) Agustin Alvarez Objectivos del Socialismo en Chile (Santiagop 1946) p2. The PS was given 4 portfolios 
in Duhalde's cabinetj agriculturep labourg health 
and the economy. Fj sigio 3.2.1946. 
(41) See below p292. 
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Presidency of the Republic did not bode well for the PCCb* 
Not only had Tlfos made his anti-communist sympathies clear 
but the PCCh had continued to press the rival presidential 
claims of his Most serious Radical opponentq Gonzalez Videla, 
even after be had become the P11's official presidential can- 
didate. (42) Indeedq the PCCh had endorsed lifos's presi- 
dential candidacy only after it 'had becorre clear thatq unless 
the Left united around a single candiAate, General Thafiez 
mi7ht well become Chile13 next Premident. Despite their 
mutual distrust and dislike, howevery domestic and intAr- 
national factors compelled 1(fos ancl the PCCh to wor1c toFretber 
durine much of his administration anti, in some wayst their 
relationsl-ipg undistorted by artificial expectations o1i either 
sideq was happier than thRt which had existee between Ole 
PCCh and Aguirre Cerda. 
If national circumstance bad been decisive in rrom- 
pting the PCCh to support nros in the 1942 presidential 
electionsg international factors appear to have determined 
the subsequent support and co-oneration which the PCCh Pavo 
to his renime. Indeed, even before Rfos enme to office, 
international events bad shapel the broaO lines of the noli- 
cies which the PCC11 urAs to rtirsue durine his atiministration. 
The German invasion of 'Jugsin in Jime 19141 I-acl, accorc? lnp 
to the Comintern, funrlar, entally transformed V-e Second 
Norld War froin a sordid stru-! ýle for spoils bptween equally 
(42) The PCCh finally declare(I for 11fos a nontb after he 
bad won the PRIs presi(leitial riowination. 31 ji q 10 18.1.1942. Intt-restinrjy enoughp PCCh had not been particularly ent', uslastic about -ýonzalez tridela eltber because lie arivocaLee CI-Ale's coitinued neutra- Litye Ibid- 5-12-1941. 
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rapacious imperialisms into a holy crusade for the defence 
of democracyp for the survival of the Soviet Union and for 
the very future of mankindo(43) In response to the changed 
nature of the war, the PCCh announced at its XI Plenum in 
October 19419 that the Popular Front Btratogyq which had 
governed its actions since 1935p had served its purpose and 
thats henceforthq the PCCh would be guided by a now concept 
National Unity*(44) Unlike the Popular Front strategyp 
National Unity was not concerned with the advance or the 
acceleration of the revolutionary process In Chile andq in 
its initial formulationst it had no explicit reform objec- 
tives. Instead, National Unity had three major goals - the 
defence of democracy at home and abroadp the fulfilment of 
the resolutions of the Pan American Conference hold in Havana 
in July 1940 (and later those of the Rio do Janeiro Conference 
held in January 1942) and the maximisation of Chile's con- 
tribution to the Allied war effort, (45) Although 
these objectives were to be realiaed by the creation of 
a vast popular movement around a political and electoral 
coalition like the Popular Frontp National Unity was intended 
to appeal to a far broader political spectrum - including 
the parties of the traditional Right and those who had been 
*hostile or indifferent' to the Front. (46) Indeedl the 
PCCh argued that the Second World War had made old distine- 
tions between Left and Right irrelevant and thatp in current 
(43) A*I* Sobolev et al. Outline 11istory ofthe Communist 
Internationa_lp p477-- 
(44) Yndre's Escobar Dfaz Unidad Nacional contra el 
fascismo pp20-22. 
(45) Ibid. 
(46) B1 Siglo 31-12.1941. . 6peech by Contreras Labarca 
to the XII Party Congress. 
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conditions, the only valid disttnction was 'between fascist 
and anti-fascist. (47) While the PCCI, hads in factq made 
isolated and half-bearted appeals to right-wing sectors in 
the name of the Popular Frontq under National Unity these 
appeals became a permanent and prominent feattire of PCCh 
policy - to Vie increasing- chagrin of both the PR and the P. S. 
Despite the aý)parent differences between the Popular 
Front strateey and National Unity, the new concept proved 
to be just as flexible an instrument as the one it replaced. 
Tbus, if National Unity began with nn explicit reform objec- 
tivesp it hadq from the first, a reforming dimension andq 
as the war drew to its closeq it acquired a series of reforw 
goals. 
The early reforming dimension of National Unity was 
the product of one of its central objectivesq nairelyp the 
maximisation of C'hilols contribution to the Allied war effort. 
In order to increase production of' materials necessary to 
the Allies - and to neet Chile's own needs in a world narket 
distorted by the war - the PCCh ur-ed the ,, overnn, 
ent to plan 
and modernise the economy. (48) To that endq the PCCh 
called for the formation of a National Sconomic Councill to 
be financed by reforms in t! -Ie tax system ane by the seizure 
of assets from fascists and s-)eculators-(49) The Colincil 
would ensure the most efficient use of CI-ilets resources anti 
develop industrialg a! -ricultural atirl inininp production. 
(47) Ibid. 22.6-1)43. Anonymous article 'Xi derechas ni 
izquierOis; fascistas o anti-fascist-is'. (48) lhid. 1, ,4- '4.19'4,2. Decipration by the Political 
Commission of the CC P--Ch tv, ovilisacio'n 3conoiAca 
para la 'jefensa Nacionall. 
(49) Ibid. 
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While the PCCh predicted that the workers would profit from 
tbe plannin! 7 and modernisation of the economy, these mea- 
sures were not designed specifically to produce fundamental 
economic and social change* it was not until late 1944 
t I'll that 'e PCCh turned Its attention once wore to the problems 
of radically transforpAng Chile's economy and society and, 
althou. gb the Comintern 1, ad been formally dissolved in June 
19439 there can be little doubt that developments in the 
International Communist kloveizient and in Soviet policy wore 
primarily responsible for the PCCh's reneuret', interest* 
In November 1943s Staling Roosevolt and Churchill 
met at Teheran and cob=itted themselves and their countries 
to collaboratlnaý in the creation of a more justs peaceful and 
prosperous world once the Axis armies had been defeated. (50) 
Extrapolating from the resolutions of the Teheran Conferenceg 
the U. S. Communist leaderp Earl Browderg predicted thatq 
just as Soviet Russia and the Allies woul(I continue to co- 
operate after the warp the revolutionary process could be 
advanced by class collaboration rather than by class con- 
flict-(51) In effectp Browder argued that the multi-class 
alliances wlich had come into existence to combat fascism 
should be waintained and even axnanded to oreate a better 
world once the war had ended. To demoýistrnte the sincere 
desire of American Communisin to collaborate with progressive 
(50) Ibid. 7-12.1943; 9.12,1)43- 
(51) Ve P, -, Cl, surnmarised anrl alucidataft rowder's Ideas 
ill numerous articles in 91 : ýirjo nrld Principios. 
The best sin--le suioiiary of tv-oo arie V-eir applica- tion to Chile can be foun, 3 iri 31aln 51. 
iii all nrticle e! ItLtlee 'IniciAo, os una nueva et. 1pa hi stOrIca I. 
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forces from any quarterl Browder persuaded the CC of the 
Communist Party of the UiA to disband the party and to re- 
group its ineu. bers in a looser American Cowj,, unist Political 
Association - intended to function as a pressure Group within 
established American political partiese(52) 
In line with Browdor's ideasq the PCCb announced at 
its XV Plenum in August 1944 that a now historic sta-e was 
at hand; Wile would be thrust through the bourgeois dewo- 
cratic stage of its development with the assistance of all 
progressive forces - including those of the traditional 
Risht. (53) Thus, although the XV Plenum marked the PCChIs 
return to a concern for fundawental chanro in Chile, it did 
not mark a return to agaressive hard-line policies or atti- 
tudes to either the government or the rilht-wing parties. 
On the contrarys the PCCh became less conditional in its 
support for the government in the final months of 1944 and 
it re-doubled its efforts to win over the proCressive right. 
Howeverg in the early months of 1945, the FCCh's 
support for the government and its efforts to win right-win- LP 4ý 
support began to flac - primarily because Vie PCCh's C0110- 
borationisin had encountered resistance in both the political 
and tra0e union fields. 'I)' ""A(I-19459 there were scigns of 
serious divergences betureen Ilussia and the Allies and in 
Junes 'Brolederism' was formally denouncee by tl-ie French 
Coiomunist leaderg Jacques 'Ilclos-(54) Alt"01.1-1-11 VIO PCCII 
( 52 Frincipios A. pril 19449 , -, eport of' i, ro-derls speoch. (53) El-ýýkrlo 5.8.1944; 6.8.1944; 7-8-1944. Speech 
5y Contreras Labarca in the XV Plenum. 
(54) DuclOs' letter to the CPUSA was re-printed in 
El Sif,, 10 10.6.1945- 
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insisted on the validity of National Unity at its XVI Plenum 
in Tuly 19459 it showed a greater concern with fundamental 
social and economic reforms than with collaborating with the 
government or the Right. (55) By the end of that yearg 
National Unity had become an instrument for the accelera- 
tion rather than the appeasement or avoidance of the class 
struggle. 
Although Rfos was reluctantq for reasons which were 
not without meritq to fulfil one pressing obligation of 
continental solidarity - namely to sever Chile's relations 
with the Axis powers - other National Unity objectives com- 
mitted the PCCh to a general support for Rfos from the begin- 
ning of his administration. (56) After allq whatever his 
failingsq Rfos had been elected democratically and he ruled, 
on the wholeg with due respect to Chile's laws and Constitu- 
tion* Moreovers the PCCh had nothing to gain and much to 
lose had Rfos been ousted from power since the most likely 
beneficiaries of such an event would be the extreme Right 
or ibaftistasIq who were even less favourably disposed towards 
the Allied cause than RfoS andq almost certainlyg moro hostile 
(55) Seep for example, the speech by Elias Lafertte to the 
XVI Plenump Princiniosq July 1945. Amongst other 
refornisp Lafertte called for a thorough-poing land 
reform (a topic hardly mentioned in the earlier 1940s) 
and the revision of contracts of foreign mining com- 
panies. 
(56) See, Florencio Dura*n op. cit. pp334-354 for some of 
Rios's reasons for not breakinp-off relations with 
the Axis. Rios's strongest argument was that rup- 
ture would not benefit the Allies in any practical 
way while It could adversely affect Chile. 
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to the PCCh and the working class movement*(57) Above 
all, howevermuch Rfos procrastinated over rupture with the 
Axisq Chile's mining products kept flowing into the USA and 
into the Allied war machine. Had the PCCh adopted a policy 
of vigorous opposition to Rfosq Chilets economic performance 
and its political stability could only have been adversely 
affected and its ability to contribute to the Allied war 
effort undermined* Since the maximisation of Cbilets con- 
tribution to that war effort was a central objective of 
National Unityp the PCCh gave Rfos Its political support and 
adopted labour policies designed to increase production and 
avoid industrial unrest. 
Howeverl the PCCh's sul-)port for Rf03 was neither 
unconditional nor uncritical. Government actions and poli- 
cies were measured against the current goals of National 
Unity and judged accordingly. Morsoverg while the PCCh 
accepted that sacrifices had to be made in war timep it was 
determined that such sacrifices should not be borne by the 
workers alone and it expected the government to respect the 
workers' democratic rights and defend their standard of 
living. (58) Although the PCCh'a support for Rfos fluctu- 
ated in accordance with his performance in both the domestic 
and foreign fieldso the PCChq unlike either the PR or the 
PS, never moved into formal opposition when he failed to live 
up to its expectations, 
(57) Accordin-T, to the British Ambassadorg for examples 
General Ib; fiez received 30,000 US dollars from Ger- 
many for his presidential campaign chest and was gen- 
erally thought to be pro-Axis. FOR FO 371/30434 
A 326/18/99 dispatch Orde to Edent 7.1.1942. 
El Sirlo z. 4.1942. 
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Even when the government acted in accord with 
National Unity goals, the PCCh was not uncritical. Thus* 
although in 1942, the PCCh accepted the need forg and voted 
for, an Emergency Law givinp the President the necessary 
powers to place Chile on a war footing, the party criticised 
certain of its provisions which limited the exercise of 
civil liberties and sought and received assurances that It 
would not be used to circumvent the Coodigo del Trabajo and 
the right to strike. (59) Similarlyq while the PCCh accep- 
ted a number of deals between Chile and the US Metal Be- 
serve - the body which arranped the purchase of Chile's 
copper and other njininr products - it was not uncritical of 
the terms agreed upon. In July 19439 for exampleg the party 
complained that a recent deal with the US Netal Reserve did 
not leave Chile with sufficient copper to meet its own needs 
and that this would have a profound effect on the economy 
and employment. (60) Significantly enough, howeverg the 
PCCh delivered the mildest of reproofs to the government 
for failing to protect Chilets interests and confined itself 
to expressing the pious belief that Chile could produce 
enough copper for its own and Allied needs. (61) 
Rfos had reason to be grateful for the PCCh'9 SuP- 
port and co-operationg critical or not. Politicallyp tbe 
PCCh's insistence on support for his government and its ad- 
vocacy of co-operation with the Riptit proved useftil to Rfos 
In his strup. gles with the P11 andq in a more general and 
(59) Ibid. 25.4.1942; 7.5-1942. 
(60) Ibid. 16.7-1943; 17-7.1-943. 
(61) Ibid. 17.7-1943. 
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negative senseq pCCb ? olicy exacerbated frictions inside 
the ADCh and prevented the coalition fro" becoming an 
effective force capahle of creating formidable problems 
for the goverrment in Congresse 
Although the maintenance of good relations with 
the PR9 or at least its left-wingt had been a lodestone of 
the PCCh's actions during the Popular Front periodt National 
Unity gave the PCCh other prioritiess In 19429 the PCCh 
defended the Minister of the Interiorp Morales Beltramit 
from left-wing Radical attack on the grounds thatq whatever 
his other faultst he was an advocate of rupture with the 
Axis. (62) After Rfoe had broken ties with the Axis# the 
PCCh became more enthusiastic in its support for the govern- 
ment and more critical of the Radical left-wings In June 
1943o it found that the attacks of the Young Turks on Rfos 
were 'incomprehensible$ and exhorted the PR to set aside 
its internal differences and unite behind the government. (63) 
Although the FCCh itself became more critida1l. of the govern- 
ment in the latter part of 1943 - for reasons which will be 
examined later - it opposed the PR's drift into formal 
opposition to Rfose Indeedq prior to the PR13 January 1944 
National Conventiong one Communist Central Committee member 
attacked the left-wing thesis - that the PR should withdraw 
from government If Rfos did not agree to form a cabinet 
based on the exclusive support of the PR or the ADCh parties - 
as a Inazi manoeuvret. (64) Although the PCCh moderated 
the language of its criticism once the left-wing thesis had 
(62) Ibid. 23-7-1942. 
(63) Ibid. 4.6.1943. 
(64) Ibid* 9.1.1944. Article by Juan Chac6n Coronag 
'Ants la Convenci6n Radical'. 
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become official PR policyt it urged the Radical ministers not 
to resign if Rfos refused to re-organise, his cabinet in the 
way the PR wantedo(65) Thusq even though the PCCh was it- 
self committed to the formation of an ADCh cabinet and even 
though one of the reasons which Rfos gave for refusing to 
form such a cabinet was his absolute determination not to ad- 
mit Communists to ministerial office# the PCCh opposed the 
PRIs ultimatum to Rf03 in April 1944. (66) After April 1944, 
when expelled Radical ministers continued to serve in cabinotp 
the PCCh encouraged such efforts as were made to find a solu- 
tion but also supported the calls which the ADCh made for the 
creation of a cabinet based on its members. (67) Howeverg 
with the XV Plenum in August 19449 the PCCh re-doubled its 
efforts to persuade the PR to return to cabinet and to co- 
operate with the PL and urged the PR to set aside the 
'erroneous$ Concepci6n resolution. (68) Since by that tinjeq 
the PR was moving into open opposition to the governmentp Hf03 
greeted the XV Plenum resolutions with enthusiasm and praised 
the PCChIs tperfect and patriotic intelligence' in seeine the 
need for a government of national unity which drew support 
from all $progressive sectorso(69) 
For all its efforts, the PCCh was unable to prevent 
the PR from declarine its formal opposition to RfO3 in Sep- 
tember 1944 and it is unlikely that PCCh pressure or influence 
(65) Ibid* 23.1.1944. 
(66) Letter from Rfos to Alfredo Rosende (President CEN 
PR)q El-Sig-lo 22.4.1944o As Roaende pointed outq 
howeverg the PCCh had already stated that it would 
not press for ministerial office if this was an 
obstacle to the formation of an ADCh cabinot. 
Ibid* 27.4.1944. 
(67) Ibid* 24.4.1944; 1-5-19441 12.5.19'44; 21.5.1944. 
(68) Ibid* 2.8.1944. 
(69) Ibid. 4.8.1944. 
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had mucl- to do with tlie PlIk's decision to return to the cabi- 
net in May 1945. With the PROs return to government and 
with the PCCh9s gradual adoption of toupher policies and 
attitudes during the course of 1945, the PCCh lost its use 
as an ally for Rfos in his strupgles with the PR. 
Despite the differences between the PH and the PCCh 
over National Unityq relations between the two parties were 
not allowed to reach the point of open rupturo. Wedded to- 
gether by electoral self-interest# and to somo extent by co- 
operation in the trade union fieldp neither party permitted 
their criticisms of each others' actions and policies to go 
too far. Indeedq even in late 1944 when divergences over Na- 
tional Unity were at their most starkj the CEN PR rarely criti- 
cised the PCCh and its most hostile practical act sc-ems to have 
been its refusal to permit one Radical dignitary to publicly 
endorse XV Plenum resolutions. (70) Regional Radical organisa- 
tions were rather less circumspect - the left-winp dominated 
Asaniblea Radical of Santiago openly expressed its disapproval 
of AV Plenum resolutions while in ttie Southq Radicals sabotaged 
the electoral canipaign of Guillermo del Pedrej; alq a liberal 
technocrat especially selected by tbe PCCh to fight a conf-res- 
sional seat left vacant by the death of the COMmunist senatorp 
Amador Pairoaq as a concrete wanifestation of XV Plenum 
policies. (71) 
(70) El Diario Ilustrado 10.10.1944 
(71) La Hora 24.9,1944 Or the Asawbien Radical's strictures 
on XV Plenum resolutions. Southern Radicals failed to 
distribute cash they had receivee to finance del Pedre- 
galls campaign - and to buy votes. FOR FO 371/37982 
AS 4986/31/9, report from Santiago Chancery to the 
South American Department# Londong dated ?. 9.1944. It 
could be that the sabotane -as not so much a rejection 
of National Unit, as a desture of sunport for del Pedregalts onponentg the olO caudillo, Arturo Alessandri. 
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Not surprisinplyg given the ancient rivalries and 
antagonisms between the PCCh and the PSs National Unity be- 
came an additional source of conflict between the two parties 
particularly after the XV Plenum. Despite their profound 
differencesp howeverp after the dissolution of the Comintern 
in June 19439 tbe PCCh proposed the creation of a single 
mass revolutionary partyl the Partido Onicog to the PS-(72) 
The issue of the Partido Onico had its impact on the faction- 
al struggles inside the PSI the provistas favoured the 
rapid creation of such a party while the anti-collaboration- 
ists, although accepting the idea in principles counselled 
caution and a lengthy process of nerotintion and agreement 
prior to its formation. (73) The PS did agree to the crea- 
tion of Joint co-ordinating committees with the PCCh at all 
levels In January 1944 but the growina strength of the PSIs 
internal conflicts and continued differences over National 
Unity soon brouCht the Partido dnico initiative to a halt - 
at least so far as the PS was concorned. (74) Ueverthelegag 
the PCCh did absorb the Partido Socialista de Trabajadores(PST) 
in the name of the Partido Vnico In June 1944, while in 1946 
it absorbed the rump of the PSA. (75) 
(72) Carlos Contreras Labarca Uni6n Nacional y Partido 
Onicog Report to the XIII Plenum ntiagov 1943) 
pp28-30* The PCCh had made a similar initiative 
in 19379 see Chapter 4 of this works ppl8g-190. 
(73) See Salvador Allende El PS proclartia al 2ý de octubre 
como fecha de reconquista (Santiagop 1943) p23 and 
La Naci6n 11-7,1944. 
(74) JeC. Jobet 91 Partido Socialista do Chiles Is p183* 
(75) El Sielo 5.6.1944; 19.6.1944; 57.1946. Although 
the PST had initially adopted an anti-coria, unist 
stances relations between the two parties became irore 
cordial and in 19439 the PST purged its most vehement 
anti-communists. Ibid. 2.5-1943. 
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With the departure of the grovistas from the PS in 
July 1944 and tbe PCChts renewed insistence on the desira- 
bility of collaboration with the Right at its XV Plenuml 
the PS began a vigorous caii, paign against National Unity. 
In late 19449 it counterposed the concept of Popular Unity 
*the union of those who have a com. munity of aspirationsp 
identity of aimaj, similarity of methodsp spiritual brother- 
hood and solidarity of Interest$ - to that of National 
Unity*(76) Moreoverg the PS took its hattle against 
National Unity and the PCCh into the trade union movement 
in late 1944 and early 1945. (77) Sut Vie PS did not allow 
its opposition to National Unity to force if out of the ADCh 
until some months after thie March 1945 congressional elec- 
tions. (78) BY that timet the shadows of the Cold War had 
begun to gather and t)7, e PS's anti-communism became increasing- 
ly warked and strident - leadinip the PS to abandon its de- 
clared ineependence of action and to serve in the vanguard 
of the Dubalde administrationts offensive apainst tý, e PCCh 
in the early months of 1946. 
If National Unity proved useful to Rfos in his strug- 
gle with the PR and as an isalle which kept the Left divided, 
it also served him well in the field of industrial relations. 
Shortly after Rfos took officet tt-e PCCh expressed its commit- 
nient to the harmonious settlement of industrial disputes 
and to the avoidance of unnecessary diartiptions at work - 
especially in industries vital to national defence, (79) 
(76) La OpiniOn 21.10.1944. 
(77) See 9 belowo PP312-314. (78) El Sie, 'lo 7-8-1945- 
(79) Ibid. 174.4.1942. 
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Howeverg the PCChIs ability and willingness to curb indits- 
trial unrest depended on a number of variables - anionfst 
themp the state of labour relations in the industry or 
plant concernedg the internal politics of the unions in- 
volved# government performance in both the domestic and 
foreign arenas and inflationary pressurese bioreoverg even 
when the PCCh was trying hard to maintain industrial peaceq 
it rarely condemned strike actions. Ilatherg it concentrated 
its efforts on securing peaceful settlements before tte 
strike had startedq ands if this proved imponsible, it 
supported the subsequent strike actions and cast the blamo 
for them on the employers' intranBirence or government inac- 
tion. 
Although official statistics claim there wero only 
19 strikes in 1942, the PCCh does not appear to have exerted 
much energy on maintaining industrial p(-ace until the latter 
part of 1942, when it had become clear that Rfos was moving 
towards rupturing, relations with the Axis powers. (60) 
Thusp it supported two strikes in the nitrate industry in 
kay and Aupust 1)42 - even though tt-at industry was one 'vital 
to national defencel. (81) Boweverg in late 19429 the PCCh 
praised coal miners for their patriotic self-sacrifice in 
accepting an unsatisfactory wage settlement and resisting 
pressures to strike and in January 1943, praised the copper 
workers of Sewell for similar reasnns. (82) Indeed, by 
(80) La Hora 10.1.1946. 
(81) Ei iirlo 4.5.1942; 23.8.1942. 
092) Ibido 1-6.11.1942; 30.1.1943. See- also Angel 
Voaals artiele OLa Fluela de ieljelltg Principlos 
April 1942. 
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April 19439 Rfoag no friend of the PCCh9 was moved to thank 
the party publicly for its 'loyal and disinterested co- 
operation' and in ýjay he claimed that the workers as a whole 
had responded to his call for lorderg discipline and tran- 
quility at worlcl. (83) 
Howeverg in the latter part of 19439 industrial 
harmony was shattered by a wave of strike movements which 
pushed the total number of strikes for that year up to 
127-(84) The increase of strike activity wbichl signifi- 
cantly enougbp did not affect production in either the coal 
or the copper industriesq was not caused by any dramatic re- 
versal of the PCChIs labour policies. flatber inflationg the 
governmont's failure to respond constructively to FCCh and 
CTCb plans to increase production and its authoritarian hand- 
ling of a number of labour disputesq created a groundswell of 
unrest which the PCCh felt little obligation to check. (85) 
As El Siglo put it in an article on the industrial unrestj 
'when these problems cannot be solved by direct agreewentq 
when the authorities of the Labour Departmont neglect their 
functions and allow conflicts to drag on indeflnitelyo6e-eee 
there is no other recourse than to strike%(86) flowoverg 
(83) El Sirrlo, 3.4.1943; 22-5-19ý0- 
(84) La Horm, 10-1.1946, ipeech by Afo3- Although the 
bare sFatistics indicate a massive increase in strike 
activity in 191439 they are somewhat misleading. Many 
of Vie strikes in late 19439 for examplep were 
caused by a sintrle is3ue - decreto lay 306, which 
introduced shift worl: on the docks andq in effoctq 
abolished overtit, e. 21 6ifflo 7.10.1943. 
(85) Governrimt ministers rebuffed CTCh rlans for increas- 
inr production by sugrestin7 that tf-a unionsp if sin- 
cerep should first stor. hol-lin. - itnion ii, eetin!, s during 
working hours. 31 Si, Tlo 11-10-1943. The c: overnment 
used its Quergency Powors to order the return to 
work of strikers in i., any industries in late 1943. 
Ibid. 31-10-1943; 1-11-194,3- La 1ý, Aci6n (86) PA Zýi! 0! 10 31-10-1943. 
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while the POCh blamed the government for the upsurp ,e of 
industrial unrestq it seems likely that t'-, ere were other 
factors at work - apart from thos3already mentioned. In the 
first placeg the municipal elections of April 1944 were 
approaching and the PCCh was usually leas inclined to exert 
its influence to check labour unrest in the months leading 
up to such eventse Secondlyq V-e PCCb did not approve of 
RfosOa cabinet of administration which lasted from June to 
September 19439 and approved even less of Rfos@3 recognition 
of the military government in Argentina (identified by the 
PCCh as a fascist, pro-Axis rogimo)*(87) Finallyp it seems 
possible that in the months following the dissolution of the 
Comintern, wben the PCCh was trying to persuade the PS to help 
form the Partido Onicog the PCCh was attempting to demon. 
strate that its industrial policies were now determined by 
national rather than international factors, Whatever the pre- 
cise nature of the PG'Ch's reasonsq it continued to support 
industrial actions during early 1944, arguing that strikes did 
not affect production and that it was no part of National 
Unity to sactifice the workers$ rights and interests*(88) 
Once the April 1944 elections had -passed, industrial 
unrest declined and Mhe PCCb began to pay more attention to 
rising pricesq sPeculation and to the problem of increasing 
production. The XV Plenum of Au-ust 1944 had its impact on 
the PCCh'z labour policies and t)-, e PCCh reiterated its conw-At- 
ment to increased production and to tý, o harmonious settlement 
of labour disputes. (89) Once morep howeverg the PCCh 
(87) Ibid- 7.6.1943. 
(88) Ibid. 4-3-1944. Editorial 'No retrocoder en las 
conquistas socialies'. (89) Ibid- 7-9.1944. 
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stated that its desire to avoid strike actions did not mean 
that it had renounced the use of the strike weapon but only 
that it should be used in the final resorto(90) The PCChI9 
renewed determinitidn:. to curb strike activityg and to keep 
labour conflicts within the C6digo del Trabajop had concrete 
results. According to the PCChp a strike in coal mines was 
avoided only because the miners were determined not to strikep 
while in the cement industryg where the PCCh was particularly 
strongg a strike action was postponed, not once* but several 
times on the PCChIs insistenceo(91) bloreoverg for the first 
time during the Rfos yearsp the PCCh began to condemn some 
strike actions as 'ill-pi! epared and premature$ in late 1944. (92) 
But even while the PCCh was trying its hardest to curb indus- 
trial unrests there were some instances when it encouraged 
strike actiong most notably in a strike of Lota stevedores 
who had refused to load a ship from 'fascist$ Argentina. (93) 
Neverthelesag partly at least because of Communist effort3q 
there were only 91 strikes in 1944 as compared to 127 in 1943, 
although it is also worth noting that during 1944 wage increasest 
in some important sectoraq tended to be in excess of infla- 
tion rates. (94) 
Even thoughg in other circumstancesp the approach 
of congressional elections would have been heralded by a 
(90) See the article by Juan Vargas Puebla in Principiosp 
August-September 19449 entitled 'La Unida d Nacional' 
es el arma de la victoria19 p9- 
(91) Article by Reinaldo Nuflez 'Entendimiento rocfproco- 
antes wue huelgall El Siplo 2.9.1944. See also ibide 4. io. i944; 15.11.1-91TV7. 
(92) Ibide 14912.1944 -a strike of railworker s led by 
Socialists was so condemned. (93) FOR FO 371/38014 AS 629/2373/99 dispatch Orde to 
Edenq dated 8.11.1944. 
(94) La Hora 10.1.1946. Speech by Hfo3 for the strike 
statistics; see Appendix D for wage and inflation 
rates in the mining industry. 
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tougher industrial line on the part of the PCChj it con- 
tinued to press for the peaceful settlement of labour dis- 
putes in early 1945. Butp with the end of 
the Second World 
'War and the PCChIs Gradual return to more agaressive poll. 
ciesp the PCCh became less inclined to check industrial 
unrest and it Gave its support to the rising tide of strike 
actions which affected Chile in the final months of 
1945. 
The PCCh*s support for Rios was not intended to 
be an end in itself so much as a means by which National 
Unity goals could be realised. How successful wag the 
PCCh in achieving those goals? As originally formulated, 
National Unity was intended to Croup together the widest 
possible combination of political forces around a series of 
objectives - the defence of democracyq the fulfilment of the 
obligations of continental solidarity and the maximisation 
of Chile's contribution to the Allied war effort. 
With regard to the defence of democracy, there is 
little evidence to suggest that it was in any real danger 
during the Rios years. The Rightq as a wholop was in some 
disarray until it regained control over Coneress in March 
1943 and although it mounted a vigorous opposition to govern- 
ment after that datep it showed little inclination to force 
constitutional crises which could have resulted in Hfos's 
overthrow - despite Communist allegations to the contrary. (95) 
But rumours of military plots did circulate from time to time 
and In july 1944, according to one sourcep army conspirators 
abandoned an attempt to oust Rios because of a general strike 
(95) Seeg for examplet Fu Siglo 21-7-1945. 
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threat made bY the PCCh. (96) Rather than tbo Right or the 
Armed Forcest it might well be argued that Rf03 himself was 
a greater danger to democracy - this feeling had some currency 
in 1943 and 1944 when he dispensed with the co-operation of 
the political parties and co-opted military men into his 
cabinet. (97) Butq perhaps because he possessed wide special 
powers as a result of the war situationg Rfos showed no desire 
to overthrow democratic inatitutionag and governedp on the 
wholeg within the law and with respect to democratic norms* 
On the occasions when lifos did appear to be infringing demo- 
cratic rights asp for examples when he used his Emergency 
Powers to circumvent the right to 3trikeg the PCCh rogistored 
its protests andg in so far as democracy was threatened during 
the Rfos yeatas the PCCh can be considered to have discharged 
its self-imposed duty to defend it. 
The PCChIs record of succes3 in persuadine Rfos to 
fulfil the obligations of continontal solidarity is similar- 
ly unimpressive* Although the FCCh launched a vigorous 
campaign to persuade Rfos to break off relations with the 
Axisp it seems more likely that Rfos was influenced by Allied 
War successes and the probable consequences of US displeasure 
than by any domestic factors. Indeedg for all the PCCh's 
effortsp it failed to persuadaeither the PR or the newly 
formed ADCh to make unequivocal declarations of support for 
rupture while the PS9 which had declared for that action in 
June 1942, arrived at its decision Independently. (98) 
(96) FOR FO 371/37982 AS 3943/31/99 telegram Orde to 
Td-enq 24-7-1944. 
(97) See, for examplet Florencio Durang op. cit-, pp396-398- (98) La Crftica 6.6.1942. 
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Whether or not domestic pressures and the PCChIs campairn 
were important factors in Hfos's decision to break off re- 
lations with the Axist Chile was still one of the last Latin 
American countries to do so. (99) Furthermoreq for all the 
FCCh's exhortationss Rfos was slow and unenthusiastic in 
fulfilling another oblijTation of continental solidarityq 
namely to talco action against Axis agents and tIeir activities 
andq despite the PCCh's porsistent dPmnnds, Cbtlo was one of 
the last Latin American countries to open diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union. (100) 
The PCCh met with 7reater success in its efforts to 
waximise Chile's contribution to the Allied war effort throuph 
its efforts to curb industrial unreqt and increase production. 
Cooper production, for examplop increased steadily tbrourrhout 
the war years'and between early 1942 and early 1945 there 
were no serious strike movements in that industry*(101) 
Howeverg since copper workers were amon, &at the best paid in 
CI-ilo and since their wapes tended to keep abreast of infla- 
tiong PCCh policy probably only fad a marpinnt impact. 
Perhaps a clearer example may bo found in the coal industry 
(99) Only Argentina maintained relations with the Axis 
for a lonver period. 
(100) See FO, 'I FO 371/37951 A 1? 22/31/9p dispatch Orde to 
Eden, dated 9.2.1944 and ibid. FO 371/3784 AS 1919/56/ 
91 Santiago Chancery to the "inistry of Economic Warfare, dated 29-3-1944 for descriptions by British 
Embassy officials of the way the rovernment dragged 
its feet on this issue. Chile finally recognised 
the USSR in Decewber 1944. El 6iZio 11.12.1914. 
(101) Juana Stambuk 'Noviwientos s les Kranto el Frente 
Popular* (Kemoriap Iniversidad Acnica Vol Estadol 
Santiago, 1970) PP40-53. Copper production increased 
from 484 million kilos in 1942 to 09) nillion kilos 
in 1944. Estadfstica Kilana December 1949, p614. 
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whichq although not directly connected to the Allied war 
effortq had preat domestic importance and was an industry 
where labour relations were notoriously poor and where Com- 
munist unions were dominant. Once alrain coal production in- 
creased until 1945 and between January 1942 and January 1943 
there was only one serious (but brief) strike. (102) Only 
in the nitrate industry where Communist unions were also 
dominantq was the PCCh noticeably less successful in rialn- 
taining industrial peace and strikes occurred every year 
of Rfos's presidency. Howeverg the nitrate industry was not 
so strategically important as copper since the Allies had 
their own manufactured sun-plies; the disparity between in- 
flation rates and wage increases tended to be wider than in 
either the coal or copper industries andg in some re3pectsq 
labour relations were extremely poor. (103) Althourh the 
PCCh managed to create joint committees of workers and em- 
ployers to increase production in both the coal and copper 
industries, these were resisted on the nitrate pampa where 
managers saw them as an attempt to undernkine their authority 
and discipline at work. (104) 
Finally* the PCCh failed to create a broad, mass 
National Unity movement which drew support from the Right 
as well as from the old frentista parties. National Unity 
(102) See El -ii&, lo 30.8-1944 for an account of this strike 
which affected 900 workers in Scbwaper. Coal produc- 
tion increased from 291509799 tons in 1942 to 
2,2799438 tons in 1944. Estadistica Chilena, 
December 1946, P743. 
(103) See Appendix 0 for a comparison of inflation and 
wage rates in the nitrate industry. 
(104) FOR FO 371/37981 AS 2031/31/99 dispatch from Urde to 
Edeng dated 25.3-1944. 
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was rejected by both the PR and the PSp and the PCCh's per- 
sistent advocacy of coLlaboration with the Right undermined 
the effectiveness and cohesion of the ADCh without producing 
any real response from right-wine sectors. Nevertheless, 
the PCCh did claim that individual members of right-wing 
parties were persuaded to co-operate with the ADCh in the 
1944 municipal elections and that others participated in 
Production Committees and in an organisation formed to chan- 
nel support for the Allied cause - the Uni6n para la 
Victoria(UPV). (105) Also the PCCh did manage to persuade 
one liberal technocfatq Guillermo del Pedrej; alp to stand as 
a National Unity candidate in a senatorial by-election*(106) 
If the PCCh's record of success in achieving National 
Unity goals was mixedq its Policy of support and co-operation 
with the Rfos reginie brought some positive rewards* In the 
first placet the PCCh kept those advisory posts on the boards 
of gemi-fiscal agencies which it had held under Aguirre 
Cerda. (107) Secondlyp on ti-te PCCh1s requestq Hfos inter- 
vened to secure the release of an Arpentine Communist and 
Comintern activi3tq Victorio Codovillaq from jail in Argon- 
tinao(108) Thirdlyp Rfos gave public recoenition to CTCb. 
an organisation which was technically illegal under the C6digo 
(105) Galo Gonzalez La lucha por la formaci'n del PCGh 0 
PP57-58- The UPV was founded in September 1942 
and was basically the preserve of the ADCh parties. El sigio 4.9.1942. 
(106) See above P297- (107) El Sigplo 22.5-1943* speech by Hfose Curiously 
enoughq PCCh publications made no comment on its 
continued tenure of the advisory posts It received from Aguirre Cerda. Butq in any eventg there were 
only two. See C11apter 5s P259- (108) El Siplo, 29.4.1944. 
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del Trabajo. (109) But these rewards were sliffht when weas- 
ured against the benefits which naturally accrued to the PCCh 
by having an administration in power whichq once more, was 
not hostile to it* Thusg except for the early months of 1946 
when it was subject to some harassment by the Duhaldo admin- 
istrations the FCCh's freedom to operate was unimpedode(110) 
It was perhaps negative benefits rather than posi- 
tive rewards which were the most strikinT products of 
National Unityo Despite the PCCh's support for a regitue 
which was more conservative than its predecessor and despite 
its persistent efforts to curb industrial unrest$ the PCCh 
did not suffer permanent or savage declines in its electoral 
and trade union supporty nor does it appear to have expori- 
enced serious internal struggles. 
Although, in nominal terms9 the PCCh appears to 
have lost a great number of votes between the municipal 
elections of 1941 and 19441 possibly in the region of some 
20,000, in terms of tegidore_ and alcaldes elected the 
decline was alight. (111) In April 19419 the PCCh elected 
122 regidores and 10 alcaldes while in April 19449 it elec- 
ted 106 regidores and 18 alealdes. (112) The PCCh itself 
(109) Ibid, 2.5-1944. Day Day speech by Rfos. Howevers Ros refused to Give the CTCh the plEjonalidad 
jurfdica it wanted until it relinquished its poli- 
tiedl-ties. Neverthelessp later in 1944, it was 
announced that dues' payments to the CTCh were now 
legal. La Comuna (Puente Alto) 4.11.1944. 
(110) Seep Chapter 79 pjj404341. 
(111) SO Official statistics for PCCK votes in the April 
1941 munici al elections exist. however, the PCCh 
polled 53,114 votes in the larch 1941 coneressional 
elections and 329219 in the April 1944 municipal 
elections. Zstadfstim Chilenal September 1941 and Aurust 1944. - 
(112) Galo aonzSlozg article in Princiriosp febr"ary 19449 
p16; El sinlo 5.4.1944; 1). 5.1914. 
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showed little concern over this decline andq in0eedg claimed 
that the 1944 results were a victory for the PCChq piven 
the low turn-out and its own self-sacrifice in acceptiniý 
poor positions on the electoral lists-(113) The PCCh 
was not so sanguine over the results of the kiarch 1945 
congressional elections - even though it polled 469133 
votes in ', larch 19459 as compared witt) some 32*000 votes in 
April 1944 - apparently reversing a declining trend. 
(114) 
There were several good reasons for the PCChI9 concern* 
First, in March 19459 the ADCh parties lost control of 
Congress* Secondlyq in liarch 19451 the PCCh failed to equal 
its karch 1941 record of 539144 vote3q even though in July 
1944 it bad absorbed the Partido Socialista do Trabajadores 
and, in theory at leasts Bome 109000 new votes - indicatinr 
that the PCCb bad suffered a sipnificant decline in its 
electoral support althoughq once a. rrainj tho PCCh lost only 
one congressional seat in the-process, (115) Thirdlyt al- 
tbougb the PCCh blamed the Imean ambitions and absurd 
intransigencet of its allies and the adventurism and divi- 
sionism of the 'Trotslcyistst in the PS for the Left's defeat 
in March 1945, it also admitted that the election result was 
a verdict on XV Plenum National Unitv. (116) Tbo PCCh 
criticised itself for failing to present National Unity as 
a combative movement for social and economic chanpo and for 
(113) Elias Lafertte, article in Qiaciploy may 1944, 
PPS-10. 
(114) Estadfstia Chilena December 1945, MOB-725. 
(115) Ibid. The PCM elected 13 Ooputies in 1945p compared 
with 16 in 1941. In the Senates the PCCh elected 3 
more members - bringing its total UP to 5. (116) Carlos hosales, articlp in Prinaipl2s, zarch-April 
1945t PP10-15- 
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failin(T to make clear that its support for hfos was con- 
ditional. (117) Thus, the March 1945 election result 
was one of the factors which nushed the PCCh into more ag- 
gressive policies during 1945. Nevertheless# it is worth 
notin., iý that between the congressional elections of 1941 and 
1945, the FCChIs share of the total votes castq fell by only 
1-5Z - less than either that of the PR or of the PS. (118) 
National Unity does not appear to have had any dras- 
tic impact on the PCCh's standing and influonce in the 
trade union movement* Although PCCh publications indicate 
that trade unionists had to be intermittently but forcefully 
reminded that legitimate demands for improvod waj; es and 
conditions should be governed by political criteria and the 
need to contribute to the defeat of world fascisinp there is 
little evidence to 3uo-gost that Viere was any large-scale 
revolt against the FCCh because of its labour policies and 
its efforts to curb industrial unrest. Howeverg in 19449 
a fairly serious challenge to the PCCh eik-erged in the copper- 
mining centres of Sewell and Chuquicamata. Accusinr the 
FCCh of the misuse of union funds9 a mixed group - identified 
as ibaftistas and ex-Conununists by the PCCh - began to canj- 
paign to have the whole of the 6% of commany profitag ear- 
marked by the C6digo del Trabajo for equal division between 
the workers and their union99 distributed to the workers 
alone. (119) helpedq no doubt9 by a genoral disgruntlement 
(117) Ibido 
(118) Sergio Guilisasti Ta-, le Partidos Polfticop Chilenos 
P319. The P71's share of the total vote fell by 
1.73', - and that of t1re Socialists (P6 and P6A) by 
3.93%, over the sa-me p, ýriod. 
(119) El Popularg Ant of a,, 7astn 9 27- ?- 1944; 3.1944; 4.3-1944. 
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with the PCChI9 labour policiess the challengers did manage 
to break the PCCbls hold over one union in Chuquicamata - 
although they appear to have lost it arain in 1945-(120) 
The campaian to deprive the unions of tteir share of company 
profits -a far more important source of funds than members' 
dues payments - was given a national character by the ri$rht- 
wing parties and press andp indeed, the Caflas Flores hill 
was presented to Congress to that end, (121) After 19449 
relations between t1le PCCh and the copper workers in 
Chuquicamata remained uneasy* They went on strike in April 
1945 when the PCCh was doing its best to maintain industrial 
peace after the XV Plenum# while in October 1945 they struck 
again and# according to the PR9 resisted the efforts of the 
FCCh and others to persuade them to return to work. (122) 
Significantly enoughq howeverg on both these occasions the 
PCCh gave public support to the striking copper workeraq 
suggesting thatq whatever the exiýýonciea of the PCCh'9 cur- 
rent political linep it was not prepared to risk an open 
confrontation with such an important body of worlcerso(123) 
Perhaps the most serious challenge which tVe PCCh 
had to face in the trade union field came from its Old 
rivals - the Socialists- Although there appear to have beon 
persistent frictions between Socialist and Communist trade 
unionists at both the local and national level throuabout 
the war yearsp hostilities between t'hem became particularly 
(120) Ibid, 9.6.19441 3.7-194.5. 
(121) El Sifrlo 23.7-1945; 12.9.1945. 
(122) Cuonta do la actuaci6ri del Pii n la XVI Convenc i6n 
Nacional Ordinaria: enero 19,44-eriero_1946, p48. (123) El Siglo 12.4.1945; IG-10-1945. 
o 313 - 
marked after the XV Plenum. (124) In December 1944, 
Socialists in the Railworkers' Union succeeded in calling 
strike action hgainst the opposition of the PCCh andq indeedl 
the PS claiwed to have defeated PCCh moves to gain endorse- 
ment for the XV Plenum National Unity at a series of national 
and provincial trade union conferences in late 1944 and early 
1945. (125) iloweverp the PCCh's failure to persuade a nuni- 
ber of trade union conferences to express support for XV 
Plenum National Unity did not mean that the PCCh had lost all 
influence in the unions concerned; for exaiiipleg even after 
the Uni6n de Profesoros de Chile had rejected a motion in fa- 
vour of National Unityp Communists were elected to posts of 
responsibility inside the union's national organization. (126) 
horeoverg in the latter part of 1945, the PCCh's more asrgres- 
sive stance enabled it to repair inost of tfe damage which 
XV Plenum collaborationism had caused. Thus, when the CTCh 
split in the early months of 1946 as a result of a dr3matic 
upsurge of tensions betureen the PCCh and the PSI precipitated 
by the PS's incorporation into the Duhalde administrationg 
the PCCh was aý)le to claim that it had retained the loyalty 
of the vast majority of CTCh provincial oreanisations as 
(124) Socialists and Communists quarrelled ovor whether 
CTCh should belonp to the ADCh (El Sigio 13.1.1943). 
A particularly good example of continuing frictions 
at the local level can be found in the struegles of 
Socialists and Communists to control Paper Lill 
unions in Puente Alto. See La Comuna (PCCh) and 
La Defensa Obrern (PS) - both published in Puente 
Alto Ourin5r the war years. 
(125) El Sialo 14.12*IL944 and La Opini&n 3.11.1944; 
28.11.1944; 11.12.1944; 16.12.1944; 7.1-1945. 
(126) La Orini6n 10.1.1945.4 Communists including Hernan 
MAW -ivecochea were elected to posts of rosponsi- 
bility in the UPCh. 
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well as tb,, iLt of a number of the utore important national 
trade union federations. (127) Ane even though the PS 
used its control of tI-e 1, Anistry of Labour to unleash a 
ferocious campaign against Communist-dominated unions in 
the months which followed* it appears to have made few last- 
ing gains at the expense of the PCCb - if only because the 
PCCh itself entered (,, overnn; ent in November 1946 and was able 
to reverse the trend. (128) 
National Unityg then, does not a-opear to have done 
much serious or lasting damage to the PCCh's standinlý and 
influence in either theelectoral or the trade union fields. 
'Why should this have been the case? In the first placep the 
PCCb's over-all sunport for Rfos (lid not prevent it from 
criticising, certain actions and policies - with the result 
that the 2CGh successfully avoide(I identification with the 
re. -, iwe's errors and slhortcoaiinCs, 6imilarlyl, tho PCChq 
although generally in favour of the peetcefill settlement of 
labour disputesp rarely attempted to prevent strikes if 
lengthy negotiations failed. Indeed, the PCCh concentrated 
on maintaining industrial peace in vital industrie3i like 
copper and coal mining, anO only than exerted its influence 
to the maximum for relatively brief periods - as, for 
exawple, in the months immediately followinq the XV Plenum. 
Secondlyp for all the antaVonisms between the PS and the 
PCCh and despite their differences over the question of co- 
operation with the Right and the deCree of support which 
should be extended towards the Rfos reainet they pursued 
(127) El Sig-lo 3-3-1946. 
(128) See Chapter 79 for a description of the PCCh Is fortunes 
during 1946 and 1947. 
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similar industrial policies during much of the war years. 
The P59 no less than the PCChq was broadly in favour of the 
peaceful settlement of labour disputesg particularly in vital 
industries. Moreoverg during the Rf03 administrations the 
FS was visibly disintegrating and offered no real alterna- 
tive to the PCCh - although a few Communists, including at 
least one of high ranks did find their way into the PS. (129) 
Finallyl in part at leastv the PCCh's comparatively success- 
ful weathering of thewar years can be explained in terms of 
the continuous process of organisational improvement which 
was carried out on the directions of the CC. 
The efforts of the PCCh'9 leadership to create a 
disciplined and cohesive party during the war years had 
several important facets. In the first placel in the early 
months of 19429 the process of examination and purge of PCCh 
officers in the nationalq regional and local orpanisationsy 
begun in earnest in October 1940, was extended to the ranic 
and file. (130) All party cards were re-called and the 
now-purged regional and local committees were instructed to 
re-issue cards only to those members worthy of the honour 
of being Communists. Amongst the criteria to be used in 
deciding a member's worthiness were his performance as a 
member of a cellq his ability to obey instructions and yet 
show initiativol his dues' payment recordl his honesty and 
personal morality and his general conduct as a defender of 
(129) The high-rankine Communist was Isidro Godoy, member 
of the Cc 1939-19419 breadworkers' leader and an old 
anarchist. He joined the PS in November 1944 
(La_OpiniOn 26.11.1944) possibly because of the 
PCCh's labour policies. 
(130) Galo GonzSlezq article entitled tEl carnet de par- 
tido y su significadolq El Siglo 8.3.1942; 9-3-1942. 
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workin7 class interests. (131) However, the PCCh leader- 
ship made it clear that these criteria should be used sens- 
ibly and t1lat only 'conscious enemies# of Vie rarty - those 
wbo indulged in factional activities or who led corrupt 
personal lives - should be excluded. Indeodg much ewpha3is 
was placed on the need to educate and train those who did 
not measure up to all the criteria but who were Ounconscious' 
rather than $conscious' enemies of the party. (132) The 
leadership also warned that the process of examination and 
purge of the membership should not proceed in a mechanical 
fashion and thatq above allq it should not be used to settle 
personal scores. (133) 
Despite these instructionsp howeverg it is ovident 
that the re-call and re-issue of party cards did cause sotue 
difficulties. According to Uumberto Abarcal the ComitS 
Local(CL) of Chuquicamata simply excluded all who were not 
'old and tried' ikembers while the CL Chaftaral incurred dis- 
pleasure by declaring itself dissolved -a procedure reminis- 
cent of the POS and the PR rather than of a bolsilovik 
party*(134) Koreovor, the process took some time and in 
May 1942, Galo Gonza'lez complained that some 50% Of thO 
membership were technically outside the party since tbey did 
not have new party cards. (135) It seems unlikoly that the 
PCCh lost anythiný- like 50% of its members but the process 
of examination and purge was undoubtedly used to get rid of 
troublemakers and unreliable elements - and served to impress 
(131) Ibid* 
(132) Ibid. 
(133) Ibid * (134) Ibid. 28.4.1942. 
(135) Ibid. 3.5.1942. 
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upon the survivors that membership of the PCCh depended on 
their own good conduct* Neverthelessq in somo respect there 
were few indications of an itumediate improvement in perform- 
ance sincep for oxamplep in 6eptetuber 1942 it was reported 
that on averagel only half of the holders of new party cards 
regularly paid dueso(136) 
Another instrument which the CC used to tone up and 
strengthen the functioning of the PCCh was the Plan NacionAl 
do Ewulaci, 6n. Launched in deptember 1943* the Plan set 
out objectives covering every aspect of the PCChIs work and 
arranged competitions betwoon organisations of equal rank 
at all levels, (137) Thusp for examplep the ClIs of' Valparafso 
and SantiaGo competed to increase the sales of Ul SDtlo and 
Principiosl(the PCCh's thooretical wagnzine)g to increase 
recr! jitraentj to create local ADCh committoesp to sot up co- 
ordinating committees with the PS (as a preliaitnary to tho 
creation of the Partido Inico), 9 to oreanise Production Com- 
mittee3o to train cadros and to organiso study circleso(138) 
According to Rumborto Abarcas the results of the first tbree 
months of the Plan were encouraging - some 1U5 local AL)Ch 
committees and 155 PS-PCCh co-ordinating con=ittoe3 had boon 
created while over 4,000 new members had been recruited. (139) 
At the end of the Plan in April 1944, the PGCh expressed it- 
self generally satisfied with the results# although criticism 
was made of its wachanical applicationo(140) 
(136) Ibid. 2 8.9.194 2. 
(137) Ibid. 24.9.1943. 
(138) Ibid- 7.10.1943. 
(139) li-Ci-cle by Humberto Abarca in Principioel lobruary 
1944, 'K plan para i-, Ovilizar a todos los Anti- 
fa3Ci.. -, tas' p1l. (1140) Article hy Galo %,: ronza'lezl in El Jinlo 29-3-19ý4. 
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Another facet of the CC's efforts to strengthen 
the party's organisation was its concern with the problem 
of finding and training new cadres* After 1941, cadre 
schools began to function in Santiago and certain regional 
centres - the Escuela Central de Cuadros in Santiago offering 
residential courses of several months duration to groups of 
a dozen or so selectedtbainces. (141) Although the func- 
tionin- of these acboolswas sometimes criticised, the PCCh 
claimed that by the end of 1945 it had solved the problem of 
how to discover new cadres and that it had finally reached 
the target of 59000 cadres set by the XII Party Congress in 
December 1941. (142) 
I-land in hand with the selection and training of 
new cadresq went a fairly systematic policy of promotion. 
Graduates of the cadre schools were seconded to posts Of 
responsibility in the regional organisationeg sometimes on 
a paid, full-time basis* Where regional officers had to 
find other jobs to support themselves and their familieso 
the CRs were exhorted t6 make Cood any financial losses 
which they might incur tirough absence from work on party 
business. (143) Thusp durinfr tPe war years, something like 
a trainedg professional body of partv orýranisors was be: -in- 
ning, to emerge. 
Although not all the graduatG3 of the cadre schools 
proved to be a success in the posts they were giveng the 
existence of a body of trained somi-professional cadres 
(141) Principiosq karch 1944 'Exporiencias de la zscuela 
Central de Cuadros por el Comito de Alumnos I pp? 2-23- (142) G. Gonzglezp La Luchn por la formaci6n del VCChg P57- (143) Ibid. p63- 
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helped to slow down the high rate of turnover in the member- 
ship of the CRs which bad been evident in the early 19409. 
Two out of three cadres especially promoted to the CR in 
Santiago in 1943 were still members in 1945 while in the CR 
Coquimbo all three of the cadres so promoted were still in 
office in 1945. (144) Nevertheless, the rate of turnover 
in CR members remained fairly hieh - in Santiagop only four 
out of the sixteen CH members elected in 1944 were re- 
elected in 1945, in Antofagastap six out of sixteen members 
were re-electedp in Concepci6nj five out of thirteeng while 
in Iquiqueq five CR members elected in 1943 survived to form 
part of a twenty-two man committee in 1945-(145) How- 
everp it is interestinp to note that of the CR members 
elected for these regions in 1945 only one had served on 
the CR Santiago just before or just after the 1940 pur(re,, 
only one in Antofagasta and none at all in Concepcion and 
Iquique. (146) 
So far as the CC was concernedg the rate of turnover 
in the membership of the important CH3 probably obeyed two 
considerations - firstly9 a desire to find the best person 
for the tasks at hand and secondly# a desire to retain a firm 
(144) News of the promotions was given in an article by Luis Reinoso in Principiosq February 19449 pp2l-22. For the composition of these CR9 in 1945 see El Sirlo 19-11-1945 and El Sifrlo do Co! juimbo 10.9.1945-. (145) El Siplo 19.2.1944; 23-2.1944; 19.11.1945; 16.11. 
1945. S1 Sur (Concepci6n) 1.4.10.1945. El-Despertar 
(Iquique) 19.12.1943; 16.10.1945. 
(146) Pedro Hernindez in Santiago and Alberto Carrasco 
in Antofagasta shared this distinction* Frents 
Popular 11.12.1939; El sigio 19.11.1945; 15.11.1940; 6--11.1945. Carrasco probably'owed his survival to 
the fact that he headed the CR AntofaVasta Control 
Commission - possibly Hernindez owed his to the same 
reason. 
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control over the regional parties. Cortainlyp the brief 
tenure of most Regional 3ecretaries suggests that Vie CH 
was anxious to prevent those important officers from build- 
ing up a local power base* Similar preoccupations probably 
played a part in the CCIs decision not to permit thrwo PCCh 
congressmen to stand for re-election in karch 19459 returning 
them instead to work, in the regional organinations. (147) 
Mother indication of general improvement might be 
deduced from the changes in the POChts organisational pro- 
occupationse Just before Rfos came to office, the PCCh 
had been most concerned with the functioning, of the collp 
the lacIc of collective work on the CC and the CIIsq with the 
resistance of PCCh trade unionists to tbe party's political 
line and with 'revolutionary virilancol against corrupt and 
dissident elements. (148) While preoccupation with these 
problems by no weans disappeared, the PCCh showed nAoro con- 
cern, in the first instancep with its cadre policy and laterp 
with 'bureaucratic formalism'. Bureaucratic formalimr - which 
in essence seems to have been a now name for the old com- 
plaint of lbureaucratiswg - was manifested in the mechanical 
and unproductive obedience of orders from above and it was, 
in part at leastg the Droduct of the very ouccess orp as 
the CC had it, of the excesses of 'revolutionary vigilancogo 
According to Galo nonzalezq suse Chs had mistakenly expelled 
members who committed errors or who showed signs of diS3i- 
dence instead of holping them by education and persuasion to 
(147) Article by Galo UonzSlezq in Princiniosq Ausust 1943, 
Questra polftica Oe cuadros'l p5. (143) See, for example, articles by Uumborto Abarca and Galo GonzQez in Principios, January 1942. 
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correct those deficiencies. (149) Indoedq bureaucratic 
formalism and the lack of tIeoretical educations according 
to the CC9 had been responsible for the FCCh falling into 
XV Plenum errorso(150) The picture of a party in which 
'revolutionary viCilancel had gone too far was further sub- 
stantiated by complaints that some regional Control Com- 
missions had become the directive orgnns and also by an 
incident recounted by Galo Gonzalezq hand of the National 
Control Commission. According to Gonzalez wheng in response 
to developi,, ients in the CFUSAq the CC of the PCCh was discus- 
sing the possibility of' changing the nnme of the Ctilean Com- 
munist Fartyq he did not express the opnosition he felt be- 
cause be was afraid of beinl, 7 accused of soctarianism. (151) 
Although a few CC members wore reprivanded and even 
demoted for their mistakeaq PCCh publications suageat that 
there was a general improvement in the functionlay of tbo 
CC durine the war yearso(JS2) At least, thoro were no 
overt signs of profound divergences on the CC and even the 
old frictions between trade unionists and the CCIs politicil 
line appear to have diminished, (153) Nevert"closs, at the 
(149) Article by kýalo GorizAllezj Princinios, Au, -,,. 1059 -15- (150) Gale Gonz; lez, op. cit., 
(151) Tbiel 
(152) Luring the war yearss CC me-,, bors flit-, inio lodoyq Abel 
'iorrAs aie Jimn Ctlac6, i Corona ,, ere reprii. anded for 
offences ran, 7in, 7 froi;. *routine atid I)ersorialistic 
methods of work' arid a lack of a sonsn of' rosponsi- 
bility. 6ee articles by Luis ýeinoso and IILIMI)orto Abarca in x1rincipios, ý'eh. 1944. Chac6np wbo had 
been involved in an escapade ii-i which an ibailista 
presidential cawnai, -n iiieetiný,, was sabotar, o(l tri' i7to 1941 %, as 0eioted froi,. tile Guls Political Comi,, Ission 
for several raoziths. Jos4 Varasq CImc6nq P117- (153) 3etween 1942 and 191ý59 Party publicaLions _dO not re- 
veal resistance aiiioa, ýst trade unloni-qLq of tile I-, Jrlfl 
indicate(' in -ýoveý, O-)er 1941. jeel also, ChaP- 59 i)272. 
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PCCh's XIII National Congress In Santiago in December 1945, 
the Secretary Generalt Carlos Contreras Labarcal was severe- 
ly criticised and apparently lost all effective power - 
although he did not lose office until he was kicked upstairs 
to be a minister in Gonzalez Videlate first cabinat. (154) 
The Immediate sequence of events which produced Contreras 
Labarcats downfall began in June 1945 wheng as a member of 
the Chilean delegation to the United Nations Conference in 
San Franciscop he failed to publicly dissociate himself - 4nd 
the PCCh - from a number of that delegation's actions 
(including support for the entrance of 'fascist' Argentina 
to the Conferenceý(155) On his return from San Franciscov 
Contreras Labarca, was reprimanded by the CC and ordered to 
make a public self-criticism. Contreras Labarca initially 
refused to do 3op at least in the way demanded by the CC9 and 
only after long and heated discussions at the X111 Congress 
was he prevailed upon to ComPlY-(156) 
There seem to have been several elements in 
Contreras Labarcats downfall. The most obvious was thatq 
Just as Marcos Chamudes was Iliquidatedt in 1940 in expia- 
tion for the PCChts errors in the conduct of the Popular Front 
strategyq Contreras Labarca was selected to pay for the terrors' 
of XV Plenum collaborationism whichp unfortunately for himp 
(154) Galo Gonzilezq op. cit., pp64-66. 
(155) El Siplo 20.8.1_9'ý75_. The Chilean delecation had also 
offended the PCCh by opposing the admission of the 
Provisional Polish Government to the UN by its 
opposition to veto powers. 
(156) Accordinj; to Luis Corvalan in nicardo Fonseca 
Combatiente Ejemplarg p163, Contreras Labarca readi. ly accepted instructions to make a self-criticism. 
But Galo Gonzalez (op. cit., p65) records that he 
initially resisted making a self-criticism in the 
way lie was told to do so* 
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had become the subject of the PCCh's pressing concern at 
precisely the time that lie was ab. 4ent from Chile &ttendin. 
the UN Conference in San Francisco. Some of the reasons why 
Contreras Labarca and not some other CC member was relected 
a 
as the sacrificial victim seem clear enough. Contreras 
Labarcaq like Earl Browder in the CPUSAq was the most prosit- 
nent PCCh leader publicly associated with the *excesses' of 
war-time class collaborationisms and to subject him to party 
discipline brouight the PCCh into line with international 
communist experience* Ploreoverg since the CC had recently 
incorporated three ex-PST leaders into its numborp it may have 
been eager to demonstrate to them - and to the PCCh as a 
whole - that even its hiChest officer was not above party 
discipline. (157) Butq perhaps the fundamental roason for 
Contreras Labarcals fall was that he had finally lost the 
support of the majority of the ruling group on the CC -a 
group which comprised some 14 CC members by 1945. (158) 
So far as can be ascertained from the available 
evidences Contreras Labarca had remained in office since the 
early 1930s largely on the sufferance of a small group of 
rigorously proletarian CC members led by Galo Gonza*loz. (159) 
Although Contreras Labarca apparently strengthened his per- 
sonal position in the late 1930s with the success of the 
Popular Front strategyt Galo GonziTlez's power and prestit-e 
(157) The three PST members incorporated onto the CC 
PCCh were Carlos Godoy Urrutiaq Natalto Boman and 
Carlos Rosales. 
(158) See Appendix E. 
(159) Seep blarta Vergara Konjorias do una mujer irreverentelg 
p129. 
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also increased through the creation of a national systom of 
Control Commissions in 1938 -a system of which he was the 
head. (160) The firm criticism of Contreras Labarca at 
the IX Plenum in October 1940 showed that he was not be- 
yond the reach of GonzSlez and his allies - as did the 
demotion of Contreras Labarca'3 closest associate from the 
CC in December 1941. (161) Even sot Gonz; lezls own posi- 
tion was far from being, totally secure - as his admission 
that he was afraid to make known his objections to the idea 
of changing the PCCh9a natne indicates. (162) Nevertbolos3s 
with Duclost denunciation of Browderism and the change in 
the policy of the International Communist k-iovenient which that 
event sianifiedl Galo Gonzalez was in a position to engineer 
the downfall of Contreras Labarcas Whether he did so for 
any reason other than Contreras Labarca'3 collaborationism 
and ineiscipline iss in the final analysiap difficult to 
decide* Butp given that there was an underlying rivalry 
between Gonzalez and Contreras Labarca -a rivalry whichl 
nonethelessg did not prevent the two men from working to- 
gether over many years - it 3eemis likely that Contreras 
Labarca finally lost office not so much because of his 
terrors' but simply because another candidate with the neces- 
sary qualities to fill the Secretary Generalship had eirierged 
froin amongst tho younger members of the CC& After fourteen 
years as Secretary Generalg Gonzalez and his allies probably 
felt that the time had come for Contreras Labaroa to stop 
down for another want a man of impeccable proletarian origingg 
(16o) See Chapter 4, p209. 
(161) See Chapter 5, pp267-270. 
(102) Galo Gotizalezq op. cit., p64. 
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of wide experience and of proven skilIq the first of a genera- 
tion of Communist leaders nurtured entirely within the PCCh - 
Ricardo Fonseca. (163) 
If this analysis of the reasons for Contreras 
Labarca's downfall is correctl it at least has the merit 
of explaining one of the more puzzling aspects of the whole 
affair - why Contreras Labarca refused to make that self- 
criticism in the way the CC demanded. After allp Contreras 
Labarca had presided over fthd survived several sharp changes 
in the PCCh9s policies with little apparent difficulty* It 
is hard to believe that the latest change in the policy of 
the International Communist Movement presented him with any 
real problem - unlesso of coursep it was the final straw in 
a lengthy process of disenchantment - and his continued 
membership of the CC and the PCCh after his Idemotiont at 
the XIII Congress seems to suggest that this was not the case. 
It might be argued that Contreras Labarca refused to make the 
the required self-criticism for reasons of personal dignity - 
but in the past he appears to have been able to accept fairly 
harsh criticism in good part* It in also possible that 
Contreras Labarcals initial resistance was based on an over- 
confident assessment of the strength of his support on the 
CC. Howeverp on balancop it seems most likely that he re- 
fused to make the self-criticism precisely because he know 
that his tenure of the Secretary Generalship was at stake - 
andq indeeds the fierce struggle which he put up may well 
have saved him from a less dianified exit than the one he 
(163) See Appendix Eq for a brief biography Of Fonseca* 
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subsequently experienced. 
Despite the improvements Made in the PCChIs origani- 
sationg it seems probable that party membership contracted 
during the war years. Although the PCCh had claimed some 
509000 members in 19409 by the end of 1941 it was reported 
that recruitment had 'weakened enormouslyl and that fluc- 
tuations were at their maximum. (164) This situation can- 
not have been improved by the re-call of party cards in the 
early months of 1942 and in August 19429 the PCCh announced 
a campaign to recruit 20,000 now memborao(165) Although 
Galo Gonzalez claimed some successe3 for this cawpaiang due, 
according to himg to the PCChI3 correct political lines it 
was not until April 1943 that the CR Santiago announced that 
it bad reached its target of 29000 new aiembers - some four 
months after the campaien had been oricinally supposed to 
finish. (166) Recruitment picked up again under the Plan 
Nacional do Emulaci6n in late 1943 and early 1944 ands in 
the later part of that year$ it seems probable that the PCCb 
absorbed some now members from the PSýr. (167) Butq after 
early 19449 no significant increases were reported in the 
PCCh newspapers until late 1943p whenp It was claimedg some 
79500 new members had joined the part), in recent nionth3. (168) 
Several points of interest emerge from the PCCh's 
recruiting activities during the war years. Firstlyq the 
PCCh appears to have made its most impressive rains in the 
(164) El SiP12.31.12.194l. 
(165) Ibid. 9.8.1942* 
(166) Ibid. 1.4.1943. 
(167) Between October 1943 and INIarch 1944, the PCCh 
claimed 59000 now recruits, Ibid* 27-3-1944. (168) Ibid. 11-12.1945- 
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periods in which itadopted relatively touqh industrial and 
political positions ass for examples in late 1943 and late 
1945. Seconds although fluctuations sometimes reached very 
hiah levels - at one points Galo Gonzalez reported that 
new members entered by one door and left by another - it 
was not a problem which loomed very largre in the PCCh's pre- 
occupations. (169) This lack of concern probably reflected 
the fact that the leadership was more or less content with 
the size of the partyq despite its fluctuationst or it may 
have reali3ed that the problems could only be correctedg in 
the long rung by an overall and general improvement in the 
functioninF of the party organiBation. Thirdlyp National 
Unity and particularly its XV Plenum variations stimulated 
the FCCh to fresh efforts to recruit from all social classes, 
Indeeds the PCCb was careful to demonstrate that its can- 
didateB for the harch 194,5 elections came from the most 
diverse social 1: roups. (170) and in the XVI Plonum in July 
19459 a number of prestigious intellectuals of national 
prominence - including Pablo Norudaq Juvencio Valle (poets)t 
NlicomedO3 GuZman (novelist) and Alejandro Lipschutz (socio- 
logist) - were formally inducted into the party, (171) 
Noreovert in the industrial unrest of late 1945p the PCCh 
began to make some important ý, ains amoncrat white collar 
workers. (172) 
Given the scantiness of the available evidenceg it 
(16q) Ibido 29.3ol944o 
(170) The PCCh claimed that its candidates for the 1945 
elections included 19 workersg 8 professionals and intellectualsq 1 industrialistg 2 white collar workers 
and a tailor. Principiosq February 19459 PPIO-llo (171) 
. 91 Si912.9.7-1945. (172) Jbide 11.12olg4ro 
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Is impossible to gaure the size of the PCCh during the war 
years with much confidence* If previous estimates of between 
25,000-30,000 members In 1940 bear any relation to the truthq 
it seems possible that after a sharp fall in 19419 member- 
ship began to recover in subsequent years andp althouph 
there were probably some set-backs, by the end of 19459 it 
was probably approachiným the 25#000 mark once more. 
Ironically anoupbg the dissolution of the Comintern 
in June 1943 only served to hiý? hlirht the PCCh's dependence 
on developments in the International Communist hovement andq 
In particular, on developments in the CPUSAe PCCh policy 
clearly followed the General direotion indicated by Earl 
f3rowder until his downfall in 1945, even to the extent of 
discussing the idea of changing the PCChIs namo - an idea 
which made some sense in the United States@ contextq but 
little at all in Chile where the PCCh was a toajor working- 
class party with deep historic roots. Moreoverg prior to 
the announcement of the dissolution of the Cominternp 
Contreras Labarca. spent several weeks in the USA presumably 
being briefed on that topicq while before the XV Plenumq 
Elfas Lafertte spent two months in the USA and Maxicoo(173) 
While there is no record that US Communists visited Chile 
on co-ordinating missionss ex-Comintern dirigente Victorio 
Codovilla. paid regular visits to the country during the war 
years - not always of his own volition - and probably 
continued to play the advisory and co-ordinatiwý role he had 
(173) Ibid- 31-5-1943; 1.7-1944. 
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played when the Comintern was still in existence. (174) 
The PCCh also drew inspiration and guidance from develop- 
ments involving the European Communist Parties* Thusp as 
Europe was liberated from Axis rule and Communists began to 
enter governments of National Unityq the PCCh began to press 
Rfoa for cabinet office*(175) Similarlys as the newly- 
liberated territories held Constituent Assemblies to produce 
new Con3titutionsg the PCCh began to call for a Constituent 
Assembly to decide the future political# social and economic 
organisation of Chile-(176) It can be seen that the dis- 
solution of the Comintern by no means altered the PCCh'B 
rigorous adherence to the policieg of the International 
Movemignt; indeedv it would have been rather surprising if 
the FCCh had suddenly begun to show an independent spirits 
After allp the PCCh's prior adherence to Comintern directions 
had re3tedq in the final analyaisp on the PCCh1a willingness 
to be led and on the Comintern's power to persuade and in- 
duces, With or without the Cominternp the leaders of the 
International Co.., ýmunlst ýIovernent could use the same methods 
(174) Codovilla was exiled to Chile in early 1944. Ibid* 3.5-1944. 
(175) In Ilay 19439 the British press attachS reported to the Ambassador in Santiago that the PCCh had no wish to enter the Rfos administration because it thourht the government 'weak and dilatoryl - and because it was making gains at the expense of the PSe F011 FO 371/33754 A 5365/324/99 dispatch from, Ordo to 
Edeng dated 15-5-1943. A year latorp the PCCh de- 
clared that its exclusion from govornment was no longer justifiable - but that it would not insist 
on cabinet participation if this was an obstacle to the formation of an ADCh cabinet. El Sitlo 5-5-1944. 
By the end of 19459 the PCCh was vierorously deniandinp 
cabinet office. El SieTlo 27-12.1945. (176) The PCCh began to call for a Constituent Assembly 
after the XVI Plenum in july 1945. Seep for exampleg El SirJO 6.9.1945- 
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to win the obedience of the PCCh. 
Howeverg although National Unity in all its various 
forms was directly inspired by the International Communist 
Vlovementg that concept and the policies which flowed from it 
did bring the PCCh what might best be described as a period 
of quiet success. While the PS9 and to a lesser extent the 
PR9 tore themselves apart with factional strupCleaj the PCCh 
strengthened its organisation and began to acquire the sub- 
stance as well as the form of the monolithic party of the 
Bolshevik ideal. While the PR and the PS became hostile to 
Rfos and his administrationg the PCChj without straininr 
the allegiance of its supporters too far# set about proving 
its worth as an ally for governmentt and in doing sop re- 
enforced its acceptability and respectability as a regular 
participant in tl, e game of Chilean politics. 
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Chapter 7 The Cold War and President Gabriel Gonzales 
Videla, 1946-1947- 
332 9 
Although Cold liar pressures began to have some 
effect on Chilean politics in the latter part of 19459 it 
was not until early 1947 that they came to have a decisive 
impacto During 1946 the Radical-Communist alliance remained 
basically intact and the PCCh helped to make Gabriel Gonzalez 
Videla Chilets third successive Radical President and* to- 
gether with the PR and the PL9 formed part of his first cabi- 
net which took office in November 1946. Howeverg by April 
1947s Cold War pressures had intensified considerably and the 
PCCh was forced from cabinet and into an increasinR isolation 
from its allies both inside and outside the government* By 
August 19479 it had become abundantly clear that Gonzalez 
Videla was only waiting for the appropriate opportunity before 
launching a national offensive against the PCCh - an opportun- 
ity which came in October when coal minors on leCal strike 
resisted (with the oncouragement and support of the PCCh) a 
government command to return to work* Accusinp the PCCh of 
plotting his overthrow with the help of foreign aeontel 
Gonzalez Videla ordered the arrest of Communist activists and 
leaders throughout the country and altbou! ýh the party wam 
permitted a severely limited legal existence in the months 
followinp the October strikep it was subjected to fairly per- 
sistent harassment and persecution by the authorities, In 
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September 19489 with the promuleation of the Ley do Defonsa 
de la Democracia, t the PCCh was outlawed and 
its members re- 
treated into complete clandestinity. 
Despite thisp the period immediately following the 
end of the Second 'World ; far wasq in many waysq one of preat 
success for the PCCh, Under President GonzSlez Videla, the 
PCCh occupied cabinet and high Tovernment office for the 
first time in its history and it experienced a dramatic in- 
crease in membersbipq in electoral support and in Its trade 
union influence. Indeedq to no small Oelgroe the PCCh's very 
success proved to be its undoin, - since it alarmed the Right 
and gave its old Radical allies grounds for disquiot* These 
developments, together with the increasingly bitter rivalries 
between Russia and the LTSA and with Chile's pressini! need for 
a US economic aidq Lrave Gonzalez Videla both motive and oppor- 
tunity to take decisive steps to curb the PCChIs growinr power* 
Although the PCCh continued to Buffer from organisational 
problems during 1946 and 19479 there is no evidence to suggest 
that the party was troubled by any sorious internal conflicts 
durine those years. Thust in 1947, in contrast to 1927, the 
PCCh was able to retreat into clandestinity in relatively 
good orderg with its organisations weakened by arrests but 
not by defections or factional strife of any sirnificance andq 
most important of allq with its morale high. 
The economic backeroun4 to Vie political d"velopments 
of 1946 and 1947 was a sombre oneo Production In the copper 
and coal mininj7 industries declined and in 1946j tax revenue 
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from copper exports fell by some 335 million P6303-M 
horeoverp by 19479 the nitrate industry which had experienced 
something of a revival in the immediate P03t-war period was 
also in difficultie3. (2) While Chile0s economy was in the 
grips Of the P03t-war recessiong the price of imported Goods 
continued to rise as did government spending and the Inflation 
rates began to experience some sharp increases rising from 
8*8)& in 1945 to 3-3*5% in 1947-0) Since wagesy in generalp 
did not keep up with inflation and since the supply of essential 
food-3tUff3 like bread and cooking oil became uncertaing 
considerable social and industrial unrest was Generated. (4) 
Perhaps the first effects which the Cold War had on 
Chilean politics was to help push the PCCh towards a tougher 
political line in the latter part of 1945 and to exacerbate 
old rivalries and antagonisms between the PCCh and the PS. 
Howeverg when the PCCh initiated its formal retreat from the 
'excesses' of war-time class collaborationist policies at its 
XVI Plenum in July 1945, it was clearly responding to a mix- 
ture of domestic and international developments. Thusq while 
the publication of Jacques DUC103' letter criticising the 
errors of Browderism in June t945 clearly had a bearing on the 
PCChIs shift of direction - as did the government's comportment 
Coal production fell from 290789530 tons in 1945 to 
199549063 tons in 1946; copper production fell from 47091819413 kilos to 3619038, i6l kilos. 
, 
EstadfAtica 
Chilenap December of 1946 and 1949. Seeq Departa- 
mento do Z3tudiO3 Financierosp Cuentas Fiscales de 
Chile(Santiago91959) p36 for copper tax revenue 
figures. 
(2) Tax revenue from nitrate exports declined from 327.9 
million pesos in 1946 to 149.9 million pesos in 1947- 
Ibid. p36 
(3) A-n-Y-bal Pinto Chile un caso de desarrollo frustrado 
p205 
(4) See Appendix D for a comparison of inflation rates 
and wage increases in one important sectorg the 
mining industry* 
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at the United Nations Conference In San Francisco - other 
factors were also at urork. (5) Even before Duclost letter 
had been publishedg the PGCh itself had admitted that the 
disappointing results of the March 1945 congressional elections 
wereq in part at leastq the product of XV Plenum resolutions 
or rather the PCCh'3 failure to empha3iso their reform con- 
tent. (6) Perhaps more important 3tillg with the disappear- 
ance of the Axis threatq the PCCh no longer had a convincing 
argument with which to porsuade the workers to curb their 
demands for better waf; es and conditions. Indeedl such was 
the intensity of social discontent in tho months after the 
end of the Second World war (even normally quiescent white 
collar workers struck in Santiago) that the PCCh would have 
found it extremely difficult and costlyq in political termsp 
to have attempted to curb industrial unrest. (7) 
Despite these- pressures 9 the PCCh inado no sudden 
lurch to the left. At Vie XVI Plenum In July 19459 the PCCh 
did not abandon the concept of National Unity or its appoals 
to the progressive Right although it did make a more forceful 
commitment to fundamental econowic and social roforms. (8) 
Howeverp in the months followinrr tt-e XVI Plenump the PCCh 
mive consistent began to g support to the workers' demands for 
better wages and conditionsg became Increasinaly critical of 
government and in particular of its tactics of dealine with 
(5) See aboves Chapter 6, pp2q1. -1 322. (6) Ibide PP310-311- 
(7) Seeg an article by Julio Alearfa in PrinCiplos, 
October 1945 entitle(' ILa pequefia bur. -tit-. 9fa iacional 
se incorpora al movimiento social' for an account of the white collar workers' strike movewents. (8) See aboveg Chapter 6p p292. 
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disputes in Important industries by imposing settlements and 
ordering strikers to return to work. (9) 
The PCCh completed its forwal process of re-orlenta- 
tion at its XIII National Congress in Santiago in December 
1945. At that @onigreasp the PCCb called on Chile to resist 
beine drawn into a regional block against the Soviet Union 
and called for a regrouplnj, ý of democratic and progressive 
forces which would push Chile through the bourgeois democratic 
revolution. (10) Accordine to Cotitrera3 Labarcal this pro- 
cess would Involve a profound aerarian reform and the break- 
up of the latifundial niassiveindustrial developýi, ent to and 
Chile's dependence on the imperialist powersq nationaligation 
of the coal and electricity industrioal i, -. iproved standards of 
living for the masses and a now constittition. (11) The PCOh 
claimed that the bost way to achiove thoso obanges was for the 
party to enter cabinetq togethor with other ADCh partiesp and 
to support the workers in their struggle for batter wages and 
conditions. (12) The goals and policios adopted at the XIII 
National Congress wore pursued wore or loss consistently 
during the next two years 
The PS also began to move towards more a-Cressive 
and left-wing policies after the end of the Sooond Uorld War - 
although the shift in direction was not so marked for tho PS 
as It had been for the PCCh. A fow weeks after the PCCh'3 
XVI Plenums the PS announced Its Tbird Front policy of indenen- 
dence from the govern, nent arid from the PýXh and in Augustg it 
(9) See, for exat. iplop El Si; -, lo 23.9.1945. (10) Ibide 9*12.1945. 
(11) Ibide 
(12) Ibid. 
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left the ADCh and became increasingly critical of the 
Fcch. (13) Although the PS had good reason for its actiong 
en,?.! a,, med as it was in a desperate struggle to restore its 
influence and strength after the factional conflicts of 1943- 
449 itq toog was also influenced by international considera- 
tionsq as the 3ocialist historiang J. C. Johetv has indica- 
tedo(14) Unable and unwilltn; ý to check the rising tide of 
industrial unrest which affected Chile in the post-war months, 
the PS sought to take advantage of the growing frictions be- 
tween the USA and Russia in order to gain an edt,. e over the 
PCCh. Thusq in the months afterAMust, the PS attacked the 
FCChq Russia and communist parties In renoral and defended 
the USA from communist charges that It was seeking worl. d 
domination. (15) By January 19469 the PS was accusing the 
PCCh of convertine Chile into a battleground between the Great 
Powers and declaring publicly that the USA would soon he 
fighting communism as it had fourbt natiamo(16) Moreovers 
the PS warned the PR (then holdin; 7 a National Convention in 
Valdivia) that unless it adointed a belligerent attitude to- 
wards the PCChq Pan American Ideals would be endanizerad and it 
could not expect help or support from the PS. (17) 
The PCCh1s deteriorating relations with the Covern- 
ment and the PS helped to produce a serious political crisis 
in late JanuarY 1946* Determined to crush a strike on the 
(13) La Oninion 30.7-1945; 7.8-1945; 30-8.1945. (14) Seat J. C. Jobet El rartido Socialista do Chilo, Is 
p187- 
(15) Seel for examples La 0]2ini6n 20.10.1945; 22.10,1945; 
31.10.1945; 10.11.1945; 19.11.1945. 
(16) Agustfn Alvarez Villablanca Objectivos del jocialismo 
on Chile (Santiagrop 1946)q 
, pl; La Onin-i6n-f7-. 1,1949. (17) La 0-nini6n 17.1.19146. , 
17 1. 
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nitrate fields - andq in general, to restore labour discipline 
in a turbulent industrial climate - Vice President Duhalde 
rescinded the personalidades jurfdicas of two nitrate unions 
(in offectl dissolving thei-, j), (18) This action was denounced 
by the CTChq the ADCh and the PS and in one of the protest 
demonstrations which followed in Plaza Bulneaq Santiagog the 
nolice opened fireq killinp several participantso(19) 'rho 
'massacre* of Plaza Rulnes led Duhalde to impose a state of 
siepe and to invite Armed Service chiefs into his cabinet - 
actions which caused the PR9 the FrI and the PJA to resign 
froin the cabinet and the CTCh to call a national genpral strike 
for January 30th. (20) The strike was ronerally successful 
and to secure a prompt return to worIcq Duh&lde apreed 'in 
principle' to a number of dej,. iands presented to him by the 
CTCh - demands which included the lifting of the state of 
siegeq the formation of a civilian left-winr cabinetq the 
restoration of the personalidades jurfdicas to the two 
nitrate unions and the nunisIlment of those Cuilty of the Plaza 
T', ulnes massacre. (21) Altfotifrh tile government lifted the 
state of siege on January 31sto on February lat the CTChq in 
an attempt to force the rapid implementation of its other 
demandas announced the re-im. position of the strike from 
February 4th. (22) At that point, the paths of the PS and 
the PCCh began to diverUe sharply. On February 2nd, the PS 
(18) El Sial! 13-1.1946. 
(19) Ibid. 29.1.1946. 
(20) Ibid* 1.2.1946. 
(21) Ibid. 4.2.1946. Other de"ands included the rupture 
of diplomatic relations with 3pain and Arf-, entinat 
effective action anainst price rises and tbo witbdrawal 
of the decree prohibitin- peasant unionisation. (22) Ibie. 2.2.1946. 
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accepted an invitation from Duhalde to join his cabinetq de- 
clared that the decision to re-impose the general strike had 
been forced upon the CTCh by the PCCh and instructed its sup- 
porters not to respond to the new strike call. (23) Not 
surprisinglyp since the Socialist delegates to the Conse. jo 
Directivo Nacional(CDN) of the CTCh had originally approved 
the renewal of the strike - andg in any event, were bound by 
the decision of the majority - the PCCh accused the PS of 
betrayinj; the working class movement for the tawdry rewards 
of cabinet office. (24) For its partp the PS declared that 
similar ambition for cabinet office had motivated the PCCh 
to press for the new strikeg that the PS's presence in cabinet 
was sufficient guarantee that Duhaldo would live up to his 
undertakings and thatp in consequencev there was no need for 
a further Coneral strike*(25) 
Partly because of the PS's defectiong the general 
strike wbich began on February 4th was not as effeotive as 
the previous one - although it was not the complete failure 
that the PS claimed, (26) On February 7ths after receiving 
a detailed reply to its demands from the covernmentg the CTCh 
ordered a general return to work. (27) Poweverp with the 
approval of the CTCh. some unions continued to strike to gain 
satisfaction for their particular domands9 and it was not until 
February 21st that Vice President Diihalde was able to announce 
that industrial tranquility had boon restorod. (28) 
(23) La Opini6n 2.2.1946; 3.2.1946. 
(24) EI big-10 392.1946. 
(25) La Opin15n 2.2.1946. 
(26) Ibid- 5.2.1946. 
(27) El Siglo 8.2.1946. 
(28) Ibid. 22.291946. 
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The events of late January and early February 1946 
split the CTCh into twoziwarring factionss one 6ocialist and tbe 
other Communists both laying claim to the name of CTCh. The 
Communist CTCh, led by Bernardo Arayas expelled the Socialist 
leader and Secretary General of the undivided CTChq Bernardo 
Ibaftezs with the support (according to El Siglo) of the vast 
majority of CTCh provincial organisations and Most Of the nation- 
al trade union federations. (29) lbaez replied by gaining of- 
ficial government recognition for his Socialist CTCh and by 
using the police to evict Communists from the CTCh headquarters 
in Santiago*(30) These were but the opening shots in a civil 
war in the trade union movement which lasted until June) 1946 and 
whichq at time3p 3pilt over into physical violence as Communists 
and Socialists battled for control of individual unions. (31) 
The Socialist Minister of Labour used his powers to break the 
PCCh's hold over a series of trade unions and he re-activated 
persecutions for fraud against Communist trade union officialso 
prosecutions which had been left in abeyance while the PCCh and 
the government had been on relatively good terms during the war 
years. (32) The governmentp for its partq arrested Communist 
(29) Ibid. 3.3-1946 
(30) Ibid. 19.2.194ý. 
(31) Seep for exampleg La Bora 13.6.1946 for an account of 
one clash between Socialists and Communists in which 
two people were killed and three wounded. 
(32) El Sifzlo 1.3.1946@ Allegations and counter-alletrations 
of fraud in the management of union funds had been 
common currency in the battle for trade union influence 
between the PS and PCCh for many years. 11ownvPr, In 
mo3ts but not allp caso3l this did not mean that tfie 
trade union officials charged with fraud committod that 
offence for personal profit. Usually,, it meant that 
trade union funds had been usec' to benefit the narties 
to which the officials belonged. Under tlie COdia ,o 
del 
Trabajo this was an offence and the account books of 
trade unions were regularly examined by the Direccion 
General del Trabajoq which kept a close watch on union 
expenditure* If a union overspent or mis-spent its 
fundsq the officials were technically guilty of fraud. 
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trade union activists and Mrassed the PCCh press - ineeedq 
by mid-Aprilq some one hundred Comaunist activists were in 
jailq including the director of El Sirlo-03) Put, by June 
1946, official hostilities between the two parties bad begun 
to decline, not only because the trade union elections which 
fed the conflict were over, but because President Mosts days 
were clearly numbered. With his death in late June, tho q"es- 
tion of the forthcominr presidential elections pusbed the 
struggles between the PS and the PCCh into second place - for 
the time being. 
Cold War pressures clearly had an impact on the up- 
surge of antagonisms wbich engulf ad the PS and the PCCb in 
e4rly 1946 " although, given the ancient rivn1ries between 
the two partiesq they provided the excuse ratber than the 
cause. These some Cold War pressures also rlayed their part 
in the deteriorating relations between the government and the 
PCCh and certainly both made use of Cold War analysis and 
language in early 1946. Duhalde accused toe PCCh of oboyinfiv, 
international sloaans aimed at upsetting the nationni economy 
and undermining the dewocratic re6twe and claimeO tbat the 
recent conduct of the PCCh had been *openly revolutionary and 
subversivel. (34) For its part, the PCCh repeatedly allerpd 
that there was an imperialist and reactionary offensive "nder 
way on botb the national and international plane and acc"ned 
US imperialism of plottinj with the Oligirchy to installa 
a Oictatorship in Chile which woulO e, isure Vint ti-e country 
(33) El 51910 15.4.1946. 
(34) Ibid. 21.2.1946. 
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remained in its underdeveloped state. (35) Indeeds in many 
wiLys the conflict between the P--Ch and government in early 
1946 closely paralleled the conflict which forced tbe PCCh 
into clandestinity the following year. (36) However, while 
Cold War pressures were sufficient to widen the hreach between 
the PS and, the coalition of left and contro parties With Which 
it had been associated for the better part of ton years# they 
were not strong enough, as yetq to destroy the links which 
bound V-e PCCh and the P. 111 together. 
While the PA was no less aware of the deteriorating 
relations between Russia arid the Western Powers and while it 
criticised the PCCh for its more aggressive labour policies 
in late 1943s the PRts actions during early 1946 were governed 
by other considerations* I" particulars the wit"drawal of 
President Rfos from public life signalled that now presidential 
elections were in the offing. The Pjq still dominated by its 
left-wingg did not look favorably on Whalde's appointment to 
the Vice Presidencyp regarding it, with some justification# 
as an attempt by 11fos to ensure that the next President of the 
Republic would be a right-wing Radical. Moreoverg when Duhaldep 
acting on Rios's adviceq rejected iiadical demands tO Postpone 
the dissolution of the two nitrate unions and to form a left- 
wing cabinets the Pli's hostility towares him incroasedo(37) 
Thus, when the PA sunported the January 30th strike andq unlike 
the PS9 the February 4th strike as well (if only for forty-eiqht 
(35) Seep for examples articles by 'Juruberto Abarca and GalO Gronza0lez in Principlosq FO-ruary-Iarch l, )469 April 1946 
and El Jinlo 24.1.1946; 4.4.1946; 4 P-5.19' 6. (36) The parallel apparetitly even extended to foreiiIn pres- sures bein,,. T placed on Afos to outlaw tie PCCh. Speech by Communist deputy Jo94 Diaz Iturrieta in lomafe to 11 los after Ms deatb. Bl Sif! lo 3.7-19'46. 
(37) 31 Si-lo 
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bours) it did so without any tboupht of takinc sides in the 
Cold War. (38) 
Similarlyq intent as it was to construct a left-wing 
electoral coalition which would give the Radical presidential 
candidate victoryp the PR was almost as anpry with V., e PS for 
joining t1he Duhalde cabinet as was thA PCCh. While the Pit 
was prepared to concede t1-at the FCC1, 's responsiveness to 
., 
ing international conditions and its attempts to use chang 
strikes for political ends were reprebonsibleg it declared that 
the FS was only marginally less guilty of the sama offences - 
and thatl in the current circtinistancesp the PS99 actions had 
been more blameworthy than those of tho PCCh. (39) 
If the left-wing, dominated CEN refused to be panicked 
into an anti-communist stance by eitber Cold War or domostic 
pressuresq differing attitudes towards the alliance with the 
PCCh did have an impact on internal Radical conflicts* In 
March 19469 right-wing Radicals formed tho IMovimiento Rndical 
Democratico (and laterg the Partido Radical Democratico) which 
pledged its support for the Duhalde Covornmentj attacked the 
CEN and the tcommunist' presidential candidacy of the Radical 
left-win. -er Gonzilez Vidola. (40) After b'ýarch 1946p relations 
between the CEN and Duhaldo continued to deteriorate* In Juneg 
the CEN declared its formal opposition to his aovernment and in 
July it took the unprecedented sten of oxpollinq Duhaldo from 
the party for a variety of offences inclurling eivin(, encourage- 
ment to the Novimiento and allowinff his naine to fro forward as 
(39) La Hora 6.2.1946. 
(39) El SiP-'lo 2-3-1946. Report of a speech by On President 
of the CEN PR to the Asamblea 'laklical. 
(40) La. Hora 20-5-1946. 
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a presidential candidate when the PH had already officially 
selected Gonzalez Videla. (41) Notwithstanrling his expulsion, 
Duhalde formally announced his presidential candidacy in 
Au-, ust in a speech in which he attacked the PCChj called upon 
the nation to rise up aTainst the 'accomplices of this inter- 
, 
the CEN of the PR - and accused national sect* - neaninF 
Gonzaftez Videla of being a communist toolo(1#2) 
While relations between Russia and tl-ie West continued 
to deteriorate during wid-1946, the Cold liar was not a decisive 
issue in the presidential cannaign of that year* Althougb 
Cold War pressures exacerbated the PR's internal difficulties 
and strengthened the P. 6's resolve to oppose Gonzalez Videla's 
candidacyl they did not prevent the Pjjq the PCCh and oLher 
ADCh parties from u, eet1n;: r, to endorse that candidacy In July 
1946. (43) lhore striking stillq Cold War pressures were not 
strong enough to -: )Prsuade tfe right-wing parties to sot aside 
their differences and unite belaind a sinfrle candidate to corij- 
bat the Ocomrijunist' threat which Gonzalez Videla appearod to 
represent and on September 4th 19469 Gonzalez Videla defeated 
tbree rival candidates in the presidential electiona. (44) 
Flowevers be failee to win an absolute majority and a Congreso 
Pleno (a meeting of both Chambers) had to be called to ratify 
his victory at the polls. 
Since the richt-wlnC, parties had a majority in 
(41) Ibid. 23-6.1946; 27-7-19'46. 
(42) El -SL-10 3-, 9-1946- (43) Ibid. 22-7-1946. 
(44) The other candidates were Ricardo Cruz Colce (Consorva- 
tivel 142,441), Fernaodo Alessandri (Liberal, 131p 
023 ýOtes) and Bernardo Ibanez (Socialist, votes). 
Gonzalez Videla polio(' 19? t? ()7 voLes. Urzui Valen- 
zuela Los p-trtidos polfticos cl, Ll(inos p98. 
o 345 o 
Congressl rumours of plots and transactions desipned to pre- 
vent Gonzalez Videla froij, being confirmed in office abnunded 
while the right-wing-, press made much of tbe 'red tbrent' in an 
attempt, according to soruep to persuade the kri-ned Vorces to 
step in and declare GonzXlez Videla's election void. (45) 
In the eventg however, when the Congres2 Plano met on October 
24thq Gonzalez Videla, helped by his old nentor Arturo Ales- 
sandri (who had persuaded the PL to vote for him), was con- 
firmed in office by 138 votes to 44. (46) Although Gonzalez 
Videla owed his success in the Co"Zreso Plano to a numbnr of 
factorsy including Liberal antipathy towards his principal 
rivallothe Conservative Ricardo Cruz Coke, and the fears 
aroused by the probable reaction of the PCCh and the masses 
if their candidate was not approvedp he also won because he 
was able to allay the anxieties of all but the most die-bard 
of right-wingers. Precisely how he managed to satisfy those 
anxieties is not altogether clear but tho assurances he xmve 
to the British knbassador in Santiaýýo both beforn awl aftar 
the Congreso Pleno were probably indicative of His Coneral 
approach. Gonzalez Videla privately informed the Wbassador 
that although it was necessary to invite t1le PCCh to share 
government officeq he woull dispense with Its services 
(45) The stronZest rumourg according to tbe Oritish Wbas- 
sador in Santiago, was that Liberals would vote for 
Cruz Coke, who would then resieng leaving ArLuro 
Alessandri (the President of the 3enate) in charpe. 
Alessandri would call fresh elections nnd the KiNt 
would combine to defeat the Left-wing candidate. FOR 
FO 371 52003 AS 6413/16/9, Import front LechA to ! loving 
dated 
1.10.1946. 
Similar rumours were currpnt in 1970 
when President Allende had to be confirmerl in office 
!i ýn. 
__ 
bv aC reso Pleno. 
(46) La Horl 25-10-19-4-6. 
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'as soon as humanly possible's waiting only for the titae when 
the PCCh had discredited Itself boforo the masses. (47) 
Similar assurances were given to the US Ambassador ands 
according to Luis Corvalans to the PL aa well. (48) 
While it mi, -ht well be areued that such assurances 
were merely the necessary price of victory in the Congreso 
Plenop later events suggrest that Gonzillez Videla followed his 
declared intentions fairly exactly. If Gonzalez Videla inten- 
ded to push the PCCh out of government at the first available 
opportunityp the tones of moral outrage which inftisoc' his 
accusations of betrayal against the PCCb in 1947 hardly seem 
justified. Conversely, howevers the chareas of betrayal which 
the PCChq in its turng levelled against GonzXlez Videla also 
lack conviction. PCCh publications of the time leave no doubt 
that the party was fully aware of the strength of the national 
and international forces ranged against it* ý, oreoverq the 
PCCb cannot even claim that it had any particular likine for 
or trust of Gonzalez Videla. AlthouCh Pablo heruda made a 
passionate contribution to his electoral campaian with the 
poem El pueblo lo llnma Gabriol, the PCCh declared its support 
for his candidacy On spite of his vacillations' and becauseq 
as Itbe representative of the ammll and medium bouraeoisiolt 
he had defeated Duhalde, the representative of tho Olig-archyq 
in the contest for the PRIs presidential nomination. (49) 
(47) FOR FO 371/52003 As 6682/16/9, arid A 7055/16/9, re- For-ts from Leche to Bovin, dated 21.10.1914,6 and 4.11.1946 respectively. 
(48) F. Parkinson Latin America, the Cold War and the World 
Powers (Londo7q 1974) P13; Luis Corvalj; n iticardo Fonseca2 Combatiente Ejeninlar p179. (49) Principios, July 1946, Oi6plewento, 'ýesumnn de. la re- 
uni6n eel cc Pccb. 15-16 julioig , -)26. 
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Furtbermoreq at the Convention where Gonzalez Videln was pro- 
claimed the candidate of the ADCh partiesq Ricardo Fonseca 
went to almost insulting lengths to wrint, - a public comi-i4tillent 
from him that he would stand by his election platform and 
&overn with the help of those parties who elected bini to the 
Presidency. (50) In other wordeq theng the PCCh 3upported 
Gonzalez Videla for much the same reason as it had supported 
Aguirre Cerda and Rfos - because he was the best available 
candidate - and not because it entertained any Illusions about 
his probity and dependability. 
Any PCCb expectations that its stay in government 
was likely to be other than a short and stormy experience 
must have evaporated after Gonzafloz Videla announced his first 
cabinet. Although the PCCh bad ur6ed him to form an administra- 
tion based on the ADCh parties and the Falanpe NacionRlq he 
chosel insteadp to invite the PL--to share office with the PH 
and the PCChq so forming the so-called Itricolourt government. (51) 
Although Gonza*lez Videlas a loader of the left-wing Radical 
faction which had consistently condemned Rfos for his insist- 
ence on giving office to Liberaleg found it necessary to amu- 
late his predecessor in precisely that respectq he had little 
real choice in the niattero Quite apart from any deal he way 
have wade with the PL to secure its support in the Congreso 
(50) Luis Corvalan op. cit_, -, PP175-176. (51) Liberals hold 3 ministries (. Defencog Health and Jus- tice); the PCCh also held 3 (Ways and Public Iforkag Agriculture and Lands and Colonization); 4 ! Iadicals 
held the remaining ministries between Viem (Intorioro 
Foreien Affairsp Financeq Commerce and the Sconomy and Education), FOR FO 371/52003 A 7055/15/99 report from Locbe to-13-evins dated 4.11.1946. 
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Plenog Gonzalez Videla had to construct a government which 
would reassure the right-wing parties and the Armed Forces, 
or at least prevent them adopting increasinply hysterical and 
intransigent positions. Moreoverg he needed some ripht-winp, 
support to secure a working majority in Confrress and since the 
Partido Conservador had categorically refused to sharo nffice 
with the PCCh9 the PL seemed the only praetical alternattve6 
Two questions remaing however$ why was the PCCh so 
determined to occupy cabinet office and why did Crontiflez 
Videla find it necessary to honour his undeniable debt to the 
PCCh when the two previous Radical Presidents - who also owed 
their election, in some part at least, to Cowtutinist votes - 
manaaed toikeep that party's support without conceding cabinet 
office? 
The PCCh gave several reasons for wantinf- cabinet 
office. The main reasont according to Galo Gontaolet at a PCCh 
National Conference held in Santiago in October 19469 was that 
the party attached over-riding importance to the impleniontation 
of Gonzalez Videla's election programmeg a propromme which 
promised sweeping changes for Chilo. (52) Since the PCCh had 
supported the two previous I Radical Presidents from outside the 
cabinet and had been unable to ensure the implementation of 
their electoral platformsq, the tilne had come for the PCCh to 
enter government and work for the fulfilment of Gonzalez 
Videla's programme from within. Gale Gonzalez also declared 
that for some time the PCCh had felt the need to pass from its 
(52) El iiflo 17-11-1946. Report of' Galo Gonzalozss 
speecb to the PCChIs October 1946 Conference. 
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tagitationalt phase to one of organisation and creation and 
thats like their European counterpartsp the PCCh wanted to 
play an active and creative role In the solution of the great 
problems which faced the Chilean people. (53) Howevorg there 
were probably reasons other than those that Galo Gonza'loz 
mentionedo The PCCh may well have felt that after having 
helped Agguirre Cerda and Rfoa without much direct rewardq it 
was now entitled to its fair share of the spoils. Furthermoreq 
given the continued deterioration of relations botiveen Mussia. 
and the USAj the PCCh probably felt that it would he better 
placed to defend its interests - and those of the working 
class - inside rather than outside the government. Finally, 
although it is unlikely to have played a lar! 7e part in the 
party's doliberationso cabinet office Cave the PCCh the chance 
to settle some old scores with the PS and, perhaps -nnre impor- 
tantp to strengthen its hold over ti-e trade union iiiovonient. 
There were also reasons why Gonzalez Videla found It 
necessary to Invite the PCCb to share cabinet office. In the 
first instance, in contrast to its attit"de during the Aguirre 
Cerda administration and the earlier part of AfosOm presidency, 
tile PCCh vociferously dewanded office. Secondly, whatever 
wisgivings the PCCh harboured towards Gontalez Videla, it und 
given him valuable support in both the 1942 and the 1946 presi- 
dential campaigns and his debt of gratitude to the party was 
rather greater than that of either Aguirre Cerda or Rfos, both 
of whom had become presidential candidates in spite of Comwu- 
nist opposition. Woreover, while Aguirre Cerda coulO do 
(53) Ibid * 
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without Coi, imunist support because lie could count on the back- 
in(; of a powerful PS and while the Second World War assured 
Rfos of Communist support without having to pay for its neither 
condition prevailed when Gonzalez Videla came to office. Given 
Chile's severe economic difficulties and the disintegration of 
the PS and its displacement by the PCCh as Chile's foremost 
working class partys Gonzalez Videla's need of Communist sup- 
port and co-operation was grenter than that of either of his 
predecessors. Finallyl unlike Aguirre Carda or Rfosp Gonzalez 
Videla was a left-wing 'Radical who professed to see the need 
for refornisp who had announced that the old liberal economy 
was dead and who declaree that he wanted to extend democracy 
from the political into the economic aphereo(54) In contrast 
to Rfos who had tried not to become overdependent on the Lefts 
Gonzalez Videla was anxiouss in the early stages of his admini- 
stration, at any rates not to become overdependont on the 
For these reasonsy he needed tbP PCChIs support and he made 
some atteript to keep that support even after the Communist 
ministers had been forced from the cabinet* 
If Gonzalez Videla hoped that the PCCh would prove a 
docile and trmctable partners tanjely allowing itself to be dis- 
credited before the masses and ther4 quietly oaaod from the 
Governments his hopes were ill-founded* Before accepting 
cabinet offices the PCCh made it perfectly clear that it would 
continue to pursue the airgressive policies it had adopted at 
the XIII National Conaress ane that it would not allow Itself 
to be dragged down tl-, e path of compromise and vacillation 
(54) Seeg Gonza'lez Videla's spef-ch to the Plý National Con- 
vention in January 1946. Ibid. 28,1.1946. 
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which had all but destroyed the PS-(55) At the PCChIs Na- 
tional Conference in October 1946, Galo Gonzalez warned that 
the President's programme would only be implemented with the 
support and mobilisation of the masses and indicated that the 
Communist ministers were not to consider themselves bound by 
cabinet decisions with which they disagreed; insteadq they 
were to report back to the CC which would, if necessaryg take 
the matter to the POOP10-(56) Moreover# Galo Gonzalez also 
declared that strikes were not tho responitbility of the wor- 
kers but were caused by the intransipence of the employerse(. 57) 
Galo Gonzalez off-set these rather apgregsive declarations by 
indicating that the PCCh would continue to seek to persuade 
other groupsq includintr the progressive rightq of the need to 
implemant Gonzalez Videlats election programme and that the 
party was prepared to be accommodatin. 7 within limits btit ho 
imade it clear that the PCCh was not prepared to sacrifice the 
substance of the propramme. (58) Indeed, given the lengthen- 
ing shadows of the Cold War arid its own experiencos of past 
Radical regirriesq the PCCh viewed its entranco into (rovorninont 
not as the triumphant conclusion of decades of effort but as 
the beginning, of a new phase of strurple, a phase in which 
the PCCh was determined to mobilise all Its forces to ensure 
that Gonzatlez Videla redeemed his election pledges arid tVint 
Chile was pushed further down the road to the bourqeois demo- 
cratic revolution* 
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For rather different reasonsg the PL also entered 
cabinet in a combative wood. Unlike the PCCbv howevers the 
PL was not concerned with the implementation of Gonzalez 
Videla's programmes other that with blocking those parts of 
which the Liberals did not approve. Rather the PL bad one 
over-riding aim, to keep the PCCh under the strictest scrutiny 
and to use every opportunity to prevent the arowtb of Comwun- 
ist influence. To that and, it opposed the appointment of 
Communist intendentes and gobernadoreag helped to block the 
ratification of Pablo Neruda's aprointment as Ambassador to 
Italy in the Senate, an0j according to Its own doclarationsg 
accepted posts in the public administration solely in order 
to prevent them from fallin7 into Communist hands. (59) 
Indeed, quite apart from its specifically anti-communist acti- 
vitiesg the PL behaved from the first more like an opposition 
than a government party. It enmpaivned openly anainst the 
economic policies of Finance Minister Roberto Wacholzj It 
supported opposition candidates in congressional by-0100tions 
and, most important of all, it tried (with the help of Conser- 
vatives) to push through Congress P restrictive law on peasant 
unionisation without consulting or informinp the President and 
the other government parties. (60) 
(59) La 1-71orl 19.12.1946. 
(60) This laws first presented to Congress in early 1947, 
was withdrawn on Gonzalez Videla's insistence, re- 
introduced after discussions between the PR and the 
PLI passed by Congress and promulgated on April 30th 
1947. Ly Hora 10ole1947; 18-1*1947; 2.2.1947; 12.2* 
1947. El fialo 30.1-1947. The law severely restric- 
ted peasant unionisation which, mince November 1946, 
had been carried out under t'a noriý; al provisions of 
the C6QQ'o del Trabajo. According to Drian Loveman 
in 37rU(, 19le in the . Countrysidej Politics and Aural 
Labour In Chil2_1919-1)72 (Indiana, 19761- -173o 
sowe 300 such unions w-rp created between Novenbor 
1946 and April 107 - in contrast to tva 34 which bad 
survived from an earlinr period Of peasant unionisa- 
tion under Aguirre Corda. 
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Liberal hostility was not the only obstacle which the 
PCCh had to face when it occupied cabinet office. Not 3ur- 
prisinglys it had to endure attacks frow both the right-wing 
opposition and the Socialists. Indeedq the PS took consider- 
able pleasure in repaying the PCCh for attacks which the 
Communists had made on . 6ocialist P, ýovernnient officials in tho 
past. La OpiniO'n accused Communist ministers and officials of 
causing strikes and of crushing tbems of approving price riseaq 
of packing the bureaucracy with party colleaguesq of causina 
disorder in the countryside and of channellinp supplies of 
scarce commodities (like cookinp oil) to PCCh members and 
supporters. (61) 
While the PCCh rewained on good terms with the 
President and the PR, it could withstand the attacks of its 
right and left wing enemies. Unfortunately for the PCChj its 
relations with the Ph soon became strained* Although the CAIN 
was still technically dominated by left-wing and centrist 
Hadicalsq in theory fairly well-disposed towards the PCChq 
many had government jobs - or wanted thow - and had become 
oficialistas, that is. more or less unconditional adherents of 
the Government* Mile a few Radical left-wingers still clung 
to the policies the PA had pursuee since 1944 and demanded the 
formation of left-wine Governmentsq these were now in a minor- 
ity on the CEN. Thus, in Januaryj when Radical left-wineers 
denounced the antics of the PL and demanded the exclusion of 
Liberals from the governmentg their voices were drowned by 
those of the oficialistas who found the actions of the PCCh 
(61) La Opini6n 16.11.1946; 21.11.1946; 26.11.1946; 
5-12elqT; 19.12.1946; 16-1-1947; 15.2. L947. 
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even more reprebansible. (62) Not only had the PCCb insisted 
on its fair share of the spoils of office but it bad failed to 
exercise a moderatine influence in the field of labour rola- 
tions. kioreoverg the PCChts intense campais-n to uniontse 
tI-e peasantry - ii. ade possible by Vie repeal of one of Agtiirre 
Cerda's decrees prohibiting unionisation in the countryside 
alarmed many Radicals who weres at the same timeq angered 
by Communist attacks on Radical government officials who re- 
fused to co-operate in that campaign*(63) Shortly after 
Radical left-wingers bad called for the exclusion of Liberals 
from Fovernmentp the President of the CEN callod openly for 
an end to the PR's alliance with the PCCh*(64) Partly to 
conjure with this threat and partly because the government 
had dealt satisfactorily with a serins of industrial disputes 
since it had come to officeg the PCCh announced on February 
4th thatp henceforthp the strike weapon would only be used in 
the final resort and that the party would co-operate in a nation- 
al plan to increase lDroduction. (65) 
Even though the PCCh mad, -ý pacifying noises on the in- 
dustrial frontp the rift with the PP continued to prow and, In 
Februarys the CEN announced that local Radical organisations 
were free to choose whether or not they wished to pAct with the 
PCCh in the April municipal elections. (66) For its parts the 
PL continued on its disruptive course. In Februaryq the PL 
announced that it would not co-operate with the PCCh and the 
PR in the appointment of those, consojeros to semi-fiscal 
(62) La Hora 8-1-1947- 
(63) Ibid. 20.1.1947. 
(G4) Ibid. 15.1.1947- 
(65) El Si, "10 5.2.1)47. 
(66) La llora, 12,2.1947- 
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agencies which were within the t. -ift of Conqross andq in the 
same wonthq Liberal senators helped to block the ratification 
of the appointment of two congressmeng one Hadical and one 
Communistq as plenipotentiaries to attend the inauguration 
of the LTrueuayan Prosident. (67) Since the appointment had 
been made by the Hadical I'Anister of Foreipri Affairal the 
Radical ministers resigned in protestq accusing the PL of 
disloyalty - even though the Liberal senators had acted airAinst 
the orders of the PL. (68) The PL resignnd toop probably in 
an attempt to trap the Communist ministers into similar ac- 
tion. (69) 9. utq while the Communists expressed their sympathy 
for the action of their "I, adical colleagueag ti-ey refused to 
resign without the consent of the CC and urged tbo Lýberal 
ministers to return to cabinetq to change theirattitudo and to 
co-operate in the strtj4 a gs-je for the implementatiOn of Gonz'*lez 
Videla's pro7ratawe. (70) 
Although the February cabinet crisis thoorotically 
gave Gonza'let Videla the opportunity to re-shapo his cabinetq 
he chose not to take itq rejected all the resignations andq 
after the PL had given assurances of good behaviour in the 
future, the tricolour cabinet continued in office. (71) 
Several factors probably played a part In Gonzilet Videla's 
decision - even thout7h he had Promised to remove the PCCh from 
cabinet 'as soon as humanly possible#. First$ Liberal indis- 
cipline was hardly an appropriate issue on which to push the 
(67) Ibid. 11.2.1947. 
(68) Ibid. 14.2.1947. 
(69) This, at least, was Ricardo Fonseca's opinion. See 
the article by him, in Principios, February-March 19479 
'Soluc16n pogular a la crisis polfticall pp3-4. 
(70) El siplo 14.2.1947- 
(71) La Hora 14.2.19'ý7- 
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PCCh from cabinetq particularly since the PCCh made it clear 
that it was not going, to he rushed into such precipitate ac- 
tion and sinceg in any event, it was finally beeinninp to 
exercise a Lioderating influence in the field of labour rela- 
tions. Secondlyq at that point Radical anger was directed 
against the PL andq while important sectors of the PR were 
showing signs of increasin(; disillusiono-, ent with the PCChO 
the approach of the April municipal elections argued arainst 
any action which inight upset the electoral arranp,, enients which 
many Radical oreanisations had with the PCCh* 
After the iebruary cabinet crisial howeverg proastiros 
inside the FJI for an end to the alliance with Ve PCCh prew 
ands with the encouragement of the Liberals who pledged their 
su-oport for such a solutiong tile oficialistas beran to advocate 
the formation of an exclusively 11adical cabinet. (72) At tile 
same timeg in the run up to the April municipal electionsp the 
right-wing and socialist press began to intensify their cam- 
paign a-g-ainst the PCCh -a development which led Gonznlez 
Videla to go to the PCCh's defence. (73) iloweverl the results 
of the municipal elections Cave the President both cause and 
opportunity to force the PCCh Out of the cabinet. In those 
electionss the PCChts sunport increased from 30219 votes ill 
April 1944 to 919204 while in Preall terms, thnt is in terms 
of male voters eligible to vote in tbo con-ressional electionsp 
(72) Perhaps the first overt sign that thi3 idea was erain- 
in-, hold in Vie PRp was wlien tlý, e President of the CSN' 
felt it necessary to formally deny rumours that lie 
asked Gonzalez Videla to form sucli a cribinet. 
La 111ora 27.2.1947- (73) In early ! ý, arcbq for exaiýplej ,; onzalez Videla doclnred that anti-coiiirunism was f-iscist-inspired. 
El S1, JZ 3-3-1947. 
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the PCCh had almost doubled its support since March 1945. (74) 
In contrast with the PCCh's dramatic gainsl the PR suffered 
losses whichq though slight, were sufficient to give those 
Radicals who advocated the termination of the PROs association 
with the PCCh additional strengtho(75) The PL9 for its 
partq managedq by a rather tortuous piece of logict to con- 
vince itself that the results represented the massive rejoc- 
tion of Communism by the Chilean people - and it declared that 
it would resign from the cabinet forthwith. (76) Faced by 
the LýberalsO decision to resign and by the Crowing pressure 
from the PR for an all-Radical cabinetq Gonzalez Videla asked 
for the resignations of the Communist ministereg a request 
with which they complied on April 16th 1947. (77) Gonzalez 
Videla immediately formed a new cabinet which included Radicals 
and a few technocrats andl while describing the new admini- 
stration as a *backwards steplp the PCCh declared its support 
for it in so far as it acted in line with Gonzalez Videla's 
electoral platform. (78) 
There were several reasons why the PCCh accepted 
its dismissal from the cabinet with reasonably good ffraceq 
(74) La Direcci6n del-Registro Electoral X_ol Partido 
Comunista ante la Lay do Defensa do la Democracia 
(Santiagos 1951) P8. Estad-1-stica Chilonag 1944-, 
pp637-657* The number of opolitical, votes (male 
votes) rose from 469133 in March 1945 to 78,336 in 
April 1947. 
(75) In 1944, the P11 received 105,001 1 oliticall votes 
and 189137 municipal votes; in 19ý79 it polled 
929032 'Political' votes and 18p538 municipal votes* 
Estadfstica Chilena 19449 pp637-657. La Diroccl6n 
del ]RePistro Electoral op. cit-9 p8. The PCCh claimed 
that the PR lost where it did not pact with the 
Communist% El Siplo 9.4.1947- 
(76) La Hor! j 11.4-. 1947. 
(77) El Siglo, 16.4.1947. 
(78) Ibid. 17.4.1947. 
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In the first placeq Gonzalez Videla allowed those Coýmiunists 
who occuoiee non-ministerial positions in the government and 
public administration to keep their postsl and he had apparent- 
ly intimatee to the PCCh that if conditions perwitted he wotild 
invite the PCCh to return to cabinet in a few months time, (79) 
Secondlys while the FCCh had been entl-ustastic about some of 
the Covernuient's earlier actions - actions like tbe repeal 
of the decree prohibiting peasant unionisation and Chile's 
veto of Spain's application to join the United Nations - it had 
grown increasingly diseruntled with tv-e government's slowness 
to implement other parts of the electoral platform and increa- 
singly critical of its economic policies. By Aprilp it had 
become obvious that tle government was not &, oing to introduce 
the sort of fundamental economic c1lanaes which the PCCh advoca- 
ted butq insteadq was intent on applyinp, the old solutions to 
Chile's economic difficijlties - balancing ti-e budgretq ctitting, 
public expenditure and stabilising wa7es but not pricese(80) 
Apart frow its objections to the Covernment's economic policies, 
the PCCh bitterly opposed a lawq recently api)rovcid by Conaressq 
which severely restricted Peasant unionisation and which seemed 
likely to be approved by the Presidonto(81) Third, the P, ", Ch 
probably reco! -nised I 
that in the current international climate, 
(79) Ltiis Corvala*n op. cit., p196. (30) 47. El SiZIO 9-4-19ý 
(81) The law restricted the number of notitions which could be presented to the landowners tO OnO a Y(Aar - outside t)-e times of harvest and sowin" x- - restricted unionisa- tion to farQ13 WhiCb OTPIO-Vee, o ver 20 wori<nrs (ton of 
Afhom had to be literate) anO wage netLtions had to have the support of 55ý, -' of 0, e wo "' rkerso La 1*ýorq 19.4.1947; 26.14.1947. According to Brian Lovett-, an on. Cit-9 P1739 aý-, ricultijral workers nremnntprl 4oo Writ! e petitions in 1947,24 in l')48 and 11 in 1951 - sýiowinr- that tle law and tl-ie repressio-i n f ti-P p, -, Cjj 1, aci Fj marked effect. 
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Gonza'lez Videla could not be expected to rule with a minority 
government in which the PCCh was a major partnAr. Such a 
government would have 
ýad 
to contend with the hostility of the 
USA and of a majority in Congress and would have hnd to faceg 
within a relatively short periodg constitutional cr13O3 and 
extra-constitutional attenints to oust It from office. (82) 
That the pressure generated by the Cold War was the 
decisive, if indirect factor, in the PCChIs ejection from 
cabinet office seents to be clear. While those pressures had 
affected Chilean politics in one way or another since the 
latter part of 1945, they intensified considerably in the 
early months of 1947- On March 12th of that year, President 
Truman announced what came to be known as the Truniptn Doctrine 
the US's commitment to contain the menace of international 
communism in Europe and elsewhere in the worldl A commitment 
which was followed by a series of economic and military plans 
designed to bolster the Western World arainst Soviet Communist 
aggression. (83) The reaction of many Western p. overnments 
to what wast in effectp Trumants battle crvt was swift. As 
one contributor to La Horn pointed outq in the three months 
after the 1-iarch 12th speechq Co:, munists were forced from 
government in Belgiuniq France, Italy and Cbile - while in 
13razilp the Communist Party was outinweti. (84) 
(32) Accordinp to Sergio Sotomayor Carta Abierta Oe tin ex- 
militante del PC (Santiago, 1953) pp6l-6? and Luis Corvaliin op-. --c-IT. 9 pl9bq the U3 State nepartrient had 
already in6ica in FebrUary 1947 thAt economic aid 
would not be e,, iven to t1lose cmintrtes which purstind foreign policies unacceptable to the USA. 
(83) Walter La Feber America, Russia and tho_Cold War (Now Yorkq 1976) PP58-59. (84) La Hora 6-7-1947. Article by Jaime Mravitales. 
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Gonzalez Videla himself adinitted that Cold War pres- 
sures did play a part in the PCCh's departure from office. 
In his opening address to Congress on May 21stq be declared 
that in the current 'dramatic and disturbed' world conditionag 
no country could be immune from the ffeelinsT of fearl almost 
of panicp which the rivalries of the Great Powers havA raised 
in recent monthsto(85) Althougrb Gonzaolez Videla declared 
that the 'feeling of fear I had caused the PL to resign from 
cabinetp implying that heq himselfg was merely responding to 
the situation which that action had createdg there seems little 
reason to doubt that he was just as affected by the deteriora- 
tine international climate as the PLo Indeedp the assurances 
he gave to the British and US AmbassaOors in October and Novem- 
ber 1946 show that he was well aware of the need to allay the 
fears of the Western Powers. By early 19479 that need had 
become even more pressing because of Chilets parlous economic 
situation andq parallel with the intensification of the Cold 
Warg Chilets need for US economic aid had become more neute, 
Indeed, a week or so before he had askad the Communist ministers 
for their resipnationsy Gonzilez Videla had dispatched a special 
mission to the USA to seek economic assistance and it seems 
highly probable that the two events were connected. Certainlyj 
in the weeks before the economic mission departedg El 31irlo 
was publishing articles which arguedg with some desperationp 
that Chile could survive without US economic aidq thRt a Third 
World liar was not in thp offinp and that V-orn was no evidence 
to sue, 19est that the United States gave preforential treatment 
(85) Ibid. 22.5-1947. 
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to governments of which they approved. (86) 
In reacting to the international climnte - and to 
Cv, ilefs need for US economic aid - Gonzglez Videla was follow- 
ing a path already trodden by Aguirre Cerda and TIfos, Aguirre 
Cerda bad broken his links with tbe PCCIh in 1940, partly at least 
because Chile needed U3 aidg wbile similar pressures hsblre-l to 
persuade Rfos to rupture Chilege relations with the Axil 
powers in 1943.07) Noreovorg while A,, uirre Cerda and Iles 
resistee domestic and international nressure to outlaw the 
PCCh in 1941 and 19469 it seems unli%oly that either of 
Gonzalez Videla's predecessors would have acted very different- 
ly bad they been subjected to the same intense pressures. 
Althou, gh t1le PCCh apparent1v Oeparted from the cabl- 
net on good terms with the President, relations hetween them 
grew steadily cooler after April 1947. At a National Con- 
ference held in Santiago in Mayq Ricardo Fonseca accused the 
US of backing reactionary anO corr"pt rovernments tbrnughout 
the world, poured scorn on the idea that a Third World Ar 
was in the offinC and denounced the USA's military and economic 
plans for Latin America as inimical to Chile's sovereignty 
and independence*(88) However, at the same time, Fonseca 
predicted that the capitalist world would soon be experiencinp 
an economic crisis even more devastatinp than that of 1929t 
and be urged the workers to mobilise apainst rlsinU prices 
and evictions and for the implementation of Gonz&lez Vidola's 
(86) See, for examples an article by Orlando Millas 'Es 
posible mantener un gobierno a Oisgusto de Wall jt? v 
El Sirlo 5-3-1947. See also the editorial in 31 Siglo 
4*4.1947. 
(87) See Chapters 5 and 6 of this work, pp"51-253, P305. (38) El Sigla 24-5-1947- 
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electoral platform. (89) In Juneq on the occasion of a bus 
strike in Santiagop the PCCh's more belligerent attitude pro- 
duced the first serious public confrontation with the President 
when government attempts to crush the strike by applying the 
internal security law produced street incidents In which four 
Orioteral were shot by the police. (90) The PCCh blamed the 
employers" intransigence for the strike but since the govern- 
ment*9 failure to enforce a wages agreement had given rise to 
the strike in the first placeq it blamed the government for 
the bloodshedo(gl) Gonzalez Videla reacted angrily to those 
charges and accused the PCCh of responsibility for the blood- 
shed since it had either been unable or unwilling to restrain 
those of its supporters who were involved in the strike wove- 
ment. (92) bioreovers he charged the PCCh with 'false doma- 
gogy' and rejected the notion that he bad broken his plodg-e 
not to use force against the peoples promi3ingg with uncanny 
inaccuracyq that he would never use force 'to curtail the 
rights the Constitution and the social laws guarantee,!. (93) 
Just as ominous for the future as this first public confronta- 
tion between Gonzalez Videla and the PCCh was the political 
resolution adopted by the PH at a National Convention hold in 
Santiago during the bus strike, At that Conventions a motion 
calling for the formation of a left-wing cabinet was defeated 
and one which pledged support for the current government and 
which prevented the PH from serving in cabinots with any sinple 
(89) Ibid* 
(90) Ibid 11.6.1947- 
(91) Ibid* 14.6.1947. 
(92) Ibid. 
(93) La Hora 15.6.1947- 
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party which professed social and economic doctrines antagoni- 
stic to those held by the PIA, was apnroved. (94) Althoufýhq 
in theorys this resolution eid not rule out a Conlinunist return 
to governuientg in practicep since no right-wing party was now 
willing to share office with the PCChq it i,. iarked the end of a 
decade of Radical-Con-munist, co-operation. 
The growing friction between the PCCh and GonzSlez 
Videla appears to have been closely paralleled by the diffi- 
culties which tlie government was hftvine in sectiring US economic 
aid. According to Fonsecap the special economic mission which 
had been sent to the US in April had returned only with a de- 
mand that an outstanding six million dollar debt he repaid 
before new loans were arranreds while a US wission which visited 
Chile in Mayo apT3arently insisted on a series of conditions 
before it would approve the payment of loans totallinor 26 mil- 
lion dollars. (93) Amonpst those coriditionss accordino to 
evidence cited by the Socialist historian Jorfre Barrfa Ser6n, 
was one which demanded the total exclusion of Communists froin 
all government office. (96) In any events after Gonziloz 
Videla's return from a Pan American conference hold in Ilo de 
Janeiro in Julyp a conference at whicb he endorsed US plans 
for continental military co-operntiong much to tho disapproval 
of the PCChq he began what proved to he the final offensive 
a, ýainst the PCCb. (97) In early August, after protracted 
negotiations with all political parties except the PCCb$ 
(94) Ibid. 9.6.1947. 
(95) El Sifr1o 24-5-1947. 
(96) Jorge Rarrfa Ser(5n 'frayectoria 
-Y 
estructurm del movi- 
iniento sindical chileno 1946-62 (Santtntýo, 199-37-7-57. The evidence was an articlo in t1in ui nublication 
Dusiness Week 
(97) La Ifora 2,9.6.19'47. 
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Gonzalez Videla announced the formation of a cabinet of admint- 
stration in which an Armed Service chieft Vice Admiral Ifolpert 
hold the post of Minister of the Intorior. (98) 
The PCCh declared that the new cabinet was yet another 
back-ward step and announced that the choice which faced Chile 
was now quite clear - popular democracy or dictatorship. (99) 
In line with this analysiag the PCCh called on the proletariat 
to develop 'to the maximum' the mobilisation of the masses and 
to influence eventaq giving popular solutions to the problems 
which faced the countryo(100) In the weeks which, followedg 
the PCCh supported a series of strike actions and latinched an 
increasingly powerful campaign against rising prices in greneral 
and the rising price of bread in particular. When coal miners 
and rail--workerB struckp in part at least to protest against 
rising pricesy Gonzalez Videla accused the PCCh of obstructing 
his plans to combat price speculation and of launchinir revolu- 
tionary strikea. (101) On August 19th, he declared that all 
government posts held by Communists were now vacant and asked 
Congress to grant him Special Powers to deal with the situation 
created by the PCCh's revolutionaby demagogy and by the 
unscrupulous machinations of the speculators. (102) On Aurust 
20th and 21stg Congress granted the Special Powers which the 
President had called for and the government immediately imposed 
a state of emergency on the coal region. (103) The PCCb9s 
reaction to these events was to argue that the current soctal 
(98) Ibid* 2.8.1947. 
(99) El Si, -lo 3.8.1947; 11.8,1947, 
(100) Ibid. 11.8.1947. 
(101) Ibid. 20.8.1947. 
(102) Ibid* 
(103) Ibid. 22.8.1947. 
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unrest was caused solely by the riainp cost of living and to 
deny vehemently that the strike actions it had supported had 
any revolutionary objectivep pointinr to the fact that the 
strikers had returned to work immediately the Special Fnwars 
had been granted. (104) devertheless, while the PCCh In- 
sisted that it would not* under any circu"sta"cesp sui"ort. 
extra-constitutional attempts to oust the logitmate, authori- 
ties from office, it also insisted that it would contin"o to 
defend the rights and Interests of the workers and sunport 
their struggle for better wages and conditionmo(105) 
After Conzalez Videla had obtained his Spocial Powersp 
the PCCh tried to step back froff, a direct confrontation with 
the governa, ent and without fundamentally cbnnginr its POSittOrls 
softened its attacks on the government and callr(4 for t1we re- 
grouping of popular forces* Foweverg hy that tiii-e itwas al- 
ready too late* The ADCh had ceamerl to functiong in anv real 
senseq after the April municipal elections and the PC(; hls de- 
parture from cabinet office ands in late Au-ýustj the Pil broke 
its final link witt, the PCCh by orderin- it. -. -; deleý. -ates to 
retire from tbe Coi-amunist-dowinnted CTCh. (106) Al though 
some elewents in the P11 and in otber parties continued to be 
fairly well disposed towards the PCChq it wasq to all intents 
and purposesl completely isolated by the time its final con- 
frontation with tfe x7overnment cav, e. 
Tl-, P, occasion for Mint confro tation was n mtril, o in 
f 
ne coal fielOs in early October 1947. Tke coal winersq who 
had exhausted all tl. -, e proce(lures laic' down in the Coldt.,, o del 
(104) Ihid . 20 -9 - 1947,, (105) Ibid. 23., 9.19'47. 
(Iorl, ) Ibid. 22 -9-19 "4,7. 
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Trabajo, declared a le: al striko from October Ah - after 
rpjecting government sAggestions of volwitnry nrbitration. 
007) 
On the very day the strike becante effective, thA gov4rnwont 
, lecreed a wage settlement which concedeei nio. -; 
t of tbo winnral 
demands and ordered thew to rr-ttirn to work. 
(109) 10ien ti, e 
miners refusedg the ! ýovArnment hlaiuod tho PCCh for 
their re- 
sistance and accuseel the Cot, antinists of lauricbinirf a rpvoltition- 
ary strike designed to overtbrow the state. 
(10)) The sýovprn- 
ment accepted offers frota the PS to supply workers to replace 
the strikers while the Army recalled many of t"em to the 
colours. (110) On October Rtb, V-1a Aýovernmant announced that 
It had uncovered an intertiRtional co; i, inunint nlots bnand on 
the Czechoslovak and Yu,, -O,; lav embassio-59 aiii-Ad at u,, 1.. j"tttn'a 
the national economy - and on Octobnr 21-qtj Chile broke off 
Oiploniatic relations witb those countries and with Qussia. (111) 
Parallel with these developments, Communist leaders and acti- 
vists were arrested in the coal Zone - irrAsts whicbq interest- 
in-ly enouab, the mininq companies found to he excessive - 
El 31. 
_-lo was 
forced to stop publication and the persecution 
was extended to other repions of the country. (112) Despite 
these measuress the miners continuerl to show resistance until 
October 219t, when the Ariny thwarted Fk-i attna, rt to hrlnfý work 
to a stop by two shifts of' i, irters -ho reftised to -stirfmce Fkfter 
their shifts were over. (113) 
(107) Considering that rouF-I, ly 15,500 Anprs worked in the 
coal inditstry in 1947, tl, p rosult. -q of' Vm hal- 
lot were v-ry L-rressive. Out of 1591ql votmm casts 
159104 were for stril. -e action. Ibid. 27-1-1947. 
(109) Ibid- 5-10-19'ý7- Ti-, --. (it-cree -avt- wn, 7es tncrr-isos of =Pto 140,1- 
(109) La 111ora 
, 
6.10 - 1947. (110) bill - 16 -1 () - 19 47. (111) Ihi 0- 9-11-19'47; 22.1n. 107, 
(112) Ibid. 23-10-19'47. 
(113) La O! Ani6n ? 2.1(). l)'47. 
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Was there, as Gonzalez Videla claimed, a revolution- 
ary Co, munist plot designed to overthrow the constitutional 
order? In any real and ii, imediate senseq there clearly was 
not. While the refusal of the coal miners to return to work 
mi, -bt well be described as an act of civil disobedience or 
even of rebelliong it was not accompanied by any PCCh attempt 
to seize nower - and the wave of strikes which affoctod Mile 
during the coal strike and later were movements of protest 
against the government's treatment of the coal miners and the 
PCCh ratlý, er than part of a synchroni3ed revolutionary Plan. (114) 
Indeeds while the PCCh may have encoural-ed strike actions and 
popular mobilisation in, the belief that it was hastenin, 7 the 
advent of the capitilist crisis which it had prAdicted, it can 
have had no illusion whatsoever that Chile was ripe for revo- 
lution at that tiaiee There were no indications to su,,, grest 
that the ruling classes were in the ! -, rip of a orofound crisis 
or that they were irrevocably divided - on tho contraryp 
whatever t1heir differencesp all the major right-wing political 
forces represented in Cotigress had approved Gonzalez Videla's 
application for special powers in August. (115) Furthermore, 
there were few indications that the Armed Forces were seriotisly 
divided or that their loyalty to tIe established order had 
been seriously underminede(116) Finallyq despite its drania- 
tic growth since September 19469 the PCCh had lost all its 
(114) 111ost of them lasted for iii, iitee Periods r-in,,, . 
1n, from 
2 to 24 bours. ieep for exa, i, plell ihi(I. 9.10.1947; 
25.10-19'47 and 4.12.1947 for tAccounts of protost 
strikes in the nitrate fieldsq copper Anos ritio the 
railways. 
(115) El SiFlo 22.8-1947. 
(il6) Althou7b- rumours of, military plots were fairly common 
, xonzýilez Videla, lil, -e Aguirro CPrOal took tl-o procau- 
tion of' retirinf- IhifIh r-, nIci! ifr officnrs who did not 
I-ave his confidence. 
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allies both inside and outside the workinp class inovoment anti 
was still far from being the tightly disciplined oreanisation 
of the bolshevik ideal* In sump none of the 'objective, and 
'subjective$ conditions for revolution laid down by Communist 
theory existedp and it aeeins extremely unlikely that a party 
as cautious and hard-beaded as the PCCb would have allowed 
itself to be dragged into a revolutionary adventure with such 
small chances of success - even on the 9orderal of the Soviet 
Union. (117) 
Nevertbelesss it is also clear that the PCCh did have 
political reasons for supportinp strike actions and popular 
mobilisation in the months leading up to October 1947 - despite 
its protestations that it was only motivated by the social and 
economic grievances of the people. Iloweverp the PCCh's inten- 
tion was not to force Gonzalez Videla from office or to disrupt 
the constitutional order - events which could only result in 
the immediate establishment of a repressive dictatorial regime. 
Ratherp by exercisini; popular pressure, the PCCh sought to 
persuade the President to chanee directiong to return to his 
alliance with the PCChj to abandon his support for the USA in 
the international field and to press ahead with the implementa- 
tion of his electoral platform. When it became clear that the 
tactics of, popular mobilisation were not producing the desired 
resultsq as it did so appear in August, the FCCh attempted to 
step bac'k from tý, e confrontation which appeared to I-)e iminiriont. 
Howeverg by that time the die was c, -k. gt and the xrovernment was 
(117) lFor a description and examination of the Comintern's 
ti-leories on Vie necessary co-tOttiong for revoDitlon 
see tý* Zic! ýonziels The Comintern and ". 'orld l-nvolution_ (Londong 1)54) PY)B'3-97. 
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intent on launching an offensive against the PCCh - 
both to 
comply with US requirements and to restore 
labour discipline 
at a time of considerable social unrest. 
The pretert for that 
offensive came in October when the coal miners refused 
to 
return to work - with the encouragement and support of 
the 
PCCh. 
Why thong did the miners refuse to return to work? 
After allq the coal region had been declared an emergency son* 
and placed under military control in August# and 
the mihers 
can have had few illusions that any resistance to government 
orders on their part would not prov4ke firm measures 
from the 
authorities* The available evidence suggests that the govern. 
ment was as least as responsible for the mineral refusal to 
return to work as was the PCCho In the first place# in Septem- 
bars the government had ordered the prosecution or mineral 
leaders for their part In the August stoppages - hardly an 
action designed to placate the mine workers. (118) Secondlyp 
although the government had been negotiating with the miners 
until the very eve or the day the legal strike was due to beging 
it did not# as was customaryq inform them of the details of 
the decree with which they were to be ordered back to worko(119) 
Thirdq the actual decree did not explicitly give the commander 
of the emergency zone the authority to order a return to work - 
butq insteadp gave him powers to contract now personnel and set 
out now wage scales. (120) Fourthlyt according to Galo 
(118) El Siglo 9.9,1947- 
(119) Principlost November 1947P article by Galo Gonzjlez 
'Hacia un Fronts Patriotico do Liberacign Social y 
Nacionall, p6. 
(120) Ibid* The unusual form of the decree was also critici- "; -edby the FN. La Hora 7.10-1947. 
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Gonzitlezg the decree was implemented only two hours after the 
strike had commenced and before it had become legalo(121) 
It may beg of courses that some of the lerrorst which 
the government committed in its handling of the situation were 
the product of its haste to got the miners back to work since 
coal stocks were dangerously low. (122) Howeverg given the 
political situations it seems more probable that the govern- 
ment deliberatelys rather than accidentlyg mishandled the situ- 
ation in order to provoke the miners' resistance* 
On the other hands it is equally clear that the PCCh 
adopted an unusually Intransigent attitude throughout the whole 
affair* After all9 during the Second World Wars the PCCh had 
used its influence to curb industrial unrest and it had accep. 
tedg ýhough not without protests President Rfoo's use of emer. 
gency powers to curtail legal strikese While it in true that 
the mineral conflict was legal and justified and while there 
was at least an element of government provocation in the mineral 
resistances the wage settlement decreed by the government gave 
the miners much of what they had asked for, Whys thong did 
not the PCCh urge a return to work? The answer to that question 
appears to lie in the Cold War and In the PCCh1s belief thato 
whatever it didg the government was Intent on thrusting it 
into clandestinitye 
Although a semblance of normality was restored when 
91 SiRlo recommenced publication on November lots from early 
October until July 1948 when the Lay do Defensa do la Democracia 
(121) Principioss Novembers 1947s arbicl, e by Galoo Gonsiles. 
(122) La Hora 7*10,1947. 
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was pas3odg the PCCh functioned in semi-clandextinitys Through 
the censored columns of ElSigloy howeverg the PCCh continued 
to defend strike actions when they occurred$ to criticise 
price rises and to denounce US imperialism - if in the most 
moderate languages The PCCh also made as much as It could of 
the signs of divergence between the PR and the PS and gave a 
warms if reservedg welcome to 7RASq a now coalition which in. 
cluded the FN and other small left and bentre partioxe(123) 
Indeedq the PCChq with the help of Marmaduque Grove and the 
remnants of the PSAq even managed to create a now coalition 
of its own - the Fronts Nacional Democritioo(FND)*(124) 
Formed to fight the Lay do Defonxa do la Democraciag the PND 
had little strength or success - althoughq in may 1948# it did 
fight a congressional by-election# giving its support to a 
candidate backed by the FRAS and the Partido Convorvador*(125) 
Even while the PCCh was permitted a slender legal 
existences the authorities continued to arrest and detain 
Communist leaders and activists and were ableg through those 
arrestal to begin a process of 'cleaning-up$ the trade unionso 
New elections were hold to replace those trade union officials 
who had been detained andq while some unions actively resisted 
the election of new officials and others continued to elect 
Communists to official positions when the Lay do Defensa was 
well on its way to the statute bookq resistancog on the wholet 
(123) El Siglo 3-3-1948. 
(124) Ibid 
,9 
21.4.1948; 22.4.1948; 28*3.1948. (125) Ibid* 10.5.1948* The candidate supported by the TR-ASq the FND and the Conservatives won* 
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was short-lived. (126) The main reason 
for this was not that 
the PCCh had lost the confidence of the workers but rather 
that the legal role which trade unions played in labour rela- 
tions militated against prolonged resistance - since without 
a legally constituted uniong the workers were 
denied the pro- 
tection and the benefits which the C8diRo del TrabaJo- 
bestowed 
upon themo(127) Howevers while government persecution con- 
tinuedg the first signs of clandestine resistancog in the form 
of underground newspapers# began to appearo(128) 
In April 1948p Gonzilez Videla completed the process 
he had begun a year earlier by presenting a bill to proscribe 
the PCCh to Congress* This biliq which in due course became 
the Ley do Defense, do la Democracia and was dubbed the 1:! Z 
Maldita by the PCChq prohibited the lexistencep organinationg 
action and propaganda' of the party and prevented Communists 
from standing or voting in public elections and from holding 
government or trade union officeo(129) Although resisted 
by the PCChq the IN9 the bulk of the PS9 by some congressmen 
from other parties (including the PR and the Partido Conserva- 
dor)q the Ley Maldita was approved by overwhelming majorities 
in both chambers of Congress and promulgated on September 3rdq 




entao Seep for an example of this process Archivo do 
la Direcci6n General del Trabajoq oficiou, 1947 Vol. 
379 Rafe No* 11108o According to La Opini6n 14.6.1948. 
Communists were still being elected to official posi- 
tionss though in reduced numbereq to unions in Sewellq 
Potrerillosq Lots, and Coronel in that months 
Without a properly constituted uniong members were de- 
prived of a number of benefits$ including siok pay and 
funeral expenses. Archivo do la Direcoi6n General del 
TrabaJLP-9 Oficios , 12479 Vol-* 399 1jefe No. 1125o* 
La Opinign 27-2.1948; 28.2.1948. 
La DiMc-cign del Registro Electoral op. cit. 9 ppi-4. 
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1948 - almost two years to the day of Gonzitlez Videla's elec- 
tion to the Prosidencyo(130) Under the Lay Malditat 40,847 
voters were denounced as Communists and 26,474 male voters 
and 19826 female and foreign voters were struck off the eleo- 
toral rollo(131) After the processes of appeal had been 
dealt vithp 23y351 people lost their voting rights - over 
59000 from Antofagasta province and over MOO each from the 
provinces of Santiagog Coquimbo and Concepoi6n. (132) The 
effects which the proscription of the PCCh had in other direc- 
tions was also striking. During 19489 for example# strike 
activity fell drasticallyq largely because of the persecution 
of the P. C. Ch - although a declining rate of inflation and wage 
awards generally in excess of rises in the Cost Of living also 
played a part in the process. (133) In any evento in 1948 
there were 20 legal strikes Involving 7,142 workers - in 
contrast to 37 strikes involving 179216 workers In 1947. (134) 
Illegal strikes and stoppages fell from 127 in 1947 to 6 in 
1948 while the numbers of workers involved fell from 51,069 
to 19203 over the same pariodo(135) The effects of the L= 
Maldita on provinces traditionally dominated by the PCCh were 
very marked - eliminations from the electoral roll in JLntofa. 
gastap for examplev practically wiped out the FCCh's electoral 
(130) The Ley do Defensa was approved by 93 votes to 20 in the Chamber of-Deputies and by 31 to 8 In the Senate* (131) La Direcci8n del Registro Electoral, op, cit. 9 pp43.4a. (132) Ibid* 
(133) In 1948t inflation ran at 18% as couspared to 33*5% in 
1947- Wace increases during 1948 for the coalg copper 
and nitrate workers were 20%. 19% and 16% respective. ly. Manufacturing wages rose by 23%, Anibal Pinto 
Op. cito p205, Estadfstica Chilena 1949, p638; 19489 P705. 
(134) Estadistica Chilena_1949, P707- (135) Ibide 
e 374 o 
support in that province while in the same province illegal 
strikes and stoppage3 fell from 22 involving some 139000 wor- 
kers in 1947 to none at all in 1948. (136) 
Although the principal target of the Ley Maldita was 
the PCChq the issue of whether or not to outlaw it had pro- 
found effects on other political parties. In the Conservative 
Partyl the issue precipitated a final confrontation between 
the more moderate and more right-wing elements (the latter 
eventually left to found the Partido Conservador Tradioiona.,. 
list (137) In the P59 it led to a battle for control be- 
tween the virulently anti-communist current led by Bernardo 
Ibgftoz and Juan Bautista Rossettiq who wanted the PS to colla- 
borate with Gonzalez Videls, In governments and the anti. 
collaborationists, who had opposed the Ley Maldita - the latter 
group founding the Partido Socialist& Popular in 1949. (138) 
For its parts the left-wing of the PR also broke away to form 
the Partido Radical Doctrinaria in 1948. (139) Indeed# of all 
the major partiong only the PL seems to have survived the con- 
flict over the Ley Maldita without ill-offset&* 
Until late 19479 when the PCCh was forced to retreat 
into clande3tinity, it had reaped considerable rewards from its 
association with Gonstlex Videla, Perhaps the most obvious 
of those rewards were the ministerial and other government 
(136) Archivo do la Direccign General del Trab&Jo Momorias 
for Antofagasta for 1947 and 19489 (137) Sergio Fernandez LarrafnOz AmPectos do la divist8n del 
Partido Conservador (Santiagop 1950) pp5--529 contains 
a good account of the division in the Conservative 
Party* 
(138) Alejandro ChOtlin Rojas Traysc-torla del-Socialismo p121. (139) 91 Sialo 4-3-1948. 
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posts it received in return for its support for Gonzalez 
Videla's pre31dential candidacy* The PCCh wa3 allotted three 
ministries in Gonzalez Videla's first governmentg Ways and 
Public Worksq Agriculturep and Lands and Colonisations mini- 
stries of little importance butp nonothelosag cabinet 
posts. (140) 'rho PCCh was also given 5 out of the 24 inten- 
dencias (including that for Santiago)p 16 gobernaciones and 
30 out of the 90 advisory posts on semi-fiscal agencie; i within 
the gift of the President. (141) Howeverp while possession 
of government office clearly increased the PCCh's power and 
influences it was not able to reap the maximum advantage from 
its changed circumstances* The President kept a close cbeok 
on the Communist ministers and their activities while they and 
the lesser Communist government officials were subjected to 
the hostile scrutiny of the Opposition parties and presso(142) 
bloreoverg Communist government officials had to contend with 
the ill-disguised antagonism of permanstitbureaucrato as well 
as that of their fellow political appointees. (143) For 
these reasonag theng and because the PCCh's stay in office 
was relatively briefq Communist penetration of the state ad- 
ministration was probably less than its enemies auggested* 
(140) The most important of these ministries was Ways and 
Public Works whichq on averageg dispensed 8% of the 
government's expenditure* Agriculture dispensed Just 
over 1% and Lands and Colonisationg 0.3Lý. E3tadfatica 
Chilena 19509 pp5lO-511. 
(141) El Siglo 10,12*1946; 11.12.1946: La ITora 3.1.1947- 
(142) FOR FO 371/52004 AS 7440/16/9, Report from Lecho to 
Beving dated 22.11.1946. 
(143) Juan Chac6n Coronag for exampleg had to contend with 
considerable hostility as Vice President of the Insti- 
tuto de Economfa Agrfcolý!. q Jose Miguol Varas Chn ong 
ppl22-123. Maria Marchant, originally nominatod-by 
the PCCh - and Gonzalez Videla - for the position of 
Intendente of Santiagog was rejected by the Controlerfa 
General de la Itep6blIca. 
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Hore important to the PCCh than the actual possession 
of government office was the opportunity to influence the for- 
mulation and conduct of government policy* In the short termp 
Communist influence and pressure appears to have played a 
large part in persuading Gonzalez Videla to withdraw the cir- 
cular prohibiting peasant unionization and to block the admis- 
sion of Spain to the U*N. Other achievements to which the 
PCCh could lay some claim include Finance Minister Roberto 
Wacholz's decision not to press ahead with the savage economies 
and credit restriction which he had originally envisagedg the 
creation of the National Economic Council and the decision of 
the Director del Registro Electoral to allow the PCCh to stand 
in elections under its own name*(144) In the longer rung 
however# the PCCh was unable to defend even these achievements, 
let alone persuade Gonsilez Videla to press ahead with the 
fundamental social and economic reforms he had promised to 
implement* Still logs was the PCCh able to persuade him to 
pursue an independent course in the Cold War* 
Despite the PCCh'n failure to achieve many of Its 
stated objectives, it experienced a massive growth in member- 
ship and in electoral support while it was in government, 
According to Humberto Abarcaq the PCCh Crew by some 52% be- 
tween October 1946 and May 1947 - an Increase which may well 
(144) El Siklo 7-1.1947. Between 1932 and 1947t the Direc- tor of the Registro Electoral refused to allow the PCCh to fight elections under its own namep hasine his arguments on electoral and internal security laws. The PCCh evaded this prohibition by inscribing its 
candidates on the 113ta of other allied parties and by standing as the Partido Democratico Nacional in the 1937 concressional elections and from 1941 as the Partido rogresista Nacional. 
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have brought total membership up to the 50*000 mark. (145) 
Most of the gains made were amonest agricultural and industrial 
workeraq but white-collar workers and members of the opetty 
bourgeoisie# also entered the party in increasing numberss(146) 
Geographicallyq the most dramatic gains were evidently regis- 
tered in the Norte Chico and in the rural provinces of the 
centre and southern and of the Central Valley*(147) Even 
greater than the growth of membership was the increase In the 
PCCh's electoral supports As has already been mentionedl the 
PCCh almost doubled its support between March 1945 and April 
19479 the most impressive gainxq in this casep being reffistered 
in the south and in Santiago. (148) 
As had occurred during 19399 when the PCCh experien. 
cad other dramatic increases in Its membership and electoral 
supportp organisational problems did not loom large in its 
preoccupations during 1946 and 1947* The PCCh's lack of con- 
cern with organinational problems did not mean that these had 
ceased to exist but rather that the leadership was more con- 
cerned with the pressing political problems which confronted 
It - in 1946, the battle against the Duhaldo government and 
the presidential electionsp and in 1947 the struggle to remain 
in government against mounting national and international 
pressures* To some extentq as weliq the lack of concern was 
probably a reflection of the fact that due to the organisational 
improvements made during the war yearep the CC had something 
(145) Humberto Abarca Orranizando la defensa do Chile 
(Santiagol 1947) P10. 
(146) Ibid, pplo-3LI,, 
(147) Ibid. 
(148) Ibid* pl5e The PCCh vote in Santiago Increased from 
139000 to 269000 between March 1945 and April 1947. 
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like a professional and efficient party machine at its dis- 
posal. 
Howeverp in May 19479 after the PCCh had boon forced 
from the cabinett the leadership turned its attention to organ- 
isational problems once moreo Humberto Abaroaq in his report 
to the FCChIs National Conference which met in Santiago in 
that monthg stated that the work of the CC continued to show 
improvements and that its individual members had shown greater 
responsibility and firmness in their performance of party 
tasks. (149) He also reported that there had been an increase 
in the number of trained and effective cadres and that most 
of the CRx showed some sign of improvement. (150) On the 
other hand* dues payments remained at a low level - an averagag 
about 38% of the membership regularly paid dues - and few mem- 
bers paid the percentage of their salaries to party funds that 
the now PCCh statutest adopted at the XIII Congress in December 
19459 63tablished. (151) Morsoverg fluctuations In member- 
ship tended to be high and there was a general lack of politi- 
cal education - and in some casess training courses for cadres 
were begun but not completed, (152) Some CRsq according to 
Abarcap continued to rely on the energies of a handful of their 
memberep a few were seriously divided by personalist conflicts 
and others still did not function according to a concrete 
plan. (153) Abarca also made particular mention of the PCCh's 
trade union activists and leaders who evidently suffered from 
(149) Ibid. 
(150) Ibid. P13. 
(151) Ibid* p1le The best region for dues was Tarapaca' at 
57T- the worstq Linares at 10%. 
(152) Ibid'* P13. 
(153) Ibid* ppl3-l4o 
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a high rate of turnover in their numberp who still suffered 
from Icaudilliat' tendencies and who were still loath to prac- 
tice democratic methods - and share trade union office with 
others of different political persuasionoe(154) rinally, 
Abarca, warned against the growth of 'legalistic Illusional 
amongst the members -a tendency to wait for Communist govern- 
ment officials to act instead of throwing themselves into the 
task of mobilising the masses - and against the continued 
threat of Maxonry. (155) 
The FCCh's general lack of concern with arganimational 
problems during 1946 and 1947 in paralleled by the absence of 
any evidence to suggest that the CC had to deal with any seri- 
ous internal conflicts during those years or face any real 
challenge to its authority, Indeedq serious clashes between 
ministers and government officials and their parties - common 
enough in Chilean politics - appear to have been almost unknown 
in the PCChe This In not to sayq howeverg that there were no 
frictions between the CC and the PCCh government officials* 
Although the CC expressed a general satisfaction with the work 
of the Communist ministers in the first months of officep in 
may 19479 it criticized them for a lack of combativity and of 
rhythm in the performance of their work and the CC declared 
that without its vigilancep the tendency of ministers and 
other government officials to fall into *opportunist devia- 
tionst of the left and rightq might well have had serious 
consequences. (156) The CC also indicted the tendency, on 
(154) Ibid. ppB-10. 
(155) Ibid* pl4. 
(156) Ibid* ppl4-15. 
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the part of some Communist government officialaq to find 'Jobs 
for the boys'. (157) Nevertheleass, of the fifty or so Com- 
munists who held government office through presidential appoint- 
ments few indeed incurred the CC*x active displeasure for 
failings or mistaken committed during their tenure and only 
one of theses Cipriano Pontigop a conseJero in the Instituto 
de Economfa Agrfcola(IRA) appears to have been subjected to 
formal disciplinary measures for his offencon. (158) 
One of the main reasons why the CC did not have many 
difficulties with its ministers or other government officials 
was its policy of selecting capable won from the second rank 
of the party's hierarchy for those posts* Thus# Miguel Conchaq 
the Minister of Agriculturep had not served on the CC before 
his appointment while Victor Contrerasq the Minister of Lands 
and Colonisationg admittedly a regional diriRente of not*9 had 
not served on the CC since 1941. (159) Even Contreras Labaroaq 
the Minister of Ways and Public Work3o who, as Secretary General 
of the PCChq seems an exception to this ruleg ha46 in factq lost 
all effective power at the XIII Party Congress in December 
1945. (160) Indeeds of the 33 members of the CCv only six 
(157) Ibide 
(158) El Popularp Antofacastaq 1.10.1947- Pontigo evidently 
accepted price rises in wheat and flour when the PCCh 
wa 
,s 
opposed to them* Ile was suspended from all party 
work for six months and from his functions as a deputY 
in Congress - except for those occasions when his vote 
was needed. Pontigo had a long and distinguished ca- 
reer in the PCCh after this incident - until his death in the early 1970a- 
(159) Victor Contreras was an ex-Mayor of Tocopilla and a 
member of the CC from 1939. He was demoted from the 
CC in 1941. El Sialo 2.1.1942. Miguel Concha was a 
professional man who had studied economics in Mexico* 
He was active in white collar trade unionism and be- 
came Vice President of the Federaci6n do Emj2leados 
Particulares. Durine clandestinityg he evidently drif- 
ted away from the PCCh and later took a post with the Ibiftez admini3trationjI? 5Z-_r8). 
(160) See above# Chapter 69 PP322-326. 
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hold government office by presidential appointment and of these# 
excluding Contreras Labarcaq only two can be considered to have 
come from the CCIs ruling group. (161) The same pattern 
emerges with regard to the PCCh1s provincial organisations 
few regional officers of importance were given government 
posts. (162) This in not to say that the men appointed to 
government office were nonentities but only that at the time 
of their appointment they no longer hold Important posts in 
the PCCh's organiaation. 
Another indication that the PCCh was not troubled by 
serious internal conflict at the time the persecution commen- 
ced may be found in the fact that very few members were ex- 
pelled for defection and treason* Indeedq in 1947t only one 
Communistq of no great weight in the PCCh but who did hold a 
government post of some importancep refused to resign from 
that post and declared that the 00 was suffering from 'roman- 
ticism' and 'revolutionary infantilism' . offences for which he 
(161) The six CC members who hold government office through 
presidential appointment were Juan Guarraq Joe* 
Valensuels, (both congressmen an well) who had posts 
in the Caja do Credito ARrfcolaq Volodia Toitelboimg 
consejero to the Banco Centrall Contreras Labarcal 
Minister of Ways and Public Works# Juan Chac6n Coronag 
Vice President of the IEAq Bernardo Arayal consojero 
to the National Economic Council. The two ginner 
circle' CC members were probably Chac6n Coronag Secre- 
tary of the CC's Agricultural Commission and Bernardo 
Arayaq recently promoted to the Secretary Generalship 
of the CTCh and onto the CCIs Political Commissions 
91 Siglo 7.11.1946; La or& 3.1.1947- (162) Some familiar names appear in the list of GonzXlez 
Videla's nomination for advisory positions on semi- fiscal agencies; like Higinio Godoyp one-time CC 
provincial actiVi3tt Francisco Deviag Mario Itermosillat 
Oscar Sep6lveda and Pedro Moya - all regional activists 
of note. Howeverg of theseq only one - Pedro Moya 
appears to have had a seat on a regional organisation 
at the time of his appointmente 
& 382 . 
was promptly expelled. (163) Although many Communists prob- 
ably drifted away from the PCCh with some rapidity during 
the first year of clandestinityp according to Galo Gonziloz 
only four Communists of any standing had to be expelled for 
desertiong and only one of these was a member of the CC. (164) 
Thusl in contrast to 1927, when the PCCh suffered from 
serious defectional particUlarly amongst its conCressmang it 
entered clandestinity apparently united and in relatively 
good order. (165) 
Indeedq despite the PCCh's fall into clandestinity in 
1947, the immediate post war period wa39 in many wayst one of 
great, if transitory, successes for the party. The PCCh in- 
creased its membership and its electoral support considerably 
and broadened its appeal to more diverse social soctorse It 
also occupied cabinet office for the first time in its history 
and emerged from that experience relatively unsullied and with- 
out having compromised its reputation in the eyes of its sup- 
porters. The successes which the PCCh enjoyed during 1946 and 
1947 enabled it to retreat into clandestinity with its morale 
high - determined to survive and to continue the struggle for 
sweeping changes in Chile, 
(163) El Despertarg Iquique# 13*12*1947, The post was the Vice-Presidency of the Caja do Cr9dito Minero and the 
man was Julio Ascu: r Latorree So far as can-be ascer- 
tained from the available evidence# Ascuf Latorre had 
not occupied any post of importance in either local 
or central PCCh organisation before his appointment. (164) Gale Gonzalez La Lucha por la formacii6n del PCCh p12. 
Gonzalez names Hermosillap Icazaq Albornoz and Guerra 
as 'traitors' - but does not detail their crimes* 
Hermosilla was a fairly prominent figure in the CR 
Santiago at one time and hold a presidential appoint- 
ment to the Caja Reaseauradora. Albornoz was once 
prominent in the CR Antofagasta and Guerra was a Congressman and a CC member - and an activist of pro- 
minence in the Antofagasta region since the early 19209. 
(165) See Chapter 3, ppll4-131 for a description of the 
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The PCCh and its place in Chilean politics 
Between 1922 and 1947 the PCCh moved from the inargins 
into the mainstream of Chilean politics and acquired some of 
its more striking characteristics both as an organi3ation and 
as an actor in the Chilean political process* Howeverl in 
many ways the PCCh'9 general character was already established 
before it came into existence* The POS9 its immediate pro- 
cursorp was essentially the political expression of a part of 
the new social forces released by the economic changes Chile 
experienced in the late 19th and early 20th centuriese The 
conditions which the migrant workers met in the now productive 
zonesq and most particularly on the nitrate pampaq gave them 
a sharp sense of class identity and class solidarity and 
served to precipitate a conscious rejection of the socialp 
economic and political structures then existing in Chilee 
In the absence of alternative organisations of all types the 
FOS was able to stop in and focus that rejection on thd idba 
of a revolutionary re-organisation of society and the moral 
regeneration of its most neglected and repressed members* 
Indeedl the P059 and the PCCh after itj gave its members not 
only goals to aim for but also rules to live by - and in that 
they were somethinig more than the political parties which had 
vied for place and profit before them. 
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By inheritancet theng the PCCh began its life with 
considerable assets; a vigorous party press and an organisa- 
tion whichq for all its weaknesseaq was capable of maintaining 
a fair degree of unity and cohesion amongst a membership 
prone to sharp personality and tactical conflicts. More im- 
portance stilIq it had a strong regional power basel, close 
links with organised labour and an exceptional leader of 
national prominence. These assets made the PCCh a polftical 
force of some significance on its foundation and gave it a 
degree of acceptance from other political groups not usually 
extended to new parties which openly proclaimed their revolu- 
tionary aims. Thust Radicals, Democrats and even some Con. 
servatives were prepared to make local electoral pacts with the 
PCCh in the early 19209 while a little laterg sections of the 
military movement and its civilian opponents sought the partyls 
favour. Howeverg this guarded acceptance by other political 
groups was destroyed partly by the determination of Ibiftes to 
smash the PCCh as a political and trade union force and partly 
by third period policies which locked the party into a vicious 
circle of isolation and defeat. Only with the advent of the 
Popular Front strategy in 1935 did the PCCh manage to break 
out of that circle and begin to recover some of its lost in- 
fluence. Indeedq with the election of Aguirre Cord& to the 
Presidency of the Republicl the PCCh began a brief era of 
unprecedented prosperity and although the party suffered from 
something of a decline during the war year3q it more than 
made good its losses in the immediate post war period. On the 
o 385 9 
eve of the partyts descent into clandestinity in 1947# it 
had attained a position of power which it did not surpass 
until 1970. 
Clearlyq the PCCh'S evolution has been determined 
both by Chilean conditions and circumstances and by its loyal- 
ty to the Moscow-based International Communist Novemento 
Indee4 the PCCh#s willingness to follow the policies and 
directions of the Comintern and its successor* has been one 
of the party's moat pronounced characteristics since its 
foundation* 'Why should this have been the case and what 
effects did it have on the party's development and fortunes? 
In the early yearso when the Comintern took little 
interest in its Latin American affiliatest the PCCh'9 loyalty 
stemmed primarily from a profound sense of alienation from 
existing Chilean structures and a no less profound admiration 
for what were seen as the achievements of the Russian Revolu- 
tion and the Soviet Union* While such sentiments Continued 
to play an important role in the PCCh's loyaltiest other 
elements soon emerged to strengthen the bonds of allegiance* 
From the later 1920al the Comintern began to take a closer 
interest in the PCCh's affairs; the party began to receive 
greater technical aid and assistance and began to send tuerabors 
to Moscow and to the seats of the Buro Sud-Americano for train- 
ing and for consultations and discussions on the best way to 
implement Comintern policy in Chile* From the early 19309, 
the PCCh was probably also in receipt of somo financial 
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support from the Cominterng thouCh never in the quantities 
necessary to make this a principal factor in its loyalty to 
Moscow. 
Although closer contacts between the FCCh and the 
Cominterng together with third period policisag helped to 
produce schism inside the party in the early 193039 their 
overall effect was to bind the PCCh closer to Moscowe With 
the expulsion of Hidalgo and his followeraq a leadership 
emerged in the PCCh which owed its poaitionq in no small 
measureq to Comintern intervention and whicht for that reasong 
wag doubly loyal to Moscow* Indeadq during the difficulties 
and factional strife of the early 1930ag the principle be- 
came firmly established that loyalty to the Comintern was the 
prime pre-requisite for all those who wanted to lead - or 
belong to - the PCChe 
While the emergence of a leaderahip which owed a 
particular debt of gratitude to the Comintern undoubtedly 
strengthened ties with Mo3cows other factors played a more 
important role. In particularg the PCCh remained loyal be. 
Cause its association with the International Communist Nove- 
ment brought it some very real benefits, Mention has already 
been made of the technical and other aid which the party 
received from the later 192039 but even before then it had 
profited in other ways. In the early 192039 membership of 
the Comintern gave the party a revolutionary glamour and 
authority to which its own actions gave it little claim andq 
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since the Comintern endorsed the use of political means to 
further the revolutionary struggle* a powerful weapon in its 
battle to convince many Chilean workers that participation in 
the 'bourgeois' political process was not the betrayal of 
the revolutionary cause that the anarchists claimede 
More generallyg the PCCh gained a comprehensive 
ideologyj, a clear revolutionary strategy and perhaps most 
important of allp a sense of perspective in the revolutionary 
struggle* Indeed* if the PCCh's association with the Inter- 
national Communist Movement sometimes exposed the party to 
severe penaltiesp it also equipped the party to overcome the 
sternest set-backs. Not the least of that equipment was a 
relatively cohesive and disciplined party organisatione 
After the early 1930st when the Comintern's authority had 
become generally accepted inside the party and when bolshevik 
organisational norms and practices had begun to take hold# 
the PCCh was rarely troubled by serious factional strife. 
Thusq after 19359 the PCCh was able to pursue policies of co- 
operation with centrist and even right-wing groups - and 
support conservative regimes like that of President 11fos - 
without experiencing the sort of internal difficulties which 
all but destroyed the PS in the 1940s. 
Howeverv the partyls Cohesion after 1935 was also 
the product of other factors* After 1933p for example# the 
policies of the International Communist Movement placed little 
strain on the PCCh's loyalties* In factq one of the more 
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important factors in the PCChIs loyalty to Moscow has been 
that, on the wholet the policies Of the Comintern and its 
successors have worked to the partyls advantages Certainly9 
except fob the early 19305 when third period policies forced 
the PCCh into costly and bitter confrontations with its most 
likely allies and with government at the same time# the party 
was not expected to pursue policies which were so obviously 
contrary to its immediate interests for any length of time* 
That the Comintern's policies generally worked to 
the party9s advantage wass in partq the product of the PCCh9a 
increasing skill in applying them to Chilean conditions. 
Certainly after 1933 the PCCh managed to remain loyal to 
Moscow's line andq at the same timep to link its domestic 
policies to changing domestic circumstances* Thuag while the 
PCCh9s drift towards tougher policies in 1940 and 1945 was 
influenced by international events and developmental it was 
also justified - and justifiable - in terms of changing 
domestic conditions. Similarlyq although the Second World 
War led the PCCh to give President Rfos a greater degree of 
consistent support than either the PR or the PSp it was care- 
ful to make that support conditionalg and to respond to popu- 
lar pressures when necessary. Indeed, while the PCCh clearly 
has been responsive to Moscow's policies and directions$ it 
was not quite the abject slave that some of its enemies have 
tried to make out* The PCCh wag giveng and sometimes took9 
time to adjust to Comintern policy changes andq despite 
allegations to the contraryg was rarely expected to change 
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course without explanations which were not full and per- 
suasive or without playing some part in the elaboration of 
the details of Comintern policy for Chile. Ploreoverg while 
international events sometimes caused the PCCh to reverse its 
attitudes towards foreign affairs abruptly and dramaticallyg 
the changes in domestic policy which those events stimulated 
were generally introduced graduallyq and tied to chaneos in 
domestic circumstances* 
If the PCCh's international links and loyalties 
brought the party considerable rewards, they also exposed it 
to some severe penalties. The PCCh lost manoeuvrability withp 
at timesp dire consequences and it laid itself open to the 
charge that it Was the agent of a foreign powerp a charge 
which made it easy for governments to persecute the party and 
which automatically limited its appeal for many Chileans* 
The FCCh's loyalty to Moscow was also a major and continuing 
source of friction inside the Chilean workinig class movement 
and helped to createthe conditions in which the PCCh's most 
serious rival - the PS - emerged. 
Howeverp it would be an exaggeration to attribute 
all the failures and misfortunes which the PCCh exporienced 
between 1922 and 1947 to its international links, General 
Ib&fiezq for examplet dealt harshly with all his opponents 
regardless of their position on the political spectrum whilep 
during the early 1930st all the left-wing parties were sub- 
jected to a degree of harassment and persecution by the 
authorities, Thusq while the PCCh'3 loyalty to Moscow made 
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it an obviousq and easyt target for governmental ho3tilityq 
its revolutionary aspirations would have earned it a rough 
passage through the late 1920s and early 1930s in any event. 
Moreoverg while the PCCh's international links probably did 
help to prevent the emergence Of a 31ngle mass revolutionary 
party in the early 193039 there is little reason to suppose 
that such a party would have retained its cohesion for any 
length of timep given the tendency of Chilean parties to frae- 
ment over differences between personalities and over tactics* 
Having said thisq howeverg it is clear that the 
PCCh's international ties exacerbated the difficulties it had 
to face. Because of those ties, the party delayed In reach- 
ing a workable accommodation with the Chilean political 
system and thus deprived itself of the full fruits of parti- 
cipation in coalition politics for some years, Andq if its 
links with Moscow were a marginal factor in the persecution 
which it experienced in the later 19209 and early 1930sq 
they were the prime cause of its descent into clandestinity 
in 1947. Neverthelesss from the PCChIs viewpointp at any 
ratel the rewards which it derived from Its association with 
the International Communist Movement far outweighed the 
penalties. 
If the PCCh9s loyalty to Moscow has been one of its 
most pronounced featuresq sot toot has been its close linics 
with organised labour. rhe historic role which Recabarren 
and the POS played in the emergence of the modern trade union 
movement in Chilet and the PCCh's close identification with 
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that movement through the FOChq proved of very great value 
to the party, and helped it to survive the difficulties of 
the late 19209 and early 1930a- 
Despite the PCCh's close links with organi3ed labourp 
its ability to control the trade union movement has never 
been as absolute as some of its detractors have ougeestedo 
Certainlyq for many of the years under consideration hereq 
Communist labour leaders apparently conducted their affairs 
without much reference to the party and occasionally showed 
themselves reluctant to follow the party's directionse 
Similarlyq the PCCh19 ability to influence industrial unrest 
was also far from absolutes During the early 1930st workers 
resisted the PCCh's constant exhortations to launch strike 
actions while after 19389 they sometimes proved reluctant to 
comply with PCCh calls to contain industrial unrest. In factq 
at any one timeg the PCCh's ability to influence the course 
of industrial unrest has depended upon a number of variableat 
the attitude and complexion of the government in power, the 
political allegiance of the trade union concernedg the history 
of labour relations in the particular plant and Industry in- 
volvedq the state of the employment market# inflation and the 
rising cost of living* 
Despite all these variableag the PCCh managed to 
expand and consolidate its influence in the trade union move- 
ment during the later 19309 and 1940al even though, after 
19389 it was more often seeking to contain rather than encour- 
age industrial unrest. That it did manage to achieve some 
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success in containing industrial unrest without losing its 
hold over the trade union movement was the product of many 
factors* The PCCh took increasing care in the selection and 
training of its trade union cadres, it enoouraCed its supporters 
to use the legal machinery available for the settlement of 
labour disputes andq during the war yearns it adopted a 
selective attitude towards worker discontents conoentratine 
its efforts onwaiiitaining industrial peace in the important 
extractive industries* In shorts although concerned with 
containing industrial unrestq the PCCh never foreswore the 
Atruggle for better w%ges and conditions and was careful to 
respond to rises in the tide of industrial untest when these 
occurred. 
The eleven years of clandeatinity and semi- 
clandestinity which the PCCh experienced after 1947 did nothing 
to undermine the party's loyalty to Moscow and had no lastina 
effect on its links with organised labour* Nor did olandesti- 
nity produce any profound alterations to the strategy which 
the FCCh had pursued (with some variations) since 1933o The 
PCCh still sought to group popular and progressive forces 
around a platform of broad appealq still sought to mobilise 
the masses around their Orievances and still sought - in so 
far as it was able . to use electoral means to combat Gonzalez 
Videlao(166) Although a small group of CC memberaq led by 
Luis Reinosop campaigned against these tactics between 1949 
and 19519 advocating the adoption of a full-blooded revolu- 
tionary programme and directq violent action# their challenge 
(166) Galo Gonsalez op. cit-oPP75-76; Luis Corvalan 
OP- cit-9 PP217:: 218. 
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to the majority on the CC was defeated and they were expelled 
from the party. (167) Thusq clandestinity tested but did 
not seriously undermine the authority of the CC and the co- 
he3ion of the party* 
By the time President Gonzalez Videla left office, 
the PCCh was already beginning to Play a more or less open 
role in politiesq despite its illegal statuag and seeking 
to re-create an alliance along the lines of the old Popular 
Front. In 19519 the PCCh joined with the Partido Radical 
Doctrinario and the Partido Socialist& do Chile to form the 
Frente del Pueblo which supported Salvador Allende in the 
1952 pi-esidential elections* Allende lost that election and 
1168) 
General Ibifiez became President of Chile for the second t mes 
In more senses than oneg Iba'fiez's second term of 
office proved to be a turning point in Chilean politics. Ilia 
election marked the end of the 11adical ascendancy over Chilean 
politics; during his regime the left-wing parties re-grouped 
and grew in strength, while a new force of the centre smergedq 
the Partido Dem6crata Cristiano. Pursuing its policy of 
rapprochement with the Socialists, the PCCh agreed to settle 
its differences with them in the trade union movement and in 
1953 helped to create a now confederationg the Central Unica 
de Trabajadores(CUT). (169) Howeverg it was not until 1956, 
after the Soviet Commun13t Party had denounoad Stalinism and 
endorsed the 'peaceful road' to powerg that the PCCh was 
(167) Galo Gonzalez ope cit-9 pp6g-73; Elfas Lafertte 
Vida do un Comunista 
, 
pp347-349. 
(168) Urzua Valenzuela Los Partidos Politicos Chilenos p93. (169) JorL-e Barrfa SerSnq El movimiento obroro on chile 
P108. 
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finally persuaded to abandon its attempts to re-create a 
multi-class alliance like the old Popular Front. In that 
yearg the PCCh accepted the Socialist thesis that the revolu- 
tionary struggle was the exclusive responsibility of the 
proletariat and it formed part of a now coalitiong based 
solely on left-wing parties - the Fronts do Acci6n PoRular 
(FRAP)*(170) Aided by the considerable social unrest which 
affected the final years of the Ibjftez regimeq the FRAP parties 
grew in strength and in 19589 the first year in which the 
PCCh was legally permitted to take part in elections once 
moreq the FRAP presidential candidateg Salvador Allendeq came 
a very close second to the victor in that contenty Jorge 
Alessandri. (171) 
In 1961, the PCCh took part in its first coneressional 
elections since 1945 and its percentage share of the votes cast 
almost equalled the record showing it had made in 1941. (172) 
Although the PCCh's relations with the PS were occasionally 
subjected to sharp pressuresq they have remained basically 
firm since 1961 and the PCCh itself continued to grow in 
strengthe In 1970t it formed part of the Popular Unity co- 
altion which finally placed Salvador Allende in the Presidency 
of the Republic* The PCCh's fortunes since 1970 are well 
known - it formed part of Allende*s governmont until his over- 
throw in September 1973 and has subsequently experienced a 
persecution more bloody and persistent than those it suffered 
(170) Alejandro Chel; n Rojas op. cit. 9 ppl42-145. (171) Urzua Valenzuela op. cit- P97* Allende polled 356,499 
votes to Alessandri's 3899948 in a five-cornered fight. 
(172) According to Guilisasti Tagle in Partidos Politicos 
Chilenos p3199 the PCCh polled 11-76% o tile votes 
cast in 1961 (electing 16 deputies to Congress) as 
compared with 10-25% in 1945 and 11.8% in 1941. 
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under either Ibanez in the late 19203 or Gonzalez Vidal& in 
the late 1940s. Whether the current repression will prove any 
more effective than previous ones remains to be seen. But 
on past 3howinag the PCCh will re-emerge from clandestinity 
when conditions permit and will continue to play an important 
role in Chile's life and politics. 
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Appendix A Basic organisational features and 
principles of the PCCh 
After 1926, the PCCh's ba31C organi3ational unit 
was the cell whichq uhlike the sectiong was intended to group 
together all party members at their place of work rather than 
at their place of residence* Howeverg the prevalence of 
underemployment and unemployment and the small size of most 
commercialt industrial and manufacturing establishments often 
meant that there were no other party members at tile place of 
work. Members in this predicament were allowed to form 
street cells where they lived andq indeedq the street cell 
long remained the most common form* The cell was expected 
to meet regularlyg to appoint a secretariat to organtse its 
affairs. Its chief tasks were to organise party activity at 
the grass-roots levelq to recruit now members and to act as 
a two-way channel of communication between the niamhorship 
and the higher echelons of the party. Membership of a cell 
was compulsory and it was through the cell that membersp in 
theory at leastq had the opportunity to participate in the 
formation of party policys(l) 
The fraction was the means by which party members 
co-ordinated their activities in all orranisations which had 
a mass character - trade unionss professional associations 
and even sports clubs* Co-nmunist Congressmen were also 
grouped together in a fraction. The fraction had most of the 
duties and functions of the cell andq indeedq in the trade 
union movement there was considerable confusion between the 
(1) Bandera Roja 17-10-1931; 22.11-1931; 28.11.1931. 
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two forms of organisation* However, the fraction had a special 
responsibility to popularise the party line and to seek now 
recruits. (2) 
Cells sent delegates to Comites Locales(CLs) w1ilch 
co-ordinated party work at the district level; these in their 
turn sent delegates to Comites Regional eis (CRs) which performed 
similar functions at the provincial level. Delegates front 
the lower echelons of the party were sent to periodic National 
Party Congressesq in theory the maxiniunt authority in the 
partyq which decided party policy and which elected a national 
executive Committeep the ComittS Central(CC). 
On paperl thong the PCCh9a organisational structure 
was fully democratic. Howeverg the concept of democratic 
centralism gave the CC the real power. According to this 
conceptq while all party members had the right andq indeadq 
the duty to discuss all party matters fullyand freely, the 
decision of the majority was binding on that of the minority 
ands more important stillq decisions made by the hipher eche- 
lons of the party were binding on the lower. Thusq in effectq 
decisions made by the CC were automatically mandatory for all 
party members. Democratic centralism topether with the develop- 
ment of organisational practices by which out-Coing officials 
nominated their successors, who were then elected by acclama- 
tion rather than ballotq meant that the higher echelons were 
generally able to control their own composition andl indoedg 
were able to impose their own choice of officers on the lower 
echelons. (3) 
(2) Ibid. 17-10-1931. 
(3) Luis Cruz Salas, 'Los Partidos Populares 1931-19451 
(Remoriat Universidad Tecnica del Estadog 1969) P34. 
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Appendix B Indices of Production 1938-1948 
1929 equals 100 
Industry Agriculture Mining 
1938 130.7 110-3 87.3 
1939 129.0 111.1 85.4 
194o 142.9 107.8 90.9 
1941 146.2 106.0 107.3 
1942 144-5 108-3 107-8 
1943 139.4 112.2 101-'). 4 
1944 143.2 122.6 104.2 
1945 163. o 118.0 103.1 
1946 173.0 11811 90.0 
1947 177.4 118*2 102,1 
1948 185.0 126.8 10910 
Source: Ricardo LaCos La Industria an Chilet Antecedentes 
Estructuralea (Santiago, 1966) p37. 
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Appendix C Strike actions 1228-1941 
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apre May June TlY* Aur. SePto Oct, Novo Deco 








Sourcet Juana Stambuk Los floviinientos-Sociales durante el 
Frente Popular (Memorint Univormiclad 
T-e-Cnr-kTTciL-de-l' Hatado, SeLntiopog 1970) 
























Inflation and Wasýs IncreaseSin the 
Mining Industry 1939-1948 
Annual Wage Increases 
Coal Copper Nitrates 
19-5 8.9 14.8 
15-8 7-0 1.9 
16.1 18.4 1k. 'I 
23.1 15-9 1501 
18.4 24.7 11.13 
14.2 r3.6 17-? 
2.0 14.2 ;? I () 
18.0 13.7 17-. 5 
5.6 1.9. t; I') -7 
20.0 19*1 76.; > 
Sourcess Anfbal Pinto Cbilep un caso do desarrollo fruatrmdo 
TSantiagop 1973) P205, 
Estad: fstica Chilenap December 1949, p638. 
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Appendix E Biographical Notes on leading Central 
Committee 1,, embers 
So far as can be ascertained from the availahle 
evidenceg fourteen members survived three successive elections 
to the CC (in 1939P 1941 and 1945) and it seems reasonable to 
group on assume that those fourteen constituted the rulinp 
the CC during those yearsp althouCh some of them probably sur- 
vived. because of their relationslAp with either Galo Gonzalez 
or Contreras Labarca rather than because of their own intrinsic 
merits* Brief bioeraphies of the fourteen are listod below$ 
in alphabetical order* 
Abarca. Cabreraq Humberto Born 1911, Antofagasta Provincep 
the son of a metallurgical worker. Began work as a messenger 
boy in Chuquicamataq later became a metal worker himself, Ac- 
tive in the trade union movement from the late 192099 creatod 
an Fic branch on the nitrate pampa in 1931. Active in the FJC 
in Vifia del inar and elected to the CC of' the PCCh in 1932. 
Went North to Andacollo in 1933 to take up employment as a 
metal worker. While thereq re-activatod the CH Coquimbo and 
becante its secretary. Rejoined the CC in 1938, became a mom- 
ber of the CC's Political Commission and later head of the 
Organisation Commission. Secretary C11 Ovalle 1938-1941. 
Deputy 1941-1945. (l) 
Barraza, Pascual Printer by trade. Secretaryq CR La, Serena 
in 1939P elected to the CC in 1939. Secretary, CR Santiago 
1945-1947. (2) 
(1) El Siglo 11.2.1945. 
(2) El Popular 3.1.1940. El Siplo, ig. 11.1945; 21.1.1947. 
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Chacon Corona, Juan' Born 1896, in Lampaq bastard son of a 
domestic servant and a local landowner. Worked In glass and 
nitrate industries and as a hatter. Became active politically 
first as an anarchistq then as a member of the POS and the 
FOCho Appointed member of the CR Santiago in 1927 and a mem- 
ber of the CC of the PCCh from 1931. Head of the CC#s Peasant 
Commission from 1936, member of the Political Commission from 
the late 19309 to 1945. Deputy 1941-1945. Vice-President of 
Instituto de Economia Agricola 1946-1947-0) 
Contreras Labarcaq Carlos Born 1899, middle class parents. 
Student leader and qualified lawyer. Joined the PCCh in 1924, 
elected to the CC In 1926. Secretary General of the PCCh from 
1931 to 1946. Deputy 1926-1930; 1937-19411 Senator 1941- 
1949. Consejero to the Junta do Exportact6n Aprloola 1938- 
1941. ); iinister of Ways and Public Works 1946-1947-(4) 
Dfaz Iturrietag Jose Born 19059 son of peasants* Nitrate 
workerg joined the FOCh in 19219 later worked in the copper 
mines of Chuquicamata. Active in trade union movement tlirough- 
out the 1920s and 1930a but not known when he joined the PCChs 
Elected to the CC in 19399 and a member of the Political Com- 
mission from 1943- Secretary of the Federaci6n Minora from 
1940. Deputy 1941-1945. (5) 
Escobar Dfaz, Andres Born 1902 in Talcat son of an agri- 
cultural worker. 'Worked on the land himselfg then became a 
mechunicp a tram-driver and a rail woricere Joined the FoCh 
and the POS in 19209 Secretary CR Talca 1922-1926; CH CuricS 
(3) Seep JOBS Miguel Varasis Chac6n for detaL13 of Chacon*9 
life and career. 
(4) Frente Popular 25,11,1939- 
(5) El Siglo, 1,2.1945- 
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1926-1929. ýIember CQ from 19329 probably member of the Poli- 
tical Commission from the same year. Deputy from 1932, Secre- 
tary CR Santiago 1941-1945. (6) 
Escobar Zamorag Alfredo Born 1911 in Rfo Coloradot his 
father was a miner and the familywa3 active in the FOChe Pa in ar 
and cement worker, Active trade unionist from the early 19308. 
Joined the PCCh in 19379 elected to the CC in 1939., hember of 
the Control Commission from 1941. (7) 
Fonsecaq Ricardo Born 1906 in Puerto Saavedraq son of pea- 
sants. Trained as a teacher and was active in teachers' unions 
from 1924. Joined the PCCh in 1929, elected to the C11 Santi&Ro 
in 1933. Secretary General of the FJC from 1937 to 1940. 
Probably member of the CC and the Political Commission from 
1937. Appointed editor of El difrlo in 1940. Deputy from 1941. 
Secretary General of the pcch 1946-1949. (B) 
Gonzalez Galo Born 1894 in Valparafso Provincep the son of 
peasants* Worked in the copper mines (1918-1920), later as a 
docker and haulier in Valparaf3o. Joined the FOCh in 1924, 
delegate to the FOCh National Convention in 1925s Joined the 
, 
Socorro Rojo Internacional (PCCh prisoners' aid association) 
in 1926 and the PCCh itself a little latero CC membor from 
19309 head of the Control Commission from the mid-19309. 
Secretary General of the PCChO 1949-1958. (g) 
Lafertteq Elfas Born in 1886 in Coquimbo Provincep motber 
schoolteacher. Typesetter by trade. Founder member POS9 
(6) El iip,, Io 9.2.1945. 
(7) Ibid. 18.2.1941; 5.2.1945. 
(8) Seeg Luis Corvalants Ricardo Fonsoca - Combattente 
I Ejemplar for details 3-f Foriseca0s life-and career. (9) Seeg Luis Enrique Delano Lialo Gonza"lez y In construc- 
ci6n del Partido (Santiapol 1968) for a rtillar hio- 
graphical account of hits life and career. 
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expelled c. 1919. Joined the FOCh and worked on the Fedoracign 
Obrera during the early 1920s. Elected onto the JEF FOCh in 
1923 and joined the PCCh a little later. Co-opted onto Lhe 
CC's Trade Union Commission in 1926. Spent most of the 
IbSfiez years in jail or in banishment. PorennipAl PCCh presl_ 
dential candidate from 1927. CC member from 1931. Senntor 
1937-1953- Although given the unique office of President of 
the PCCh in the 1930sq Lafertte Is generally considered to 
have been the party's 'banderal - the living embodiment of 
the days of Recabarren and the partyts historic past - rather 
than a real force in the leadership, (10) 
Ocampot Salvador Born 19039 in Tarapac9q the son of a rail- 
worker. Linotypist, worked on many newspapersq Communist and 
non-Communist. ýiember POS and the FOCh* Fotinder member FJC 
in 1923, elected to the CC of the PCCh in 1926. Appointed 
Secretary General of the FOCh in 1931 and later becatrio the 
sub-Secretary General of the CTCh (1936-1945) and the hand 
of the CC19 Trade Union Commission. Deputy 1941-1945. (Il) 
Santos Medel, Leoncto Coal minor and union organisor In tho 
southern coalfields. Not known when he entered the PCCh. ý, Onj_ 
ber of the CC from 1939. Deputy 1941-1945-(12) 
Vargas Puebla, 
_Juan 
Born 1908 in La Serenal father a shoe- 
maker* Worked as a tin-platerg later bocame a construction 
worker and plasterer. Joined anarchist-dominated Plasterersf 
Union in 1925- Joined the PCCh in 1932 and was a member of 
the CC of the FJC in the 3ame year. Expelled for Trotskyisw 
(10) Seep Elfa3 Lafertte Vida do un Camunista. 
(11) Seep an anonymous pampl-ilet una Vida al servicio del 
Pueblo (Santiagog 1965) for dotails of Ocamposs career. (12) F. 1 Poy)ular 3.1.1940. 
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in 1934, re-admitted in 1935- Nember of the CC and its Trade 
Union Commission from 1939p metaber of the Political Commission 
from 1941. Regidor 1938-1941. Deputy 1941-1945. (13) 
Zamoraq Justo Born 1902 in Quillotag son of peasant parents, 
Worked in the nitrate fields and later as a tram-driver in 
Valparafso. Joined the FOCh in 19219 recruited by Galo 
Gonzalez Into the PCCh in 1930* Secretary CR Aconcagua 1936. 
1939; Concepci6n 1939-1940. Member of the CC from 19369 
member of the Political Commission 1941-1945. (14) 
(13) El Siglo 4.2-194.5; El Imparcial 29-7-1937. 
(14) El Sigio 19.2.1941; 8.2-1945. 
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Appendix F Votes Cast for the PCCh in peneral 
elections for the Chamber of Deputies 
in 19379 1941 and 1945 
Constituency 1937 L9 41 1943 
10 Arica 2, o94 39702 29399 
2. Tocopillat Antofagasta 39528 79514 59226 
3. Chaftarals Copiapo 253 - - 
4. La Serenap Coquimbo - 49136 39753 
5. Petorcaq San Felipe - 19823 19053 
6. Valparafsop Quillota 49275 5,466 49777 
7- Santiago lat. 39737 6,591 79090 
2nd. - 19989 29251 * 
3rd 29340 2,615 
8. Melipillap San Antonio - 19421 19317 * 
9, Rancagua 19038 29690 1094 * 
10. San Fernandol Santa - 429 - 
Cruz 
11. CuricS - 19218 723 
12* Talcap Curepto - 19797 903 
13. Constituci6n - - - 
14* Linares - 492 
15- Itata - - - 
16. Chillan - 7814 43o 
17- Concepci6n 19944 59773 6,9ý51 
l8e Arauco - 19880 196a3 
19. Laja 
20. Traiguen 671 10 
21* Temuco - 1078 19271 
22. Valdivia 293 19365 19395 
23- Osorno - 286 - 
24. Llanquihue leg 
25. Ancudl Castro 
26. Magallanes - - - 
Totals 179162 539144 469133 
indicates one deputy 
elected 
Sourcet Estadistica Chilena December 19379 September 1941 
and December 19T5-. - 
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A. PRIMARY SOURCE 
Manuscripts 
(a) Foreign Office Records 
, General correspondencet Chile - Series FO 3719 
1922-1946. 
(b) Archivog DirecciSn General del Trabajo. Provi. 
dencias and Oficlos 9 all volumes for 1941-, 
-lg")V6 
and 19T7. Various 
ýrolumes 1934-1945. 
(ii) Printed Documentsq Reports 
Pamnhlet Literature 
3eeches and Contem 
Abarcap Humberto Como organizar la victoria, 
Informe presentado a 17a -Xsesi& 
plenaria del CC del PCCh (Santiaeog 
1941). 
Organizar y movilwar los recursö8 
del 13afs nara la defensm nacional. 
Informe presentado a I& XIII so- 
SiSn plonaria del CC del PCCh 
(santiagot 1943). 
Ormanizando la defensa do Chile* 
Informe presentado a la XIV con- 
forencia nacional del PCCh (San- 
tiaf: o, 1947). 
Alvarez V-p Agustfn El Tercer Frente (Santiaf; og 1945) 
Obýectivos del Socialismo (Santiagoo 
1946) 
Boletines do las Sesiones de la Camara do Diputadon 
Various volumes 1921-1949-. 
Boletines do las Sesiones do la Camara do Sonadores 
Various volumes 1925-1948. 
Bur6 Sud-Americano El Movimlento Revolucionario 
Latinn-Americano. Versionos de la 
Primera Conforancia Comunista 
Latino-Americano. Junio 1929. 
(Buenon Aireng 1929). 
Las Grandes Ltichas Rovolucionitrins 
del Prolotariado Chilano. 
Directiva del LISA al PCCh (Santiagog 
1932). 
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Contreras Labarcao El Trotskismo (Santiagot 1937) 
Carlos 
El Congreap do la Victoria Informe 
presentado al X Con(; reao Nacional 
del PCCh (Santiago, 1938). 
Unidad para defender la victoria 
Informe preaentado a la se3t6n 
plenaria del CC del PCCh. Noviembrog 
1938 (Santiaeog 1938). 
Por la paz X or nuavas victorias UOil-Frente Popular Informe prosen- 
Tado al XI Conareso Nacional del 
PCCh (Santiagop 1939)- 
La Cons)2iraciSn do los anamlZon 
del pueblo Discurso. (Santiagos 
1940 0 
El PrOgrama del Fronts Popular debe 
ser realizado Inforizie al IX sosidn 
plonaria dol-CC del PCCh (Santiagog 
194o). 
Este as Schnakel Discurso. 
(Santiagog 1947). 
Union Nacionaly Partido Unico 
Informs presentado a I& X111 sesi6n 
plenaria del CC del PCCh (Santiago# 
1943)- 
Unign Nacionalppara consolida ; -a desarrollar el ! ýklmen democratico 
(Santiagog 1941#) 
Alessandri; portavoz da las tuerzas 
reaccionariesY--12rofascistas 
Discur3O* (Santiagop 1943) 
La lucha del 12ueblo por la re- 
organizac i do Chile Informs pro- 
sentado al XIII Congreso Nacional 
del PCCh (Santiago, 1945) 
Chacan Coronap Elproblema apraria Informs pro- 
Juan 3entado al XI Congreso Nacional del 
PCCh (Santiagog 1940) 
CTCh Memoria 1943-1946 (Santiapog 1946). 
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Dfaz Martfnezg Juan Treinta Mesas do Acci6n on favor 
del Proletariado Chileno 
(Santiagog 1939) 
Escobar Dfazq Las Finanzas del partido Informs 
Andre's presentado al XI Congreso, Nacional 
del PCCh (Santiagog 1939) 
Unidad Nacional contra el fascismo 
y on defensa do la demooraoift y la 
patria Informo prosentado a la 
assi; rn- plenaria del CC del PCCh 
(Santiagop 1941) 
Executive Committee From the Fourth to the Fifth 
of the Communist 
I) 
World Congress (Londong 19217) 
International (ECC 
The Comintern between the Fifth 
and Sixth World Congresses 
(Lond-ong 1929) 
The Programme of the Communist =ternational (Londony 1929) 
The Revolutionary Movement in the 
Colonies (Londong 1929) 
Godoy Urrutias Adgnde va ei nocialismo? 
C6sar «rSantiagog 1939) 
Quo es ei inconformiamo? 
(Santiagog 1940) 
Groveg Marmaduque Toda la vordad (Santlagog 1929) 
Guerrerog Vietor Por una__juvontud comunista da manas TSantiagop 1941)------- 
Hidalgol Manuel and Dos discursoa on el Parlamento 
Zapatal Emilio (Santialpog 1933) 
Izquierda Comunista En Defensa de la Revoluci6n Informang 
tenis y documenton prosentadon al 
congroso nacional del PC (Santlago, 
1933 
Qui4n dividiS. 01 Grupo "ance? 
(Santiago, no date) 
Federaci6n Obrera A la Clase Trabajadora Ranifesto. 
de Chile (FOCh) Santiago, 1931) 
Resoluciones do la 12rimera con 
,- ferencia de la CSLA (Santiagos 1933) 
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Hapamos la unidad de todos los 
obreros del ]2jfs (Santiagot 19-34) 
Fon3ecaq Ricardo Como resolver los problemax 
nacionales? Informs a la Conferen- 
cia Nacionalp Octubre 1946 
(Santiagop 1946) 
Chile es capaz de resolver aus 
probleman Informe prosentado a la 
XIV Conferencia Nacional del PCCh 
(Santiagos 1947) 
La Dirseci6n del Registro Electoral y el Partido Comu- 
nista de Chile ante La-Ley de Defensa de la Demooracin 
(Santiagot 1950) 
Laferttep Elfas and Los Comunistant Frente Popular y 
Contreras Labarcaq Inde]Rendencia Nacional (-Santinrtop 
Carlos 1937) 
Laferttep Elfas Somo triunferemos an Jae olocciones 
a 19 41 Informe presentado a la 
IX segi6n plonaria del CC del PCCh (Santiagop 1940) 
Ilacia la transformacioon econgmics 
y-politica do Chile Informe pro. 
sentado a la XVI se3i6n plenarin del 
CC del PCCh (Santiagop 1945). 
oft 
Millasp Orlando Una Rolftica para la juventud 
, trabajadora (Santialgog 1940) 
Falmaq Daniel La Unidad Juventud aplastarn al 
fasc. Ismo (Santiago* 1941) 
PCCH Ilacia la formaciSn do un vordadero 
partido do clase Resoluciones (to 
la Conferencia Nacional (Santiago# 
1933) 
Conforencia Repional del PCCh 
(Coquimbol 1933) 
Plan do estudios do un curso do 
capacitaci45n (Santiagoo 193 
Manuel Hidalgo - colaborador pro- fesional con la ru-rguesia (9-antiagog 
1933) 
A los trab&Jadores socialistas 
Santiagog 193 
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Ellas Lafertteq Josig Vepa y Juan 
Guerra (Antofagastag 1937) 
Resoluciones do la VII aesi&n ple- 
naria del CC del PCCh (Santiagov 1939) 
Problemas do OrFanizaciSn (Santiago,, 
1939) 
Estatutos del PCCh (Santineop 1940) 
La Disoluci&n de Ja Internacional 
Comunista (santiagot 1943) 
Chile unido en la coalici6n mindial 
antinazi Resoluciones de la XII 
sesiý; n-plenaria del CC del PCCh 
(Santia, gog 1943) 
00 Blementos teoricos-practicon enatte 





acci4in del PCCh (Santineog 1947) 
La vardad sobre la hualga do los 
her6icos eron del carb6n Decia- 
raci6n de la Comisi6n PolfFica del 
PC (Santiagog 1947) 
Partido Obrero Re- Ad4nde va al CTCh? 
volucionario Tsantlagoo 1944) 
(Trotskyist) 
Partido Radical Cuenta do la actuaciSn dol CEN del 
PR a la XVI Conferencia Nacional 
Ordinaria Enero 1(954-4--Enero-1949 
(Santiaeog 1946) 
Partido Socialista Grove, el militar y ol ciudadano Santiago, 1937) 
Teals polltico presentado al VI 
Congreso Ordinarlo del PS. Seccional 
Nuflos (-Siä nE: i a gr, o9 19 40 Y- 
La linoa politica del PS 
(Santlago, 1941) 
El Libro Negro del Partido Comunista 
TSantiagOt 1940) - 






PosiciOn Doctrinaria y Platuforma 
(Santiago# 1940) 
Poiftica Socialista (Santiagog 
1938) 
Siquierosi Juan Elgroviamos principal obstaculo, 
para la revolucl6n obreraycampe- 
sina en Chile (Santiagop 1933)- 
Vargas Puebla, Juan La class obrera an la lucha contra 
el fasciamo Co-informs presentado 
a la XII sesl6n plenaria del CC del 
PCCh (Santiago# 1943) 
Wais-sp Oscar Frente Popular X Lucha do Clessal 
Grove al Poder o Fronts P 
Poder? (Santiago# 1936) 
Zuftigag Luis El Partido Socialista en lok polftieft 
chilena --US-antiagog 1938) 
(iii) Newspapers and Journals 
(all the following were published in Santiago 
unless otherwise stated) 




















Boletfn del Comitg Central 
Boletfn del CC del la Izquierda 
Comunista 




Boletfn Sindical Agrario 
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Claridad FECh 1920-1931 
Claridad PS 1938 
Consigna PS 1935-1941 
CTCh CTCh 1943-1948 
Combats PST 1943 
El Bonsts (Iquique) POS 1912-1913 
El Combats (Valdivia) PCCh 1926 
El Comunista (Antofagasta) PCCh 1922-t926 
El Despertar (Iquique) PCCh t943-1947 
El Despertar de los Trabajadorea POS/ 1912-1927 
(Iquique) PCCh 
El Despertar do los Obrerog FOCh 1922 
(b Le u) 
El Despertar del Pueblo (Iquique ) PCCh 1931-1933 
El Despertar del Proletariado PCCh 1934 
(Iquique) 
El Grito Popular (Iquique) PD 1911 
El Heraldo (Arica) FOCh 1921-1923 
El Obrero Grafico Prin ting workers 1932 
El Obrero, Panadero Bak ers' Union t924-193i 
El Obrero Tranviario FOCh 1932-1933 
El Popular (Antofagasta) PCCh 1939-1947 
El Productor (Iquique) IWW 1921-1923 
El Proletario (Tocopilla) PD t9o4-t9t3 
El Siclo PCCh 1940-t948 
El Socialista (Valparafso) POS 1915-1918 
El Socialists. (Antofagasta) POS 1916-1921 
El Soviet (Talcahuano) PCCh/FOCh 1922-1923 
Fronts Unico PCCh 1934-1936 
Fronts Popular (Concepci6n) PCCh 1937 
Fronts Popular PCCh t936-ig4o 
Fronts Popular (Iquique) PCCh 1937-1941 
Fronts Popular (La Serena) PCCh ig4i 
Hoz y hattillo PCCh 1932 
Isquierda IC 1934-1936 
Justicia PCCh/FOCh 1924-1927 
1931-1933 
Justicia (Antofagasta) PCCh/FOCh 1931-1934 
Justicia (Iquique) PCCh/FOCh 1933 
Juventud Obrera Fic 1932 
La Batalla (Valdivia) PCCh 1926 
La Chispa ic 1931 
La Chispa Comunista (Talcahuano) PCCh 1923 
La Comuna (Vifta del Mar) POS/FOCh 1919-1921 
La Comuna (Puente Alto) PCCh 1944-1947 
La Defensa Obrera (Tocopilla) PCCh 1927; 
1931-1932 
La Defensa Obrera (Puente Alto) PS 1942-1946 
La Democracia PD 1899-1901 
La Federaci6n Obrera FOCh 192t-1924 
La Gran Federacign Obrera GFOCh 1910-1913 
La Jornada Comunista PCCh 1924-1927 
(Valdivia) 1931-1932 
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La Llamarada (Antofagasta) 
La Locomotora 
La Mujer Nueva 
La Protesta 
La Tribuna 
La Vom Obrera y Gampesina 






























Writers and artists 
(b) Other Party Presses 
La Hora PR 
Trabajo MNS 
(c) The Established Press* 
El Diario Ilu3trado 1922-1948 
El Mercurio 1922-1948 
La Opini6n 1932-1948 





















*All these newspapers were consulted as 
and when required for the years under con- 
3ideration in this study* Their editorial 
viewpoints differed considerably* El 
Diario Ilu3trado was right-wing Catholic 
Conservative and El Mercuric, was liberal 
conservative. La Opini6n wWs pro-ibanista 
and anti-alessandrista In the 19303 but 
became increasingly identified with the 
PS in the 19403. La Naci6n became the 
official governmen: E newspaper during the 
first Presidency of Ibiftez (1927-1931) 
and thereafter reflected the views of the 
government of the day* 
(d) The Comintern and Cominform Press 
El Trabajador Latino Americano 1931-1932 
(Montevideo) 
International Press Correspondence 1922-1939 
(Vienna and London) 
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La Gorrespondencia Sud Americana 1926 
(Buenos Aires) 
Revista, Comunista(Montevideo) 1932 
The Communist International (London) 1929-1935 
World News and Views (London) 1939-1947 
For a Lasting Peaceq For a Peoples$ 1947-1948 
Democracy (Bucharest) 
(e) Others 
Boletfn-de Trabajo 1911-1926 
Estadistica Chilena 1935-1950 
Ercilla 1943-1947 
Revista HOY 1939-1941 
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Trayactoria del Movimianto Cam- 
posino Chileno (Santiagop n. d. ) 
Re barron, (Santiago, 1938) 
Recuerdos do Gobierno (3 Vol**# 
Santiagog 1967) 
Alvarez Andrewsp Oscar Teorfa Y prictica dol sIndical- 
ismo (Santiagog 1940) 
Alexanders R, J* Communism 
- 
in Latin America (Now 
Jeraeyg 1963) 
Trot-skyism in Latin America 
TStanfordq 1973) 
Labor Relations in Argentina, 
Brazil anii Chile (Now Yorks-1962) 
Ampuerop RaU1 La Izquierda en punto muorto ý-gantiagop 1969) 
Angellq Alan Politics 
- and 
the Lnbour Movement 
in Cht10 (Londong 1971) 
Arias Escobodot La Pronsa Obrera do Chileq-1900- 
Osvaldo 1930 (Chill; nq 71) 
Barrfa Serong Jorge Los movimientos sociales do 1910 
a 1926 (Santiagop 1963) 
Trayoctoria-Y estructurm del movi- ;; iento sindical chilono 1949.1ý6F 
(Santiaeog 19637 
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El movimiento obrero en Chile 
iSantiacot 19711- 
Bermudez 2-tirall Oscar El drama i2olitica do ClAle T-Santiagop 1947) 
Blakemoreq He British Nitrates and Chilean _ _ 1974) (London, Politics 1896-189, ý 
Blakemoreq He and Latin America: Geographical Per- 
Smithq Clifford Ed s6) sPective!, (Londong 1971) 
Boorsnerg Demetrio The Bolsheviks and the National - and Colonial Quest! on$ 1917-1928 7-en a va .- 19 57) 
Boizardp Ricardo El Dramatico proceso do Annbalon " Santiaeop 1933) T 
Historia do una derrota (Santiaeog 
1941) 
Voces do la 12olfticat ol- ]261pito 
y la calle (Santiagop 1939) 
Bonillas Frank and Student Politics in Chile (Now 
Glazerg Myron Yorkq 1970) 
Borkenaup Franz World Communism -A flistory of 
the Communist International 
T71ichigang 1992) 
Bowers, Claude Chile through EmbassX Windows Jew York, 1958) 
Bravog Alfredo Gmoe 4 de junio; El Fostfn do lom 
Zu-daces (Santiagog 1932) 
Bravo Laving Mario Chile frente al Socialismo y &I 
To"munismo (Santiagov 1934) 
Bravo Rfosq Leonidas Lo quo supo un auditor do Guerra 
'(Santiagop 1955) 
Browerl D. R. The New Jacobinst The French 
Communist-Party and the Popular 
Lront (Cornellp 1968) 
Burnetts B*G* Political Groups in Chile 
(Austin* 1970) 
Burnettq B*G* and The Rise of the Latin American 
Poblete Troncoso$ Me Labor Movement (Now York, 1960) 
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Caberog Alberto Recuerdos do don Pedro Aguirre 
Eerda (Santiagos 1948) 
Casanueva Valencia 9 El Partido 
Socialista y la luchn 
Fernando and Fernan- de clases en Chile (Santiagog 
dez Conquel Mafluel 1973) 
Cavada Rie3cop Eduardo El Comunismo y su proeotgandit on 
Ehile (Santiagot 1933) 
Chamudesq Marcos El libro blanco do mi leyenda 
n=ra (Santiagog 1964) 
Cuidado, no me desmien 
TSantiagov 1954) 
Chiletuna advertencia fimaricana 
TSantiagov 1972) 
Charling Carlos Dal AviSn Rojo_a la Ropu'blica 
Socialista (Santiaeog 19701 
Chelen Rojasq Alejan- Tra ectoria del Socialismo 
dro Duenos Airesp 1967) 
Chilcotes ReHo The Brazilian Communist Party: 
Conflict and Integration 1,922- 
122_2 (N; -w York, 1974) 
Clauding Fernando The Communist Movement from Com- 
Intern to Cominform (Londont 1975) 
Clissoldp Stephen (ede) Soviet Relations with Latin 
America 1_918_1968. ýLondonq 1970) 
Collierg Simon Ideas and Politics of Chilean In- 
dependence 1808-1833 (Cambridge, 
1967) 
Comisi6n Econ6mica Antecedentes sobre in econowra 
para America Latina chilena 1925-1952--(Santialgol, 19,54) 
Correa Prietog Luis El Presidents lbiflez (Santiagos 
1962) 
Corteaq Lia and Diccionarip Polftico do Chile 
Fuentest Jordi (Santiago, 1967) 
Corvalang Luis Ricardo Fonseca - Combatiente 
Ejemplar (Santiagog 1971) 
Cruz Coke, Ricardo Geograffa Electoral do Chile 
(Santiaeot 1952T 
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Dograss Jane The Communist International 14- 
1952 (3 vo1s*9 Londong 19 0 
Delanop Luis Enrique Galo, Gonzalez y la construcclin - del Partido, (Santiagot 1968) 
Departamento de Cuentas Fiscales do Chile 
Estudios Financieros T-Santiagot 1959) 
Dillong Dorothy International Communism and Latin 
Americas Perspectives and Pros- 
pe. cts (Gain3villet 19bZj 
Donosop Ricardo Alessandri, _ aritador 
Z demoledor 
(2 vola. 1, Maxic-og 1-9-54) 
Durant Florencio El Partido Radical (Santiagop 
1958) 
Echafzq Rene Le6n EvoluciSn do los partidos polfti- 
S. 03 (Santiago, 1949) 
Edwardsq Alberto La Fronda Arfatocratica (Santiagog 
1939) 
Edwardas Alberto and Historia do los Partidos Polfticos 
Freig Eduardo do Chile (bantiagot 1969) 
Ell3worthp P*T- Chile, an economy in transition 
(Now Yorkq 1945) 
Encinag Francisco and Hi3toria do Chile (3 vole., 4th 
Castedog Leopoldo ednes Santiaeog 1961) 
Escobar Zetenog Compendio de la leaislaci6n 
Ari3todemo social X desarrollo del movimiento 
obrerc, en ChIlie- (Santiaýo, 1940) 
Falettos Enzop Rufzq 





Genesis Historica del Procoso 
Politico 'Uhileno (Bantiagol 1971) 
Pedro Aptuirre Carda Y al Franta 
Popular (Santiagog 1938) 
Traicionj (SantiaCog 1941) 
EnVir, ilft_de Guerra (Santiagos1946) 
As, pootos do la divisi6n del var- 
tido Conservador (Santiamos 195 
Inform& (Santiago* 1954) 
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Poster, W. Z. History of the Communist Party 
of the USA_jNew Yorkq 1952) 
Outline Ilistoryof the World 
Trade Union loovement (New Yorkq 
1956) 
GaIdamess Luis Estudio do la Historia do Chile T-8th edno, Santiago# 1938) 
Gilq Federico El sistema politico do Chile T-Santiagop 1969) 
Godoy Urzuag Hernan Estructura social do Chile 
(Santiagog 1971) 
Gonzalezq Galo La Lucha por la formaciSn del 
PCCh (Santiaeol 1938) 
Gonzalezq Jose Curso elemental sobre el Partido 
(Santiaeop 1962) 
Gonzalez B., q Ernesto Parto do los Montes o In sub- 
levaciSn do In mar ' 
inerfa, 
(Santiaj; oy 1932) __ 
Gonzallez Videla, Plemorias (2 vols. 9 Santingog 
Gabriel 1975) 
Graysong George El Partido DemOcratn Cristiano 
Chileno (Buenos Airesq 1968) 
Guiliiasti Taglet S. PartidosPoliticoo Chilenos (2nd, 
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Guifiez C*q Julio Interpretacion do la evolucign 
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1932 a 1952, (ConcepciZng 1963) 
Gfjzman Herna'Ondezq Jorge Gabriel 
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Halpering Ernst Nationalism and Communism in 
Sh-2110 (Mass- p 1965) 
Heise Gonzalezq Julio Historia Constitucional do Chile 
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Historia do Chiles El Perfodo 
Parlamentario 1861-1925 Tiantiagog 
19741 
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Infanteg Marta Testigos del Treinta y Ocho T-Santiagol 1972) 
Jacobs, Dan (ed. ) The New Communism (New York$ 
1969) 
Jobetq Julio Cgaar Ensaxo Crftico del Desarrollo 
Econ6mico-Social do Chile 
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Luis Emilio Recabarrent Los 
origenes del movimiento oGF-aro 
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Luis Emilio Recabarrent obras 
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El Sociallamo Chileno a travgge 
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RI Partido Socialista do Chile 
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La Feber, Walter 
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Corval; n 27 horas (Santiagot 1972) 
Americas Russia and the Cold War TNew York, lqý-&) 
Lagosp Ricardo La industria en Chile$ antece- 
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1966) 
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1957) 
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1964) 
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Santiagop 1959) 
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- ; -I consenso (Santiagog 19MT 
Nollaut Gunther Internati&nal Communism and 
World Revolutions Histor and 
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Nunns Frederick Mo Chilean Politics 1920-1921. The 
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Forces, (Albuquerqual 1970) 
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Chile entre don Aleasnndris (4 
vols. 9 Santiagog 1962) 
Palma ZuRigag L. Pedro Aguirre Carda (Santiagop 
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Parkinson, Fred Latin Americaq the Cold War and 
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obrora on Chile' Cundernos do la 
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